Ambiguity and rationality

Recently, several theories of decision making and probability judgment have been proposed that take into account ambiguity (Einhorn and Hogarth, 1985; Gardenfors and Sahlin, 1982). However, none of these theories explains exactly what the psychological causes of ambiguity are or addresses the issue of whether ambiguity effects are rational. In this paper, we define ambiguity as the subjective experience of missing information relevant to a prediction. We show how this definition can explain why ambiguity affects decisions in the ways it does. We argue that there are a variety of rational reasons ambiguity affects probability judgments and choices in the ways it does. However, we argue that the ambiguity effect does not cast doubt on the claim that utility theory is a standard of rational choice. Rather, we suggest that the effect of ambiguity on decisions highlights the fact that utility theory, like any normative model of decision making only prescribes the optimal decision, given what one knows.     

Ambiguity and explanation

This paper presents evidence that ‘because’ is importantly ambiguous between two closely related senses covering what are usually called causal explanations, on the one hand, and grounding or metaphysical explanations, on the other hand. To this end, it introduces the lexical categories of monosemy, polysemy and homonymy; describes a test for polysemy; and discusses the results of the test when applied to ‘because’. It also shows how to understand so-called hybrid explanations in light of the semantic facts established by the analysis.     

Ambiguity in perception and experimentation

Bruno and Cutting (1988) varied four monocular cues to perceived depth in a factorial design. Subjects judged the distance between test objects. Given main effects in the analysis of variance, the authors concluded that the perceivers integrated the four different sources of information, as opposed to simply selecting a single source. Given no interactions in the analysis of variance, the authors concluded that the integration process was additive rather than multiplicative. The ambiguity inherent in Bruno and Cutting's experiments and analyses is discussed. As presented, their results did not provide evidence for integration of depth cues or evidence for additivity, independence, and parallel processing of the cues. An additional analysis of the distribution of the rating judgments given by their subjects, however, provides some evidence for integration of the cues. The fuzzy logical model of perception (FLMP) is extended to describe perceptual recognition of depth. The model assumes independence of the cues during feature evaluation and a nonadditive integration process in which the least ambiguous cues have the greatest impact on the judgment. The FLMP is contrasted with a model assuming additivity of the cues. Because both models describe the results equally well, it remains for future researchers to provide definitive tests between the models.     

The Ambiguity of Quantifiers

In the tradition of substructural logics, it has been claimed for a long time that conjunction and inclusive disjunction are ambiguous:we should, in fact, distinguish between ‘lattice’ connectives (also called additive or extensional) and ‘group’ connectives (also called multiplicative or intensional). We argue that an analogous ambiguity affects the quantifiers. Moreover, we show how such a perspective could yield solutions for two well-known logical puzzles: McGee’s counterexample to modus ponens and the lottery paradox.     

Ambiguity: Spiritual and psychotherapeutic aspects

Ambiguity is treated here as one of the interfaces between spirituality and psychotherapy. The multiplicity of spiritualities and the characteristics of spiritual leaders are discussed, the latter contrasted with the tenets of traditional psychotherapy. Similar and integrative aspects of spiritual and psychotherapeutic sojourners are examined.     

Robust Tolerance for Ambiguity

We argue first that "ambiguous prospects" should be defined in a way that is compatible with dictionary definitions and other technical uses of ambiguity. We then define an ambiguous prospect as a disjunction of risky prospects. Then to harmonize some findings in the literature we test the hypothesis that people are ambiguity indifferent up to moderate amounts of ambiguity and are ambiguity averse only for large amounts of ambiguity. To test the hypothesis we found probability equivalents to risk for prospects of varying degrees of ambiguity. Up to an ambiguity range of .7 the equivalents were near that of a normatively equivalent risky prospect while the equivalents of highly ambiguous prospects differed. We interpret the data in terms of competing desires for minimum effort and maximum accuracy.     

Ambiguity in pictorial depth

Pictorial space is the 3-D impression that one obtains when looking 'into' a 2-D picture. One is aware of 3-D 'opaque' objects. 'Pictorial reliefs' are the surfaces of such pictorial objects in 'pictorial space'. Photographs (or any pictures) do in no way fully specify physical scenes. Rather, any photograph is compatible with an infinite number of possible scenes that may be called 'metameric scenes'. If pictorial relief is one of these metameric scenes, the response may be considered 'veridical'. The conventional usage is more restrictive and is indeed inconsistent. Thus the observer has much freedom in arriving at such a 'veridical' response. To address this ambiguity, we determined the pictorial reliefs for eight observers, six pictures, and two psychophysical methods. We used 'methods of cross-sections' to operationalise pictorial reliefs. We find that linear regression of the depths of relief at corresponding locations in the picture for different observers often lead to very low (even insignificant) R2s. Thus the responses are idiosyncratic to a large degree. Perhaps surprisingly, we also observed that multiple regression of depth and picture coordinates at corresponding locations often lead to very high R2s. Often R2s increased from insignificant up to almost 1. Apparently, to a large extent 'depth' is irrelevant as a psychophysical variable, in the sense that it does not uniquely account for the relation of the response to the pictorial structure. This clearly runs counter to the bulk of the literature on pictorial 'depth perception'. The invariant core of interindividual perception proves to be of an 'affine' rather than a Euclidean nature; that is to say, 'pictorial space' is not simply the picture plane augmented with a depth dimension.     

Ethical Ambiguity in Science

Drawing on 171 in-depth interviews with physicists at universities in the United States and the UK, this study examines the narratives of 48 physicists to explain the concept of ethical ambiguity: the border where legitimate and illegitimate conduct is blurred. Researchers generally assume that scientists agree on what constitutes both egregious and more routine forms of misconduct in science. The results of this study show that scientists perceive many scenarios as ethically gray, rather than black and white. Three orientations to ethical ambiguity are considered—altruism, inconsequential outcomes, and preserving the status quo—that allow possibly questionable behavior to persist unchallenged. Each discursive strategy is rationalized as promoting the collective interest of science rather than addressing what is ethically correct or incorrect. The results of this study suggest that ethics training in science should focus not only on fabrication, falsification, and plagiarism and more routine forms of misconduct, but also on strategies for resolving ethically ambiguous scenarios where appropriate action may not be clear.     

Ambiguity in sentence processing

As listeners and readers, we rarely notice the ambiguities that pervade our everyday language. When we hear the proverb `Time flies like an arrow' we might ponder its meaning, but not the fact that there are almost 100 grammatically permissible interpretations of this short sentence. On occasion, however, we do notice sentential ambiguity: headlines, such as `Two Sisters Reunited After 18 Years in Checkout Counter', are amusing because they so consistently lead to the unintended interpretation (presumably, the sisters did not spend 18 years at the checkout). It is this consistent preference for one interpretation-and one grammatical structure-rather than another that has fuelled research into sentence processing for more than 20 years. Until relatively recently, the dominant belief had been that these preferences arise from general principles that underlie our use of grammar, with certain grammatical constructions being preferred over others. There has now accrued, however, a considerable body of evidence demonstrating that these preferences are not absolute, but can change in particular circumstances. With this evidence have come new theories of sentence processing, some of which, at first glance, radically question the standard notions of linguistic representation, grammar and understanding.     

Ambiguity Attitudes over Time

Previous research demonstrates that individuals exhibit a stronger level of ambiguity aversion for high probabilities than for low probabilities. Given that risky and ambiguous prospects are often unresolved until a future date (e.g., investment decisions, new product launches, and medical interventions), this study examines the impact of time on ambiguity preferences at different probability levels. Our experimental results indicate that although ambiguity preferences for low‐probability events remain constant, a robust effect of time occurs for high‐probability events. More specifically, temporal distance mitigates ambiguity aversion. This effect is consistent for different elicitation methods (preference rating and probability–ambiguity trade‐off tasks). We propose a dual‐process model (affective versus cognitive processing styles) to explain our results. Affective processing for high‐probability lotteries resolved in the current period increases ambiguity aversion, while cognitive processing leads to less ambiguity‐averse choices for future lotteries. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Ambiguity and gratuitous concurrence in inter-cultural communication

A: Excuse me, but we're just trying to find the right bus that takes us to the boat for Upolu. We were told that it stops here in front of the village store, but we've been waiting since 9 o'clock this morning and we'd like to know if there is going to be a bus before this evening or if we'll have to wait until tomorrow for a bus. I: Yes.     

Ambiguity and Undecidability in Fides et Ratio

The article offers a response to the encyclical Fides et Ratio , identifying its ambiguity with respect to two issues: the nature of the relation between faith and reason, and the diagnosis of the relation of modernity and postmodernity. The tension between the different accounts in the encyclical is not a flaw but a positive feature of the encyclical as an exercise in catholicity.