Arnold Gesell and the Maturation Controversy

This article examines the work of Arnold Lucius Gesell and argues that he not only paved the way for contemporary research in motor development, but that he and colleagues anticipated fundamental issues about growth that must be addressed by psychologists and neuroscientists who are committed to the advancement of developmental science. Arnold Lucius Gesell was a pioneer in developmental psychology when the field was in its infancy. He worked diligently for the rights of physically and mentally handicapped children to receive special education that would enable them to find gainful employment. Gesell's writings in books and popular magazines increased public awareness of and support for preschool education and better foster care for orphans. Despite these achievements, many of his successors have questioned his views about infant development. Developmental psychologists have criticized Gesell for proposing a stage theory of infant growth that has fallen into disfavor among contemporary researchers. His conception of development as a maturational process has been challenged for allegedly reducing complex behavioral, perceptual, and learning processes to genetic factors. The author rejects this overly simplistic interpretation and contends that Gesell's work continues to stand the test of time.     

Arnold Gesell's progressive vision: child hygiene, socialism and eugenics

In October 1913, The American Magazine published an article by Arnold Gesell that portrayed Alma, Wisconsin (his hometown) as overflowing with the mentally and morally unfit. In "The Village of a Thousand Souls", Gesell called for the observation and segregation of the unfit as a eugenic measure. This article explores the reasons behind this infamous article by someone who became a famous developmental psychologist and pediatrician. Gesell's papers at the Library of Congress reveal his socialist views of poverty, injustice, and human development. The archives of his father's photography studio at the Wisconsin Historical Society reveal his manipulation of the photographic record to fit his negative view of Alma. Typical of the era, Gesell's Progressive vision combined social control and negative eugenics with egalitarianism and the benevolent engineering of the environment.     

Contingency, Education, and the Need for Reassurance

This short paper is a response to Richard Smith’s ‘Abstraction and finitude: education, chance and democracy’. In his paper Smith contends that a rationalist agenda dominates education and democracy today, and that this agenda by rendering us insensitive to the tragic dimension of life, breeds a sense of hubris, or arrogance towards fate which is fuelled by an inordinate confidence in our knowledge. In the worlds of education and politics it has led to an obsession with management and transparency, and to students who fear to take risks. As a specific example of this, he takes up the recent fixation in universities with learning how to learn, which he says leads to an over-emphasis on skills in the curriculum, and to an ‘audit’ culture. While sympathising with much of his analysis of the latter, my counter-suggestion is that the contemporary world lacks anything but a sense of the contingency of things, to the contrary, that at the heart of its mangerialist culture and its performatist ethos lies the need for reassurance. My response focuses on the politics of the self-directed learner that lies at the heart of the lifelong learning literature, on learning how to learn, on the notion of transparency and on the transparent society, and on the politics of contingency and scepticism. Prof. Kenneth Wain teaches philosophy of education and courses in ethics and political philosophy at the University of Malta, where he is also involved in teacher education. Last year (2004) he published his most recent book The Learning Society in a Postmodern World with Peter Lang (New York). His earlier books were Philosophy of Lifelong Education (1987) Croom Helm (London), The Maltese National Curriculum: a critical Evaluation (1991) Mireva (Malta) Theories of Teaching (1992) Mireva (Malta) The Value Crisis: an Introduction to Ethics (1995) University of Malta Press. He has also published several articles in international refereed journals.     

A more dangerous enemy? Philo’s “confession” and Hume’s soft atheism

While Hume has often been held to have been an agnostic or atheist, several contemporary scholars have argued that Hume was a theist. These interpretations depend chiefly on several passages in which Hume allegedly confesses to theism. In this paper, I argue against this position by giving a threshold characterization of theism and using it to show that Hume does not confess. His most important “confession” does not cross this threshold and the ones that do are often expressive rather than assertive. I then argue that Hume is best interpreted as an atheist. Instead of interpreting Hume as a proto-logical positivist and arguing on the basis of Hume’s theories of meaning and method, I show that textually he appears to align himself with atheism, that his arguments in the Dialogues on Natural Religion support atheism, and that this position is most consistent with Hume’s naturalism. But, I hold that his atheism is “soft” and therefore distinct from that of his peers like Baron d’Holbach—while Hume really does reject theism, he neither embraces a dogmatically materialist position nor takes up a purely polemical stance towards theism. I conclude by suggesting several ways in which Hume’s atheistic philosophy of religion is relevant to contemporary discussions.     

Thinking about luck

Luck looms large in numerous different philosophical subfields. Unfortunately, work focused exclusively on the nature of luck is in short supply on the contemporary analytic scene. In his highly impressive recent book Epistemic Luck, Duncan Pritchard helps rectify this neglect by presenting a partial account of luck that he uses to illuminate various ways luck can figure in cognition. In this paper, I critically evaluate both Pritchard’s account of luck and another account to which Pritchard’s discussion draws our attention—viz., that due to Nicholas Rescher. I also assess some novel analyses of luck that incorporate plausible elements of Pritchard’s and Rescher’s accounts.     

Emotions outside the box��the new phenomenology of feeling and corporeality

The following text is the first ever translation into English of a writing by German phenomenologist Hermann Schmitz (*1928). In it, Schmitz outlines and defends a non-mentalistic view of emotions as phenomena in interpersonal space in conjunction with a theory of the felt body’s constitutive involvement in human experience. In the first part of the text, Schmitz gives an overview covering some central pieces of his theory as developed, for the most part, in his massive System of Philosophy, published in German in a series of volumes between 1964 and 1980. Schmitz’s System is centred on the claim that the contemporary view of the human subject is the result of a consequential historical process: A reductionist and ‘introjectionist’ objectification of lived experience culminating in the ‘invention’ of the mind (or ‘soul’) as a private, inner realm of subjective experience and in a corresponding ‘grinding down’ of the world of lived experienced to a meagre, value-neutral ‘objective reality’. To counter this intellectualist trend, Schmitz puts to use his approach to phenomenology with the aim of regaining a sensibility for the nuanced realities of lived experience—hoping to make up for what was lost during the development of Western intellectual culture. Since both this text and the overall style of Schmitz’s philosophising are in several ways unusual for a contemporary readership, a brief introduction is provided by philosophers Jan Slaby and Rudolf Owen Müllan, the latter of whom translated Schmitz’s text into English. The introduction emphasises aspects of Schmitz’s philosophy that are likely to be of relevance to contemporary scholars of phenomenological philosophy and to its potential applications in science and society.     

The phenomenology of religious humility in Heidegger’s reading of Luther

The return to religion in contemporary continental philosophy is characterized by a profound sense of intellectual humility. A significant influence within this discussion is Heidegger’s anthropology of finitude in Being and Time and his later critiques of onto-theology. These critiques, however, were informed by Heidegger’s earlier phenomenology of the lived experience of religious humility performed alongside his reading of Martin Luther’s theology. This article shows that for Luther and Heidegger, religious humility is foremost an affection structured according to the enactment of one’s dissimilitude from God and resulting existential tribulation. During a seminal period in his development, Heidegger’s phenomenology of humility changed from an Eckhartian conception of detachment culminating in the unio mystica to a Lutheran conception of humiliation and Anfechtung. Heidegger’s break from a mystical phenomenology of humility parallels Luther’s own break from that tradition, and anticipates contemporary developments in the continental philosophy of religion.

A Psychology of Religious Plurality: From Intra-Religious Dialogue to Intra-Psychic Reality

Panikkar’s (The intra-religious dialogue, 1978) classic, re-issued by Paulist Press in 1999, grapples with the theological challenges in the disciplines of comparative theology and the theology of religions through what he terms, “intra-religious dialogue.” In this psychology of religious plurality, I use works from a variety of disciplines to highlight the achievements of Panikkar’s intra-religious dialogue, as well as to critique his work in the hope of finding categories of understanding that can be profitably used to face the inter-personal crises of the contemporary world, namely religious terrorism.     

Skepticism and faith in Shestov’s early critique of rationalism

Shestov’s work can be summed up under six headings. Three are sharp contrasts, three are paradoxes. (1) First there is the contrast between Shestov the person, who was moderate, competent, and calm, and Shestov the thinker, who was extreme, incandescent, and impassioned. (2) Then there is the contrast between his critique of reason, his acceptance of irrationalism, and the means by which he attacks the former and defends the latter: namely, careful rational argument. Sometimes he argues like a lawyer (after all, he had a law degree from Moscow University). (3) Shestov speaks repeatedly of the “horrors and atrocities of human existence.” But his examples are always drawn from history or literature, never from his own life, although we know that he experienced much horror. (4) Nietzsche is the thinker whom he invokes most frequently, and most warmly. Yet, paradoxically, Shestov completely ignores most of Nietzsche’s central themes. (5) Shestov’s skeptical doubts are mostly directed at rationalism; he is not skeptical about the existence or benevolence of God. Yet he is explicitly skeptical about divine omniscience and implicitly skeptical about divine omnipotence in a metaphysical sense, though not in its ethical application. (6) Shestov has a deep faith that God can undo all the horrors of life, putting an end to all suffering. At the same time he knows that this will not, and cannot, happen, since the very idea of undoing the past, erasing its horrors, is conceptually incoherent.     

Graham Ward’s Poststructuralist Christian Nominalism

In his Cities of God, Graham Ward advocates for what he calls an ‘analogical worldview’. On the one hand, he suggests that this analogical worldview has its roots in pre-modern theology and philosophy, especially in Augustine and Aquinas. On the other hand, Graham Ward draws heavily on contemporary critical theory to express this view. The thesis defended in this paper is that by reading the concept of analogy from Augustine and Aquinas in terms of contemporary critical theory, especially that of Jacques Derrida, Ward develops an analogical worldview that has strikingly nominalist ramifications. These ramifications imply that, in the end, there is no longer an adequacy between the perceiving mind and the reality perceived. The argument is developed in three steps. In the first step, Ward’s reading of contemporary critical theory, especially with respect to Derrida, is introduced. In the second step, the theological appropriation of Derrida in the analogical worldview is analyzed. In the third step, the nominalist implications of this application are shown in terms of Ward’s critique of privileging heterosexual relationships. In this third section, I will also deal more extensively and precisely with the question of what I mean by labeling his work as ‘nominalism’ as well as outlining the specific form of nominalism that I am here invoking. In the penultimate section, I will attempt to show that Ward’s nominalism can also be found in the works of Milbank and Pickstock, as it has to do with the specific way in which they take up the Platonic tradition. In my concluding remarks, I will come back to the discussion about the ontological status of sexual relations, indicating my own view on this issue.     

Carnap’s 1934 Objections to Wittgenstein’s Say/Show Distinction

In sections 18 and 73 of Carnap’s Logical Syntax of Language, Carnap famously presents what he understands to be decisive objections to Wittgenstein’s Tractarian distinction between saying and showing. However, Carnap has been criticized in recent literature for severely misinterpreting that distinction. Against this criticism it is argued that Carnap reads that distinction as applying to two distinct classes of expressions (Unsinn and sinnlos) that he holds to emerge from his reading of Tractatus 4.1212 and related Tractarian theses. It is then argued that Carnap’s counterexamples to Wittgenstein’s theses are successful given his reading, and that our analysis of his counterexamples puts us in a unique position to reevaluate his conventionalism.     

From the ‘Village of a Thousand Souls’ to ‘Race Crossing in Jamaica’: Arnold Gesell,eugenics and child development

Perhaps best known for providing age‐related norms in early development, norms that are still used as a basis for measures of developmental maturity, Arnold Gesell was a key figure in developmental psychology from the 1920s through the 1950s. After examining Gesell's reputation and status in the field, we explore Gesell's changing relationship to eugenics, both in terms of Gesell's often contradictory attitudes about the role of hereditary and environmental influences in development, and in terms of the broader relationship between the eugenics movement and science. © 2010 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

Psychoanalyzing Historicists?: The Enigmatic Popper

The paper shows how Karl Popper’s critique of ‘historicism’ is permeated by psychoanalytic discourse regardless of his critique that psychoanalysis is one of the exemplars of pseudoscience. Early on, when he was formulating his philosophy of science, Popper had an apparently stringent criterion, viz. falsifiablity, and painstaking analysis. The central argument of this paper is that despite his representation of psychoanalysis as the principal illustration of the category he dubs as ‘pseudoscience’, Popper’s analysis has been infused with psychoanalysis when it comes to his social and political philosophy. Besides, not only was his interpretation of the proponents of ‘historicism’ and the ‘closed’ society mediated by the very concepts of a field which he indicted as pseudoscientific but also he frequently slipped into vacuous and unverifiable accusations forgetting the jurisdiction he formerly accorded to empirical adequacy and logical consistency when examining and assessing theories.     

World in My Eyes

The following article delineates at least two important thrusts of the Journal of Adult Development. First, it demonstrates the journal’s commitment to the complementarity of natural science (quantitative) and human science (qualitative) models of research in either studies that utilise a single method or mixed-models methods. The journal’s theoretical and methodological flexibility evokes Maslow’s (1946) classic distinction between means-oriented and problem-oriented research in which, in the former, the method dictates the range of problems that can be studied whereas the latter–most consonant with the journal’s approach–gives priority to the phenomenon being studied. Second, since its inception, the journal has been committed to providing young scholars with an outlet for the publication of their work. Later, Karl Dominey of Brown University discusses his own transition from adolescence to young adulthood (or what now would more likely be called emerging adulthood). As his piece demonstrates, Karl integrates psychological and sociocultural factors with a keen literary bent to explore this personally important developmental transition using a variant of narrative analysis. He hopes to be admitted into a doctoral programme in sociology and/or American civilisation next fall to explore issues related to individual and social (e.g. father–son) development. Readers who wish to correspond with Karl either about his piece and/or about the gruelling process of admission to doctoral programmes are strongly encouraged to do so.     

Samuel Alexander’s Emergentism: Or, Higher Causation for Physicalists

Samuel Alexander was one of the foremost philosophical figures of his day and has been argued by John Passmore to be one of ‘fathers’ of Australian philosophy as well as a novel kind of physicalist. Yet Alexander is now relatively neglected, his role in the genesis of Australian philosophy if far from widely accepted and the standard interpretation takes him to be an anti-physicalist. In this paper, I carefully examine these issues and show that Alexander has been badly, although understandably, misjudged by most of his contemporary critics and interpreters. Most importantly, I show that Alexander offers an ingenious, and highly original, version of physicalism at the heart of which is a strikingly different view of the nature of the microphysical properties and associated view of emergent properties. My final conclusion will be that Passmore is correct in his claims both that Alexander is significant as one of the grandfather’s of Australian philosophy and that he provides a novel physicalist position. I will also suggest that Alexander’s emergentism is important for addressing the so-called ‘problem of mental causation’ presently dogging contemporary non-reductive physicalists.     

Artifice and virtue in the<Emphasis Type="Italic">Xunzi</Emphasis>

Xunzi was chronologically the third of the three great Confucian thinkers of China’s classical period, after Confucius and Mencius. Having produced the most comprehensive philosophical system of that period, he occupies a place in the development of Chinese philosophy comparable to that of Aristotle in the Western philosophical tradition. This essay reveals how Xunzi’s understanding of virtue and moral development dovetailed with his positions on ritual propriety, the attunement of names, the relation betweenli (patterns) andlei (categories), and his view ofdao (the way) in general. I have argued for a “constructivist” understanding of each of these aspects of Xunzi’s philosophy in some detail elsewhere (see Hagen 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003), and so here I will just briefly review a few key points before addressing their relation to moral development.     

The construct of brain maturation in theories of child development.

Developmental psychologists have avoided using brain maturation as a primary construct in theories of child development for a variety of reasons during the past 40 years. However, during the last decade we have seen a return to considering brain growth as a useful element in theory construction. During the past few years, the frontal lobe has received increasing attention with respect to major developmental issues. In this Introduction, we review some of these historical and contemporary trends.     

Hermeneutical Portrait of Today’s 18–22 Year Old Young Adult Male

This article’s objective is to help uncover today’s 18–22 year old young adult male in his modern day milieu in order to paint a hermeneutical portrait of his maleness and masculinity. It will attempt to do so utilizing two main categories: (1) psycho-social development and (2) socio-cultural types and archetypes. Psycho-social development refers to the meaning and telos of the young man’s “maleness” and “masculinity.” It is the self-perceived direction of his sexuality explored within the frameworks of physiology and post-modern implications of his development. Socio-cultural types and archetypes refer to the established male roles and masculine identity markers as well as the human energy that operates in the daily life of college men today. The article concludes with a portrait of the young man’s overall perception of the public sphere, how he is placed within a social and political mindset and imagination regarding maleness and masculinity today.     

Why Euclid’s geometry brooked no doubt: J. H. Lambert on certainty and the existence of models

J. H. Lambert proved important results of what we now think of as non-Euclidean geometries, and gave examples of surfaces satisfying their theorems. I use his philosophical views to explain why he did not think the certainty of Euclidean geometry was threatened by the development of what we regard as alternatives to it. Lambert holds that theories other than Euclid’s fall prey to skeptical doubt. So despite their satisfiability, for him these theories are not equal to Euclid’s in justification. Contrary to recent interpretations, then, Lambert does not conceive of mathematical justification as semantic. According to Lambert, Euclid overcomes doubt by means of postulates. Euclid’s theory thus owes its justification not to the existence of the surfaces that satisfy it, but to the postulates according to which these “models” are constructed. To understand Lambert’s view of postulates and the doubt they answer, I examine his criticism of Christian Wolff’s views. I argue that Lambert’s view reflects insight into traditional mathematical practice and has value as a foil for contemporary, model-theoretic, views of justification.