The creative spark of death: The effects of mortality salience and personal need for structure on creativity

Previous research indicates that the awareness of death can be a barrier to creative expression. Specifically, when mortality is rendered salient, creativity is inhibited. However, no studies have considered how individual differences may impact the effect of mortality salience on creativity. Past research has found that mortality salience increases explorative thought processes for individuals low in personal need for structure. Thus, for these people, mortality salience may increase, not decrease, creativity. The current study examined this possibility. Personal need for structure was measured, mortality salience was experimentally manipulated, and creativity was assessed. As predicted, mortality salience increased creativity amongst individuals low in personal need for structure. No effect of mortality salience was observed amongst individuals high in personal need for structure.     

The effects of Web site structure: the role of personal difference.

This study examined the effects of Web site structures in terms of advertising effectiveness- memory, attitude, and behavioral intentions. The primary research question for this study is, What type of Web site (Web ad) structure is most effective? In the pilot study, we tested the difference between two Web site structures, linear and interactive, in terms of traditional advertising effectiveness. Results from the pilot study did not support our research expectations. However, differences in terms of memory were noted between the two structures. After re-creating the Web site based on subjects' comments, in the final experiment, we examined the differences between the two structures and the moderating role of personality difference on the effects of Web site structure. The results confirm that participants' attitude, memory, and behavioral intentions were affected differently by the different Web site structures. However, some research hypotheses were not supported by the current data.     

Inter‐ and intrapersonal processes underlying authoritarianism: The role of social conformity and personal need for structure

Several personality constructs have been theorised to underlie right‐wing authoritarianism (RWA). In samples from New Zealand and Germany (Ns = 218, 259), we tested whether these constructs can account for specific variance in RWA. In both samples, social conformity and personal need for structure were independent predictors of RWA. In Sample 2, where also openness to experience was measured, social conformity and personal need for structure fully mediated the impact of the higher‐order factor of openness on RWA. Our results contribute to the integration of current approaches to the personality basis of authoritarianism and suggest that two distinct personality processes contribute to RWA: An interpersonal process related to social conformity and an intrapersonal process related to rigid cognitive style. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Differing emotional sensitivities in the two factors of personal need for structure

The current project examines dispositional orientations toward positive or negative stimuli based on individual differences in personal need for structure (PNS). Although Neuberg and Newsom (1993) describe PNS as stemming from two sources of simple structure, desire for structure (DFS) and response to lack of structure (RLS), the two subscales are commonly combined. The current study found that high DFS (but not high RLS) was associated with a tendency to create more positive words in a word-fragment-completion task, generate more positive content in a story-completion task, and remember more positive words in a free-recall memory task. High-RLS (but not high-DFS) was associated with the opposite tendency (i.e., oriented toward negatives). Possible revisions to previous conclusions involving PNS are discussed.     

Mortality salience increases death-anxiety for individuals low in personal need for structure

Research derived from terror management theory suggests that death cognition does not lead to death-anxiety because people respond to thoughts of death by turning to social and cultural structures that provide a sense of psychological security. However, recent research indicates that it is people high, but not low, in personal need for structure that turn to social and cultural structures in response to heightened death cognition. Such findings suggest that people low in PNS may be vulnerable to experiencing death-anxiety when death thoughts are activated. The current study explored this possibility. Individual differences in personal need for structure were measured and death cognition (mortality salience) was manipulated. Subsequently, death-anxiety was assessed. Mortality salience increased death-anxiety, but only among individuals low in personal need for structure.     

The sense of diachronic personal identity

In this paper, I first consider a famous objection that the standard interpretation of the Lockean account of diachronicity (i.e., one’s sense of personal identity over time) via psychological connectedness falls prey to breaks in one’s personal narrative. I argue that recent case studies show that while this critique may hold with regard to some long-term autobiographical self-knowledge (e.g., episodic memory), it carries less warrant with respect to accounts based on trait-relevant, semantic self-knowledge. The second issue I address concerns the question of diachronicity from the vantage point that there are (at least) two aspects of self—the self of psycho-physical instantiation (what I term the epistemological self) and the self of first person subjectivity (what I term the ontological self; for discussion, see Klein SB, The self and its brain, Social Cognition, 30, 474–518, 2012). Each is held to be a necessary component of selfhood, and, in interaction, they are appear jointly sufficient for a synchronic sense of self (Klein SB, The self and its brain, Social Cognition, 30, 474–518, 2012). As pertains to diachronicity, by contrast, I contend that while the epistemological self, by itself, is precariously situated to do the work required by a coherent theory of personal identity across time, the ontological self may be better positioned to take up the challenge.     

Interactive effects of social context and sex role identity on female self-disclosure during the acquaintance process

Female subjects who differed in masculinity and in femininity self-disclosed to a same-sex confederate in contexts that made either social/expressive motives or instrumental motives particularly salient. The confederate spoke first on each of four disclosure topics, presenting either intimate or nonintimate information in her disclosures. The results were consistent with our primary assertion that measures of sex role identity would accurately forecast contextual variations in female self-disclosure. Specifically, femininity tended to promote self-disclosure in social/expressive contexts while clearly inhibiting such exchanges in the instrumental context. Supplementary data revealed that the tendency of highly feminine participants to close up in the instrumental context stemmed not from problems in their contemporaneous interpersonal relationships with their partners, but rather from a concern that disclosing too much might adversely affect their partners' evaluation of their competencies. Although masculinity did not exert direct effects of female self-disclosure within any particular context, it did have an influence, for subjects high in femininity were highly self-revealing across contexts if they were also high in masculinity (i.e., androgynous).This research was supported by National Institute of Mental health Grant MH 43726-01 to David R. Shaffer.     

Extending the challenge-hindrance model of occupational stress: The role of appraisal

Interest regarding the challenge-hindrance occupational stress model has increased in recent years, however its theoretical foundation has not been tested. Drawing from the transactional theory of stress, this study tests the assumptions made in past research (1) that workload and responsibility are appraised as challenges and role ambiguity and role conflict are appraised as hindrances, and (2) that these appraisals mediate the relationship between these stressors and outcomes (i.e., strains, job dissatisfaction, and turnover intentions). For a sample of 479 employees, we found that although workload, role ambiguity, and role conflict could be appraised primarily as challenges or hindrances, they could also simultaneously be perceived as being both to varying degrees. Support was also found for a model in which primary appraisal partially mediated the stressor-outcome relationship.     

Memory and mineness in personal identity

Stanley Klein and Shaun Nichols (2012) describe the case of patient R.B., whose memories (they claim) lacked the sense of “mineness” usually conveyed by memory. Klein and Nichols take R.B.’s case to show that the sense of mineness is merely a contingent feature of memory, which they see as raising two problems for memory-based accounts of personal identity. First, they see it as potentially undermining the appeal of memory-based accounts. Second, they take it to show that the conception of quasi-memory that underpins many memory-based accounts is inadequate. I argue that Klein and Nichols’ characterization of R.B.’s experience is implausible; as a result, the problems that they describe for memory-based accounts of personal identity do not arise.     

On two arguments for the indeterminacy of personal identity

Both arguments are based on the breakdown of normal criteria of identity in certain science-fictional circumstances. In one case, normal criteria would support the identity of person A with each of two other persons, B and C; and it is argued that, in the imagined circumstances, A=B and A=C have no truth value. In the other, a series or spectrum of cases is tailored to a sorites argument. At one end of the spectrum, persons A and B are such that A=B is clearly true; at the other end, A and B are such that the identity is clearly false. In between, normal criteria of identity leave the truth or falsehood of A=B undecided, and it is argued that in these circumstances A=B has no truth value.These arguments are to be understood counterfactually. My claim is that, so understood, neither establishes its conclusion. The first involves a pair of counterfactual situations that are equally possible or tied. If A=B and A=C have no truth value, a counterfactual conditional with one of them as consequent and an antecedent that is true in circumstances in which either is true should have no truth value. Intuitively, however, any such counterfactual is false. The second argument can be seen to invite an analogous response. If this is right, however, there is an important disanalogy between this and the classical paradox of the heap. If the disanalogy is only apparent, the argument shows at most that the existence of persons can be indeterminate.     

A dilemma for the soul theory of personal identity

The problem of diachronic personal identity is this: what explains why a person P₁ at time T₁ is numerically identical with a person P₂ at a later time T₂, even if they are not at those times qualitatively identical? One traditional explanation is the soul theory, according to which persons persist in virtue of their nonphysical souls. I argue here that this view faces a new and arguably insuperable dilemma: either (a) souls, like physical bodies, change over time, in which case the soul theory faces an analogue problem of diachronic soul identity, or (b) souls, unlike physical bodies, do not change over time, in which case the soul theory cannot explain why souls relate to particular bodies over time and so at best only partially explains personal identity. I conclude that the soul theory fares no better than physicalist-friendly accounts of personal identity such as bodily- or psychological-continuity-based views.     

Advance directives and the personal identity problem

The value and authority of advance directives such as the living will and the durable power of attorney are discussed, as well as the dangers of loss of personal identity and psychological continuity that these directives present. Differing theories of the degree of psychological continuity necessary for the preservation of personal identity are examined, concluding with the author's "compromise position" that cases of permanent unconsciousness and neurological dementia destroy some of the preconditions for personhood and thereby negate the choice between respecting the wishes of the formerly competent person and the new, different person's life because such beings are not persons at all.     

The relationship between sex-role identity and beliefs in personal control

Three hundred and ten college undergraduate students completed the Bem Sex-Role Inventory and Rotter's Internal-External Scale measuring locus of control. Males were significantly more internal than females. Both males and females who had high same-sex scale scores were significantly more internal than those with low same-sex scale scores. That is, males who were masculine or androgynous and females who were feminine or androgynous reported greater internal locus of control beliefs than did those males who were feminine or undifferentiated and those females who were masculine or undifferentiated. It was suggested that these findings result from different styles of power typically associated with sex-role stereotypes.     

The need for personal and social education in secondary schools and further education

The need for personal and social education in schools is outlined. Reference is made to the concept of psychological education that is being developed in the United States, and a model of personal growth and career development is described with particular emphasis on areas of personal growth that need to be developed within the school curriculum. Results of a survey of young people's personal and interpersonal problems are presented which give accounts of the range of difficulties 235 fourth year and fifth year boys and girls in secondary education and 36 young people in employment had in their interpersonal relationships with parents, teachers, employers, community authority figures, same- and opposite-sex friends, etc. Information was also obtained on what actually occupied young people's thoughts: the things they found it difficult to cope with and talk about, the things that they felt parents should tell their children, what they would like to talk to their teachers and parents about, and the attributes which they felt they could or could not change for themselves.