Self research in educational psychology: a cautionary tale of positive psychology in action

Recent calls for a positive psychology that would deemphasize human pathology and dysfunction in favor of building an understanding of positive features of human life and human flourishing make two assumptions that the author questions in this article. First, he challenges the assumption that disciplinary psychology has been fixated on pathology and dysfunction by considering work in educational psychology that, both historically and currently, espouses the characteristics of positive psychology as articulated by its major advocates. Second, through a brief, critical consideration of research on the self in educational psychology, he contests the assumption that psychology has sufficient resources to develop into the positive psychology envisioned by its promoters. He argues that psychology's emphasis on the individual, whose core self resides in a deep, internal psyche, radically strips psychology of the historical and sociocultural resources that enable self-development, constrain self-understanding, and constitute the self.     

Positive psychology and virtue: Values in action

ABSTRACT

This paper provides an overview of the issues and themes that were discussed on an interdisciplinary panel which occurred at the American Philosophical Association’s pacific division meeting in April of 2017. The panel focused on the connections between the VIA classification of virtues and character strengths in psychology and virtues and the Aristotelian approach to virtue in philosophy. Three key themes emerged from the papers presented at this panel: 1) the nature of the relationship between virtues and character strengths on the VIA model; 2) the extent to which the conceptions of virtues and character strengths are best understood as universal or culturally-embedded; and 3) the reliability of using self-report measurements to measure character strengths. This paper serves to frame papers that resulted from that panel and were incorporated into this special issue of the Journal of Positive Psychology.     

Traps and gaps in action explanation: theoretical problems of a psychology of human action

This article deals with the question of whether human action can be explained empirically by a psychological theory that refers to intentions, expectancies, and evaluations as determinants. In contrast with the majority of action theories in psychology and philosophy, a logical connection between action and intention is defended and, consequently, a causal relationship between action and intention is refuted. This is illustrated by reference to one of the most widely known and applied psychological action theories: the theory of planned behavior (I. Ajzen, 1991). However, the logical-connection argument can be circumvented if the existing research findings are reinterpreted as part of a psychology of intention. This article demonstrates the value of such an approach for future research. However, the final section of the article outlines some further fundamental theoretical difficulties for this perspective.     

Social action theory for a public health psychology

Many illnesses can be prevented or limited by altering personal behavior, and public health planners have turned to psychology for guidance in fostering self-protective activity. A social theory of personal action provides an integrative framework for applying psychology to public health, disclosing gaps in our current understanding of self-regulation, and generating guidelines for improving health promotion at the population level. A social action view emphasizes social interdependence and interaction in personal control of health-endangering behavior and proposes mechanisms by which environmental structures influence cognitive action schemas, self-goals, and problem-solving activities critical to sustained behavioral change. Social action theory clarifies relationships between social and personal empowerment and helps explain stages of self-change.     

The cultural psychology of Kohut's self psychology

Contrary to criticism, Heinz Kohut's self psychology does not support an absorption into self nor a morally neutral response to society. Kohut's psychology of the self and narcissism aims toward an analysis of contemporary Western culture that will restore it. In the process of assisting individuals and culture to recover from the vicissitudes of narcissism, Kohut has introduced a new type of cultural psychology, a culture of empathy.     

Discourse, action, rhetoric: from a perception to an action paradigm in social psychology

This article provides a personal account of how discursive social psychology has been used to understand social and political change in South Africa and to reflect on the strengths and limitations of the approach. While celebrating the shift from the perception paradigm to the genuinely social constructionist focus on discursive interaction, the article also argues for an expanded focus on embodied action.     

The development of counselling psychology in a clinical psychology service

This paper will describe one Clinical Psychology department's efforts to incorporate Counselling Psychology into the service. It is written from the experience of the Chartered Counselling Psychologist.     

On the psychology of time in action: regulatory mode orientations and procrastination

Six studies explored the relations of the regulatory modes of locomotion and assessment to individuals' tendency toward procrastination. Across academic and organizational contexts, and a variety of ways of assessing procrastination, the authors found assessment to be positively related to procrastination and locomotion to be negatively related to procrastination. Discussion considered implications of these findings to task environments that may instill the tendencies toward locomotion or assessment and to task requirements where timeliness and punctuality are (or are not) prioritized.     

The relationship between scientific psychology and common-sense psychology

This paper explores the relationship between common-sense psychology (CSP) and scientific psychology (SP) — which we could call the mind-mind problem. CSP has come under much attack recently, most of which is thought to be unjust or misguided. This paper's first section examines the many differences between the aims, interests, explananda, explanantia, methodology, conceptual frameworks, and relationships to the neurosciences, that divide CSP and SP. Each of the two is valid within its own territory, and there is no competition between them — primarily because CSP is not, and has no interest in being, a scientific theory. In the second section some implications are drawn. First, neither CSP nor SP has the mind-body problem in its familiar form. Second, CSP, for excellent reasons, is not equipped to handle irrational or non-rational behaviour; there are some grounds for believing that this can and should be the task of SP. Third, philosophical psychology, or armchair theories of action, perception, etc., are doomed to failure. And, fourth, the realm of the psychological is so heterogeneous that no single model for either CSP or SP is likely to succeed.