Dimensions of perfectionism and irrational thinking

Several authors have suggested that perfectionism is associated with irrational thinking. The purpose of the present research was to test the hypothesis that various dimensions of perfectionism are related significantly to core irrational beliefs. In Study 1, 102 subjects completed the Multidimensional Perfectionism Scale (MPS) and the Irrational Beliefs Test (IBT). The MPS provides assessments of self-oriented, other-oriented, and socially prescribed perfectionism. Analyses revealed that self-oriented perfectionism was correlated positively with the IBT high self-expectations and perfect solutions subscales. Socially prescribed perfectionism was correlated significantly with a variety of irrational beliefs including high self-expectations, demand for social approval, dependency, blame proneness, and anxious overconcern. Other-oriented perfectionism was correlated with few irrational beliefs. In Study 2, 130 subjects completed the MPS and the Survey of Personal Beliefs, a new measure of core irrational beliefs. Analyses confirmed that all three perfectionism dimensions were associated with core irrational beliefs. It is concluded that the results constitute general support for the hypothesis that cognitive aspects are important in both personal and social components of perfectionism and that perfectionists are characterized by increased levels of irrational beliefs that may contribute to maladjustment. The findings are discussed in terms of the associations among perfectionism, irrational beliefs, and maladjustment.Gordon L. Flett, Ph.D is currently an assistant professor in the Department of Psychology at York University. Paul L. Hewitt, Ph.D is a clinical psychologist at Brockville Psychiatric Hospital. He is also an assistant professor in the Department of Psychiatry at the University of Ottawa. Kirk R. Blankstein, Ph.D, is an associate professor in the Department of Psychology at Erindale College, University of Toronto. Spomenka Koledin is a former student at Erindale College, University of Toronto. Currently, she is a graduate student in the Master of Arts programme at York University.     

An experimental test of a core REBT hypothesis: evidence that irrational beliefs lead to physiological as well as psychological arousal

While numerous studies support Rational Emotive Behavior Therapy and Theory (REBT), they tend to be limited by their use of correlational designs, simulated scenarios and self-report measures. This study tested a core REBT hypothesis in an experimental design using multiple physiological as well as psychological measures. Ninety patients from a medical practice were placed in a real-life stressful situation while holding either a rational, an irrational, or an indifference belief. Those holding a rational belief reported the greatest increase in concern whereas those holding an irrational belief reported the greatest increase in anxiety. Of particular significance, those holding a rational belief showed a decrease in systolic blood pressure whereas those holding an irrational belief showed an increase (diastolic blood pressure increased in both conditions). These results not only support the core REBT hypothesis, but also suggest a way to differentiate between beliefs and emotions by measuring physiological as well as psychological changes.     

Utilizing artistry in a therapeutic relationship

Abstract

In many humanistic approaches, therapeutic change involves utilizing the relationship between the client and therapist as a tool for personal growth. Like any relationship, the therapeutic relationship is one that is co‐created between those engaged in it, namely, the client and the therapist. Utilizing this co‐created relationship requires a sense of artistry on the part of the therapist. A therapist must be willing to engage in this meaningful relationship with the client. A therapist must also be aware of the personal values that he or she brings into therapy, and how they influence the therapeutic relationship. Finally, a therapist must acknowledge the power that the therapist and the client possess in the relationship, and understand how that power can be used to validate and invalidate the therapist's and the client's personal meanings. These aspects of therapeutic artistry are discussed and the use of therapeutic artistry in Eron and Lund's (1996) narrative solutions approach is presented.     

An Example of Employment Service Adjustment Counseling

This article traces one client's progress from chronic unemployability to vocational stability through the use of rational emotive therapy (RET). The authors explain the causality among activating events, belief systems, and emotional consequences. Examples are given of rational and irrational self-talk, and the client is helped toward a view of self-responsibility in determining his own consequences. The theoretical model is applied to specific areas of the client's daily life, and, through his personal acceptance of the dynamics of emotional disturbance, the client learns new and more effective behavior.     

Belief in good luck and psychological well-being: the mediating role of optimism and irrational beliefs

The authors examined the relationship of belief in good luck with depression and anxiety within the context of a number of cognitive and personality variables used to explain depression and anxiety. Undergraduate students (46 men, 98 women) were administered measures of belief in good luck, depression, anxiety, optimism, neuroticism, attribution style, self-esteem, and irrational beliefs. The results showed that belief in good luck was significantly related to optimism and irrational beliefs. A number of models were tested to determine whether irrational beliefs or optimism mediated the relationship between belief in good luck and depression and anxiety. The findings suggested that negative relationships between belief in good luck and both depression and anxiety are best addressed by the theory that belief in good luck engenders optimistic traits and a reduced level of irrational beliefs.     

Meaning in Life: A Qualitative Inquiry into the Life of Young Adults

The present study explores the relationship of meaning in life with subjective well-being among a sample of young adults launching their career. Using a qualitative approach, ten young adults were asked to share their life experiences using a semi structured interview schedule. A grounded theory analysis revealed that happiness forms a core concern for an individual where it depends not only on the cultural norm involving an individual where social relationships form an important part, but also goals and aims (s) he/she wishes to achieve in life. It exists in temporality but is impacted by the larger dimension of meaning in life which is relatively stable and covers a huge expanse of an individual’s existence. Finding a meaning in life involves both personal goals such as self growth and attainment of peace, and also professional goals like fulfillment of one’s academic aim. Meaning in life is also seen as being impacted by an individual’s past happenings, belief in self- worth and social responsibility.     

Self-Compassion,Self-Esteem,and Irrational Beliefs

Assumptions associated with Rational-Emotive Behavior Therapy (REBT) suggest that self-compassion, but not self-esteem, should be incompatible with irrational beliefs and with the emotional disturbances that they produce. In this study, 184 university students responded to a self-compassion scale along with measures of irrational beliefs, self-esteem, depression, and anxiety. As expected, self-compassion correlated negatively with irrationality, predicted better mental health, and explained inverse connections of self-esteem with irrational beliefs. In support of REBT, the irrationality of low frustration tolerance also partially mediated the inverse self-compassion relationship with anxiety. Other findings for self-esteem and for the irrational belief of self-worth, nevertheless, suggested complexities for the REBT conceptual framework. These data most importantly confirmed self-compassion as part of what REBT would describe as an effective personal philosophy.     

Beliefs m Realistic and Unrealistic Control: Assessment and Implications

ABSTRACT Scales were constructed to measure perceived control over controllable events (realistic control) and perceived control over uncontrollable events (unrealistic control). Internal reliability, test-retest reliability, and discriminant validity of both scales were adequate. Study 1 measured perceived personal control over hassles that judges rated on general controllability. For hassles very high in controllability, perceived personal control was related to belief in realistic control but not to belief in unrealistic control; for hassles very low in controllability, perceived personal control was related to belief in unrealistic control but not to belief in realistic control. Study 2 showed that participants high in unrealistic control belief (but not those high in realistic control belief) persevered more on a task that was in part uncontrollable. Study 3 showed that the combination of low realistic control belief and high unrealistic control belief predicted poorer future health, particularly for participants who have reported the experience of many negative events and/or hassles. The conditions under which unrealistic control results in maladaptive outcomes are discussed.     

Religiosity and Homonegativism: A Path-Analytic Study

Religiosity has been shown to be related to negative attitudes toward homosexuals. We hypothesized that the dimension of ethical conservatism is the major intervening variable that links religiosity to homonegativity. Other variables hypothesized to predict homonegativity included respondents' sex, sexual preference, belief about the amount of choice in sexual orientation, and number of gay friends. A path model of these relationships was proposed and was tested on college students who responded to items measuring the variables in the model. Regression analyses supported the hypothesis that religiosity predicted ethical conservatism, which in turn predicted homonegativity. The model accounted for 50% of the variability in the homonegativity items. These findings indicate that homonegativism does not necessarily stem from irrational fear or repression of homosexual desires but that it can be related to a generally conservative position on questions of personal morality.     

Rational-emotive therapy and the religious client

The religious client presents a particular challenge to the RET therapist in that the irrational beliefs responsible for the client's problems are often created or supported by distortions in the religious belief system. This paper will discuss the connections between religious distortions and the irrational ideas, ways to deal with them, and then present the most common religiously based irrational beliefs along with biblical disputations.Constance Lawrence, M.S., is Director of the Christian Counseling Center in Norwalk, CT, and also has a private practice in Weston, CT.     

Effect of the destructive disagreement belief on satisfaction with one's closest friend

The purpose of this study was to test the hypothesis that, when imagining a serious disagreement with one's closest friend, verbalizing the irrational belief that disagreement is destructive would lead to greater relationship dissatisfaction than would verbalizing the rational belief that disagreement is not destructive. The author used two counter-demand-control conditions to test a second hypothesis that this effect would not be the result of demand characteristics. Undergraduates (119 women and 43 men) were randomly assigned to 1 of 5 conditions in a pretest-posttest design. In comparison with a control condition, posttest relationship dissatisfaction was significantly higher in the irrational condition and was lower, but not significantly so, in the rational condition. These results were not attributable to demand characteristics and suggested that this irrational belief increased relationship dissatisfaction.     

Beliefs and inferences: A test of a rational-emotive hypothesis 1. Performing in an academic seminar

Subjects were asked to imagine that they were going to present an academic seminar. They were further asked to imagine (a) that they adhered to a rational belief or an irrational belief; (b) that they had made or had not made an effort in preparing for the seminar and (c) that their performance counted or did not count towards their final examination grade. Whilst in role, subjects were asked to make inferences about various aspects of their performance and the responses of others. While the results supported the hypothesis that imagining that one is holding an irrational belief leads to more negative inferences than holding a rational belief, it was also found that not making an effort in preparing for the siminar led subjects to make more negative inferences than making an effort. In addition, there were several two-way and three-way significant interactions between the independent variables. The results supported Ellis's (1985) recent formulation concerning the complex relationship between events and inferences (A), beliefs (B) and emotional and behavioral consequences of beliefs (C).Windy Dryden PhD is Senior Lecturer in the Department of Psychology, Goldsmiths' College, University of London, England. Julia Ferguson is Research Assistant in the Department of Psychology, Goldsmiths' College, University of London, England. Tony Clark was an Undergraduate Student in the Department of Psychology, Goldsmiths' College, University of London, England. He graduated in 1987.     

Delusions as harmful malfunctioning beliefs

Delusional beliefs are typically pathological. Being pathological is clearly distinguished from being false or being irrational. Anna might falsely believe that his husband is having an affair but it might just be a simple mistake. Again, Sam might irrationally believe, without good evidence, that he is smarter than his colleagues, but it might just be a healthy self-deceptive belief. On the other hand, when a patient with brain damage caused by a car accident believes that his father was replaced by an imposter or another patient with schizophrenia believes that “The Organization” painted the shops on a street in red and green to convey a message, these beliefs are not merely false or irrational. They are pathological. What makes delusions pathological? This paper explores the negative features because of which delusional beliefs are pathological. First, I critically examine the proposals according to which delusional beliefs are pathological because of (1) their strangeness, (2) their extreme irrationality, (3) their resistance to folk psychological explanations or (4) impaired responsibility-grounding capacities of people with them. I present some counterexamples as well as theoretical problems for these proposals. Then, I argue, following Wakefield’s harmful dysfunction analysis of disorder, that delusional beliefs are pathological because they involve some sorts of harmful malfunctions. In other words, they have a significant negative impact on wellbeing (=harmful) and, in addition, some psychological mechanisms, directly or indirectly related to them, fail to perform the jobs for which they were selected in the past (=malfunctioning). An objection to the proposal is that delusional beliefs might not involve any malfunctions. For example, they might be playing psychological defence functions properly. Another objection is that a harmful malfunction is not sufficient for something to be pathological. For example, false beliefs might involve some malfunctions according to teleosemantics, a popular naturalist account of mental content, but harmful false beliefs do not have to be pathological. I examine those objections in detail and show that they should be rejected after all.     

The value problem and the nature of knowledge

Jason Baehr has argued that the intuition that knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief is neither sufficiently general nor sufficiently formal to motivate the value problem in epistemology. What he calls the “guiding intuition” is not completely general: our intuition does not reveal that knowledge is always more valuable than true belief; and not strictly formal: the intuition is not merely the abstract claim that knowledge is more valuable than true belief. If he is right, the value problem (as we know it) is not a real problem. I will argue in this paper that he is wrong about the generality claim: knowledge is always more valuable than true belief; and yet he is right about the formality claim—there is more to the intuition than just the abstract claim that knowledge is more valuable than true belief. What this amounts to, I will argue, is that there is still a value problem but that the guiding intuition can tell us how to solve it.     

In defence of single-premise closure

It’s often thought that the phenomenon of risk aggregation poses a problem for multi-premise closure but not for single-premise closure (either with respect to knowledge or with respect to justified belief). But recently, Lasonen-Aarnio and Schechter have challenged this thought. Lasonen-Aarnio argues that, insofar as risk aggregation poses a problem for multi-premise closure, it poses a similar problem for single-premise closure. For she thinks that, there being such a thing as deductive risk, risk may aggregate over a single premise and the deduction itself. Schechter argues that single-premise closure succumbs to risk aggregation outright. For he thinks that there could be a long sequence of competent single-premise deductions such that, even though we are justified in believing the initial premise of the sequence, intutively, we are not justified in believing the final conclusion. This intuition, Schechter thinks, vitiates single-premise closure. In this paper, I defend single-premise closure against the arguments offered by Lasonen-Aarnio and Schechter.     

Gender,negative affectivity,and observed social support behavior in marital interaction

Most prior research on social support in close relationships examines perceptions of support, failing to capture fully the helping behaviors that partners exchange while interacting. We observed 60 newly married couples each engage in two 10-minute interactions. with one spouse (the helper) responding while the partner (the helper) discussed a personal characteristic or problem that he or she wanted to change. Helper and helper behaviors were coded and examined in relation to gender and negative affectivity, which have been linked in prior research to perceptions of support. Husbands and wives did not differ in helper behaviors, but wives displayed more negative helper behavior than did husbands. Helper and helper behavior covaried with negative affectivity in expected directions, and helper behavior covaried with the partner's negative affectivity. Finally, analysis of negative reciprocity sequences showed that, as helpers, husbands were more likely to reciprocate negative behavior, and to have their negative behavior reciprocated, to the extent that they were high in negative affectivity. We emphasize the value of observational data in understanding social support in marriage, we discuss the implications of the findings in terms of prevailing beliefs about gender and social support, and we outline the specific links between negative affectivity and observed support behavior in marriage.     

Beliefs and inferences—a test of a rational-emotive hypothesis: 3. On expectations about enjoying a party

Ninety-six subjects were asked to imagine that they were going to a party. They were further asked to imagine (a) that they adhered to a rational or an irrational belief; (b) that they had jilted or been jilted by a partner with whom they were having an intimate relationship; and (c) that they knew or did not know other friends who would be going to the party. Whilst in role, subjects were asked to make inferences about various aspects of their enjoyment of the party. The results supported the hypothesis that holding an irrational belief leads to more negatively distorted inferences than holding a rational belief, and that having been jilted by a partner would have a similar effect. There was only limited support for the hypothesis that the second two independent variables would have a moderating or amplifying effect on the negativity of inferences through interaction with the belief variable. The implications of these findings for counselling are discussed, especially with respect to challenging irrational beliefs.     

Using Drawings to Elicit Nonverbal Constructs in Experiential Personal Construct Psychotherapy

Clients who have experienced psychological wounds prior to the use of language frequently struggle to articulate and make sense of their core constructs around self and others. These early wounds can have a significant influence on future relational interactions, even though they may be experienced at a nonverbal level. While eliciting these preverbal constructs may be essential to the healing process, without verbal representation the therapeutic task can be difficult. In this article, we will discuss the use of symbolism within personal construct psychology as well as the use of drawings as representations of nonverbal constructs. We will then discuss experiential personal construct psychotherapy and its focus on the ways we both connect and disconnect from others. Finally, we will present Kristen, a therapy client who experienced early relational wounds and increasingly dissociated in response to relational stress as she matured. Kristen's work in therapy around her fragmented sense of self included drawing her internal self-parts. Only then was she able to wrap words around that which she previously experienced nonverbally. In this case study, Kristen's drawings and her core constructs as elicited during four years of therapy will be presented and discussed.     

Two Egocentric Sources of the Decision to Vote: The Voter's Illusion and the Belief in Personal Relevance

The decision to vote in a national election requires a choice between serving a social good and satisfying one's self-interest. Viewed as a cooperative response in a social dilemma, casting a vote seems irrational because it cannot have a discernible effect on the electoral outcome. The findings of two studies with undergraduate samples suggest that some people vote not because they set aside self-interest, but because they expect their own behaviors to matter. Two psychological processes contribute to this belief: the voter's illusion (the projection of one's own choice between voting and abstention to supporters of the same party or candidate), and the belief in personal relevance (the belief that one's own vote matters regardless of its predictive value for the behavior of others). The rationality of these two egocentric mechanisms depends on the normative framework invoked. Their relevance for actual voting behavior is indicated by their ability to account for four types of variation in turnout rates.     

Beliefs and inferences: a test of a rational-emotive hypothesis: 2. On the prospect of seeing a spider

96 subjects were asked to imagine that they were about to enter a room in which there may have been one or more spiders. They were also asked to imagine that (a) they either held a rational or an irrational belief about spiders, (b) they were about to enter the room either alone or with someone, and (c) that the room was either dark or light. Having absorbed their assigned role, the subjects were then asked to make inferences about various elements of their situation. The results supported the hypothesis that holding an irrational belief leads to more negative inferences. It was also found that the lighting conditions in the room and whether the subject was alone or with someone affected the negativity of the inferences made. In addition, there were several two-way and three-way interactions between the independent variables which indicated that entering a light room or being with someone else tended to moderate the negativity of inferences made by those holding a rational belief rather than the opposite, amplifying the negativity of inferences made by those holding an irrational belief. The results supported Ellis's (1985) recent formulation concerning the complex relationship between events and inferences (A), beliefs (B), and emotional and behavioral consequences of beliefs (C).