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Douglas and Gibbins (1983) recently argued that our demonstration that errors in self-other recognition are often instances of self-deception was inadequate. In their study, they found that both self-other and acquaintance-other recognition errors met two of the four criteria we had offered as necessary and sufficient for ascribing self-deception. They presented no evidence that either type of recognition error was not an instance of self-deception. Here we describe the original basis of our demonstration and point out the logical fallacy in Douglas and Gibbins' argument. 相似文献
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Kathleen Gill 《The Journal of value inquiry》1988,22(4):307-312
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Luca Moretti 《Philosophical Studies》2008,141(1):97-114
Minimal entities are, roughly, those that fall under notions defined by only deflationary principles. In this paper I provide
an accurate characterization of two types of minimal entities: minimal properties and minimal facts. This characterization
is inspired by both Schiffer’s notion of a pleonastic entity and Horwich’s notion of minimal truth. I argue that we are committed
to the existence of minimal properties and minimal facts according to a deflationary notion of existence, and that the appeal
to the inferential role reading of the quantifiers does not dismiss this commitment. I also argue that deflationary existence
is language-dependent existence—this clarifies why minimalists about properties and facts are not realists about these entities
though their language may appear indistinguishable from the language of realists.
相似文献
Luca MorettiEmail: |
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Kevin D. Hoover 《Synthese》2015,192(11):3509-3532
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Berit Brogaard 《Philosophical Studies》2008,141(1):21-42
There are two doctrines for which Quine is particularly well known: the doctrine of ontological commitment and the inscrutability
thesis—the thesis that reference and quantification are inscrutable. At first glance, the two doctrines are squarely at odds.
If there is no fact of the matter as to what our expressions refer to, then it would appear that no determinate commitments
can be read off of our best theories. We argue here that the appearance of a clash between the two doctrines is illusory.
The reason that there is no real conflict is not simply that in determining our theories’ ontological commitments we naturally
rely on our home language but also (and more importantly) that ontological commitment is not intimately tied to objectual
quantification and a reference-first approach to language. Or so we will argue. We conclude with a new inscrutability argument
which rests on the observation that the notion of objectual quantification, when properly cashed out, deflates.
相似文献
Berit BrogaardEmail: Email: |
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Patrick Todd 《Philosophical Studies》2013,164(3):829-844
In the literature on free will, fatalism, and determinism, a distinction is commonly made between temporally intrinsic (‘hard’) and temporally relational (‘soft’) facts at times; determinism, for instance, is the thesis that the temporally intrinsic state of the world at some given past time, together with the laws, entails a unique future (relative to that time). Further, it is commonly supposed by incompatibilists that only the ‘hard facts’ about the past are fixed and beyond our control, whereas the ‘soft facts’ about the past needn’t be. A substantial literature arose in connection with this distinction, though no consensus emerged as to the proper way to analyze it. It is time, I believe, to revisit these issues. The central claim of this paper is that the attempts to analyze the hard/soft fact distinction got off on fundamentally the wrong track. The crucial feature of soft facts is that they (in some sense) depend on the future. Following recent work on the notion of dependence, however, I argue that the literature on the soft/hard distinction has failed to capture the sense of dependence at stake. This is because such attempts have tried to capture softness in terms of purely modal notions like entailment and necessitation. As I hope to show, however, such notions cannot capture the sort of asymmetrical dependence relevant to soft facthood. Arguing for this claim is the first goal of this paper. My second goal is to gesture towards what an adequate account of soft facthood will really look like. 相似文献
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Philosophical Studies - The standard account of ontological commitment is quantificational. There are many old and well-chewed-over challenges to the account, but recently Kit Fine added a new... 相似文献
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William L. Rowe 《International Journal for Philosophy of Religion》2009,65(2):87-92
By taking ‘existence in reality’ to be a great-making property and ‘God’ to be the greatest possible being, Plantinga skillfully
presents Anselm’s ontological argument. However, since he proves God’s existence by virtue of a premise, “God (a maximally
great being) is a possible being”, that is true only if God actually exists; his argument begs the question of the existence
of God. 相似文献