Mechanisms of inferential order judgments in humans (Homo sapiens) and rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta)

If A > B, and B > C, it follows logically that A > C. The process of reaching that conclusion is called transitive inference (TI). Several mechanisms have been offered to explain transitive performance. Scanning models claim that the list is scanned from the ends of the list inward until a match is found. Positional discrimination models claim that positional uncertainty accounts for accuracy and reaction time patterns. In Experiment 1, we trained rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) and humans (Homo sapiens) on adjacent pairs (e.g., AB, BC, CD, DE, EF) and tested them with previously untrained nonadjacent pairs (e.g., BD). In Experiment 2, we trained a second list and tested with nonadjacent pairs selected between lists (e.g., B from List 1, D from List 2). We then introduced associative competition between adjacent items in Experiment 3 by training 2 items per position (e.g., B?C?, B?C?) before testing with untrained nonadjacent items. In all 3 experiments, humans and monkeys showed distance effects in which accuracy increased, and reaction time decreased, as the distance between items in each pair increased (e.g., BD vs. BE). In Experiment 4, we trained adjacent pairs with separate 9- and 5-item lists. We then tested with nonadjacent pairs selected between lists to determine whether list items were chosen according to their absolute position (e.g., D, 5-item list > E, 9-item list), or their relative position (e.g., D, 5-item list < E, 9-item list). Both monkeys' and humans' choices were most consistent with a relative positional organization.     

Eye fixations are influenced by the distribution of information within words

Reader's eye movements were monitored while they inspected isolated words in preparation for a synonym judgement task. The 10-letter words appeared on a screen near the point of fixation, with the first fixation being imposed near the beginning, or the centre, or the ending of the word. The words themselves had uneven distributions of information, in that the beginnings or the endings contained common sequences of letters in English. Three types of words were used: those with very redundant endings (e.g., yearningly), with moderately redundant endings (e.g., varnishing), and with moderately redundant beginnings (e.g., contravene). Redundancy was defined in terms of the total number of words in English which possess that particular sequence of five letters as the beginning or the ending. The experiments asked whether the convenient viewing location within a word varied according to the distribution of information, and whether the extent of redundancy in a word ending is reflected in the distribution of visual attention given to the word. The results were analysed separately for those cases where the reader made just two fixations upon the word before moving to the synonym task, and for those cases where the reader made exactly three fixations. These were the dominant fixation patterns. Evidence for the notion of a convenient viewing position consisted of long first fixations (when there were just two fixations), when this fixation was near the centre of the word. The distribution of information within the words did not influence the duration of the first fixation, although the duration of the gaze within each half-word did increase when more informative letter sequences were being inspected. The extent of redundancy was also seen to influence the inspection patterns, when a comparison was made between the two types of words with redundant endings. Words with very redundant endings received fewer fixations when the first fixation was at the beginning, and for words gaining exactly two fixations, the second fixation was shorter if the word had a very redundant ending.     

A model of the precaution adoption process: evidence from home radon testing.

We present the precaution adoption process model--a stage theory consisting of seven distinct states between ignorance and completed preventive action. The stages are "unaware of the issue," "aware of the issue but not personally engaged," "engaged and deciding what to do," "planning to act but not yet having acted," "having decided not to act," "acting," and "maintenance." The theory asserts that these stages represent qualitatively different patterns of behavior, beliefs, and experience and that the factors that produce transitions between stages vary depending on the specific transition being considered. Data from seven studies of home radon testing are examined to test some of the claims made by this model. Stage theories of protective behavior are contrasted with theories that see precaution adoption in terms of movement along a single continuum of action likelihood.     

Contributions of specific cell information to judgments of interevent contingency

College students considered the possible effect of an experimental drug on a skin rash. The information came from a 2 x 2 contingency table involving receipt or nonreceipt of the drug and improvement or nonimprovement of the rash: Cell A = receipt-improvement; Cell B = receipt-nonimprovement; Cell C = nonreceipt-improvement; Cell D = nonreceipt-nonimprovement. Without numerical information. Ss judged cells to be ordered A greater than B greater than C greater than D. The same order held when the contribution of each cell was derived from the contingency judgments of other subjects given numerical information. No such consistency was seen when one group of Ss made both judgments: whether individual Ss equally or unequally assessed the importance of the four cells, their contingency estimates showed cell use to be ordered A greater than B greater than C greater than D. These findings may result from strong biases that Ss harbor in processing contingency information.     

Raven's matrices and working memory: A dual-task approach

The cognitive system does not just act as a mirror from the sensory input; instead, it tends to normalize this information. Given that letter processing seems to be much more specialized than digit processing in the cortex, we examined whether the regularization process occurs differently from digits to letters than from letters to digits: We employed a masked priming same/different experiment (e.g., probe, VESZED; prime, V35Z3D ; and target, VESZED). When embedded in letter strings, digits that resemble letters (e.g., 3 and 5 in V35Z3D -VESZED) tend to be encoded in a letter-like manner, whereas when embedded in digit strings, letters that resemble digits (e.g., E and S in 9ES7E2–935732) tend not to be encoded in a digit-like manner.     

Two operations for "ratios" and "differences" of distances on the mental map

Ss judged "ratios of distances" and "differences of distances" between pairs of U.S. cities. Results fit the theory that Ss used two comparison processes as instructed. A ratio scale of distances between cities was constructed from the 2 rank orders. From this scale, an interval scale of the city locations on an east-west continuum was derived. This scale agrees with the subtractive model fit to "ratios" and "differences" of easterliness and westerliness, and it also agrees with multidimensional scaling of judged distances between cities. These findings are consistent with the theory that Ss use subtraction when instructed to judge either "ratios" or "differences," but that they can use both ratio and difference operations when the stimuli (in this case, distances) constitute a ratio scale on the subjective continuum.     

An adding result in impression formation

Ss were presented with a highly polarized piece of information, followed by a same-signed moderately polarized piece of information, and were asked whether the second piece of information led them to like the person describedmore, less, or just the same. The obtained percentage ofadding responses was 65%; that is, most of the responses indicated that Ss impression of the person described became more polarized following addition of moderately polarized information (p <.001). More adding was obtained for negatively than for positively evaluated adjectives (p <.05).     

Confidence ratings in speech perception research: Evaluation of an efficient technique for discrimination testing

Discriminability of voice onset time was determined for four naive Ss in order to evaluate the relative efficiency of a testing procedure which utilized confidence ratings along with the conventional oddity task. Ss rated their judgments on oddity trials as “very very sure,” “somewhat sure,” or “just guessing.” Each S’s discrimination scores were given weights according to his ratings, yielding functions that were compared with those computed using unweighted percent correct scores. The confidence-rating technique produced readily interpretable results with about one-third as many judgments as are needed when the conventional procedure is used. Possible problems with the interpretation of the functions and the generalizability of the technique are discussed.     

Making sense of word senses: the comprehension of polysemy depends on sense overlap

Studies of polysemy are few in number and are contradictory. Some have found differences between polysemy and homonymy (L. Frazier & K. Rayner, 1990), and others have found similarities (D. K. Klein & G. Murphy, 2001). The authors investigated this issue using the methods of D. K. Klein and G. Murphy (2001), in whose study participants judged whether ambiguous words embedded in word pairs (e.g., tasty chicken) made sense as a function of a cooperating, conflicting, or neutral context. The ambiguous words were independently rated as having low, moderate, or highly overlapping senses to approximate a continuum from homonymy to metonymic polysemy. The effects of meaning dominance were examined. Words with highly overlapping meanings (e.g., metonymy) showed reduced effects of context and dominance compared with words with moderately or low overlapping meanings (e.g., metaphorical polysemy and homonymy). These results suggest that the comprehension of ambiguous words is mediated by the semantic overlap of alternative senses/meanings.     

When objects are close to me: Affordances in the peripersonal space

In the present study, we investigated, using language, which motor information is automatically activated by observing 3-D objects (i.e., manipulation vs. function) and whether this information is modulated by the objects' location in space. Participants were shown 3-D pictures of objects located in peripersonal versus extrapersonal space. Immediately after, they were presented with function, manipulation, or observation verbs (e.g., "to drink," "to grasp," "to look at") and were required to judge whether the verb was compatible with the presented object. We found that participants were slower with observation verbs than with manipulation and function verbs. With both function and manipulation verbs, participants were faster when objects were presented in reachable space. Interestingly, the fastest response times were recorded when participants read function verbs while objects were presented in the accessible space. Results suggest that artifacts are first conceived in terms of affordances linked to manipulation and use, and that affordances are differently activated, depending on context.     

Effects of search criterion upon unanticipated free recall of categorically related words

Ss determined whether words in a list were members of a relatively general or specific category (e.g., foods vs vegetables), and then they were given an unanticipated free recall test. Assumptions were that: (1) evaluating a word against a general criterion (e.g., food) results in the detection of fewer semantic elements than would evaluating it against a specific criterion (e.g., vegetable), and (2) detecting more semantic elements primes memory. In three studies, free recall scores were highest for the specific search. Instructions to form an image or to think of an association for each word did not improve recall. Telling Ss, just before recall, what categories composed the list increased recall clustering, but not recall.     

Children's interpretation of generic noun phrases

Generic utterances (e.g., "Cows say 'moo'") have 2 distinctive semantic properties: (a) Generics are generally true, unlike indefinites (e.g., "Bears live in caves" is generic; "I saw some bears in the cave" is indefinite), and (b) generics need not be true of all category members, unlike universal quantifiers (e.g., all, every, each). This article examined whether preschool children and adults appreciate both these features, using a comprehension task (Study 1) and an elicited production task (Study 2). In both tasks, 4-year-old children--like adults--treated generics as distinct from both indefinites ("some") and universal quantifiers ("all"). In contrast, 3-year-olds did not differentiate among generics, "all," and "some." By 4 years of age, generics emerge as a distinct semantic device.     

Aspects of the unity of consciousness and everyday memory failures

We argue that analyzing everyday memory failures in terms of the "unity of consciousness" can elucidate the bases of such failures. A perfect unity amongst one's mental states is rare. In extreme cases the unity of consciousness can breakdown in dramatic fashion (e.g., in Dissociative Identity Disorder), but such breakdowns also occur in less dramatic ways that affect us in everyday life. For example, disruptions in the unity of consciousness can result in everyday memory failures, such as forgetting to put on a tie for an important formal meeting. After providing some philosophical background into the notions of "unity of consciousness" and "functionalism," we offer preliminary analyses of three examples of everyday memory failure. We then introduce and develop what we call the "unity model" of memory failure and show how it explains the examples. We also describe different ways that unity can break down which, in turn, can lead to memory failure and inappropriate behavior. We then show how slips of action and other kinds of cognitive failures (e.g., memory blocks) differ from everyday memory failures. Finally, we examine alternative models (e.g., Absentmindedness and Multimodal) arguing that the unity model is preferable, and then show how our model is consistent with some experimental results.     

WHAT'S IN A LABEL? JUDGMENTS OF FEMINIST MEN AND FEMINIST WOMEN

Although significant progress has been made on research concerning stereotypes of feminist women, very little is known about the stereotypes of feminist men. College students rated one of four terms—"feminist man,""feminist woman,""man," or "woman." Compared to "feminist woman,""feminist man" was evaluated more positively, but as less potent (i.e., lower in stereotypically masculine characteristics) and less heterosexual. Although feminist man had the highest evaluative ratings of the four terms and was rated similarly in confidence to woman and man, compared to the other terms it was rated low in attractiveness and potency. These results suggest that at least on some dimensions a feminist man's masculinity may be questioned, which in turn may be a hindrance to men in adopting the feminist label.     

Test of the phonological recoding hypothesis using a letter-delay task

In some English words is a silent letter in the letter strings, e.g., PSALM. This type of word provides room to manipulate phonological similarity against the words with a nonsilent letter in the corresponding position, e.g., PASTA, to test the phonological recoding hypothesis. Letter strings excluding the silent letter or the sounding letter, e.g., _salm and a phonological condition, _asta as an orthographic condition, were presented. A "psalm-type word" was processed faster than pasta-type word," indicating that phonology plays a leading role in word recognition.     

Modal Incompleteness Revisited

In this paper, we are going to analyze the phenomenon of modal incompleteness from an algebraic point of view. The usual method of showing that a given logic L is incomplete is to show that for some L and some cannot be separated from by a suitably wide class of complete algebras — usually Kripke algebras. We are going to show that classical examples of incomplete logics, e.g., Fine logic, are not complete with respect to any class of complete BAOs. Even above Grz it is possible to find a continuum of such logics, which immediately implies the existence of a continuum of neighbourhood-incomplete Grz logics. Similar results can be proved for Löb logics. In addition, completely incomplete logics above Grz may be found uniformly as a result of failures of some admissible rule of a special kind.     

Lexically guided retuning of letter perception

Participants made visual lexical decisions to upper-case words and nonwords, and then categorized an ambiguous N–H letter continuum. The lexical decision phase included different exposure conditions: Some participants saw an ambiguous letter “?”, midway between N and H, in N-biased lexical contexts (e.g., REIG?), plus words with unambiguous H (e.g., WEIGH); others saw the reverse (e.g., WEIG?, REIGN). The first group categorized more of the test continuum as N than did the second group. Control groups, who saw “?” in nonword contexts (e.g., SMIG?), plus either of the unambiguous word sets (e.g., WEIGH or REIGN), showed no such subsequent effects. Perceptual learning about ambiguous letters therefore appears to be based on lexical knowledge, just as in an analogous speech experiment (Norris, McQueen, & Cutler, 2003) which showed similar lexical influence in learning about ambiguous phonemes. We argue that lexically guided learning is an efficient general strategy available for exploitation by different specific perceptual tasks.     

A psychophysiological study of the use of partial information in stimulus-response translation.

Ss performed a hybrid go/no-go reaction task in which colored letters were assigned in various ways to 4 finger responses, 2 on each hand. In addition to reaction time, psychophysiological measures were used to assess the duration of stimulus identification and the onset of central and peripheral motor activity. The results suggest that response selection can begin on the basis of 1 stimulus dimension (e.g., color), while the other dimension (e.g., letter form) has not yet been identified. Other results are discussed with regard to "selection for action" (Allport, 1987) and the importance of stimulus-response translation strategies in the use of partial information.