Aquinas, Merit, and Reformation Theology after the Joint Declaration on the Doctrine of Justification

Lutheran considerations of Aquinas have been shaped by the Reformation division. Can a Reformation consideration of Aquinas on merit move beyond either false contrast or false harmonization? Merit plays a limited, but important role in Aquinas' understanding of God's movement of the human self toward its end of eternal life. Lutheran differences from Aquinas on merit also focus on eternal life. While much of the difference is rooted in differences of theological perspective, just this difference of perspective must be further explored. Aquinas' understanding of merit challenges Lutheran theology's understanding of the self and its role in the Christian life.     

Seeing the unseen,hearing the unsaid: hallucinations,psychology and St Thomas Aquinas

Psychologists referring to St Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274) in the context of hallucinations have neither accurately portrayed his conceptions of such experiences nor critically examined his alleged personal experience of them. This paper first examines Aquinas’ conception of what are termed “hallucinations.” It is shown that he allowed both natural and supernatural explanations for such experiences, with both accounts acknowledging an underlying physical cause. Contrasting explanations for his alleged personal experience of hallucinations are examined, including a new “Chestertonian” interpretation. Critiques of the use of his canonisation documents as factual evidence are also considered. It is concluded that Aquinas had a sophisticated understanding of hallucinations, and although it is fundamentally unknowable whether he actually experienced a hallucination, nevertheless, the approach we take to understanding his experience is of importance. The implications of Aquinas for interdisciplinary dialogue between theology and psychology in the field of hallucinations are then examined.     

Aquinas’s Transformation of the Virtue of Courage

Courage is an important moral virtue for both Aristotle and Aquinas. For Aristotle, courage is a virtue that belongs to warriors who are ready for a noble death on the battlefield. As a Christian theologian as well as an Aristotelian expert, Aquinas aims to give this Aristotelian moral virtue a fully theological expression. This paper analyzes the differences between Aquinas’s conception of courage and Aristotle’s, as well as explores Aquinas’s transformation of Aristotelian courage through a three part process. Firstly, based on Aristotle’s paradigm of courageous warriors in battle, Aquinas extends the scope of “battle” from the military sense to a broader one. By doing so, Aquinas expands the range of application of courage. Secondly, Aquinas explicitly defines endurance as the chief act of courage based on the reason that endurance is more difficult than aggression, thereby shifting our attention from the attack aspect of courage to the endurance aspect. Finally, Aquinas defines the principal act of perfect courage as martyrdom thereby pointing to Christ, who was the perfect martyr, as the paradigm of a courageous person. The result of this transformation is a successful theological virtue of courage.     

The Causality Distinction,Kenosis, and a Middle Way: Aquinas and Polkinghorne on Divine Action

This article evaluates and considers two important philosophical contributions to the discussion considering divine action in the work of Thomas Aquinas and John Polkinghorne. Aquinas argues that God employs both primary and secondary causality, in that God causes some events directly by divine power and others by means of secondary causes. Polkinghorne argues that this approach makes God the author of evil and opts instead for a “kenotic approach” to divine action, wherein God chooses to “empty” God's self of complete divine control. We think that these views can complement each other and need not represent mutually exclusive alternatives.     

Vermigli Replicating Aquinas: An Overlooked Continuity in the Doctrine of Predestination

Although Peter Martyr Vermigli is well recognized for his integration of Thomism with Reformed theology, there is no consensus on whether to consider Thomas Aquinas a dominant influence on his doctrine of predestination. Recent scholarship argues that Gregory of Rimini’s influence is greater than Aquinas. This essay provides strong evidence to the contrary for the influence of Aquinas on Vermigli’s early exposition of predestination as a Reformer. Vermigli not only drew upon Aquinas’s doctrine in general, as he does elsewhere, but reproduced the details of Aquinas’s article in the Summa on whether foreknowledge of merits is the cause of predestination. This finding has significance for understanding the development of Vermigli’s thought, his relation to Thomist scholasticism, and his mature writings on predestination. In general, this evidence increases the importance of Thomas as a formative influence on Vermigli’s thought.     

Rewriting Aquinas’ animal ethics: the primacy of reason in the determination of moral status

Arguing in support of Aristotle, Aquinas conceptualised the cognitive functioning of the human as exceeding that of other animals. In its base form, the Thomistic position asserts that the intellective functioning of the human animal is superior to the instinctual operation of the non-human animal. For Aquinas, it is the intellect that determines the enactment of the human will. Thus, if a non-human animal is devoid of intellect, no willing of any action is possible. Consequently, an action of a non-human animal which is humanly perceived as immoral, is in fact morally agnostic because the animal lacks the reasoning capacity to judge the potential action's moral status. Given that Aquinas’ argument centres on the role of reason in determinations of moral status, we seek to determine the status theoria of the Thomistic moral theory in light of contemporary studies into animal cognition. The assertion is made that this particular aspect of Aquinas’ moral theory requires rewriting because reason is evident in animal cognition to a greater extent than Aquinas would have been able to appreciate given his contextual limitations. This presence of reason, we argue, ascribes moral status to some non-human animals, analogous to their human counterparts. However, we will also contend that rather than dismissing Aquinas’ reason-founded ethics, value could be found in retaining a rewritten Thomistic theoretical construction which extends Aquinas’ ethic to include animals apart from the human that are bearers of the faculty of reason.     

ON BEING HEARD BUT NOT SEEN: MILBANK AND LASH ON AQUINAS,ANALOGY AND AGNOSTICISM

The article investigates an important recent dispute within systematic theology over the interpretation of Thomas Aquinas. John Milbank has defended the view that the doctrine of analogy in Aquinas is peculiarly implicated with his entire ontology, that it cannot be understood in merely semantic terms, and that it involves a less “agnostic” position on knowledge of God than is often assumed. The article critically engages this position in two ways. It offers an archaeology of the prior polemical context out of which the claim arose, for the meaning and purpose of Milbank's claim are illuminated once it is seen as the vigorous repudiation of a “grammatical” or “linguistic” interpretation of Thomas on analogy which had been proffered earlier by Nicholas Lash. It will also provide a close investigation of the citations and interpretations of Aquinas texts that Milbank uses to ground his position, in order to adjudicate the dispute with Lash. The result will be to call strongly into question the plausibility of Milbank's readings of Aquinas. The article also indicates at several points the way in which those readings are shaped by an overriding anti‐Kantian thrust in Milbank's entire approach to the discussion. In conclusion, it adumbrates the larger and older question which subtends the entire dispute: to what degree is some kind of vision or intuitive grasp of being as such, or of God's being, granted human beings in this life?     

Thomas Aquinas on hylomorphism and the in-act principle

In Summa Theologiae I.76.1 Aquinas presents an argument for the hylomorphic union of body and soul that he attributes to Aristotle. Aquinas builds on Aristotle’s original argument, however, offering his own short but powerful line of reasoning in support of one of the main premises. This additional argument involves an appeal to the principle that nothing acts except insofar as it is in act. This principle has roots in the thought of Aristotle, but is not explicitly used by him. It is, however, fundamental for Aquinas and pervasive throughout his work. In this paper I examine the principle and its implications for Aquinas’ version of the argument. Furthermore, I argue that the principle is foundational to Aquinas’ criticisms of Averroes’ account of the intellective soul and that its inclusion renders Aquinas’ version of the argument incompatible with Averroes’ view.     

Why Philosophy Abides for Aquinas

In Truth in Aquinas Catherine Pickstock and John Milbank continue Radical Orthodoxy's 'reinterpretation' of the history of philosophy and theology by evaluating philosophy as metaphysics so that 'metaphysics collapses into sacra doctrina ' in Thomas Aquinas. Their strategy for saving Aquinas from Heideggerian 'onto-theology' is the opposite of that Jean-Luc Marion who in 'Saint Thomas d'Aquin et l'onto-théo-logie' keeps philosophy and metaphysics distinct from sacred teaching. The article examines some of the questions involved by reconsidering the nature of philosophy as textual commentary in late Antiquity and in the Middle Ages. It goes on to examine what Aquinas means by 'the truth of things', and concludes by looking at how he treats the aspects of metaphysics and the relation of metaphysics and sacra doctrina . Hankey judges that Marion is right on this question. The author suggests that what is involved with Milbank and Pickstock is not a reinterpretation of Aquinas. What they have written depends on mistakes and misrepresentations of basic points in his teaching, e.g, participation, intellectual intuition and abstractions, God's being and his existence in things, with the result that Thomas looks more like Descartes or Spinoza than himself.     

Dispositions of the Will

According to Aquinas (1888–1906), the virtue of justice is a habit, that is to say, a stable disposition of the will. Many commentators have found this claim to be puzzling, since it is difficult to see what this might entail, beyond a simple tendency to choose and act in accordance with precepts of justice. However, this objection does not take account of the fact that for Aquinas, the will is the principle of human freedom, and as such, it is expressed through, but not limited to a capacity for particular choices and actions. It therefore needs stable dispositions, towards characteristic aims, in order to function effectively. This paper sets out a case for the cogency of Aquinas’s overall account of the will and its dispositions, by way of an examination of familiar expressions of human freedom which cannot be reduced to a series of individual choices and acts. It then turns to a closer examination of Aquinas’ analysis of the will, arguing that Aquinas’ claims about the orientation of the will towards some overarching and comprehensive good can fruitfully be understood in terms of this expansive conception of human freedom.     

New remarks on the cosmological argument

We present a formal analysis of the Cosmological Argument in its two main forms: that due to Aquinas, and the revised version of the Kalam Cosmological Argument more recently advocated by William Lane Craig. We formulate these two arguments in such a way that each conclusion follows in first-order logic from the corresponding assumptions. Our analysis shows that the conclusion which follows for Aquinas is considerably weaker than what his aims demand. With formalizations that are logically valid in hand, we reinterpret the natural language versions of the premises and conclusions in terms of concepts of causality consistent with (and used in) recent work in cosmology done by physicists. In brief: the Kalam argument commits the fallacy of equivocation in a way that seems beyond repair; two of the premises adopted by Aquinas seem dubious when the terms ??cause?? and ??causality?? are interpreted in the context of contemporary empirical science. Thus, while there are no problems with whether the conclusions follow logically from their assumptions, the Kalam argument is not viable, and the Aquinas argument does not imply a caused origination of the universe. The assumptions of the latter are at best less than obvious relative to recent work in the sciences. We conclude with mention of a new argument that makes some positive modifications to an alternative variation on Aquinas by Le Poidevin, which nonetheless seems rather weak.     

HOPE,A MODE OF FAITH: AQUINAS,LUTHER AND BENEDICT XVI ON HEBREWS 11:1

In articulating a theological account of Christian hope faithful to its objective character, Pope Benedict XVI summons the authority of Thomas Aquinas, citing his comments on faith and hope as those terms occur in Hebrews 11:1. Benedict sets off Aquinas's understanding of hope‐filled faith's objectivity by placing it in contrast with Luther's apparently more subjective interpretation of faith in Hebrews 11:1 as conviction. Closer analysis of both Aquinas and Luther, however, suggests a greater overlap in their exegetical conclusions, opening the way for a more nuanced appreciation of a virtue whose living possession and exercise, as the rest of Spe Salvi confirms, involves both objective and subjective dimensions     

Direct Realism, Intentionality, and the Objective Being of Ideas

My aim is to arrive at a better understanding of the distinction between direct realism and representationalism by offering a critical analysis of Steven Nadler's account in Arnauld and the Cartesian Philosophy of Ideas. I argue contrary to Nadler that Descartes and Arnauld are representationalists, and I also argue that Aquinas is a representationalist.     

The decolonial Aquinas? Discerning epistemic worth for Aquinas in the decolonial academy

As the ideological constructor of the destruction of colonised peoples and knowledge, Western philosophy must bear its burden for complicity. Decoloniality is amid the discourses of critique contra modernity and its denigration of the colonised. In the South African academy, for instance, much support has been validly rendered to decoloniality, consequently those employing “Western” frameworks should be challenged to constant re-evaluation. Here, the virtues and vices of decoloniality will not be considered. Rather a discernment will be undertaken of the “epistemic worth” of conducting – specifically mediaeval and Western – philosophical research amid calls for the decentring of Western epistemological dominance, within the tradition of Saint Thomas Aquinas in the decolonial milieu. The argument is proffered – from multifold perspectives – that Aquinas, as both pre-modern and pre-colonial, does have relevance to the decolonial academic climate. The case is defended that Arabic philosophers importantly influenced Aquinas’ work, thus, demonstrating his openness to non-Western thought. Furthermore, from an epistemological perspective, it is contended that Aquinas’ placing of the subject at the focal point of adequations to truth by credencing the situatedness of the perceiver, deconstructs modern objectivity, which in itself has caused considerable damage to non-Western epistemologies. Aquinas’ epistemic relevance in this context, it is argued, may contribute to a median between demonstrable science and the multi-layered context of the epistemic subject.     

The Problem of Propagation: Original Sin as Inherited Discourse

As Modernist doctrines emphasizing the unity and agency of the educated self are increasingly set up as the straw men of contemporary educational discourses, premodern and Medieval theories of selfhood tend to disappear from the horizon of educational thought altogether. In this essay, in order to subvert this overcoming of our intellectual past, I examine Thomas Aquinas’ reading of the doctrine of original sin. Relying on Graham McAleer’s claim that Aquinas’ metaphysical theory sanctifies the body, I argue that Aquinas’ understanding of original sin relies on a discursive, pedagogical model to account for human finitude.     

Aquinas and modern consequentialism

Because the moral philosophy of St Thomas Aquinas is egoistic while modern consequentialism is impartialistic, it might at first appear that the former cannot, while the latter can, provide a common value on the basis of which inter‐personal conflicts may be settled morally. On the contrary, in this paper I intend to argue not only that Aquinas’ theory does provide just such a common value, but that it is more true to say of modern consequentialism than of Thomism that it gives in to the partiality of different interests and fails to provide a robust common value on the basis of which disagreements may be settled morally. This is so primarily because the egoism of Aquinas represents a fundamental commitment to personal moral development which is absent from modern teleological theories.     

On the causal role of privation in Thomas Aquinas's metaphysics

“Privation” (privatio) is defined by Thomas Aquinas as the want of some property in a subject that ought naturally to possess that property. In this paper, I explicate the ontological status of privation as a form of nonbeing in order to shed light on the challenging question whether privation, as a kind of absence, can play a causal role for Aquinas, and if so, how. According to Aquinas, I argue, privations in a subject serve to determine what sort of (efficient) causal relations that subject can enter into, but, as nonbeings, privations cannot be the cause of the subject's entering into those relations, and in this way, they cannot be efficient causes of effects distinct from the subject.     

The illuminative function of the agent intellect

Thomas Aquinas argues that the agent intellect's function is to abstract an intelligible species from a phantasm. However, insofar as he claims that the intelligible species is not present in the phantasm, it is unclear how the agent intellect accomplishes this task. In this paper I explore two models of abstraction – the extraction model and the production model – suggesting that each fails to capture Aquinas’ understanding of abstraction. I then offer my own interpretation of the function of the agent intellect – the illumination model – by employing Aquinas’ comparison of the agent intellect to light. I argue that the agent intellect neither extracts nor produces an intelligible species, but rather makes the nature that is already present in the object intelligible by actualizing its passive power of intelligibility. This involves the co-actualization of partner powers in the intellect and in the intelligible object, and ultimately makes it possible to cognize a particular, material object in a universal way.     

A Response to Paul Griffiths’ Annihilationist Proposal

In his recent influential theological work, Paul Griffiths, the esteemed Buddhism scholar and Anglican convert to Catholicism, proposes, among other things, that annihilationism is a viable option for Christians, including Catholics, despite apparent magisterial prohibition. He argues, in effect, that every creature must be naturally mortal because bodily, including the angels. Therefore, de facto immortal creatures are not immortal by nature, but by a positive act of God in addition to the creative act. Accordingly, it makes no sense to assert the existence of an eternal hell. Rather, since sin is fundamentally corrosive, those who opt to continue down the rabbit's hole of sin literally become nothing. Hell, then, is a no‐place and a no‐time. Hence, as long as the damned continue to exist, they have the opportunity for eventual redemption as for eventual self‐annihilation. Griffiths attempts to defend this thesis in dialogue with Augustine, in particular, to the neglect of Aquinas, except to argue that Aquinas’ own arguments for the natural immortality of the human soul are incoherent. I will argue instead that spiritual being exists, that it is naturally immortal, that Aquinas demonstrates both, and that even an Augustinian such as Joseph Ratzinger recognizes Aquinas’ theological insights and builds on them.