How Really Real Is Real?

This paper takes issue with a number of family therapists who appear to hold that reality is entirely constructed out of our beliefs and that different views of reality can only be discriminated between on the basis of their usefulness for a particular purpose. Rather this paper argues for a co-constructivist position, that is, that the knower's beliefs and constructs are in an interpenetrating relationship with reality and that different views of reality can be discriminated between on the basis of their adequacy in describing that reality and that it is this adequacy that will determine their usefulness. These issues are not just of theoretical interest but have important implications for the practice of therapy.     

Naked narrative: Real research?

A multi‐layered narrative is presented as a way of inviting discussion about narrative as research in the talking therapies and social sciences. The core issue under consideration is the challenge of researching lived experience and how this is distorted or eliminated by many traditional approaches to research. The paper contains an account of a first experience of presenting a narrative about ethical decision‐making to a national research conference by someone more accustomed to writing and researching in traditional propositional discourses. The aim of this narrative is to focus attention on the lived experience of generating new understanding and practice and to raise questions for discussion about the role of narrative in research, especially research directed towards developing insight into lived experience.     

A Quantitative Analysis of Athletes’ Voluntary Use of Slow Motion,Real Time,and Fast Motion Images

The current study examined athletes’ reported intentional use of slow-motion, real-time, and fast-motion images. Athletes (N = 604; 298 males and 306 females; M_age = 21.73 years, SD = 4.54) completed the Image Speed Questionnaire, an instrument created to assess the frequency with which athletes reported employing the three image speeds. Despite the applied sport psychology guideline of imaging only at real time speed, athletes reported employing all three image speeds to varying degrees depending on the function of imagery being employed and the stage of learning of the athlete. Gender and competitive level were found not to influence athletes’ reported voluntary image speed use. Athletes reported employing slow-motion images most often when learning or developing a skill or strategy. Real-time images were consistently used most often by athletes regardless of imagery function or stage of learning, and fast-motion images were used most often when imaging skills or strategies that had been mastered. Findings are discussed within the context of the stages of learning (Fitts & Posner, 1967 Fitts, P. M. and Posner, M. I. 1967. Human performance, Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole.  [Google Scholar]) and the PETTLEP (Physical; Environmental; Task; Timing; Learning; Emotional, and Perspective) approach to motor imagery (Holmes & Collins, 2001 Holmes, P. S. and Collins, D. J. 2001. The PETTLEP approach to motor imagery: A functional equivalence model for sport psychologists. Journal of Applied Sport Psychology, 13: 60–83. [Taylor & Francis Online], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]). Implications for imagery practitioners and future directions for image speed research are also offered.     

A review of: “Real events revisited: Fantasy,memory and psychoanalysis”

Ann Scott (1996) Real Events Revisited: Fantasy, Memory and Psychoanalysis, London: Virago, $12.99

Caroline Malone, Linda Farthing and Lorraine Marce (eds) (1996) The Memory Bird: Survivors of Sexual Abuse, London: Virago, $8.99     

What Is ‘Real’ in Probabilism?

This paper defends two related claims about belief: first, the claim that, unlike numerical degrees of belief, comparative beliefs are primitive and psychologically real; and, second, the claim that the fundamental norm of Probabilism is not that numerical degrees of belief should satisfy the probability axioms, but rather that comparative beliefs should satisfy certain constraints.     

How Digital Computer Simulations Explain Real‐World Processes

Scientists of many disciplines use theoretical models to explain and predict the dynamics of the world. They often have to rely on digital computer simulations to draw predictions fromthe model. But to deliver phenomenologically adequate results, simulations deviate from the assumptions of the theoretical model. Therefore the role of simulations in scientific explanation demands itself an explanation. This paper analyzes the relation between real‐world system, theoretical model, and simulation. It is argued that simulations do not explain processes in the real world directly. The way in which simulations help explaining real‐world processes is conceived as indirect, mediated by the theoretical model. Simulacra are characterized further, and turn out to be a priori measurable. This gives a clue to a better understanding of the epistemic role of computer simulations in scientific research.     

The Real World: What Good Is It?

Any experimental science runs the risk of implosion. The tasks that were created as surrogates for complicated real-world situations can take on lives of their own. When that happens, scientists become fascinated with the nuances of variations within that little world. Their theoretical accounts end up with little place for phenomena that could not be observed there. Extrapolations to other settings may require large doses of conjecture (or leaps of faith). This essay examines some possibilities for understanding the world of the lab by grappling with applied problems in the world outside and perhaps doing a little good along the way.     

Radical embodied cognitive science and “Real Cognition”

A persistent criticism of radical embodied cognitive science is that it will be impossible to explain “real cognition” without invoking mental representations. This paper provides an account of explicit, real-time thinking of the kind we engage in when we imagine counter-factual situations, remember the past, and plan for the future. We first present a very general non-representational account of explicit thinking, based on pragmatist philosophy of science. We then present a more detailed instantiation of this general account drawing on nonlinear dynamics and ecological psychology.

     

Will the Real Moral Judgment Please Stand Up?

The recent, influential Social Intuitionist Model of moral judgment (Haidt, Psychological Review 108, 814–834, 2001) proposes a primary role for fast, automatic and affectively charged moral intuitions in the formation of moral judgments. Haidt’s research challenges our normative conception of ourselves as agents capable of grasping and responding to reasons. We argue that there can be no ‘real’ moral judgments in the absence of a capacity for reflective shaping and endorsement of moral judgments. However, we suggest that the empirical literature indicates a complex interplay between automatic and deliberative mental processes in moral judgment formation, with the latter constraining the expression and influence of moral intuitions. We therefore conclude that the psychological literature supports a normative conception of agency.

Real or imagined incomplete lateralization of function in females?

Visual field effects for 30 normal familial right-handed females were investigated with 4-point random forms known to be recognized more accurately in the right visual field by normal familial right-handed males, and the relationship between spatial ability and various performance patterns was examined. The forms were presented 2 deg in the left or right visual field. After a 10-sec delay, the subject decided whether or not a form exposed in central vision was the same as the stimulus. Incomplete lateralization of function appeared to be supported by the finding of no field differences. An alternative explanation was discussed since visual field superiority was significantly correlated with WAIS Block Design scores scaled for age, females with relatively low scores showing a right visual field superiority and females with relatively high scores showing a left visual field superiority. The experiment was repeated with 30 familial right-handed males. A significant right visual field superiority was obtained, but visual field superiorities were not correlated with measures of visuo-spatial or verbal ability.     

Testosterone intake and aggressiveness: Real effect or anticipation?

In a double-blind experiment, human males (n = 27) were given either testosterone (40 mg/day), placebo, or no treatment, over a one week period. Subjective and observer assessed mood estimations were conducted before and after treatment. Testosterone levels in saliva were measured with radioimmunoassay. The results revealed a significant placebo effect [c. f. Medicine and Science in Sports 4: 124–126]: After treatment, the placebo group scored higher than both the testosterone and the control group on self-estimated anger, irritation, impulsivity, and frustration. Observer-estimated mood yielded similar results. The lack of a placebo effect in the testosterone group is intriguing, and may be due to secondary effects caused by suppression of the body's own testosterone production, since recorded non-protein bound testosterone did not significantly rise due to treatment. The resultss suggest that androgen usage causes expectations, rather than an actual increase of aggressiveness. © 1994 Wiley-Liss, Inc.     

Real Relationship: The “Something More” of Psychotherapy

Although it often operates silently, the personal relationship is a part of everything that transpires between therapist and client. Following the psychoanalyst Ralph Greenson's (1967) early lead, the term Real Relationship is used to capture this personal aspect of psychotherapy. It is divided into two elements, realism and genuineness; and both these elements are further divided into magnitude and valence aspects. Research on the real relationship is almost nonexistent, and to an important extent this is due to the lack of a reliable, valid, and convenient measure. The author is involved in a research project aimed at developing such measures from both the client and therapist perspective. Examples of items are provided.     

Explaining Jury Verdicts: Is Leniency Bias for Real?

Laboratory research suggests juries that begin deliberation with a strong majority (i.e., 2/3 or more) usually end up choosing the verdict favored by this majority, whereas those without a strong majority generally acquit or hang. We tested the robustness of these findings in the field by examining trial and deliberation correlates of jury verdicts using data from 79 criminal jury trials held in Indiana. As expected, several trial characteristics and the first-vote preference distribution were related to jury verdicts. However, there was no evidence of leniency bias—75% of those juries without a 2/3 majority on the first deliberation vote ended up convicting. Contributions of the study, limitations, and alternative explanations for the observed severity bias are discussed.     

Slavoj Žižek and the Real Subject of Politics

Slavoj ?i?ek's refusal to sketch an alternative to the global liberal-capitalist order, combined with his claim that there is an urgent need for a repolitization of, most of all, the economy, raises the question of the possibility of radical political thought and action. Considering fundamentalisms and politically correct multiculturalism not as oppositional, but as correlative to the “depolitization” of post-modern societies, ?i?ek invokes the emancipatory legacy of Europe in an attempt to reinvent Marxism in a way similar to what Lenin, thrown into an open situation, had to do in 1917 between the revolutions. A single question confronts political philosophy today: is liberal-capitalist democracy the ultimate horizon of our political practice, or is it possible to open up the space for another political articulation? The key to a repolitization is to identify with the “symptom” of the existing global order's false claim to Universality, with the excluded “part of no part” who politicizes it's predicament by claiming to stand for the real universal. In order not to discard political struggle as “unrealistic”, today's cynical “realist” consensus must be broken. Taking things as they “really are” has become the dominant ideological mode that keeps people from thinking about alternatives. The remedy is to show that things never are “really” as they are.

     

Real Men Don’t Make Mistakes: Investigating the Effects of Leader Gender, Error Type, and the Occupational Context on Leader Error Perceptions

Purpose

Despite the fact that leaders make mistakes, little attention has been paid to the effects of errors on subordinate perceptions. This study investigated the influence of errors on perceptions of leader competence, effectiveness, and desire to work for the leader. It also examined the effects of gendered expectations on perceptions of male and female leader errors by investigating the interactions that occur between the leader’s gender, the type of error, and the occupational context.

Design/Methodology

A sample of 284 undergraduates read a series of fictional employee emails describing a leader’s behavior and responded to several measures while envisioning themselves as subordinates of the leader.

Findings

Results suggested task and relationship errors exert damaging and differential effects on perceptions of leader task and relationship competence, respectively, and equally damage desire to work for the leader. Male leaders were perceived as less task and relationship competent, desirable to work for, and effective than female leaders for committing errors in a masculinized domain.

Implications

This study suggests leader errors matter, and that current leadership models ought to be expanded to account more clearly for them. Moreover, it offers insight into the role of gendered expectations in determining perceptions of male and female leader errors.

Originality/Value

This study is one of the first to empirically examine leader error perceptions and the effects of gender stereotypes on these perceptions. It represents a step toward understanding evaluations of male and female leaders, not when they succeed, but when they make mistakes.     

Is It Real or Is It Fiction? Children's Bias Toward Reality

Children aged 3 to 8 years old and adults were tested on a reality–fantasy distinction task. They had to judge whether particular entities were real or fantastical, and response times were collected. We further manipulated whether the entity is a specific character or a generic fantastical entity. The results indicate that children, unlike adults, show a tendency to err by judging fantastical entities as real (response bias toward reality). All children were significantly slower when categorizing fantastical stimuli compared with real stimuli. We conclude that the process of classifying items into real versus fantastical categories develops at least until children are 7 to 8 years old.