General theories of explanation: buyer beware

We argue that there is no general theory of explanation that spans the sciences, mathematics, and ethics, etc. More specifically, there is no good reason to believe that substantive and domain-invariant constraints on explanatory information exist. Using Nickel (Noûs 44(2):305–328, 2010) as an exemplar of the contrary, generalist position, we first show that Nickel’s arguments rest on several ambiguities, and then show that even when these ambiguities are charitably corrected, Nickel’s defense of general theories of explanation is inadequate along several different dimensions. Specifically, we argue that Nickel’s argument has three fatal flaws. First, he has not provided any compelling illustrations of domain-invariant constraints on explanation. Second, in order to fend off the most vehement skeptics of domain-invariant theories of explanation, Nickel must beg all of the important questions. Third, Nickel’s examples of explanations from different domains with common explanatory structure rely on incorrect formulations of the explanations under consideration, circular justifications, and/or a mischaracterization of the position Nickel intends to critique. Given that the best and most elaborate defense of the generalist position fails in so many ways, we conclude that the standard practice in philosophy (and in philosophy of science in particular), which is to develop theories of explanation that are tailored to specific domains, still is justified. For those who want to buy into a more ambitious project: beware of the costs!     

On the eliminative explanation of social theories

The paper discusses eliminative explanation in which a (social) successor theory correctively explains and, as a consequence, eliminates its predecessor theory. Technical concepts and results from general logic are applied to the explication of corrective explanation, especially to the notion of framework translation that it involves.     

Intuitive theories of group types and relational principles

Three studies investigated perceivers’ beliefs about the principles by which different kinds of social groups govern interactions among group members. In Study 1, participants rated a sample of 20 groups on a set of group properties, including measures of relational principles used within groups. Results showed that people believe that interactions in different types of groups are governed by different blends of relational principles unique for each type of group. Study 2 experimentally demonstrated that perceivers could use minimal group property characteristics of different types of groups (i.e., extent of group member interaction, group size, duration, and permeability) to make inferences about the relational principles used in different types of groups. Study 3 demonstrated that relational style information influences people’s judgments of a group’s entitativity and collective responsibility.     

A new dialectical theory of explanation

This paper offers a dialogue theory of explanation. A successful explanation is defined as a transfer of understanding in a dialogue system in which a questioner and a respondent take part. The questioner asks a special sort of why-question that asks for understanding of something and the respondent provides a reply that transfers understanding to the questioner. The theory is drawn from recent work on explanation in artificial intelligence (AI), especially in expert systems, but applies to scientific, legal and everyday conversational explanations.     

A quantum theoretical explanation for probability judgment errors

A quantum probability model is introduced and used to explain human probability judgment errors including the conjunction and disjunction fallacies, averaging effects, unpacking effects, and order effects on inference. On the one hand, quantum theory is similar to other categorization and memory models of cognition in that it relies on vector spaces defined by features and similarities between vectors to determine probability judgments. On the other hand, quantum probability theory is a generalization of Bayesian probability theory because it is based on a set of (von Neumann) axioms that relax some of the classic (Kolmogorov) axioms. The quantum model is compared and contrasted with other competing explanations for these judgment errors, including the anchoring and adjustment model for probability judgments. In the quantum model, a new fundamental concept in cognition is advanced--the compatibility versus incompatibility of questions and the effect this can have on the sequential order of judgments. We conclude that quantum information-processing principles provide a viable and promising new way to understand human judgment and reasoning.     

Children balance theories and evidence in exploration, explanation, and learning

We look at the effect of evidence and prior beliefs on exploration, explanation and learning. In Experiment 1, we tested children both with and without differential prior beliefs about balance relationships (Center Theorists, mean: 82 months; Mass Theorists, mean: 89 months; No Theory children, mean: 62 months). Center and Mass Theory children who observed identical evidence explored the block differently depending on their beliefs. When the block was balanced at its geometric center (belief-violating to a Mass Theorist, but belief-consistent to a Center Theorist), Mass Theory children explored the block more, and Center Theory children showed the standard novelty preference; when the block was balanced at the center of mass, the pattern of results reversed. The No Theory children showed a novelty preference regardless of evidence. In Experiments 2 and 3, we follow-up on these findings, showing that both Mass and Center Theorists selectively and differentially appeal to auxiliary variables (e.g., a magnet) to explain evidence only when their beliefs are violated. We also show that children use the data to revise their predictions in the absence of the explanatory auxiliary variable but not in its presence. Taken together, these results suggest that children's learning is at once conservative and flexible; children integrate evidence, prior beliefs, and competing causal hypotheses in their exploration, explanation, and learning.     

Arithmetic,set theory,reduction and explanation

Philosophers of science since Nagel have been interested in the links between intertheoretic reduction and explanation, understanding and other forms of epistemic progress. Although intertheoretic reduction is widely agreed to occur in pure mathematics as well as empirical science, the relationship between reduction and explanation in the mathematical setting has rarely been investigated in a similarly serious way. This paper examines an important and well-known case: the reduction of arithmetic to set theory. I claim that the reduction is unexplanatory. In defense of this claim, I offer some evidence from mathematical practice, and I respond to contrary suggestions due to Steinhart, Maddy, Kitcher and Quine. I then show how, even if set-theoretic reductions are generally not explanatory, set theory can nevertheless serve as a legitimate and successful foundation for mathematics. Finally, some implications of my thesis for philosophy of mathematics and philosophy of science are discussed. In particular, I suggest that some reductions in mathematics are probably explanatory, and I propose that differing standards of theory acceptance might account for the apparent lack of unexplanatory reductions in the empirical sciences.     

The depth of history and explanation as benefit and bane for psychological control theories

A longstanding debate has recently re-erupted in the self-regulation literature around the concept of self-efficacy. This article presents an argument that the debate emerges from a lack of understanding of the history of control theories within both the social and physical sciences and the various levels of explanation to which phenomena can be subjected. This history, coupled with the issues of determinism, materialism, and empiricism evoked by the deeper level of explanation that some versions of control theory provide, has led some critics to mis-apply non-psychological properties to control theories and obscure their usefulness. Here, the usefulness of a deeper control theory level of explanation is illustrated using comparisons with explanations found in goal-setting theory and social cognitive theory.     

A theoretical explanation of the dissociative reaction and a confirmatory case presentation.

A theoretical explanation for the classical distinction between the conversion and dissociative hysterias was advanced based on previous research with cases of conversion hysteria and multiple personality. The principles were illustrated and extended using Rorschach and Hand Test data from a fugue state.     

An experimental and theoretical appraisal of the perspective and size-constancy theories of illusions

The perspective and size-constancy theories of illusions are described. They both imply that illusory distortions arise as a consequence of mistaken perceptual impressions of depth. Predictions from these theories are tested in six experiments and several ancillary studies. They show that although differences in apparent distance may be sufficient for the appearance of illusions their presence is not a necessary condition. Detailed theoretical implications of these results are considered in discussion.     

A balance theory explanation of challenges confronting cross-sex friendships

This study was part of an ongoing investigation into four of the potential challenges confronting women and men in cross-sex fiendships (O’Meara, 1989). Unlike previous research, which explored the perspective of only one member of each cross-sex fnendship, this study examined the perspectives of both individuals in cross-sex fienhhips. The levels of actual and perceived agreement and understanding were investigated through utilization of a variation of Heiderian Balance Theory and Laing’s Interpersonal Perception Method. Seventy three pairs of cross-sex fiends completed a survey examining direct perspectives, metaperspectives, and meta-metaperspectives, on the four challenges. Over 92% of the participants were heterosexual, 68% were Caucasian, 10% were Afican American, 10% were Hispanic, 3% were Asian, 4% were Native American, and 5% indicated “other.” Results indicate that cross-sex fiends generally agree that O’Meara’s four challenges present only minimal problems in their individual relationships, and that balance theory provides a viable explanation of how perceived agreement and understanding concerning challenges are arrived at within cross-sex fnendships. Additionally, results illustrating disagreements and misunderstandings within cross-sex friendships highlight the importance of looking at the perspectives of both individuals within a dyad.