THE PARADOXICAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MORALITY AND MORAL WORTH

Abstract: If the social environment were arranged so that most people in the West could, with relatively little effort, be morally good to a reasonable degree, would this be a good thing? I claim that it is not entirely obvious that we should say yes. This is no idle question: mainstream Western social morality today seems to be approaching the prospect for a morality that is not taxing. This question has substantial theoretical interest because exploring it will help us understand the paradoxical relationship between morality and moral worth.     

训练对儿童道德判断的影响的实验研究

促进儿童道德判断能力的发展,使他们能明辨是非,是我们学校道德教育的一项重要任务。 皮亚杰(J.Piaget,1932)很早就证明儿童的道德判断随年龄的增长而变化。但是,皮亚杰没有明确指出影响这一变化的各种因素。     

信息加工认知心理学的发展和面临的挑战

本文认为当代信息加工认知心理学发展的特点是：（１）与高新科学技术结合．在基础理论的研究方面有较大的突破;（２）将自然认知与社会认知的研究结合起来,促使信息加工的研究能更接近人类实际的认知过程：（３）将基础理论研究与应用研究相结合,不断扩大认知心理学的研究领域和应用范围．为了迎接面临的挑战和适应社会发展的需要,信息加工认知心理学应更充分地体现时代精神,坚持走实验研究和现象学研究相结合、定量研究与定性研究相结合、微观研究与宏观研究相结合,以及文理互补、多科渗透的发展道路。     

FOK的线索熟悉性假说与线索熟悉性判断

这项研究对ＦＯＫ的线索熟悉性假说进行了进一步检验,该假说认为,人们是根据自已对记忆线索是否熟悉而作ＦＯＫ判断的,研究结果表明,线索熟悉性判断与ＦＯＫ判断是两种不同性质的判断,它们可以在相同的刺激模式下表现出不同的反应模式。     

EVIDENCE AND FALSIFICATION: CHALLENGES TO GREGORY PETERSON

In this reply to Gregory Peterson's essay “Maintaining Respectability,” which itself is a response to my “Is Theology Respectable as Metaphysics?” I elaborate upon my claims that theology treats God's existence as an absolute certainty immune to refutation and that modern science constitutes the canons of respectable reasoning for metaphysical disciplines. I conclude with some comments on Peterson's “In Praise of Folly? Theology and the University.”     

REACTANCE AND INTENTIONALITY ATTRIBUTIONS AS DETERMINANTS OF THE INTENT TO FILE A GRIEVANCE

Experimental studies were conducted in two unions to examine the effects of perceptual variables–namely, reactance and intentionality attributions–on the intent to seek redress from management action. Participants responded to a series of vignettes, each of which described a management action (formal punishment, informal warning, promotion denial) taken against an employee. The vignettes varied systematically in terms of the perceived threat to worker freedom posed by the action and the degree to which the action was motivated by a dispositional rather than an environmental attribution. Both studies demonstrated that greater threat and dispositional attributions provoked stronger intent to file a grievance. Implications of the findings were discussed for investigating and screening grievances.     

UNCERTAINTY OF COMPARATIVE JUDGEMENTS AND MULTIDIMENSIONAL STRUCTURE

An analysis of preferences with respect to silhouette drawings of nude females is presented. Systematic intransitivities were discovered. The dispersions of differences (comparatal dispersions) were shown to reflect the multidimensional structure of the stimuli, a finding expected on the basis of prior work. Difference ratings of these stimuli were analyzed by the TORSCA and INDSCAL procedures. The three stimulus dimensions all appeared in the multidimensional analyses.     

MORALITY AND NATURE: EVOLUTIONARY CHALLENGES TO CHRISTIAN ETHICS

Christian ethics accentuates in manifold ways the unique character of human nature. Personalists believe that the mind is never reducible to material and physical substance. The human person is presented as the supreme principle, based on arguments referring to free‐willed actions, the immateriality of both the divine spirit and the reflexive capacity, intersubjectivity and self‐consciousness. But since Darwin, evolutionary biology slowly instructs us that morality roots in dispositions that are programmed by evolution into our nature. Historically, Thomas Huxley, “Darwin's bulldog,” agreed with Darwin on almost everything, except for his gradualist position on moral behavior. Huxley's “saltationism” has recently been characterized by Frans de Waal as “a veneer theory of morality.” Does this mark the end of a period of presenting morality as only the fruit of socialization processes (nurture) and as having nothing in common with nature? Does it necessarily imply a corrosion of personalist views on the human being or do Christian ethics have to become familiar again with their ancient roots?     

CONSCIENCE, MORAL TRUTH, AND MORAL ERRORS: SOME RESPONSES TO EDMUND LEITES

Edmund Leites's lucid article on conscience, casuistry, and moral decision in the Church of England in the late 17th and early 18th centuries has amply demonstrated how the idea of conscience developed and changed from a background assumption of moral autonomy to that of self-reliance in addition to the belief in moral autonomy. In this shift the art of moral casuistry has gradually lost its original relevance and even become a forgotten idea. It may be wondered why this happened and what significance may be adduced from this. It may also be wondered what philosophical evaluation can be rendered of casuistry independent of the historical nexus of its transformation. From a comparative perspective in connection with the Chinese heritage, Leites's paper provides excellent evidence for the surprising existence of similar strains of thought on conscience in Chinese and Western traditions even though the metaphysical and religious contexts and backgrounds of these strains of thought are radically different. This difference in metaphysical and religious contexts and backgrounds raises some profound philosophical questions which are indicated in Leites's comments on my original article. In this response, I shall first discuss similar strains of thought on conscience in Chinese and English sources, and then explore briefly the different metaphiscal structures underlying these thoughts. I shall finally consider what theoretical conclusions are warranted in light of both the article and the comments of Edmund Leites.     

图形的相似性与差异性判断的关系及机制的研究

本研究采用与标准刺激特征相似和关系相似的图形组成的图片,让80名大学生被试选择与标准刺激更相似的和差异更大的图形,分析相似性和差异性判断的关系以及两种判断过程的机制。结果发现：相似性判断和差异性判断不是镜像关系;差异性判断的时间长于相似性判断的时间;在特征与关系共存的时候,特征和关系在相似性判断和差异性判断中起着不同的作用,相似性判断更多地考虑关系,差异性判断更多地考虑特征。     

HUSSERLIAN INTENTIONALITY AND THE CHINESE CONCEPT OF MIND

The phenomenology of Edmund Husserl is, in one sense, a theory of pure consciousness that aims to set forth an absolute, ultimate, rigorous ground for the sciences based on the field of pure consciousness. Husserl believed that, on the basis of this field of pure consciousness, he could secure eternal significance for the spiritual life of man. Intentionality is the key element in this theory of pure consciousness and it plays a crucial part in the realization of Husserl's philosophical goal. By contrast, traditional Chinese philosophy was not concerned to seek an absolute, ultimate ground for the sciences or to derive a set of moral norms and a theory of value for human life from logical and scientific truths. Rather, Chinese philosophy sought to adjust the relationships between man and nature and between man and man in their ordinary, secular existence. It placed no value in the ideas of pure logic, pure science, or pure consciousness. Traditional Chinese philosophers inquired into the experiential, intuitive 'mind' ( xin ^a). This approach to 'mind'was understood by the Chinese to require rigorous logical proof or scientific theory:— anyone can perceive one's 'mind'in daily life and, by analogy, anyone can 'perceive'other 'minds'. If Husserl's intentionality is the transcendental reason of Western philosophy, the 'mind'is the practical reason of Chinese philosophy. What, then, are the essential features of Husserl's 'intentionality'and the Chinese 'mind'? What are their respective theoretical features? Can they be brought together and compared in a philosophically significant fashion?     

COHERENTISM AND THE EPISTEMIC JUSTIFICATION OF MORAL BELIEFS: A CASE STUDY IN HOW TO DO PRACTICAL ETHICS WITHOUT APPEAL TO A MORAL THEORY

This paper defends a coherentist approach to moral epistemology. In “The Immorality of Eating Meat” (2000), I offer a coherentist consistency argument to show that our own beliefs rationally commit us to the immorality of eating meat. Elsewhere, I use our own beliefs as premises to argue that we have positive duties to assist the poor (2004) and to argue that biomedical animal experimentation is wrong (2012). The present paper explores whether this consistency‐based coherentist approach of grounding particular moral judgments on beliefs we already hold, with no appeal to moral theory, is a legitimate way of doing practical ethics. I argue (i) that grounding particular moral judgments on our core moral convictions and other core nonmoral beliefs is a legitimate way to justify moral judgments, (ii) that these moral judgments possess as much epistemic justification and have as much claim to objectivity as moral judgments grounded on particular ethical theories, and (iii) that this internalistic coherentist method of grounding moral judgments is more likely to result in behavioral guidance than traditional theory‐based approaches to practical ethics. By way of illustrating the approach, I briefly recapitulate my consistency‐based argument for ethical vegetarianism. I then defend the coherentist approach implicit in the argument against a number of potentially fatal metatheoretical attacks.     

ISLAM AND ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS: TRADITION RESPONDS TO CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES

Abstract. Mounting globed environmental challenges beg for cross-cultural discussions that highlight underlying cultural values regarding nature. This paper explores the insights of Islamic scholars as they examine the interaction of Islamic culture and the West. The Western worldview that separates religion and science, value and fact, in particular differs from Islamic tradition, which sees all facets of life and affairs as interconnected by virtue of their common source—the Creator. As traditional Islamic values have been abandoned to adopt modern Western technologies, environmental problems have intensified in the Muslim world. Islamic scholars urge a return to Islamic ideals that reflect a sacramental view of the physical universe, and they champion the revival of an Islamic science that synthesizes empirical study and symbolic cognition.     

WORLD HUNGER AND A MORAL RIGHT TO SUBSISTENCE

We live in a world in which one of every five persons does not get enough to eat. Each day more than ten thousand people die of starvation; thousands more, both adults and children, suffer brain damage and other functional abnormalities because of malnutrition. Often there is simply not enough drinking water or not enough food available. Some people must do without. A drought has come and some are allowed to die. Or, less food has been grown because less fertilizer was imported and hundreds or thousands die.     

BLAME AND RESPONSIVENESS TO MORAL REASONS: ARE PSYCHOPATHS BLAMEWORTHY?

Abstract: Many philosophers believe that people who are not capable of grasping the significance of moral considerations are not open to moral blame when they fail to respond appropriately to these considerations. I contend, however, that some morally blind, or ‘psychopathic,’ agents are proper targets for moral blame, at least on some occasions. I argue that moral blame is a response to the normative commitments and attitudes of a wrongdoer and that the actions of morally blind agents can express the relevant blame‐grounding attitudes insofar as these agents possess the capacity to make judgments about non‐moral reasons.     

MORAL FACTS AND SUITABLY INFORMED SUBJECTS: A REPLY TO DENHAM

The nature of moral facts, and their relationship to rationality, imagination and sentiment, have been central and pressing issues in recent moral philosophy. In this paper, I discuss and criticise a meta‐ethical theory put forward by Alison Denham, which views moral facts as being constituted by the responses of ideal, empathetic agents. I argue that Denham's account is radically unstable, in that she has given us an account of the nature of such agents which is inconsistent with an independently plausible principle relating to concept acquisition. I go on to discuss one line of defence that Denham might employ, but argue that taking such a line entails abandoning what she takes to be an important advantage of her account over rival ideal‐observer theories such as Michael Smith’s.