The verification of category and property statements

Two experiments compared the speed with which category and property statements of matched associative production frequency could be verified. The verification of category statements was consistently faster than that of property statements, for both true and false judgments. The category advantage did not interact with the level of production frequency for the true sentences. Implications for models of decision processes in semantic memory are discussed.     

Quantification and semantic memory

Two models are considered for how people verify explicitly quantified sentences, such as All fathers are parents and Some fathers are parents. The models share the same second stage, but have different first-stage mechanisms. In the Predicate Intersection Model, suggested by Meyer (1970), the first stage involves a serial, self-terminating search among names of categories that intersect the predicate category. In the Feature Comparison Model (Smith, Shoben & Rips, 1974a), the first stage involves evaluating the overall relatedness between the subject and predicate categories by comparing their semantic features. To test the models, three reaction time experiments required subjects to verify statements quantified by Some or All. In the first experiment, the semantic relatedness of categories in false Some-statements was varied. Contrary to predictions of the Predicate Intersection Model, related categories increased reaction time for both true and false Some-statements. While the first experiment revealed that All-statements took longer to verify than comparable Some-statements, the second experiment demonstrated that the All-Some difference can be eliminated by presenting both statement types in the same block of trials, also disconfirming the Predicate Intersection Model. Finally, Experiment III examined the meaning of Some-statements in more detail by having subjects interpret the quantifier Some as “some but not all.” With this interpretation, Some-statements took longer to verify than All-statements. Overall the results support the Feature Comparison Model.     

Evaluating information for truthfulness: The effects of logical subordination

Research has shown that many individuals do not routinely evaluate new information for consistency with respect to what they already know. One factor that may affect the likelihood of critical evaluation is whether or not the information is the central focus of the message. Two experiments tested this possibility by establishing differential emphasis of false information within complex sentences. Half of the target sentences contained a false fact in the main clause and half contained a false fact in the subordinate clause. In Experiment 1 subjects verified 64 sentences presented orally as either true or false. In Experiment 2 subjects read and evaluated 20 paragraphs for the presence of false information. As expected, subjects were less likely to report the false information when it was conveyed as logically subordinate rather than central. The results suggest one explanation for deficits in comprehension monitoring and have implications for understanding susceptibility to persuasive communications.     

Syntactic presupposition in sentence comprehension

Two experiments investigated the role of syntactic presupposition in sentence comprehension. In Experiment I subjects verified cleft, pseudocleft and factive complement sentences with respect to preceding context paragraphs, which contradicted either the assertion or the presupposition of the target sentence. Subjects took significantly longer to verify sentences with false presuppositions than sentences with false assertions. In Experiment II subjects verified cleft and pseudocleft sentences with respect to subsequently presented pictures. Once again, verification times for sentences with false presuppositions were significantly longer than verification times for sentences with false assertions. It was argued that these findings are more adequately explained by a “structural” hypothesis, than in terms of strategies designed to locate given and new information.     

Comprehending quantified sentences: The relation between sentence-picture and semantic memory verification

People were timed as they decided whether quantified sentences like All (some) of the round figures are red were true or false of an accompanying picture. The response latency was a function of the quantifier and the relation between the sets mentioned in the subject and predicate of the sentence. The pattern of latencies was similar to the pattern found for sentences that refer to concepts in semantic memory, e.g., All (some) dogs are animals (Meyer, 1970). This result suggests that the same process may be operating in both domains. Two alternative models of the process are considered. One model assumes that the common process consists of computing the relation between the two sets mentioned in the sentence. The other model assumes that the common process consists of comparing the representation of the sentence to the representation of information computed from the second source. Both models are integrated with broader theories of performance in various comprehension tasks.     

Memory for truths and falsehoods

Three experiments were carried out to determine whether recognition memory was more efficient for true statements (on the basis of the subjects’ stable body of knowledge) than for false statements. The first two experiments did not show any difference. In a third experiment, the distractors were structured to prevent subjects from responding on the basis of the familiarity of individual component words rather than on the basis of the complete sentences. This experiment showed a clear difference between sentence classes, with true sentences remembered more accurately and faster than false sentences. The data fit, in general, the hypothesis that true sentences are doubly represented in memory. The relation of these findings to the findings on the effects of encoding tasks is also noted.     

The interaction of veracity and syntax in the processing of sentences1

The reaction times of 80 Ss in judging sentences true or false with respect to pictures were analyzed, and it was noted (a) that true sentences containing an expected surface structure required less time than false sentences of the same structure, (b) that latencies to true sentences containing an unexpected surface structure were longer than latencies to the same sentences when their structure was identical to that of previous sentences, and (c) that transitive-verb constructions appeared easier to judge than predicate nominatives of the same length.     

How big is big? Relative and absolute properties in memory

Previous studies of semantic memory have overlooked an important distinction among so-called “property statements”. Statements with relative adjectives (e.g., Flamingos are big) imply a comparison to a standard or reference point associated with an immediate superordinate category (a flamingo is big for a bird), while the truth of statements with absolute adjectives (e.g., Flamingos are pink) is generally independent of such a standard. To examine the psychological consequences of this distinction, we asked subjects in Experiment 1 to verify sentences containing either relative or absolute adjectives embedded in either predicate-adjective (PA) constructions (e.g., A flamingo is big (pink)) or predicate-noun (PN) constructions (e.g. A flamingo is a big (pink) bird), where the predicate noun was the immediate superordinate. Reaction times (RTs) and errors for relative sentences decreased when the superordinate was specified, but remained constant for absolute sentences. These data also suggest that the truth value of relative sentences depends, not just on the superordinate, but also on a more global standard for everyday, human-oriented objects. Experiment 2 extends these results in showing that ratings of the truth of relative sentences are a function of the difference in size between an instance and its superordinate standard (e.g., between the size of a flamingo and that of an average bird) and the difference between the instance and the standard for everyday objects. Experiment 3 replicated these findings using reaction time as the dependent measure.     

Priming and property dominance effects in semantic memory

Retrieval from semantic memory was examined by means of reaction times to property statements (e.g., sparrow has beak). The variables of interest were normatively defined property dominance (frequency), type of priming between related sentences (sparrow-sparrow vs. sparrow-robin), and separation or lag between related sentences. Statements asserting a high-dominant property (1) were verified more quickly than those containing low-dominant properties, (2) were primed by a preceding related sentence of either high or low dominance, and (3) revealed decay of priming from Lag 1 to 4. The differences between priming with and without stimulus repetition were nonsignificant when stimuli were treated as a random effect. In support of the Collins and Quillian (1972) model of semantic memory, the priming and property dominance factors interacted.     

Verifying environmental relationships

In two experiments, subjects first learned the locations of objects in a 21 x 21 ft room and then were timed as they verified, from memory, statements about the spatial relationships of the objects to certain features (e.g., the outside walls, the center of the room, subdividing partitions). The statements were of the form “X is (not) close to (far from) F” in Experiment 1 and “X is farther from (closer to) F than Y is” in Experiment 2, where X and Y are specific objects and F is a feature. While some of the latencies varied directly with the magnitudes of the distances between objects and features named in the sentences, there were several instances in which sentences associated with equivalent distances led to different latencies or sentences associated with different distances led to equivalent latencies. The possible cognitive operations underlying the latency pattern are discussed.     

The logic in language: How all quantifiers are alike,but each quantifier is different

Quantifier words like each, every, all and three are among the most abstract words in language. Unlike nouns, verbs and adjectives, the meanings of quantifiers are not related to a referent out in the world. Rather, quantifiers specify what relationships hold between the sets of entities, events and properties denoted by other words. When two quantifiers are in the same clause, they create a systematic ambiguity. “Every kid climbed a tree” could mean that there was only one tree, climbed by all, or many different trees, one per climbing kid. In the present study, participants chose a picture to indicate their preferred reading of different ambiguous sentences – those containing every, as well as the other three quantifiers. In Experiment 1, we found large systematic differences in preference, depending on the quantifier word. In Experiment 2, we then manipulated the choice of a particular reading of one sentence, and tested how this affected participants’ reading preference on a subsequent target sentence. We found a priming effect for all quantifiers, but only when the prime and target sentences contained the same quantifier. For example, all-a sentences prime other all-a sentences, while each-a primes each-a, but sentences with each do not prime sentences with all or vice versa. In Experiment 3, we ask whether the lack of priming across quantifiers could be due to the two sentences sharing one fewer word. We find that changing the verb between the prime and target sentence does not reduce the priming effect. In Experiment 4, we discover one case where there is priming across quantifiers – when one number (e.g. three) is in the prime, and a different one (e.g. four) is in the target. We discuss how these findings relate to linguistic theories of quantifier meaning and what they tell us about the division of labor between conceptual content and combinatorial semantics, as well as the mental representations of quantification and of the abstract logical structure of language.     

How to Precisify Quantifiers

I here argue that Ted Sider's indeterminacy argument against vagueness in quantifiers fails. Sider claims that vagueness entails precisifications, but holds that precisifications of quantifiers cannot be coherently described: they will either deliver the wrong logical form to quantified sentences, or involve a presupposition that contradicts the claim that the quantifier is vague. Assuming (as does Sider) that the “connectedness” of objects can be precisely defined, I present a counter-example to Sider's contention, consisting of a partial, implicit definition of the existential quantifier that in effect sets a given degree of connectedness among the putative parts of an object as a condition upon there being something (in the sense in question) with those parts. I then argue that such an implicit definition, taken together with an “auxiliary logic” (e.g., introduction and elimination rules), proves to function as a precisification in just the same way as paradigmatic precisifications of, e.g., “red”. I also argue that with a quantifier that is stipulated as maximally tolerant as to what mereological sums there are, precisifications can be given in the form of truth-conditions of quantified sentences, rather than by implicit definition.     

基于同义关联的句子错误记忆：发展性逆转现象及句式效应

以汉语把字句和被字句为材料,采用学习-再认方式,考察基于同义关联的句子错误记忆及其发展性逆转现象和句式效应。实验1结果发现高二和初二校正后的关键诱饵句错误再认率显著高于小学五年级,把字关键诱饵句校正后的错误再认率显著高于被字句,表明基于同义关联的句子错误记忆存在发展性逆转现象和句式效应。实验2结果发现三个年级关键诱饵句与无关句的错误再认率差异均不显著,表明去除同义关联后,句子错误记忆现象被抑制。结果表明,同义关联能诱发句子错误记忆,且句子错误记忆存在发展性逆转现象和句式效应。     

Development and Validation of the Short Grit Scale (Grit–S)

Two experiments investigated the possibility that external statements in the Rotter I-E scale are more depressing in tone than internal statements, and thus depressed subjects may respond to external items due to item mood level rather than locus of control content. Results of Experiment 1 revealed that the external alternative was rated as more depressing than its internal counterpart for the majority Of the 23 I-E items (18 for females and 15 for males), while a small number of I-E items (3 for females and 6 for males) contained internal and external statements rated as balanced for depressing Content. For two I-E items the internal alternative was rated as more depressing. Results of Experiment 2 revealed that endorsement of external items was significantly related to self-reported depression for both total I-E score and for the item subset where external statements(as revealed in Experiment 1) were the more depressing of the item pair. External endorsement was not significantly related to depression for the I-E item subset where options are balanced for mood level, while endorsement of internal statements was related to depression only for the item subset where the internal option was rated as more depressing. These results were interpreted as supporting prior research which demonstrated mood response set using altered Rotter I-E scale items, Implications for use of the Rotter I-E scale in the study of depression were discussed.     

Inferences from disclosures about the truth and falsity of expert testimony

Participants acting as mock jurors made inferences about whether a person was a suspect in a murder based on an expert's testimony about the presence of objects at the crime scene and the disclosure that the testimony was true or false. Experiment 1 showed that participants made more correct inferences, and made inferences more quickly, when the truth or falsity of the expert's testimony was disclosed immediately after the testimony rather than when the disclosure was delayed. Experiment 2 showed no advantage for prior disclosure over immediate disclosure. Experiment 3 showed that the pattern of inferences when there was no disclosure mirrored the pattern when it was disclosed that the expert's testimony was true rather than false. Participants made more correct inferences from true conjunctions than disjunctions, and from false disjunctions than conjunctions. We discuss the implications for theories of the mental representations and cognitive processes that underlie human reasoning.     

Children's acceptance of underinformative sentences: The case of some as a determiner

In recent literature there is unanimous agreement about children's pragmatic competence in drawing scalar implicatures about some, if the task is made easy enough. However, children accept infelicitous some sentences more often than adults do. In general their acceptance is assumed to be synonymous with a logical interpretation of some as a quantifier. But in our view an overlap with some as a determiner in under-informative sentences cannot be ruled out, given the ambiguity of the experimental instructions and the attitude of trust by children in adults. Our study investigated this hypothesis with different experimental manipulations. We found that when the experimenter's intentions are clear (Experiment 1, all/some order effect; Experiments 2 and 4, conditions 2 and 3), under-informative sentences are usually rejected; otherwise (Experiment 1, some/all order effect; Experiments 3 and 4, control condition) they are accepted. However, analysis of verbal protocols indicated that pragmatically infelicitous sentences are accepted, with some interpreted mostly as a determiner, irrespective of the function of some as a quantifier. Acceptance is not in itself synonymous with a logical interpretation of some as a quantifier.     

Semantic representations as procedures for verification

Doubly quantified sentences can be ambiguous (Every man knows some woman) or unambiguous (Every man knows every woman). For active and passive sentences of these types, we elicited from subjects three types of judgments designed to reflect which quantifier they assigned wide scope in interpreting the sentence. There was a strong tendency for the three measures to agree, and for these agreements to fall on the surface structure subject of the sentence, independent of sentence type. The data are interpreted as showing a tendency for the first quantifier to include the second within its scope; thus for both ambiguous and unambiguous sentence types active sentences tend to be interpreted differently from their passive transforms. A semantic theory adequate to capture this phenomenon must assign sentences semantic representations specifying not only truth-conditions but also procedures for verification.     

The meaning(s) of conditionals: conditional probabilities,mental models,and personal utilities

Five experiments were conducted to test the hypothesis that people understand conditional statements ("if p then q") as indicating a high conditional probability P(q/p). Participants estimated the probability that a given conditional is true (Experiments 1A, 1B, and 3) or judged whether a conditional was true or false (Experiments 2 and 4) given information about the frequencies of the relevant truth table cases. Judgments were strongly influenced by the ratio of pq to p not q cases, supporting the conditional probability account In Experiments 1A, 1B, and 3, judgments were also affected by the frequency of pq cases, consistent with a version of mental model theory. Experiments 3 and 4 extended the results to thematic conditionals and showed that the pragmatic utility associated with believing a statement also affected the degree of belief in conditionals but not in logically equivalent quantified statements.     

Processing doubly quantified sentences: Evidence from eye movements

We investigated the processing of doubly quantified sentences, such asKelly showed a photo to every critic, that are ambiguous as to whether the indefinite (a photo) specifies single or multiple referents. Ambiguity resolution requires the computation of relative quantifier scope: Whether a or every takes wide scope, thereby determining how many entities or events are to be represented. In an eye-tracking experiment, we manipulated quantifier order and whether continuations were singular or plural, for constructions with the direct or the indirect object occurring first. We obtained effects consistent with the on-line processing of relative scope at the doubly quantified phrase and considered two possible explanations for a preference for singular continuations to the quantified sentence. We conclude that relative quantifier scope is computed on line during reading but may not be a prerequisite for the resolution of definite anaphors, unless required by secondary tasks.