Achievement Emotions: A Control-Value Approach

Emotions are ubiquitous in achievement settings. Apart from test anxiety research and attributional studies, psychological research has neglected these emotions. We argue that more research on the functions, origins, and regulation of achievement emotions is needed, addressing both outcome emotions related to success and failure, such as hope, pride, anxiety, shame, and hopelessness, and activity emotions such as the enjoyment and boredom experienced in achievement settings. Using Pekrun’s (2006) control-value theory of achievement emotions as a theoretical framework, we first outline a three-dimensional (object focus × valence × activation) taxonomy of achievement emotions. We then summarize research on the individual and social origins of these emotions, arguing that control appraisals, value appraisals, achievement goals, and related contextual factors are of specific relevance for achievement emotion arousal. Next, the importance of emotions for achievement behavior and performance is addressed. In conclusion, we discuss the regulation and modification of achievement emotions and their relative universality across genders, settings, and cultures.     

Epistemic Emotions and Co-inquiry: A Situated Approach

This paper discusses the virtue epistemology literature on epistemic emotions and challenges the individualist, unworldly account of epistemic emotions. It argues that epistemic emotions can be truth-motivating if embedded in co-inquiry epistemic cultures, namely virtuous epistemic cultures that valorise participatory processes of inquiry as truth-conducive. Co-inquiry epistemic cultures are seen as playing a constitutive role in shaping, developing, and regulating epistemic emotions. Using key references to classical Pragmatism, the paper describes the bridge between epistemic emotions and co-inquiry culture in terms of habits of co-inquiry that act as the scaffolding of epistemic emotions. The result is a context-sensitive and practice-oriented approach to epistemic emotions that conceives of those emotions as being shaped by co-inquiry epistemic cultures.

     

Quantifying the Value of Emotions Using a Willingness to Pay Approach

People generally seek out positive moods and avoid negative moods; however, it is unclear which motivation is more pronounced. Two studies addressed this issue by developing a value-based ranking of emotions based on the willingness to pay (WTP) approach. The approach utilizes money’s cardinal properties and assumes opportunity costs as with everyday purchases. In Study 1 British participants indicated they would be willing to pay more to experience positive than to avoid negative emotions. In Study 2 this positivity bias was replicated with another sample of British participants. However, Hong Kong Chinese participants did not show such a preference, and were willing to pay significantly less to experience positive emotions but more to avoid negative emotions when compared with British participants. Experiencing Love was given the highest WTP judgment in all samples. Thus, some emotions are universally valued, whereas preferences for others differ across cultural groups, perhaps shaped by norms. Implications concerning valuations of psychological states for policy purposes are discussed.     

Child Conduct Problems Across Home and School Contexts: a Person-Centered Approach

To examine patterns of conduct problems across the home and school context, we used latent class analysis to analyze primary caregivers’ and teachers’ ratings on the conduct problems subscale of the Strengths and Difficulties Questionnaire (Goodman Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 38, 581–586, 1997) in the Family Life Project (N?=?1,292), a prospective study of child development in rural and small town contexts. We found a similar four-class solution at 5 and 7 years of age. In decreasing prevalence, the following classes were identified: (1) low symptoms reported by both informants (low cross-context); (2) high parent-reported symptoms, low teacher-reported symptoms (home context); (3) low parent-reported symptoms, moderate teacher-reported symptoms (school context); and (4) high symptoms reported by both informants (high cross-context). Classes exhibited stability from age five to age seven: children were more likely to remain in the same class than to transition to a different class, and longitudinal stability was especially high for children in the low cross-context class at age 5. A number of child and family characteristics measured in early childhood (executive function, verbal ability, poverty-related risk, sensitive parenting, and parental depressive symptoms) were associated with class membership at age five and age seven, but were generally not associated with longitudinal transitions between classes.     

Emotions,Attitudes, and Reasons

Our emotional faculties respond to successes, gains, advantages, threats, losses, obstacles, and other personally significant objects or situations, producing positive or negative evaluations of them according to their perceived import. Being an evaluative response is a feature that emotions share with paradigm attitudes (beliefs, intentions, judgments, etc.). However, recently philosophers have been reluctant to treat emotions as attitudes. The usual reasons given have to do with the automaticity of emotions and their occasional recalcitrance. In this article, I argue that these things shouldn't disqualify emotions from counting as genuine attitudes. Our emotions do bear the kind of relationship with our reasons that is characteristic of our attitudes.     

Voters, Emotions, and Memory

In this paper we argue that emotional response to information encountered in campaigns has implications for the likelihood of remembering that information at the time of the vote. Most voting models are built on what voters remember—whether it is the placement of candidates on issues, or opened ended responses to prompts. That recall of memory is biased is well-known, but the extent to which those biases are driven by affective response to candidate information has not been studied. Using dynamic process tracing, we examine voters' emotional responses, information search, and candidate evaluations during a simulated presidential primary campaign. By manipulating anxiety and the amount of incongruent information that voters encounter, we can detect the direct influence of affect in information processing. We find evidence that voters are more likely to remember information that generates any affective reaction as opposed to information for which the subjects report no emotional response. However, we find little evidence that anxiety has a special role, compared to enthusiasm or anger, in increasing the likelihood that an individual item is remembered. This challenges a primary contention of the theory of Affective Intelligence that anxiety leads to more memories for campaign information.     

Emotions: Here and Now,Then and There

Religions difer not only in the creeds they espouse, but also in the kinds of emotions they inspire. Any discussion of the relation between religion and emotion must therefore be incomplete and misrepresentative of some views. In this short commentary, I focus on two areas of potential controversy that I believe would profit from further discussion and debate. The first involves the truth or authenticity of emotional experience; the second concerns the possibility of disembodied emotional states. Although both issues are presented in the context of religious beliefs, their theoretical and practical implications are not specifically religious; rather, they concern first the dialectical relation between social institutions and emotional syndromes and second, the relation between emotion and cognition.     

Emotions,feelings and intentionality

Emotions, I will argue, involve two kinds of feeling: bodily feeling and feeling towards. Both are intentional, in the sense of being directed towards an object. Bodily feelings are directed towards the condition of one's body, although they can reveal truths about the world beyond the bounds of one's body – that, for example, there is something dangerous nearby. Feelings towards are directed towards the object of the emotion – a thing or a person, a state of affairs, an action or an event; such emotional feelings involve a special way of thinking of the object of the emotion, and I draw an analogy with Frank Jackson's well-known knowledge argument to show this. Finally, I try to show that, even if materialism is true, the phenomenology of emotional feelings, as described from a personal perspective, cannot be captured using only the theoretical concepts available for the impersonal stance of the sciences.     

Emotions, Retribution, and Punishment

I examine emotional reactions to wrongdoing to determine whether they offer support for retributivism. It is often thought that victims desire to see their victimizer suffer and that this reaction offers support for retributivism. After rejecting several attempts to use different theories of emotion and different approaches to using emotions to justify retributivism, I find that, assuming a cognitive theory of emotion is correct, emotions can be used as heuristic guides much as suggested by Michael Moore. Applying this method to the actual emotional reactions of victims' relatives, however, does not find support for retributivism. Instead, it suggests punishment should be understood as part of a process of recovery with a complex set of demands. Retributive concerns can play a role in the process, but they don't have the priority that retributivism requires.     

Emotions,Motivation, and Character: A Phenomenological Perspective

In this paper, I wish to explore whether and how emotions build on a state of being motivated that is linked to character and requires the positive contribution of habit. Drawing on phenomenological accounts of motivation (most notably Husserl’s and Merleau-Ponty’s), I argue that the relation between emotions and character depends on the institution of an emotional space, which is responsible for our sensitivity to the values of the felt situation and yet it is open to changes and revisions.     

School Counselor Selection: A Systematic Approach

This article presents an objective-based model for the selection of counselors. The model places emphasis on a systematic approach, with staff involvement and clear objectives for the process, and includes suggestions for avoiding ineffective behaviors based on traditional approaches.     

Emotions,narrative and change

There is a wide agreement that emotions are central to the evaluation and understanding of change processes in psychotherapy. Unfortunately, most of the debate on the role of emotions has been influenced by the reductionist view of ‘psychophysiological symbolism’ (Averill 1996). We defend the position that, in order to understand their role in psychotherapy fully, we need to move in the direction of a more complex view of emotions. This paper presents a view of emotionsas social constructed phenomena operating via language and narrative. We present research suggesting that these narratives may be an essential process for understanding psychological disorders, how these disorders are developed and, finally, how they can be changed.     

Emotions,values, and aesthetic perception

Philosophical naturalism is a suitable background for an account of aesthetic perception as an alternative to traditional aesthetic theory. Pragmatist notion of habits as meanings gives a basis for a conception of emotions and values in the framework of organism environment interaction. Any object of perception may be a carrier of meanings if some habits are involved. This holds for linguistic expressions as well as for tones of color, doors and windows, museums, galleries and other non-linguistic sign-vehicles. The outcome is a multilayered system of meanings with which aesthetic perception is interpreted.     

Basic Emotions, Natural Kinds, Emotion Schemas, and a New Paradigm

ABSTRACT— Research on emotion flourishes in many disciplines and specialties, yet experts cannot agree on its definition. Theorists and researchers use the term emotion in ways that imply different processes and meanings. Debate continues about the nature of emotions, their functions, their relations to broad affective dimensions, the processes that activate them, and their role in our daily activities and pursuits. I will address these issues here, specifically in terms of basic emotions as natural kinds, the nature of emotion schemas, the development of emotion–cognition relations that lead to emotion schemas, and discrete emotions in relation to affective dimensions. Finally, I propose a new paradigm that assumes continual emotion as a factor in organizing consciousness and as an influence on mind and behavior. The evidence reviewed suggests that a theory that builds on concepts of both basic emotions and emotion schemas provides a viable research tool and is compatible with more holistic or dimensional approaches.