What Can Causal Claims Mean?

How can Hume account for the meaning of causal claims? The causal realist, I argue, is, on Hume's view, saying something nonsensical. I argue that both realist and agnostic interpretations of Hume are inconsistent with his view of language and intentionality. But what then accounts for this illusion of meaning? And even when we use causal terms in accordance with Hume’s definitions, we seem merely to be making disguised self-reports. I argue that Hume’s view is not as implausible as it sounds by exploring his conception of language.     

What Should we Hope?

Philosophia - In this paper I propose an interpretation of Kant’s notion of the highest good which bears political, ethical, and religious layers simultaneously. I argue that a proper...     

What Do We Mean by “The Biology of Menopause”?

Most commonly, the biology of menopause is equated with the biomedical model of menopause. The biomedical model emphasizes the central importance of estrogen and has an overriding focus on disease. A broader-biological model is presented, which emphasizes the role of hormones in healthy functioning. Hormones are team players in complex, multidetermined systems that have a purpose. Hormones act in concert with other physiological systems and with sensory and social inputs. Human biology is both similar to and different from that of other animals. The implications of these assumptions for understanding menopause are discussed, especially the kinds of questions that are asked and the kinds of evidence needed before conclusions are drawn with regard to clinically significant areas. A broader-biological model of menopause provides a framework within which health-related issues can be considered from a perspective that is, on the one hand, more holistic, and on the other hand, more attentive to individual differences.     

What Must We Mean By “Community”? A Processive Account

The term "community" in ethics and bioethics traditionally has been used to designate either a specific kind of moral relationship available to rational agents or, in contrast, the context in which any sense of rational agency can even be understood. I argue that bioethics is better served when both "selves" and "community" are expressed through a more processive language that highlights the functional character of such concepts. In particular, I see the turn to "processive" community in bioethics as a turn towards method, contextualization, and narrative. In clinical practice, such a processive account demands that bioethics concentrate on methods of developing healthy dialogue and deeper understanding from within the problematic situation rather than trying to "fix" problems using ethical tools developed from outside the present situation. "Community," I argue, is in and of the interactive processes of inquiry itself. Such inquiry, such "communitying," requires that we engage individual patients in context; it demands more than simply gaining their permission or mere consent; it demands developing a supportive environment for participation.     

How Should What Economists Call “Social Values” Be Measured?

Most economists and some philosophers distinguish individual utilities from interpersonal social values. Even if challenges to that conceptual distinction can be met, further philosophically interesting questions arise. I pursue three in this paper, using, as context for the discussion, health economics and its attempt to discern empirically a social welfare function to help guide rationing decisions. (1) To discern these utilities and values in a manner that is morally appropriate if they are to influence rationing decisions, who should be queried? To discern individual health state utilities, persons in precisely those states should be asked (generically, “patients”), but for social values, representatives of the general public should be. (2) To discern social values, what should representatives of the public be asked? They should be asked “person trade-off” (PTO) questions that encompass their own self-interest, not PTO questions that focus only on others. (3) What must public representatives understand before they respond to such questions? Despite the philosophically complex problem of patient adaptation, they should understand (among other things) the health state utilities elicited from actual patients with the conditions at issue.     

Forgiveness or Fairness?

Abstract

Several philosophers who argue that forgiveness is an important virtue also wish to maintain the moral value of retributive emotions that forgiveness is meant to overcome. As such, these accounts explicate forgiveness as an Aristotelian mean between too much resentment and too little resentment. I argue that such an account ends up making forgiveness superfluous: it turns out that the forgiving person is not praised for a greater willingness to let go of her resentment, but rather for her fairness or good judgment. I conclude by arguing that the virtue of fair-mindedness is more compatible with maintaining the value of the retributive emotions than the virtue of forgiveness.     

What Does it Mean to call God Good?

Contemporary expositions of God's goodness commonly err either (1) by subjecting God to moral laws, which is to question His sovereignty, or (2) by failing to establish that God will always act in accordance with moral principles, which removes the theist's ability to appeal to God's goodness in response to problems of evil. Current attempts at intermediate positions which avoid these two problems fall short. In this paper, I aim to construct a better intermediate position and account of God's goodness. I do this by claiming that God's ability to create is best explained in terms of God's self-love. Since God, as the greatest possible being, must be able to create, He must love Himself. I argue that this in turn entails that God loves all things, since by loving Himself, God loves the pre-existent ideas of everything that will come to exist, and by extension the things themselves. This, I argue, allows us to have confidence that God will act in accordance with moral principles, but without subjecting Him to moral laws.     

Who Should Do Faculty Development and What Should It Be?

In the face of widespread public dissatisfaction with higher education, faculty development programs—especially semester- and year-long leaves—have become more important than ever before as a means of helping faculty broaden their scholarship and enhance their teaching. Department chairs should play an important hand in decisions on faculty development assignments. Given that they also have other important responsibilities, however, ways must be found to entice department chairs to become as involved in faculty development as they are in promotion and tenure, curriculum review, and decisions on merit salary increments. The particular value of faculty development programs for women and members of minority groups must also be recognized. These two groups of faculty may experience special problems in adjusting to faculty life, which make faculty development opportunities even more valuable to them than to others.     

What Kinds of People Should We Create?

The advent of genetic engineering will give people the power to design the members of the succeeding generation, and thus will render practical the issue how such a power ought to be exercised. Here I address that issue in a general way. I point out that the aim of making future people better adapted to the modern social environment is implicitly circular, since the natures of the people themselves will determine the nature of the social environment. I claimthat the human property the enhancement of which would do most to enrich experience is intelligence; accordingly increased intelligence should be a primary aim of genetic designers. The tendency to feel pain should be attenuated, as positive motivation is substituted for negative (to some extent). People should be designed so as to be motivated more by reason than by any non-rational drives (though rational motivation may still involve pleasure andpain). The sex drive, having outlived its usefulness, will probably be replaced by some other source of pleasure. As a side effect of these changes in people, the arts and social sociences will be transformed beyond recognition. [1]     

What Should Realists Say About Honor Cultures?

Richard Nisbett and Dov Cohen’s (1996) influential account of “cultures of honor” speculates that honor norms are a socially-adaptive deterrence strategy. This theory has been appealed to by multiple empirically-minded philosophers, and plays an important role in John Doris and Alexandra Plakias’ (2008) antirealist argument from disagreement. In this essay, I raise four objections to the Nisbett-Cohen deterrence thesis, and offer another theory of honor in its place that sees honor as an agonistic normative system regulating prestige competitions. Since my account portrays honor norms as radically different from liberal ones, it actually strengthens Doris and Plakias’ case in some respects: cultures of honor are not merely superficially different from Western liberal ones. Nonetheless, the persistent appeal of honor’s principles, and their moral plausibility in certain contexts, suggests not antirealism, but pluralism—a reply on behalf of realism that itself has considerable empirical support.     

What Should Conceptual Engineering Be All About?

Philosophia - Conceptual engineering is commonly characterized as the method for assessing and improving our representational devices. Little has been said, however, on how best to construe these...     

What Does Heidegger Mean by the Transcendence of Dasein?

Abstract

In this paper, I shall examine the evolution of Heidegger’s concept of ‘transcendence’ as it appears in Being and Time (1927), ‘On the Essence of Ground’ (1928) and related texts from the late 1920s in relation to his rethinking of subjectivity and intentionality. Heidegger defines Being as ‘transcendence’ in Being and Time and reinterprets intentionality in terms of the transcendence of Dasein. In the critical epistemological tradition of philosophy stemming from Kant, as in Husserl, transcendence and immanence are key notions (see Husserl, The Idea of Phenomenology, 1907, and Ideas I, 1913). Indeed, ‘transcendence in immanence’ is a leitmotif of Husserl’s phenomenology. Husserl discusses transcendence in some detail in Cartesian Meditations §11 in a manner that is not dissimilar to Heidegger. Heidegger is critical of Husserl’s understanding of consciousness and intentionality and Heidegger deliberately chooses to discuss transcendence as an exceptional domain for the discussion of beings in his ‘On the Essence of Ground’, his submission to Husserl’s seventieth-birthday Festschrift. Despite his championing of a new concept of transcendence in the late 1920s, Heidegger effectively abandons the term during the early 1930s. In this paper, I shall explore Heidegger’s articulation of his new ontological conception of finite transcendence and compare it with Husserl’s conception of the transcendence of the ego in order to get clearer what is at stake in Heidegger’s conceptions of subjectivity, Dasein and transcendence.     

What Form of Historical Consciousness Should Schools Impart?

Studies in Philosophy and Education - In this essay, I ask what form of historical consciousness schools should nurture in students. The two criteria I set up in this regard are...