Self-Awareness and the Integration of Pramāṇa and Madhyamaka

Buddhist theories of mind pivot between two distinct interpretative strands: (1) an epistemological tradition in which the mind, or the mental, is the foundation for valid knowledge and (2) a tradition of deconstruction, in which there is no privileged vantage point for truth claims. The contested status of these two strands is evident in the debates surrounding the relationship between epistemology (pramāna) and Madhyamaka that extend from India to Tibet. The paper will focus on two exemplars of these approaches in Tibet, those of ?ākya Chokden (shākya mchog ldan, 1428–1507) and Tsongkhapa (tsong kha pa blo bzang grags pa, 1357–1419).     

The Rāga Bhāva in the Sāṁkhya Kārikā: Rectifying an Age-Old Mistake

The last foot of the 23rd verse of the Sā?khya Kārikā (SK)—‘tāmasam asmāt viparyastam’—is in need of reinterpretation. Prevailing interpretations are generally based on the primary meaning of the verse. In that sense, it is understood as a declaration of the four tāmasika bhāva that are contrary to the sāttvika ones. Taking the primary meaning of the verse is problematic because it contradicts the gu?a-bhāva coherence required by the doctrine of satkārya. The doctrine of satkārya is one of the foundational principles of Sā?khya. The avirāga or rāga bhāva shows coherence to rajas rather than tamas. I show that the verse needs to be interpreted by taking the secondary meaning. Accordingly, avirāga or rāga is established as a bhāva of rajas rather than tamas. Further, I also show that the idea of bhāva in the Sā?khya Kārikā and the Bhagavadgītā may be closely related.     

The incarnated icon of Ṣaydnāyā: light and shade

The shrine of the Virgin Mary in the Syrian town of ?aydnāyā is an important Levantine Christian centre and one of the principal Christian pilgrimage sites in the Middle East, second only to the holy city of Jerusalem during the Middle Ages. This study's intent is to examine in detail, and to provide a key for interpreting, the major incongruity emerging through a comparison of the two main textual traditions regarding the shrine: the Christian-Arabic and the Latin-Western. The dissimilarity is constituted by the significant divergences concerning the representation of the miracle of the incarnation traditionally ascribed to the icon of the Virgin venerated in ?aydnāyā, which is essentially omitted in the Christian-Arabic sources. I argue that a key to the understanding of this reticence can be provided by an analysis of the heretical character ascribed to this particular miracle in Islamic theological thought and of the consequent threat it posed to the survival of the shrine itself. That being the primary focus of the investigation, the article also explores some aspects of the cultural and historical vicissitudes and crises of the cult of the shrine in the West from the fourteenth century onwards which, despite the great number of academic works dedicated to this subject, have remained unclear to this day. More specifically, I argue that apparently aporematic elements on the textual level can be interpreted logically by examining the central role played by the Knights Templar in the cult's material and cultural diffusion and by taking into account the connection of the shrine's decay with the order's downfall. The present analysis focuses almost exclusively on the medieval period as being the most significant for the formation and development of the cult of the shrine.     

Vedic and devotional waters: The Jalabheda of vallabhācārya

Summary Bhāvas, or comprehensive states of mental and emotional awareness, manifest different guṇas, or attributes, of the Lord. These attributes are wholly composed of saccidānanda, but due to variations in their bearers (ādhāra), which is to say in the antaḥkaraṇa of different speakers and listeners, they are affected, expressed, and experienced differently. In this way, bhāvas cannot exist without the Lord’s divine attributes, nor can they exist in the absence of the individual jīva. They are eternal because they belong to the Lord but become meaningful only because the individual through the senses can realize them. They thus serve as a fulcrum between the human and divine, and it is at this delicate point of balance that līlā is played out.     

The importance of Hinayāna and Mahāyāna

Volume 1. Hinayāna. Den tidlige indiske buddhisme. Volume 2. Mahāyāna. Den senere indiske buddhisme. Christian Lindtner, 1998, Copenhagen, Spektrum/Forum Publishers, Vol. 1: 228 pp., ISBN 87 7763 170 6; Vol. 2: 256 pp., ISBN 87 7763 174 9     

From criticism to approval: A reconsideration of Ji’s Yogācāra position on Madhyamaka

Madhyamaka and Yogācāra are two Mahāyāna schools which have distinct systems. In the seventh century East Asia, the doctrinal distinction between the two schools was received as doctrinal contrast in the polemic circumstance of Emptiness-Existence (C. kongyou 空有) controversy. In this context, Ji 基 (632–682), the putative founder of East Asian Yogācāra school, has been normally considered by scholars to have advocated ‘Existence’ (viz., Yogācāra) in opposition to ‘Emptiness’ (viz., Madhyamaka). It is problematic, however, to brand Ji’s Yogācāra position simply as anti-Madhyamaka. Although Ji evidently expresses evident criticism on such a Madhyamaka exegete as Bhāvaviveka (ca. 500–570) in some of his works, he also describes Bhāvaviveka in an amicable or even respective way in other works. By analyzing Ji’s extant works, this article argues that Ji’s scholastic attitude toward Madhyamaka changed from criticism to approval.     

The logic and language of Nirvāna: A contemporary interpretation

In contrast to historically orientedapproaches, this paper tackles the concept ofNirvna from the perspective ofcontemporary philosophy of language. It focuseson four propositions: Nirvna exists;Nirvna does not exist; Nirvna existsand does not exist; Nirvna neither exists nordoes not exist. The Buddha's rejectionof these propositions is interpreted by meansof explicit and conditionaldefinitions of existence. Stalnaker's notion ofpragmatic presupposition providesan explanation why the propositions are withoutmeaning. After comparing theword ``Nirvna' with indexicals, propernames and theoretical terms, it is finallyasked what linguistic function the word has.     

‘The Process Concept of God and Pacifism’

In this article I argue for the superiority of the neoclassical (or process) concept of God to the classical concept of God as static, especially as the former relates to the moral superiority of pacifism to just war theory. However, the two main proponents of neoclassical or process theism—Alfred North Whitehead and Charles Hartshorne—failed to see the full ramifications of their improved concept of God in that they tended to stop short of pacifism by maintaining an uneasy alliance with the violence often associated with classical theism.     

The Religious Function of Jaina Philosophy:AnekāntavādaReconsidered

This paper considers the socio-religious rationale for the Jaina theory of the non-one-sided nature of reality (anekāntavāda). In doing so it rejects the received view thatanekāntavāda's exclusive function is to promote non-violence at the intellectual level. Instead it advances a model which emphasizes the way in whichanekāntavādasustains a real connection between karmic matter and the soul (jīva) and so maintains the rationale for identity defining ascetic practice. The social and religious dangers of one-sided (ekānta) views for the Jaina tradition are demonstrated by a consideration of the Digambara teacher Kundakunda's idiosyncratic use of the two truths model of reality.     

Delivering the last blade of grass: Aspects of the bodhisattva ideal in the Mahāyāna

The ideal of the bodhisattva was crucial in the development of the Mahāyāna branch of the Buddhist tradition. It provided a meeting ground for cardinal Mahāyānist doctrines concerning prajñã (wisdom), karunā (compassion) and ?ūnvatā (voidness), as well as introducing into Buddhism more overtly religious elements which help to account for its popular appeal in those areas where the Mahāyāna took hold. The vow of the bodhisattva to forego entry into nirvāna until all beings “down to the last blade of grass” have been delivered raises several apparent contradictions and condundrums; these disappear in the light of a proper understanding of the pivotal Mahāyānist doctrine of ?ūnvatā. This paper examines the relationship of the bodhisattva ideal to the metaphysic of sunyata and discusses the place of this ideal in the spiritual economy of the Mahāyāna.     

Clinging to Nothing: The Phenomenology and Metaphysics of Upādāna in Early Buddhism

The concept of clinging (upādāna) is absolutely central to early Buddhist thought. This article examines the concept from both a phenomenological and a metaphysical perspective and attempts to understand how it relates to the non-self doctrine and to the ultimate goal of Nibbāna. Unenlightened consciousness is consciousness centered on an ‘I’. It is also consciousness that is conditioned by and bound up with a being in the world. From a phenomenological perspective, clinging gives birth to the illusion of self, or what is called the ‘conceit of “I am”’. From a metaphysical perspective, clinging binds consciousness to a worldly being. Seen in the first way, Nibbāna is ‘centerless’ consciousness. Seen in the second, it is unconditioned consciousness. Viewed in either way, Nibbāna is a state of consciousness reached through the eradication of clinging     

Karma accounts: supplementary thoughts on Theravāda,Madhyamaka, theosophy,and Protestant Buddhism

This article supplements Jens Schlieter's discussion of the cognitive metaphor of a karmic bank-account, adding selected points on karma monetary/fiscal metaphors as preserved chiefly in Pāli and Sanskrit sources. It explores various strands of the history of South Asian religions where distinct economic metaphors for karma come closer to the late ‘bank-account of karma’: i.e., the Vedic ‘three debts,’ a Hindu concept of God as accountant, the varieties of weighing the (mis)deeds, the Buddhist monastic status of debt and fiscal transactions, the equivalence of karma and debt as discussed by Madhyamaka thinkers, and others. While endorsing Schlieter's point, it also takes into account such modern Western sources as early theosophical discourse and ‘Protestant Buddhism.’     

The Problem of Foundation in Early Nyāya and in Navya-Nyāya

The evaluation of arguments was not the sole concern of logicians in ancient India. Early Nyāya and the later Navya-Nyāya provide an interesting example of the interaction between logic and ontology. In their attempt to develop a kind of property-location logic (Navya-)Naiyāyikas had to consider what kind of restrictions they should impose on the residence relation between a property and its locus (which might again be a property). Can we admit circular residence relations or infinitely descending chains of properties, each depending on its successor as its locus? Early Naiyāyikas and to some extent also Navya-Naiyāyikas regard these phenomena as a kind of absurdity and they want to rule them out. Their intuitions about properties are close to well-founded systems of set theory, whereas the author of the Navya-Nyāya work Upādhidarpa?a is a proponent of a non-well-founded property concept. Despite certain similarities with sets properties are still regarded as intensional objects in Navya-Nyāya. In the present article I demonstrate that a Quine/Morse-style extension of George Bealer's property calculus T1 (with or without a property adaptation of the axiom of regularity) may serve as a formal system which adequately mirrors the Navya-Nyāya property-location logic.     

Cognitive and communicative function: The effects of chronological age and “handicap age”

Abstract

Three classes of cognitive tests (short-term memory, long-term memory access/recall, and verbal ability) and one class of communicative tests (visual speech-reading) were administered to 49 hearing-impaired and 69 normal hearing subjects, varying in age between 23 and 75 years. It was found that when dB-loss and “handicap age” were partialled out, the negative effects of cognitive ageing remained: Speed in accessing alphanumeric symbols from long-term memory and as rehearsal speed correlated substantially with chronological age. Discriminant analyses revealed a communality between the discrimination of old from young subjects, and skilled from less skilled speech-readers: Visual decoding skill and rehearsal speed constituted the common discriminators. Departing from this result, an age-dependent componential model of visual speech-reading is delineated. with particular reference to the assumption that a temporally early lexical access system is crucial to the decoding of lip movements.     

The early Yogācāra theory of no-self

ABSTRACT

I reconstruct early Yogācāra theory of no-self based on works by Asa?ga and Vasubandhu. I introduce the idea of the cognitive schema (CS) of the self, a conception borrowed from the developmental psychologist, Jean Piaget. A fundamental CS is a psychological function that guides the formation of perceptions. I propose that Manas can be understood in terms of being the CS of the self, a psychological mechanism from which perceptions of external objects are formed. In addition, I argue that non-imaginative wisdom can be regarded as an experience during which the CS of the self does not function, such that one only possesses pure sensations without perceptions of external objects. After the repeated experience of non-imaginative wisdom, the CS of the self is changed to the purified CS of no-self. It still supports interactions with the external world, but in a way that does not allow the four afflictions (self-delusion, self-belief, self-conceit, and self-love) to arise.

Abbreviations: MS: Mahāyānasa?graha; TS: Tri??ikā-kārikā; TSN: Trisvabhāvanirde?a; VVS: Vi??atikā Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi     

The Mothers and Daughters of Bhakti: Janābāī in Marathi Literature

International Journal of Hindu Studies - This article focuses on the writings of the lonely, orphaned poet Janābāī, a popular figure believed to have lived in fourteenth-century...     

The Ontological Roots of Human Science: the Message of Evolution—The Physics of Freedom (Choice)

The original proposal of H. H. Pattee (1971) Pattee, H. H. 1971. “Can life explain quantum mechanics?”. In Quantum theory and beyond, Edited by: Bastin, T. 307–319. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  [Google Scholar] of basing quantum theoretical measurement theory on the theory of the origin of life, and its far reaching consequences, is discussed in the light of a recently emerging biological paradigm of internal measurement. It is established that the “measurement problem” of quantum physics can, in principle, be traced back to the internal material constraints of the biological organisms, where choice is a fundamental attribute of the self-measurement of matter. In this light, which is shown to be a consequence of Pattee's original suggestion, it is proposed that biological evolution is a gradual liberation from the inert unity of “subject” and “object” of inanimate matter (as “natural law” and “initial conditions”), to a split biological existence of them and, as a consequence, the “message of evolution” is freedom, rather than complexity in itself. Some classical philosophical systems are brought into context to show that the epistemologies of several strictly philosophical systems of the social sciences are well acquainted with the problem and their solutions support our conclusions.