Does Confucian Ethics Integrate Care Ethics and Justice Ethics? The Case of Mencius

In recent years, scholars of Confucian ethics have debated on important issues such as whether Confucian ethics embraces, or should embrace, universal values and impartiality. Some have argued that Confucian ethics integrates both care and justice, and that Confucian ethics is both particularistic and universalistic. In this essay, I will defend a view of the relation between care and justice and the relation between care ethics and justice ethics on the basis of the notion of ‘configuration of values,’ and show why care ethics and justice ethics cannot be integrated. I will support this view by a reading of some pertinent passages in the Mencius.     

The Ethics and Politics of Religious Ethics, 1973–2023

This essay addresses the questions, “what good is religious ethics for?” and “what justification exists for the field?” in three steps. First, it canvases how religious ethicists have offered reasons for carrying out work in the field to identify an Anti-Reductive Paradigm that is guided by an Egalitarian Imperative. That imperative functions as a thin, minimal morality of inclusivity and equal respect that guides work in the field. Second, the essay considers the field's ends. Here the focus shifts from values that shape the field's methods to values that can describe the field's purposes. That shift requires us to think in terms of a thick rather than a thin morality, one with substantive rather than procedural virtues in mind. The essay offers a constructive, substantive proposal under the rubric of Critical Humanism. Critical Humanism justifies the study of religious ethics as an enterprise that can expand the moral imagination through its encounter with difference. It is shaped by four values: post-critical reasoning, social criticism, cross-cultural fluency, and environmental responsibility. Third, the essay brings the two parts of the argument together by explaining how to connect such purposes to the thin morality of inclusivity and equal respect. One upshot of the essay is to have us think not only about values, but also about power as it pertains to scholarship in the guild; hence the attention to the ethics and politics of religious ethics.     

Role Ethics or Ethics of Role-Play? A Comparative Critical Analysis of the Ethics of Confucianism and the Bhagavad Gītā

Both Confucianism and the Bhagavad Gītā emphasize the moral authority of social roles. But how deep does the likeness between these ethical philosophies run? In this essay I focus upon two significant points of comparison between the role-based ethics of Confucianism and the Gītā: (1) the interrelation between formalized social roles and family feeling, and (2) the religious dimension of moral action. How is it that Confucians ground their social roles in family feeling, while the Gītā emphasizes rupture between role and sentiment? Furthermore, are we to understand Confucianism as presenting a social philosophy that eschews religious concerns, whereas the Gītā denies the moral significance of family feeling in lieu of obtaining soteriological freedom? Examining the aesthetic and religious dimensions of the ethics of Confucianism and the Gītā clarifies a key distinction that both views implicitly make, albeit for divergent reasons: the difference between living one’s roles and playing one’s roles.     

A Third Method of Ethics?

In recent decades, the idea has become common that so‐called virtue ethics constitutes a third option in ethics in addition to consequentialism and deontology. This paper argues that, if we understand ethical theories as accounts of right and wrong action, this is not so. Virtue ethics turns out to be a form of deontology (that is, non‐consequentialism). The paper then moves to consider the Aristotelian distinction between right or virtuous action on the one hand, and acting rightly or virtuously on the other. It is claimed that virtue might play an important role in an explanation of acting virtuously (as it does in Aristotle’s ethics), but that such explanations can be charged with ‘double‐counting’ the moral value of the virtues. The paper concludes that, if we focus on the question of the value of virtue, rather than on the notion of right action, there is room for a self‐standing and important view which could be described as virtue ethics.     

Transatlantic Divergences in Citizen Science Ethics—Comparative Analysis of the DIYbio Code of Ethics Drafts of 2011

Codes of ethics were drafted by participants in the European and North American Congresses of DIYbio, a single global organization of informal biotechnology practitioners, in 2011. In general, the existence of a code of ethics amongst a community is itself significant. Codes of professional ethics are common in scientific and engineering fields, as well as in DIY communities. It is also significant, and highly unusual, that DIYbio has maintained two separate codes of ethics years after their drafting. While agreement was reached within the congress for each geographic region, with considerable commonality between the two codes drafted, they are far from identical. There are differences in the ordering of items, the wording of common items, and the presence/absence of items. I will argue that these differences are meaningful, and consider them with respect to cultural variation, ethics, and societal implications. Finally, I recommend that the entire DIYbio organization unite under a single code of ethics, and that one of the existing drafts is superior to the other for this purpose.     

Concretizing an Ethics of Emptiness: The Succeeding Volumes of Watsuji Tetsurô’s Ethics

Watsuji Tetsurô’s Ethics is one of the most important works in Japanese ethical thought. But scholarly research in English has largely focused on the first of three volumes of Ethics, leaving the latter two oft-neglected. In order to balance out the views of Watsuji’s ethics, this paper focuses on the contributions of the second and third volumes of Ethics. These volumes are essential for any concrete understanding of Watsuji’s ‘ethics of emptiness’. The second volume develops the ideas of the first, particularly how the dual-structure (individuality and communality) is concretely realized through the various stages of ethical organization (family, local community, economy, nation, and state). The third volume develops the notions of space and time from the first volume into a theory of climate (fûdo) and history. By analyzing these, we can understand Watsuji’s system as a whole and clarify Watsuji’s unique contribution to ethical theory.     

Who is Authorized to Do Applied Ethics? Inherently Political Dimensions of Applied Ethics

A standard view in ethics is that ethical issues concern a different range of human concerns than does politics. This essay goes beyond the long-standing dispute about the extent to which applied ethics needs a commitment to ethical theory. It argues that regardless of the outcome of that dispute, applied ethics, because it presumes something about the nature of authority, rests upon and is implicated in political theory. After internalist and externalist accounts of applied ethics are described, “mixed” approaches are considered that contain inevitable political dimensions. A feminist alternative, Walker’s metaethic of responsibility, shows that authority is best understood as relational and that situations of unequal power are therefore often the places where applied ethics arises. Furthermore, in a democratic society, commitments to democracy should shape the account of authority, and, thus, the nature of applied ethics as well.     

Engineering Ethics Beyond Engineers’ Ethics

Engineering ethics is usually focused on engineers’ ethics, engineers acting as individuals. Certainly, these professionals play a central role in the matter, but engineers are not a singularity inside engineering; they exist and operate as a part of a complex network of mutual relationships between many other people, organizations and groups. When engineering ethics and engineers’ ethics are taken as one and the same thing the paradigm of the ethical engineer which prevails is that of the heroic engineer, a certain model of the ideal engineer: someone both quite individualistic and strong enough to deal with all the moral challenges that could arise. We argue that this is not the best approach, at least today in our interrelated world. We have achieved a high degree of independence from nature by means of technology. In exchange for this autonomy we have become increasingly tied up with very complex systems to which we constantly delegate new tasks and powers. Concerns about safety keep growing everywhere due to the fact that now we have a sensitive awareness of the huge amount of power we are both consuming and deploying, thus, new forms of dialogue and consensus have to be incorporated at different levels, in different forums and at different times. Within these democratic channels of participation not just the needs and interests, but also the responsibilities and mutual commitments of all parties should be taken into account.     

What Kind of Doing is Clinical Ethics?

This paper discusses the importance of Richard M. Zaner’s work on clinical ethics for answering the question: what kind of doing is ethics consultation? The paper argues first, that four common approaches to clinical ethics – applied ethics, casuistry, principlism, and conflict resolution – cannot adequately address the nature of the activity that makes up clinical ethics; second, that understanding the practical character of clinical ethics is critically important for the field; and third, that the practice of clinical ethics is bound up with the normative commitments of medicine as a therapeutic enterprise.     

What Sort of Ethics Does Technology Require?

This essay critically examines thenon-essentialist and anti-deterministicphilosophy of technology developed in the workof Andrew Feenberg. As I interpret the work,Feenberg achieves an important``demystification' of technology. His analysispeels away the facade of ironclad efficiency,rationality, and necessity that permeates ourexperience of technology. Through theoreticalargument and rich examples, he illuminated thecontingent interests, values, meanings, andvoices that are built into specifictechnologies, often by experts. He shows howtechnology is transformed by lay actors whochallenge its design on behalf of a wideragenda of interests, values, meanings andvoices. My critique focuses on Feenberg'sattempt to argue from his demystification oftechnology to the full democratization of alltechnical design and decision-making. I arguethat Feenberg's framework lacks the ethicalresources required both to (1) justify thedemocratization of technical decisions, andmore basically, (2) to determine when laychallenges to technology do and when theydon't, advance democratic ideals, and why. Itrace these problems to ethical inadequacies inhis notions of interests, democratization, andan alternative modernity. A sub-theme of myargument is that our society's Lockeanmorality of property rights and market freedomsposes fundamental ethical objections to hisphilosophy of technology with which it isill-equipped to deal.     

Campbell’s Law and the Ethics of Immensurability

The paper examines “Campbell’s Law”: “The more any quantitative social indicator is used for social decision-making, the more subject it will be to corruption pressures and the more apt it will be to distort and corrupt the social processes it is intended to monitor.” The examination of measurability leads to explaining the reason for existence of a class of unmeasurable phenomena. The author describes a kind of habitus in which a strong taboo against measuring must exist by necessity, not by choice. The taboo is, in effect, a result of degradation of a certain kind of habitus. And finally, the paper demonstrates under which conditions the Campbell’s law is in effect, and how we can mitigate its effects in social decision-making.     

Research Ethics Board (REB) Members’ Preparation for,and Perceived Knowledge of Research Ethics

The Tri-Council Policy Statement: Ethical Conduct for Research Involving Humans (TCPS) was first developed to establish a standard of practice in research ethics by the three federal agencies responsible for funding institutional research in Canada: Canadian Institutes of Health Research (CIHR), Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council (NSERC), and Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC). In 2010, a second edition of the policy, known as the TCPS 2, was released with updated information and expanded coverage of research ethics issues. According to the TCPS 2, the Agencies’ mandate is “to promote research that is conducted according to the highest ethical standards,” and the TCPS 2 serves as a benchmark for this with respect for human dignity as its underlying value. Research institutions receiving Agency funding are to comply with this policy statement by forming Research Ethics Boards (REBs) to review all research involving human participants. The intention behind this review requirement is to provide a proportionate assessment of the benefit-to-risk ratio of the research, and in that process, to safeguard “respect for persons”, express a “concern for welfare”, and uphold “justice” (CIHR, SSHRC, NSERC 2010, p. 8). Research may not proceed until ethics approval is granted by an institution’s REB. The current study evaluates REB members’ perspectives on their knowledge of research ethics, and juxtaposes these perceptions with those of researchers. Specifically, we are interested in the extent to which REB members with less experience read the TCPS 2, and whether those with less experience have decreased confidence in their ethics knowledge.     

Are Ethics Training Programs Improving? A Meta-Analytic Review of Past and Present Ethics Instruction in the Sciences

Given the growing public concern and attention placed on cases of research misconduct, government agencies and research institutions have increased their efforts to develop and improve ethics education programs for scientists. The present study sought to assess the impact of these increased efforts by sampling empirical studies published since the year 2000. Studies published prior to 2000 examined in other meta-analytic work were also included to provide a baseline for assessing gains in ethics training effectiveness over time. In total, this quantitative review consisted of 66 empirical studies, 106 ethics courses, 150 effect sizes, and 10,069 training participants. Overall, the findings indicated that ethics instruction resulted in sizable benefits to participants and has improved considerably within the last decade. A number of specific findings also emerged regarding moderators of instructional effectiveness. Recommendations are discussed for improving the development, delivery, and evaluation of ethics instruction in the sciences.     

“The Notion of Neutrality in Clinical Ethics Consultation”

Clinical ethics consultation (CEC), as an activity that may be provided by clinical ethics committees and consultants, is nowadays a well-established practice in North America. Although it has been increasingly implemented in Europe and elsewhere, no agreement can be found among scholars and practitioners on the appropriate role or approach the consultant should play when ethically problematic cases involving conflicts and uncertainties come up. In particular, there is no consensus on the acceptability of consultants making recommendations, offering moral advice upon request, and expressing personal opinions. We translate these issues into the question of whether the consultant should be neutral when performing an ethics consultation. We argue that the notion of neutrality 1) functions as a hermeneutical key to review the history of CEC as a whole; 2) may be enlightened by a precise assessment of the nature and goals of CEC; 3) refers to the normative dimension of CEC. Here, we distinguish four different meanings of neutrality: a neutral stance toward the parties involved in clinical decision making, toward the arguments offered to frame the discussion, toward the values and norms involved in the case, and toward the outcome of decision making, that is to say the final decision and action that will be implemented. Lastly, we suggest a non-authoritarian way to intend the term “recommendation” in the context of clinical ethics consultation.