Turning Hard Problems on Their Heads

Much of the difficulty in assessing theories of consciousness stems from their advocates not supplying adequate or convincing characterisations of the phenomenon (or data) they hope to explain. Yet, to make any reasonable assessment this is precisely what is required, for it is not as if our ‘pre-theoretical’ intuitions are philosophically innocent. In what follows, I will attempt to reveal, using a recent debate between Chalmers and Dennett as a foil, why, in approaching this topic, we cannot characterise the data purely first-personally or third-personally nor, concomitantly, can we start such investigations using either first-personal or third-personal methods.     

Automatic retrieval in directed forgetting

In two experiments, we investigated the role of automatic retrieval in directed forgetting, using a stem completion test. In each experiment, we compared the performance of an implicit group, a process dissociation procedure (PDP) group, and a group given a speeded response task. The response times of the speeded response group on the stem completion task replicated earlier data in suggesting that this group adopted a purely automatic retrieval strategy. Experiment 1 revealed a directed-forgetting effect on automatic retrieval with the item method, but Experiment 2 revealed no directed-forgetting effect on automatic retrieval with the list method, consistent with the lack of implicit effects with the list method throughout the literature. Both experiments showed lower automatic estimates for the PDP group than for the implicit and speeded response groups, which did not differ. The data are consistent with either a selective rehearsal or an inhibition account of directed forgetting with the list method. The comparison of methods for assessing automatic retrieval is consistent with earlier evidence suggesting that subjects may adopt a generate/recognize strategy when given direct retrieval instructions.     

Der neuropathische Schmerz in der medizinischen Praxis

Patients with pain symptoms probably represent one of the most frequent treatment indications in clinical practice. This is regardless of medical specialty, as pain is interdisciplinary and occurs in all fields, and is thus also treatable and should be treated, as long as the pain is chronic, i.e. lasting for more than 3 up to a maximum of 6 months. The exception is purely organ-related or postoperative pain that is induced by an attributable previous incident. The pain as such, as long as it is not trauma- or surgery-induced, is invariably a neurological disease or a neurological symptom.     

What's in a taxon?

Whether taxometrics yields inferential knowledge to something latent is partly but not wholly a semantic question. Although the single variables are manifest indicator scores of individuals, the statistics computed from them via postulates of the formalism are not mere data summaries and will be incorrect or meaningless if the structural conjectures are false. The unidirectional derivability from postulates to data relations supplies the taxonic inferences' surplus meaning that constitutes conventional psychometric meaning of latency (e.g., latent class analysis). Surplus meaning beyond the purely mathematical may be provided by interpretive text attributing unobserved attributes or causal origin to taxon members.     

On the falsifiability of matching theory.

Herrnstein's matching theory requires the parameter, k, which appears in the single-alternative form of the matching equation, to remain invariant with respect to changes in reinforcement parameters like magnitude or immediacy. Recent experiments have disconfirmed matching theory by showing that the invariant-k requirement does not hold. However, the theory can be asserted in a purely algebraic form that does not require an invariant k and that is not disconfirmed by the recent findings. In addition, both the original and the purely algebraic versions of matching theory can be asserted in forms that allow for commonly observed deviations from matching (bias, undermatching, and overmatching). The recent finding of a variable k does not disconfirm these versions of matching theory either. As a consequence, matching remains a viable theory of behavior, the strength of which lies in its general conceptualization of all behavior as choice, and in its unified mathematical treatment of single- and multialternative environments.     

Gruesome Connections

It is widely recognized that Goodman's grue example demonstrates that the rules for induction, unlike those for deduction, cannot be purely syntactic. Ways in which Goodman's proof generalizes, however, are not widely recognized. Gruesome considerations demonstrate that neither theories of simplicity nor theories of empirical confirmation can be purely syntactic. Moreover, the grue paradox can be seen as an instance of a much more general phenomenon. All empirical investigations require semantic constraints, since purely structural constraints are inadequate. Both Russell's theory of empirical knowledge and Putnam's model-theoretic argument against metaphysical realism illustrate the inadequacy of purely structural constraints.     

Emotion as patheception

Emotions cannot be fully understood in purely cognitive terms. Nor can they be fully understood as mere feelings with no content. But it has not been easy to give an account of the relation of affect and cognition in a way that preserves the perceived unity of emotional experience. Consequently, emotion theories tend to lean either toward cognitivism, or, alternatively, the view that emotions are basically non-cognitive affairs. The aim of this paper is to argue for an account of emotion as a unity of affect and cognition. Emotions, it will be suggested, do not combine, blend, add, or causally relate cognition to affect, or affect to cognition, but are rather original unities which should be viewed as coordinate with, rather than subordinate to, either cognition, perception, feeling, or any other basic mental category.     

Can Explanatory Reasons Be Good Reasons for Action?

What kind of thing is a reason for action? Are reasons for action subjective states of the agent, such as desires and/or beliefs? Or are they, rather, objective features of situations that favor certain actions? The suggestion offered in this article is that neither strategy satisfies. What is needed is a third category for classifying reasons which makes them out to be neither purely subjective nor purely objective. In brief: a reason for action is a feature of the situation that matters to the agent. On this proposal, subjective states of the agent are indeed indispensable in characterizing reasons for action. Precisely which set of situational features matter to an agent—precisely what shape the agent experiences the situation as having—depends on the agent's psychological makeup. Those features themselves are not psychological states, however, and it is precisely those features that constitute the agent's reasons for action.     

Natural scenes can be identified as rapidly as individual features

Can observers determine the gist of a natural scene in a purely feedforward manner, or does this process require deliberation and feedback? Observers can recognise images that are presented for very brief periods of time before being masked. It is unclear whether this recognition process occurs in a purely feedforward manner or whether feedback from higher cortical areas to lower cortical areas is necessary. The current study revealed that the minimum presentation time required to identify or to determine the gist of a natural scene was no different from that required to determine the orientation or colour of an isolated line. Conversely, a visual task that would be expected to necessitate feedback (determining whether an image contained exactly six lines) required a significantly greater minimum presentation time. Assuming that the orientation or colour of an isolated line can be determined in a purely feedforward manner, these results indicate that the identification and the determination of the gist of a natural scene can also be performed in a purely feedforward manner. These results challenge a number of theories of visual recognition that require feedback.     

Motivation by ideal

Moral ideals should not be seen as simple and purely personal, but as complex values with a social dimension that transcend attempts to formulate or realize them. Orientation towards ideals needs a realistic component: people should identify with the quest for an ideal, not with the ideal itself, and consider the possibility of negative consequences of their pursuit. Such realism about ideals includes acknowledging that ideals are not the only, nor the most important, motivating force of morality.     

As Good as GOLD: Gram–Schmidt Orthogonalization by Another Name

Generalized orthogonal linear derivative (GOLD) estimates were proposed to correct a problem of correlated estimation errors in generalized local linear approximation (GLLA). This paper shows that GOLD estimates are related to GLLA estimates by the Gram–Schmidt orthogonalization process. Analytical work suggests that GLLA estimates are derivatives of an approximating polynomial and GOLD estimates are linear combinations of these derivatives. A series of simulation studies then further investigates and tests the analytical properties derived. The first study shows that when approximating or smoothing noisy data, GLLA outperforms GOLD, but when interpolating noisy data GOLD outperforms GLLA. The second study shows that when data are not noisy, GLLA always outperforms GOLD in terms of derivative estimation. Thus, when data can be smoothed or are not noisy, GLLA is preferred whereas when they cannot then GOLD is preferred. The last studies show situations where GOLD can produce biased estimates. In spite of these possible shortcomings of GOLD to produce accurate and unbiased estimates, GOLD may still provide adequate or improved model estimation because of its orthogonal error structure. However, GOLD should not be used purely for derivative estimation because the error covariance structure is irrelevant in this case. Future research should attempt to find orthogonal polynomial derivative estimators that produce accurate and unbiased derivatives with an orthogonal error structure.     

ON EISLER'S GENERAL PSYCHOPHYSICAL DIFFERENTIAL EQUATION AND HIS FECHNERIAN INTEGRATION

The general psychophysical differential equation (GPDE) for calculating 'intrasubjective' relations, is reviewed and it is argued that: ( a ) the use of calculus and Weber functions are unnecessary for the determination of such relations: simple algebraic methods are available, ( b ) Taylor's expansion in the derivation of GPDE is not necessary: a short cut method is suggested and applied instead, ( c ) GPDE is untenable as an empirical model, for it is based on one definition and one assumption which are both arbitrary and purely mathematical, ( d ) The sources of error in the validation procedures used by Eisler are pointed out; ( e ) by means of a validity test and the due treatment of a dozen sets of experimental data, the Fechnerian integration as well as GPDE are invalidated.     

Causal Inference from Noise

Correlation is not causation is one of the mantras of the sciences—a cautionary warning especially to fields like epidemiology and pharmacology where the seduction of compelling correlations naturally leads to causal hypotheses. The standard view from the epistemology of causation is that to tell whether one correlated variable is causing the other, one needs to intervene on the system—the best sort of intervention being a trial that is both randomized and controlled. In this paper, we argue that some purely correlational data contains information that allows us to draw causal inferences: statistical noise. Methods for extracting causal knowledge from noise provide us with an alternative to randomized controlled trials that allows us to reach causal conclusions from purely correlational data.     

Cross-modal bias and perceptual fusion with auditory-visual spatial discordance

Investigations of situations involving spatial discordance between auditory and visual data which can otherwise be attributed to a common origin have revealed two main phenomena:cross-modal bias andperceptual fusion (or ventriloquism). The focus of the present study is the relationship between these two. The question asked was whether bias occurred only with fusion, as is predicted by some accounts of reactions to discordance, among them those based on cuesubstitution. The approach consisted of having subjects, on each trial, both point to signals in one modality in the presence of conflicting signals in the other modality and produce same-different origin judgments. To avoid the confounding of immediate effects with cumulative adaptation, which was allowed in most previous studies, the direction and amplitude of discordance was varied randomly from trial to trial. Experiment 1, which was a pilot study, showed that both visual bias of auditory localization and auditory bias of visual localization can be observed under such conditions. Experiment 2, which addressed the main question, used a method which controls for the selection involved in separating fusion from no-fusion trials and showed that the attraction of auditory localization by conflicting visual inputs occurs even when fusion is not reported. This result is inconsistent with purely postperceptual views of cross-modal interactions. The question could not be answered for auditory bias of visual localization, which, although significant, was very small in Experiment 1 and fell below significance under the conditions of Experiment 2.     

Mueller-Lyer decrement: practice or prolonged inspection?

Noting the similarity between the illusion decrement and selective adaptation paradigms, Long has challenged the view that illusion decrement effects reflect a strategic--as opposed to a structural--underlying mechanism, and has called for further research on this issue. To investigate the confound between prolonged free inspection and repeated trials in the standard decrement procedure, the effects of three inspection conditions (continuous, intermittent, and immediate) on the magnitude of the overestimation Mueller-Lyer illusion have been assessed under two levels of trials (a total of two or six judgments). Significant illusion decline was found only under conditions of repeated trials, with either continuous or intermittent inspection. These findings do not support the predictions of purely structural theories (including neural adaptation and efferent readiness theories), according to which degree of decrement should be determined solely by viewing time. Instead, the data demonstrate that illusion decrement is a product of practice, providing converging evidence for the view of decrement as involving a cognitive 'recalibration' or learning process.     

Setting phenotypes in a mutual help organization: Expanding behavior setting theory

Expands Barker's theory of behavior settings by proposing an additional method of classifying settings based on their functional/behavioral aspects--the setting phenotype. Although behavior setting theory has been widely hailed as a revolutionary contribution to behavioral science, it has had limited impact on general psychology. This may be due in part to a reliance on a purely structural method of classifying behavior settings--the setting genotype. Behavioral data were collected from 510 meetings of 13 self-help groups from a mutual help organization for persons with problems in living. A cluster analysis was performed to uncover meaningful behavioral patterns among the groups. Four phenotypes were identified: personal, impersonal, small talk, and advising. Mutual help group phenotype was found to be related to a set of setting characteristics as well as to overall rated change of group members. The results are discussed in light of the significance of the phenotype construct for making behavior setting theory more relevant for social scientists.     

Can First-Order Logical Truth be Defined in Purely Extensional Terms?

W. V. Quine thinks logical truth can be defined in purely extensional terms, as follows: a logical truth is a true sentence that exemplifies a logical form all of whose instances are true. P. F. Strawson objects that one cannot say what it is for a particular use of a sentence to exemplify a logical form without appealing to intensional notions, and hence that Quine's efforts to define logical truth in purely extensional terms cannot succeed. Quine's reply to this criticism is confused in ways that have not yet been noticed in the literature. This may seem to favour Strawson's side of the debate. In fact, however, a proper analysis of the difficulties that Quine's reply faces suggests a new way to clarify and defend the view that logical truth can be defined in purely extensional terms.     

The aesthetics of behavioral arrangements

With their origins in scientific validation, behavior-analytic applications have understandably been developed with an engineering rather than a crafting orientation. Nevertheless, traditions of craftsmanship can be instructive for devising aesthetically pleasing arrangements-arrangements that people will try, and having tried, will choose to continue living with. Pye (1968) provides suggestions for this, particularly through his distinctions between workmanship of risk versus workmanship of certainty, and the mating of functional precision with effective or otherwise pleasing variability. Close examination of woodworking tools as well as antique machines offers instructive analogues that show, for instance, that misplaced precision can be dysfunctional when precision is not essential to a design. Variability should be allowed or even encouraged. Thus, in the design of behavioral contingencies as well as of practical or purely aesthetic objects, "precise versus variable" is not necessarily a distinction between good and bad. More generally, behavior analysts would do well to look beyond their technical experience for ways to improve the aesthetics of contingency design while continuing to understand the resulting innovations in relation to behavior-analytic principles.