Application of variable criterion theory to choice reaction time

A theory of choice reaction time ICRT is presented which is based on a variable criterion model assuming the decision criterion to be normally distributed. The theory provides functions of time describing the growth of component processes following stimulus onset. For correct responses, these processes are sensory and associative strength. For errors, the processes are sensory strength, generalized associative strength, and associative inhibition. A model for separating the effects of these processes from that of response competition is presented. The theory describes, with great accuracy, the CRT distributions of correct responses and errors, not only for the experiment for which it was derived, but also for a second experiment in which the criterion was experimentally manipulated. It accounts for the basic facts of the speed-accuracy tradeoff, not only with respect to the two experiments with different speed requirements, but also with respect to the variation of speed over trials within each experiment. While derived from group data, the theory also describes the performance of individual subjects. The mean and variability of the criterion distribution and the ability to utilize associative inhibition are identified as the major sources of individual differences. Methodological problems involved in the scaling analysis of group data are also discussed.     

Probability effects in choice reaction time tasks

This paper contains a short review of the main results that were obtained by the author in a series of experiments that constituted a study of the effects of signal probability on choice reaction time. The effects of stimulus probability are shown to be influenced by the following variables: (1) differences in the method of varying stimulus probability, (2) differences in task complexity, (3) differences in S-R code, and (4) differences in Ss’ motivation. The data that are considered here are the overall mean RT for particular signals and the mean RT for sequential repetitions. Two questions, related to the psychological “nature” of the probability effects in choice RT are discussed: (1) The question of the relationship between the relative frequency and the number of alternatives as two different ways of determining the probability effect in choice RT; and (2) the question of identifying the main determinants of the trial-to-trial variability of RT in such experiments.

     

The basis for choice reaction time slowing in Alzheimer's disease

Slowed reaction time has been suggested as an early feature of Alzheimer's disease (AD), but the basis for this slowing has not been established. Patients with mild AD were compared with controls on a choice reaction time task, both cued (CCRT) and uncued (CRT). Initial and 1-year followup data were analyzed both as mean reaction times and as parameters of a fitted two-component quantitative model (the ex-Gaussian model). Slowing of CRT proved to be a sensitive test for AD. Slowing was due to changes in both the sensory/motor and the decisional components of the CRT model. However, these changes were found in both AD and slower, older controls. The modeling of CRT in AD is discussed.     

Physiological evidence for response inhibition in choice reaction time tasks

Inhibition is a widely used notion proposed to account for data obtained in choice reaction time (RT) tasks. However, this concept is weakly supported by empirical facts. In this paper, we review a series of experiments using Hoffman reflex, transcranial magnetic stimulation and electroencephalography to study inhibition in choice RT tasks. We provide empirical support for the idea that inhibition does occur during choice RT, and the implications of those findings for various classes of choice RT models are discussed.     

Correction for fast guessing and the speed-accuracy tradeoff in choice reaction time

In choice reaction time tasks, response latency varies as the subject changes his bias for speed vs accuracy; this is the speed-accuracy tradeoff. Ollman's Fast Guess model provides a mechanism for this tradeoff by allowing the subject to vary his probability of making a guess response rather than a stimulus controlled response (SCR). It is shown that the mean latency of SCR's (μ_s) in two-choice experiments can be estimated from a single session, regardless of how the subject adjusts his guessing probability. Three experiments are reported in which μ_s apparently remained virtually constant despite tradeoffs in which accuracy varied from chance to near-perfect. From the standpoint of the Fast Guess model, this result is interpreted to mean that the tradeoff here was produced almost entirely by mixing different proportions of fast guesses and constant (mean) latency SCR's. The final sections of the paper discuss the question of what other models might be compatible with μ_s invariance.     

Sequential effects of catch-trials on choice reaction time

The aim of the study was to examine whether or not choice reaction time (RT) depends on catch-trial frequency. The results show a significant increase of mean RT as the catch-trial frequency increases from zero to 0.77. A similar effect has been shown previously in simple RT experiments. The interpretation of these effects on simple RT supposes the existence of an inverse relationship between catch-trial frequency and anticipated response frequency. This cannot be extended to a choice RT task since the subject must wait for the stimulus to arrive before deciding which is the appropriate response. The interpretation of the present results proposes preparatory adjustments prior to the arrival of the stimulus. Sequential effects found suggest that (1) the tendency to prepare for a stimulus at a trial was stronger when a stimulus was presented at the preceding trial than after a catch-trial, and (2) the frequency effects of catch-trials can be explained completely in terms of sequential effects.     

Confidence ill stimulus predictions and choice reaction time

In two choice reaction time (RT) experiments, a stimulus prediction and a confidence judgment in the prediction preceded each occurrence of one of two stimulus alternatives. Ss identified each stimulus presentation by pressing a left-hand or right-hand telegraph key. In Experiment I the source of the stimulus predictions and confidence estimates was varied between groups of 20 Ss. For each condition, RT to correctly predicted stimuli was an inverse function of prediction confidence. Following incorrectly predicted stimuli, RT was not reliably influenced by confidence when S gave both predictions and confidence judgments; but RT to incorrectly predicted stimuli was an increasing function of confidence when E verbalized the predictions and confidence estimates or when S predicted and E indicated confidence. In Experiment II Ss made predictions and the validity of Es confidence estimate was manipulated between Ss. When Es confidence was perfectly related to the probability of a correct prediction, choice RT to nonpredicted stimuli was inversely related to confidence. However, choice RT to nonpredicted stimuli was not affected by prediction confidence when Es judgments were random.     

Stimulus proba]bility and choice reaction time

Two experiments, in which three stimuli were paired with two responses in a 2∶1, 1∶1 arrangement, showed choice RT to be a decreasing function of the relative frequency of stimulus occurrence when response frequencies are equated. The size of effect varied significantly with stimulus type (Experiment 1), being larger for circular light patches of differing diameter than for sets of colors, letters, and spatially distributed light sources, but was independent of differences in the similarity of stimulus alternatives within a set (Experiment 2). The results are discussed in terms of various strategies of stimulus identification.     

Sequential effects in auditory choice reaction time tasks

This paper concerns sequential effects in choice reaction time tasks. Performance in two interleaved auditory tasks was examined, and two general types of sequential effects were revealed. First, a response repetition effect occurred: Subjects were facilitated in responding when both the stimulus and the response were immediately repeated. Generally, it appeared that subjects were operating according to the bypass rule—that is, repeat the response if the stimulus or some aspect thereof is repeated from the preceding trial; otherwise, change the response. In addition, the experiment also revealed a second type of sequential effect, known as a task-switching effect. Subjects were overall slower to respond when the task changed between adjacent trials than when there was no task change. A final result was that subjects were markedly impaired when the stimulus changed but the same response had to be repeated. This finding has been reported elsewhere when purely visual tasks have been used. Hence, it seems that particular difficulties arise, in such sequential testing situations, when type-distinct stimuli are grouped into the same response categories.     

A partial repetition effect in choice reaction time for multidimensional stimuli

Bertelson (1963), and others more recently, have observed that when the same stimulus is presented consecutively the reaction time (RT) to the second presentation is faster than the RT to the first presentation. In Experiments 1 and 2, two-dimensional stimuli are used in a discrete four-choice RT task where the stimuli can either be completely repeated, partially repeated, or completely different. In Experiment 3, three-dimensional stimuli were used in a discrete eight-choice RT task where the stimuli can either be completely repeated, partially respeated with respect to two dimensions, partially repeated with respect to one dimension, or completely different. The partial repetition of multidimensional stimuli showed a significant facilitation effect on RT with all sets of stimuli used in the present experiments. This result is discussed in respect to the various possible loci of the repetition effect.     

Repetition effects in choice reaction time to multidimensional stimuli

Ss classified as quickly as possible stimuli back-projected one at a time on a small screen by pressing one of two levers in response to each stimulus, according to the levels of a single specified binary stimulus dimension. Stimuli were rectangles varying in height alone, in width alone, or in both dimensions, in either a correlated or an orthogonal fashion. Stimuli followed responses by a fixed interval of 82, 580, or 1,080 msec. Response time was longer when both dimensions varied orthogonally than when only one dimension varied, indicating that Ss were unable to avoid perceiving the rectangle figures as wholes. Repeated stimuli were responded to more quickly than stimuli which were different from the immediately preceding stimulus in all conditions. With orthogonally combined dimensions, response time to stimulus repetitions was lowest, increased when the stimulus changed while the response was repeated, and increased still further when both the stimulus and the response changed. Increasing the time interval between stimuli decreased response time for nonrepetitions, while response time for repetitions was relatively unaffected. The results were discussed in terms of two models of serial choice reaction time.     

Verbal predictions of unexpected stimuli and choice reaction time

In two choice reaction time (RT) experiments, subjects verbally predicted the stimulus alternative that was either most or least likely to be presented on each trial. An expectancy interpretation of prediction effects requires that stimuli matching least likely predictions yield the longest RTs. In Experiment 1, with four stimulus alternatives, RTs to stimuli matching the verbalized stimulus, both most likely and least likely predictions, were shorter than RTs to stimuli that matched neither the most nor the least likely predictions. However, matching most likely predictions produced faster responses with two alternatives. In Experiment 2, multiple predictions of both most and least likely stimuli were compared with joint predictions of first and second most likely alternatives. RTs to stimuli matching least likely predictions were longer than RTs to most likely matches, implicating prediction type as a partial determinant of RT. Matching least likely stimuli were responded to more quickly than unpredicted alternatives, demonstrating the importance of generating a prediction per se over the implied level of expectancy. Results from both experiments were contrasted with nonparametric predictions from an ordered memory scanning model.