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1.
KARL SCHAFER 《Philosophy and phenomenological research》2011,82(2):265-286
It has recently been argued that certain areas of discourse, such as discourse about matters of taste, involve a phenomenon of ‘‘faultless disagreement’’ that rules out giving a standard realist or contextualist semantics for them. Thus, it is argued, we are left with no choice but to consider more adventurous semantic alternatives for these areas, such as a semantic account that involves relativizing truth to perspectives or contexts of assessment. I argue that the sort of faultless disagreement present in these cases is in fact compatible with a realist treatment of their semantics. Then I briefly consider other considerations that might be thought to speak against realism about these areas of discourse. I conclude with the tentative suggestion that realism about matters of taste is far more plausible (at least in some cases) than most philosophers believe today. 相似文献
2.
Jamin Asay 《国际科学哲学研究》2013,27(1):1-21
This paper investigates the nature of scientific realism. I begin by considering the anomalous fact that Bas van Fraassen's account of scientific realism is strikingly similar to Arthur Fine's account of scientific non-realism. To resolve this puzzle, I demonstrate how the two theorists understand the nature of truth and its connection to ontology, and how that informs their conception of the realism debate. I then argue that the debate is much better captured by the theory of truthmaking, and not by any particular theory of truth. To be a scientific realist is to adopt a realism-relevant account of what makes true the scientific theories one accepts. The truthmaking approach restores realism's metaphysical core—distancing itself from linguistic conceptions of the debate—and thereby offers a better characterization of what is at stake in the question of scientific realism. 相似文献
3.
The miracle argument for scientific realism can be cast in two forms: according to the miraculous theory argument, realism is the only position which does not make the empirical successes of particular theories miraculous. According to the miraculous choice argument, realism is the only position which does not render the fact that empirically successful theories have been chosen a miracle. A vast literature discusses the miraculous theory argument, but the miraculous choice argument has been unjustifiably neglected. I raise two objections to Richard Boyd's defense of the latter: (1) we have no miracle free account of the emergence of take-off theories and (2) the anti-realist can account for the non-miraculous choice of empirically successful theories by attributing mere empirical adequacy to background theory. I argue that the availability of extra-empirical criteria that are arguably truth conductive but not theory-laden suffices to answer (1), and the unavailability of extra-empirical criteria that are conductive to empirical adequacy but not necessarily to truth (and are also not theory-laden) constitutes to reply to (2). The prospects for a realist victory are at least somewhat promising, on a controversial assumption about the rate at which empirically successful theories emerge. 相似文献
4.
Moti Mizrahi 《国际科学哲学研究》2013,27(4):393-407
In this article, through a critical examination of K. Brad Wray's version of the argument from underconsideration against scientific realism, I articulate a modest version of scientific realism. This modest realist position, which I call ‘relative realism’, preserves the scientific realist's optimism about science's ability to get closer to the truth while, at the same time, taking on board the antirealist's premise that theory evaluation is comparative, and thus that there are no good reasons to think that science's best theories are close to the truth. 相似文献
5.
Michael Sollberger 《European Journal of Philosophy》2015,23(4):815-837
Current orthodoxy in the philosophy of perception views indirect realism as misguided, wrongheaded or simply outdated. The reasons for its pariah status are variegated. Although it is surely not unreasonable to speculate that philosophical fashion is one factor that contributes to this situation, there are also solid philosophical arguments which put pressure on the indirect realist position. In this paper, I will discuss one such main objection and show how the indirect realist can face it. The upshot will be a defence of a new structural account of indirect realism which is immune to a number of objections that have been traditionally levelled at such theories of perceptual consciousness. 相似文献
6.
Elizabeth Barnes 《Philosophical Studies》2017,174(10):2417-2433
Social constructionism is often considered a form of anti-realism. But in contemporary feminist philosophy, an increasing number of philosophers defend views that are well-described as both realist and social constructionist. In this paper, I use the work of Sally Haslanger as an example of realist social constructionism. I argue: (i) that Haslanger is best interpreted as defending metaphysical realism about social structures; (ii) that this type of metaphysical realism about the social world presents challenges to some popular ways of understanding metaphysical realism. 相似文献
7.
THOMAS L. CARSON 《Philosophy and phenomenological research》2007,75(2):349-368
Discussions of the problem of evil presuppose and appeal to axiological and metaethical assumptions, but seldom pay adequate attention to those assumptions. I argue that certain theories of value are consistent with theistic answers to the argument from evil and that several other well‐known theories of value, such as hedonism, are difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile with theism. Although moral realism is the subject of lively debate in contemporary philosophy, almost all standard discussions of the problem of evil presuppose the truth of moral realism. I explain the implications of several nonrealist theories of value for the problem of evil and argue that, if nonrealism is true, then we need to rethink and re‐frame the entire discussion about the problem of evil. 相似文献
8.
Ross P. Cameron 《Synthese》2007,156(1):143-159
In this paper I argue that warrant for Lewis’ Modal Realism is unobtainable. I consider two familiar objections to Lewisian
realism – the modal irrelevance objection and the epistemological objection – and argue that Lewis’ response to each is unsatisfactory
because they presuppose claims that only the Lewisian realist will accept. Since, I argue, warrant for Lewisian realism can
only be obtained if we have a response to each objection that does not presuppose the truth of Lewisian realism, this circularity
is vicious. I end by contrasting Lewis’ methodology with Forrest’s in order to illustrate a rival method that does not fall
victim to the objection I lay against Lewis. 相似文献
9.
Gerald Doppelt 《Topoi》2013,32(1):43-51
In this essay, I critically evaluate the approaches to explaining the success of science in Kuhn and the works of inference-to-the-best-explanation scientific realists. Kuhn’s challenge to realists, who invoke the truth of theories to explain their success, is two-fold. His paradigm-account of success confronts realists with the problem of theory change, and the historical fact of successful theories later rejected as false. Secondly, Kuhn’s account of the success of science has no need to bring truth into the explanation. In turn, I argue that weakness in Kuhn and the prevailing forms of scientific realism motivate a better account of realism which I characterize as ‘best current theory realism’ and defend against the pessimistic meta-induction and the problem of theory-change. This realism argues that the best explanation of the success of current and past scientific theories only requires the simple claim that our best current theories are true. Kuhn’s account can explain how normal science succeeds but cannot account for why its problem solutions work where they do and why they fail for other puzzles. 相似文献
10.
Timothy D. Lyons 《Erkenntnis》2005,63(2):167-204
The axiological tenet of scientific realism, “science seeks true theories,” is generally taken to rest on a corollary epistemological
tenet, “we can justifiably believe that our successful theories achieve (or approximate) that aim.” While important debates
have centered on, and have led to the refinement of, the epistemological tenet, the axiological tenet has suffered from neglect.
I offer what I consider to be needed refinements to the axiological postulate. After showing an intimate relation between
the refined postulate and ten theoretical desiderata, I argue that the axiological postulate does not depend on its epistemological
counterpart; epistemic humility can accompany us in the quest for truth. Upon contrasting my axiological postulate against
the two dominant non-realist alternatives and the standard realist postulate, I contend that its explanatory and justificatory
virtues render it, among the axiologies considered, the richest account of the scientific enterprise. 相似文献
11.
K. Brad Wray 《Synthese》2013,190(9):1719-1729
I aim to clarify the relationship between the success of a theory and the truth of that theory. This has been a central issue in the debates between realists and anti-realists. Realists assume that success is a reliable indicator of truth, but the details about the respects in which success is a reliable indicator or test of truth have been largely left to our intuitions. Lewis (Synthese 129:371–380, 2001) provides a clear proposal of how success and truth might be connected, comparing a test of success of our theories to medical tests with low rates of false positives and false negatives. But, contrary to what Lewis claims, I argue that it is not enough for the realist to undercut the claim that success is not a reliable indicator of truth. Rather, the realist must show that our current best theories are likely true. Further, I argue that tests in science are unlike medical tests in a number of important ways. 相似文献
12.
Matthew Kennedy 《No?s (Detroit, Mich.)》2011,45(1):77-102
Working from a naïve‐realist perspective, I examine first‐person knowledge of one's perceptual experience. I outline a naive‐realist theory of how subjects acquire knowledge of the nature of their experiences, and I argue that naive realism is compatible with moderate, substantial forms of first‐person privileged access. A more general moral of my paper is that treating “success” states like seeing as genuine mental states does not break up the dynamics that many philosophers expect from the phenomenon of knowledge of the mind. 相似文献
13.
I argue in this paper that anyone who accepts the ontology of scientific realism can only accept a pragmatic theory of truth, i.e., a theory on which truth is what it is epistemically right to believe. But the combination of realism with such a theory of truth is a form of internal realism; therefore, a scientific realist should be an internal realist. The strategy of the paper is to argue that there is no adequate semantic or correspondence theory of truth compatible with a realist ontology, that a redundancy theory cannot account for the value of truth, and that the only kind of truth theory which can account for the value of truth, and is compatible with a realist ontology, is a pragmatic theory. The kind of truth theory I wish to defend is objective and naturalistic, and the ontology is realistic. My position is, therefore, one of objective, naturalistic realism. 相似文献
14.
Otávio Bueno 《Studia Logica》2008,89(2):213-235
Scientific change has two important dimensions: conceptual change and structural change. In this paper, I argue that the existence
of conceptual change brings serious difficulties for scientific realism, and the existence of structural change makes structural
realism look quite implausible. I then sketch an alternative account of scientific change, in terms of partial structures,
that accommodates both conceptual and structural changes. The proposal, however, is not realist, and supports a structuralist
version of van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism (structural empiricism). 相似文献
15.
Timothy D. Lyons 《Journal for General Philosophy of Science》2011,42(2):317-338
According to standard scientific realism, science seeks truth and we can justifiably believe that our successful theories
achieve, or at least approximate, that goal. In this paper, I discuss the implications of the following competitor thesis:
Any theory we may favor has competitors such that we cannot justifiably deny that they are approximately true. After defending
that thesis, I articulate three specific threats it poses for standard scientific realism; one is epistemic, the other two
are axiological (that is, pertaining to the claim that science seeks truth). I also flag an additional axiological “challenge,”
that of how one might justify the pursuit of a primary aim, such as truth. Bracketing epistemic realism, I argue that the
axiological threats can be addressed by embracing a refined realist axiological hypothesis, one that specifies a specific
subclass of true claims sought in science. And after identifying three potential responses to the axiological “challenge,”
I contend that, while standard axiological realism appears to lack the resources required to utilize any of the responses,
the refined realist axiology I embrace is well suited to each. 相似文献
16.
Jamin Asay 《Philosophical Studies》2013,163(1):213-232
Creeping minimalism threatens to cloud the distinction between realist and anti-realist metaethical views. When anti-realist views equip themselves with minimalist theories of truth and other semantic notions, they are able to take on more and more of the doctrines of realism (such as the existence of moral truths, facts, and beliefs). But then they start to look suspiciously like realist views. I suggest that creeping minimalism is a problem only if moral realism is understood primarily as a semantic doctrine. I argue that moral realism is better understood instead as a metaphysical doctrine. As a result, we can usefully regiment the metaethical debate into one about moral truthmakers: In virtue of what are moral judgments true? I show how the notion of truthmaking has been simmering just below the surface of the metaethical debate, and how it reveals one metaethical view (quasi-realism) to be a stronger contender than the others. 相似文献
17.
It is plausible to think that some animals perceive the world as coloreddifferently from the way humans perceive it. I argue that the best way ofaccommodating this fact is to adopt perceiver-relativism, the view that colorpredicates express relations between objects and types of perceivers.Perceiver-relativism makes no claim as to the identity of color properties;it is compatible with both physicalism and dispositionalism. I arguehowever for a response-dependence version of it according to which an object counts as red (for a type of perceiver) iff it standardly looks red to normal perceivers (of that type). Finally, I develop a notion of minimal realism on which this account counts as realist despite its subjectivist elements, in that it is committed to the objectivityof truth. 相似文献
18.
Michael R. Slater 《Modern Theology》2019,35(2):244-267
This essay examines the theological grounds for rejecting metaphysics and the correspondence theory of truth, and argues that while there are good grounds for rejecting a certain kind of metaphysically oriented theology, metaphysics per se is neither objectionable nor avoidable in Christian theology. In the process, it also defends a realist conception of truth against some recent theological criticisms, and argues that a commitment to a modest version of metaphysical realism and realism about truth is not only philosophically tenable, but also theologically preferable to non‐realist views. 相似文献
19.
Matthew Sleat 《Inquiry (Oslo, Norway)》2013,56(3):288-305
This paper examines the relationship between truth and liberal politics via the work of Bernard Williams and Richard Rorty. I argue that Williams is right to think that there are positive relations between truth, specifically a realist understanding of truth, and liberal politics that Rorty's abandonment of the realist vocabulary of truth undermines. At the heart of this concern is the worry that abandoning the realist vocabulary opens up the possibility that the standards of justification for our true beliefs can be manipulated by those with the power to do so in order to further their own political ends. The political benefit of realism is that it fixes the standards of justification and makes them immune to manipulation by the use of power. However, I suggest that there is a form of realism available that Rorty can accept which would deliver the political benefits of the realist vocabulary without requiring him to accept the thick realist metaphysics that he wants to avoid. My conclusion is that there is a positive and important relationship between truth and liberal politics, a relationship that can be sustained without any necessary commitment to realist metaphysics. 相似文献
20.
Why Does Laudan’s Confutation of Convergent Realism Fail? 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Antonio Diéguez-Lucena 《Journal for General Philosophy of Science》2006,37(2):393-403
In his paper “A Confutation of Convergent Realism”, Larry Laudan offered one of the most powerful criticisms of scientific
realism. I defend here that although Laudan’s criticism is right, this does not refute the realist position. The thesis that
Laudan confutes is a much stronger thesis than realist needs to maintain. As I will exemplify with Salmon’s statistical-relevance
model, a less strict notion of explanation would allow us to claim that (approximate) truth is the best explanation for such
success, even if it is accepted that there can be cases of unsuccessful (approximately) true theories and cases of successful
false theories. 相似文献