Consider the source: One step in assessing premise acceptability

Premise acceptability is conceptually connected to presumption. To say that a premise is acceptable just when there is a presumption in its favor is to give a first approximation to this connection. A number of popular principles of presumption suggest that whether there is a presumption for a premise, belief, or claim depends on the sources which vouch for it. Sources consist of internal belief-generating mechanisms and external testimony. Alvin Plantinga's notion of warrant lays down four conditions upon a source for the belief which it generates to be warranted. We argue that there is a presumption for a premise, belief, or claim if and only if there is a presumption of warrant for that premise,belief or claim. This amounts to the thesis that there is a presumption for a belief from a challenger's point of view if and only if there is a presumption from that person's point of view that her cognitive faculties which have generated the belief have been functioning properly, in an appropriate cognitive environment, in accord with a segment of her design plan aimed at the truth, and that these faculties are reliable. In light of our argument for this thesis, we may legitimately claim that one way to determine that there is a presumption for a belief is to determine that there is a presumption of warrant for that belief, and thus that in determining whether there is a presumption for a belief or premise, we may consider the source.     

Climate change,justice and the right to development

The primary human rights documents of the United Nations claim that every human has a right to development, a right that also includes continuous improvement of each person's living conditions. On one interpretation, this implies a right to a never-ending improvement of living conditions. According to the author, this interpretation faces several counterintuitive implications. First, it seems reasonable that we cannot have a right to improvement without regard to environmental sustainability; improvements must instead focus on well-being, a concept that is partially unrelated to material improvements. Second, if development is a human right, there are several distributional problems with this right. The paper discusses three different responses to the idea that everybody has a right to continuous improvement and concludes that the best solution is to reject the idea that everyone has such a right. This does not imply that we must reject a right to a certain minimum level of well-being; it just means that this right cannot include claims for never-ending improvement.     

A causal model theory of the meaning of cause, enable, and prevent

The verbs cause , enable , and prevent express beliefs about the way the world works. We offer a theory of their meaning in terms of the structure of those beliefs expressed using qualitative properties of causal models, a graphical framework for representing causal structure. We propose that these verbs refer to a causal model relevant to a discourse and that "A causes B" expresses the belief that the causal model includes a link from A to B. "A enables/allows B" entails that the model includes a link from A to B, that A represents a category of events necessary for B, and that an alternative cause of B exists. "A prevents B" entails that the model includes a link from A to B and that A reduces the likelihood of B. This theory is able to account for the results of four experiments as well as a variety of existing data on human reasoning.     

Persons and Substances

I have argued elsewhere that the psychological criterion of personalidentity entails that a person is not an object, but a series ofpsychological events. As this is somewhat counter-intuitive,I consider whether the psychological theorist can argue that a person, while not a substance, exists in a way that is akin to theway that substances exist. I develop ten criteria that such a`quasi-substance' should meet, and I argue that a reasonablecase can be made to show that the psychological theorist's conception of a person meets these criteria.     

Vigilance and the reinforcing properties of shock

There have been some observations to indicate that waiting for a shock is stressful, that the coining of an anticipated shock can serve as a tension reliever, and that failure to obtain an anticipated shock is more stressful than being shocked. Based on these observations, the following hypotheses were tested. If it is true that failure to receive shock is more stressful than the shock itself, it should be possible to train an animal to bring on a shock that had failed to come when anticipated. If a period of anticipating shock is stressful, and shock serves as a reliever of the stress, it should be possible to train an animal to perform a response instrumental to bringing on the shock sooner. Results indicated that shock does seem to serve as a reliever, that waiting for shock is stressful, but that failure to receive an anticipated shock under these circumstances is not more stressful than the shock itself. In addition, it was found that subjects learned to produce shock instrumentally if the shock was inevitable and could thus be brought about sooner. Results were inconclusive, though generally negative, on the issue of whether S’s would produce an avoidable shock that had failed to come when anticipated.     

Why I’m still a proportionalist

Mark Schroeder has, rather famously, defended a powerful Humean Theory of Reasons. In doing so, he abandons what many take to be the default Humean view of weighting reasons—namely, proportionalism . On Schroeder’s view, the pressure that Humeans feel to adopt proportionalism is illusory, and proportionalism is unable to make sense of the fact that the weight of reasons is a normative matter. He thus offers his own ‘Recursive View’, which directly explains how it is that the weight of reasons is a normative matter. In this paper, I argue against Schroeder that a Humean ought to be a proportionalist. On my view, proportionalism is clearly an intuitive theory of weighting for a Humean, so we should resist it only if Schroeder can demonstrate either that there is a serious problem with the view, or that there is a better alternative. I then further argue that Schroeder fails to deliver on either condition. As a result, I conclude that there are good intuitive reasons for a Humean to be a proportionalist, and no good reason not to be.     

The Decision-Theoretic Lockean Thesis

Abstract

Certain philosophers maintain that there is a ‘constitutive threshold for belief’: to believe that p just is to have a degree of confidence that p above a certain threshold. On the basis of this view, these philosophers defend what is known as ‘the Lockean Thesis’, according to which it is rational to believe that p just in case it is rational to have a degree of confidence that p above the constitutive threshold for belief. While not directly speaking to the controversy over the Lockean Thesis, this paper defends the general idea behind it—namely, the thesis that there is some threshold such that it is rational to believe that p if and only if it is rational to have a degree of confidence greater than that threshold. This paper identifies the threshold in question—not with the alleged constitutive threshold for belief—but with what I call ‘the practical threshold for rational belief’. Roughly, the thesis defended here is that it is rational to believe that p if and only if it is rational to have a degree of confidence that p that rationalizes engaging in certain types of practical reasoning.     

Feature Centrality and Conceptual Coherence

Conceptual features differ in how mentally tranformable they are. A robin that does not eat is harder to imagine than a robin that does not chirp. We argue that features are immutable to the extent that they are central in a network of dependency relations. The immutability of a feature reflects how much the internal structure of a concept depends on that feature; i.e., how much the feature contributes to the concept's coherence. Complementarily, mutability reflects the aspects in which a concept is flexible. We show that features can be reliably ordered according to their mutability using tasks that require people to conceive of objects missing a feature, and that mutability (conceptual centrality) can be distinguished from category centrality and from diagnosticity and salience. We test a model of mutability based on asymmetric, unlabeled, pairwise dependency relations. With no free parameters, the model provides reasonable fits to data. Qualitative tests of the model show that mutability judgments are unaffected by the type of dependency relation and that dependency structure influences judgments of variability.     

Learning to fail: reoccurring tip-of-the-tongue states

This experiment looked at elicited tip-of-the-tongue (TOT) states to test the hypothesis that making an error once makes people more likely to make it again, via an implicit learning mechanism. We present a methodology that allows us to determine whether error reoccurrences are due to error learning or to the fact that some items tend to pose repeated difficulty to participants. We elicited TOTs by asking participants to supply the word that fitted a given definition. Each time participants indicated that they were experiencing a TOT they were randomly assigned a delay of either 10 or 30 seconds, during which they were asked to keep trying to retrieve the item. After the delay, the correct answer was supplied. We argue that this longer delay in a TOT state amounts to greater implicit learning of the erroneous state. A period of 48 hours later, participants returned to the laboratory and were asked to supply the words for the same definitions as those seen on Day 1. Results showed that TOTs were almost twice as likely to reoccur on words that had elicited a TOT and been followed by a long delay than on those that had been followed by a short delay.     

Teichman, Freedom of Expression and the Public Platform

ABSTRACT In the course of her defence of German protesters against Peter Singer's lectures, Jenny Teichman claims that the right to make use of a public platform is not covered by the principle of freedom of expression. I argue that this view is mistaken, and that she is also wrong to focus on whether Singer deserved a public platform. Instead I suggest that what matters is whether there was an attempt to prevent communication between a speaker and willing hearers. But I agree with Teichman that there are some relevant differences between speaking from a public platform and speaking privately. In particular I argue that protesters have a right, though not one based on freedom of expression, to interrupt a public speaker. Such a right is on a par with the speaker's freedom to draw public attention to the fact that she has opinions which she thinks worthy of a hearing, and in exercising it a protester must not prevent those who wish to hear the speech from doing so. Finally I offer an argument against the view that disrupting Singer's lectures could be seen as a justified interference with freedom of expression.     

Being in a position to know

The concept of being in a position to know is an increasingly popular member of the epistemologist’s toolkit. Some have used it as a basis for an account of propositional justification. Others, following Timothy Williamson, have used it as a vehicle for articulating interesting luminosity and anti-luminosity theses. It is tempting to think that while knowledge itself does not obey any closure principles, being in a position to know does. For example, if one knows both p and ‘If p then q’, but one dies or gets distracted before being able to perform a modus ponens on these items of knowledge and for that reason one does not know q, one is still plausibly in a position to know q. It is also tempting to suppose that, while one does not know all logical truths, one is nevertheless in a position to know every logical truth. Putting these temptations together, we get the view that being in a position to know has a normal modal logic. A recent literature has begun to investigate whether it is a good idea to give in to these twin temptations—in particular the first one. That literature assumes very naturally that one is in a position to know everything one knows and that one is not in a position to know things that one cannot know. It has succeeded in showing that, given the modest closure condition that knowledge is closed under conjunction elimination (or ‘distributes over conjunction’), being a position to know cannot satisfy the so-called K axiom (closure of being in a position to know under modus ponens) of normal modal logics. In this paper, we explore the question of the normality of the logic of being in a position to know in a more far-reaching and systematic way. Assuming that being in a position to know entails the possibility of knowing and that knowing entails being in a position to know, we can demonstrate radical failures of normality without assuming any closure principles at all for knowledge. (However, as we will indicate, we get further problems if we assume that knowledge is closed under conjunction introduction.) Moreover, the failure of normality cannot be laid at the door of the K axiom for knowledge, since the standard principle NEC of necessitation also fails for being in a position to know. After laying out and explaining our results, we briefly survey the coherent options that remain.

     

Effects of motor intention on the perception of somatosensory events: A behavioural and functional magnetic resonance imaging study

The intention to execute a movement can modulate our perception of sensory events, and this modulation is observed ahead of both ocular and upper limb movements. However, theoretical accounts of these effects, and also the empirical data, are often contradictory. Accounts of “active touch”, and the premotor theory of attention, have emphasized how movement intention leads to enhanced perceptual processing at the target of a movement, or on the to-be-moved effector. By contrast, recent theories of motor control emphasize how internal “forward” model (FM) estimates may be used to cancel or attenuate sensory signals that arise as a result of self-generated movements. We used behavioural and functional brain imaging (functional magnetic resonance imaging, fMRI) to investigate how perception of a somatosensory stimulus differed according to whether it was delivered to a hand that was about to execute a reaching movement or the alternative, nonmoving, hand. The results of our study demonstrate that a somatosensory stimulus delivered to a hand that is being prepared for movement is perceived to have occurred later than when that same stimulus is delivered to a nonmoving hand. This result indicates that it takes longer for a tactile stimulus to be detected when it is delivered to a moving limb and may correspond to a change in perceptual threshold. Our behavioural results are paralleled by the results of our fMRI study that demonstrated that there were significantly reduced blood-oxygen-level-dependent (BOLD) responses within the parietal operculum and insula following somatosensory stimulation of the hand being prepared for movement, compared to when an identical stimulus was delivered to a nonmoving hand. These findings are consistent with the prediction of FM accounts of motor control that postulate that central sensory suppression of somatosensation accompanies self-generated limb movements, and with previous reports indicating that effects of sensory suppression are observed in higher order somatosensory regions.     

Exploring predictors of alternative job changes

Previous studies have found that the variables that predict employee turnover vary considerably across situations. This lack of consistency may reflect limitations imposed by viewing turnover only as a decision to leave a current job. The variables that predict turnover may depend on the type of job change that an employee makes after leaving. This study explored which variables predicted leaving a job and moving to three alternative types of job change. The results show that different variables predicted employee moves to a new type of job in the same organization, the same job in a different organization, and a different job in a different organization. This supports the concept that turnover may be better modelled as a decision not only to leave a job, but also to move to a different work situation.     

Effects of motor intention on the perception of somatosensory events: a behavioural and functional magnetic resonance imaging study

The intention to execute a movement can modulate our perception of sensory events, and this modulation is observed ahead of both ocular and upper limb movements. However, theoretical accounts of these effects, and also the empirical data, are often contradictory. Accounts of "active touch", and the premotor theory of attention, have emphasized how movement intention leads to enhanced perceptual processing at the target of a movement, or on the to-be-moved effector. By contrast, recent theories of motor control emphasize how internal "forward" model (FM) estimates may be used to cancel or attenuate sensory signals that arise as a result of self-generated movements. We used behavioural and functional brain imaging (functional magnetic resonance imaging, fMRI) to investigate how perception of a somatosensory stimulus differed according to whether it was delivered to a hand that was about to execute a reaching movement or the alternative, nonmoving, hand. The results of our study demonstrate that a somatosensory stimulus delivered to a hand that is being prepared for movement is perceived to have occurred later than when that same stimulus is delivered to a nonmoving hand. This result indicates that it takes longer for a tactile stimulus to be detected when it is delivered to a moving limb and may correspond to a change in perceptual threshold. Our behavioural results are paralleled by the results of our fMRI study that demonstrated that there were significantly reduced blood-oxygen-level-dependent (BOLD) responses within the parietal operculum and insula following somatosensory stimulation of the hand being prepared for movement, compared to when an identical stimulus was delivered to a nonmoving hand. These findings are consistent with the prediction of FM accounts of motor control that postulate that central sensory suppression of somatosensation accompanies self-generated limb movements, and with previous reports indicating that effects of sensory suppression are observed in higher order somatosensory regions.     

Minority Minds: Mental Disability and the Presumption of Value Neutrality

Elizabeth Barnes has recently developed an account of disability that is sensitive to the role of self-evaluation. To have a physical disability is, according to Barnes, to have a body that is merely different from the norm. Yet, as Barnes notes, some disabilities will genuinely frustrate some life plans. It may be the case, therefore, that a disability is instrumentally bad for a person and that acquiring one may be a genuine loss. Equally, however, a person may genuinely value a disability such that it is instrumentally good for them and that they experience the acquiring of it as a gain. Notably, Barnes explicitly restricts this analysis to physical disabilities, leaving open the status of mental disabilities. Nevertheless, Barnes does not rule out the extension of her model to this category, and she expresses a desire to see future work on other disabilities built upon it. This article takes up this challenge, making the case that to possess a mental disability is merely to possess a minority mind.     

Comparison of the effect of onset asynchrony on auditory grouping in pitch matching and vowel identification

Previous experiments have shown that when a slightly mistuned harmonic of a complex tone starts more than about 80 msec before the remaining components, it makes a reduced contribution to the pitch of the complex. This contribution decreases to zero by about 300-msec onset asynchrony. In vowel perception, however, analogous experiments have shown that a much shorter asynchrony (around 40 msec) is enough to ensure that a component does not influence a vowel’s phonemic category. The three experiments reported here demonstrate that this difference in the utility of onset time as a grouping cue does not arise because of differences in stimulus structure, but rather is due to the perceptual task. They show that the onset asynchrony needed in a pitch-matching experiment to remove the contribution that a mistuned component makes to the pitch of a vowel is the same as that needed to remove the contribution to the pitch of a flat-spectrum complex tone. They further show that a much smaller onset asynchrony is needed to perceptually remove the same harmonic from a vowel for the calculation of vowel quality. The implication of this result for models of auditory grouping is discussed.     

Using perceptrons to explore the reorientation task

The reorientation task is a paradigm that has been used extensively to study the types of information used by humans and animals to navigate in their environment. In this task, subjects are reinforced for going to a particular location in an arena that is typically rectangular in shape. The subject then has to find that location again after being disoriented, and possibly after changes have been made to the arena. This task is used to determine the geometric and featural cues that can be used to reorient the agent in the arena. The purpose of the present paper is to present several simulation results that show that a simple neural network, a perceptron, can be used to generate many of the traditional findings that have been obtained using the reorientation task. These results suggest that reorientation task regularities can be explained without appealing to a geometric module that is a component of spatial processing.     

The phenomenological directness of perceptual experience

When you have a perceptual experience of a given physical object that object seems to be immediately present to you in a way it never does when you consciously think about or imagine it. Many philosophers have claimed that naïve realism (the view that to perceive is to stand in a primitive relation of acquaintance to the world) can provide a satisfying account of this phenomenological directness of perceptual experience while the content view (the view that to perceive is to represent the world to be a certain way) cannot. I argue that this claim is false. Specifically, I maintain that the only acceptable naïve realist account of the relevant phenomenology is circular and that the content view can provide a similar account. In addition, I maintain that a certain specific variety of the content view provides a non-circular and thus more satisfactory account of this phenomenology. If so, then contrary to what is commonly assumed there are powerful phenomenological grounds for preferring the content view to naïve realism.