存在论、本体论和世界观:“思维和存在的关系问题”的辩证法

哲学意义的存在论、本体论和世界观,并不是相互割裂的关于"存在"、"本体"和"世界"的实证知识,而是以"思维和存在的关系问题"为实质内容的反思性的哲学理论。作为历史性的思想和思想性的历史,哲学的世界观是以理论形态所表征的人生在世和人在途中的人的目光。它既是反思存在的存在论,又是追问存在的根据的本体论,由此构成反思思维与存在的否定性统一的辩证法。辩证法是以"思维和存在的关系问题"为"基本问题"的存在论、本体论和世界观"三者一致"的哲学理论。     

以人为本的价值观

从哲学上看,尽管我们的存在论和认识论在事实上是要以人为本的,但"以人为本"却并不是一个存在论和认识论的命题,而是一个纯粹的价值观命题.我们在理解贯彻"以人为本"原则时,需要牢牢把握它的价值观特征.     

“先验想象力”抑或“超越论形象力”——海德格尔对康德先验想象力概念的解释与批判

通过讨论海德格尔对康德先验想象力概念之批判的核心,文章强调海德格尔所理解的康德的"想象力"概念首先不是一心理学、人类学意义上的,作为一种心理、心智能力的"感性创作能力",也不仅仅是一先验哲学的,即既独立于感性经验,而又使得任何科学的经验认知成为可能的认识论意义上的"先验构想力量"。相反,相比较前两者,它更是一种渊源性的"奠基力量"或在存在论上"更为源初的‘可能性’"。     

“感性世界”的重构与《资本论》的世界观

近代认识论中的"感性确定性"批判及感性世界问题,构成了马克思哲学革命的必要理论前提和思想路径。马克思对感性世界进行了存在论分析,区分出感性世界的不同存在层次,即感性直观、感性对象与感性活动,由此提出了一种基于科学实践观的感性世界观。马克思将特定认识论问题转化为社会历史存在论,并进一步深化和发展为拜物教批判、资本统治批判。在《资本论》中,马克思的感性世界观深化为一种关于资本主义社会普遍物化结构的世界观,从而在理论范式、问题意识和思想视域层面超越了西方近代哲学。     

从思辨认识论到社会认识论

从元认识论的视角看,认识论既是反思认识的理论框架,又是启发认识行为的研究纲领。传统认识论(从古希腊哲学到黑格尔哲学以及某些受传统哲学影响的现代哲学)在本质上是思辨的,它的最大失误在于没有以社会为基点来解释认识问题,其实质是没有看到人的社会本体性及其认识的社会性。“反思辨”是现代认识论的逻辑起点。由于“反思辨”的角度和方式不同,现代认识论又大体可分为四条思路,即马克思主义的、人本主义的、科学主义的和实用主义的。这几种思路有一个重要的立足点是一致的,那就是关心社会、研究社会、参与社会、改造社会,因而本身就是“社会的”。     

本体论的困难及其出路

1.存在和存在的证明的一致1.1 本体论地谈论存在问题无论如何也不可能是一种科学的研究。当对象性地谈论存在问题时,本体论的存在便被放置在这种谈论的外面。本体论的第一个困难便是要求存在和存在的证明的一致,即存在本身便是其自身的明证(evidence)。在这个明证的水平上,本体论与认识论的分界突然消失了;存在要求直观性而使本体论认识论化,另一方面,明证要求最终性而使认识论本体论化。本体论的这种要求导致近现代本体论的革命。     

康德自由概念的四个存在论维度

自由概念是康德哲学的核心概念,是理解康德哲学的一把钥匙.学界对康德自由概念的理解聚讼纷纭,莫衷一是:“二分法”,“三个层次”或“三步曲”.但是它们只是停留在对康德自由概念的分类和梳理层面上,并没有揭示康德自由概念的完整内涵和内在逻辑.康德是从自由的可能性、实在性、现实性和实际性四个存在论维度构建有机联系的自由理论.本文试图从这四个存在论维度恢复隐藏在康德哲学体系中自由概念的完整原貌,揭示其存在论意蕴.康德自由概念不是认识论意义上或心理学意义上的自由,而是存在论意义上自由,它揭示了人的存在的本质,即人的存在的价值、尊严、责任和权利.     

马克思哲学的实践生存论内蕴

“哲学家们只是用不同的方式解释世界,问题在于改变世界。”[1]马克思的这句话至少有三层含义,第一,以“解释世界”为宗旨的近代哲学,秉承形而上学思维方式,局限于认识论领域来谈主客体的同一性,它对存在的理解是无根的。以“改造世界”为宗旨的马克思哲学奠基于实践基石,着眼于实践来理解人的存在,理解人与自然的关系,从而找到了人与感性世界同一性的真正基础,它对存在的理解则是有根的。第二,不能满足于在理论范围内谈现实问题,把现实问题仅仅归结为观念问题,而要着眼于“改变世界”,因为理论的根在现实之中,理论的问题仅仅在自身之内是解…     

意向性的计算解释

当代心智哲学和认知科学中,意向性是颇受关注且又不断引发争论的中心概念之一。直观上,意向性系指心智状态或过程具有的"关于性",即心智的内容是关于或表征某种东西的。许多哲学家认为,意向性是大多数(甚至所有)心智状态的标志。倘若意向性确是一种真实的现象,则以理解心智现象为己任的认知科学,就有责任用科学上合适的方式来解释心智状态的这一特质。     

存在逻辑的基本概念——存在

存在逻辑(logic of existence)是哲学逻辑的一个分支领域。它不像传统的本体论(存在论)那样,回答什么是存在这一类问题,而是要阐明存在的逻辑意义。 存在逻辑的核心问题是对存在“E！”的解释,即对“E！”的定义问题。这也是整个哲学逻辑的核心问题。由于对存在“E！”的不同理解,而形成了存在逻辑内部的不同流派。 “存在”是一个极普通的概念。初看起来,理解“存在”的含义并不困难,正如评判一个     

What shall we do with emergence? A survey of a fundamental issue in the metaphysics and epistemology of science

A survey of some recent literature on the concept of emergence provides a case study of an important issue in the general metaphysics and epistemology of science. Emergentism has often been motivated by the desire to avoid excessive reductionism in the philosophy of mind and culture and in the respective fields of the philosophy of science—philosophy of psychology and of the human and social sciences. Philosophers employing the concept of emergence usually argue that there are several ‘levels’ of reality and that the entities and properties of the ‘higher’ levels (e.g., mentality) emerge from those of the ‘lower’ ones (e.g., the physical universe). The standard division between ontological and epistemological approaches to this concept is shown to be inadequate through a critical discussion of emergence from the perspective of a pragmatist philosophy of science. It is argued that emergence should be conceived of both ontologically and epistemologically, because there is no humanly possible point of view for ontologizing about the way the world is structured in itself, entirely independently of our epistemic standpoints. Emergence thus turns out to be an example of the way in which the ‘pre-critical’ dispute between dogmatic metaphysics and skeptical reactions to it (which Kant famously wanted to overcome) still dominates philosophy of science. Hence, the problems of emergence and realism are observed to be intimately connected.     

Open‐endedness,Schemas and Ontological Commitment

Second‐order axiomatizations of certain important mathematical theories—such as arithmetic and real analysis—can be shown to be categorical. Categoricity implies semantic completeness, and semantic completeness in turn implies determinacy of truth‐value. Second‐order axiomatizations are thus appealing to realists as they sometimes seem to offer support for the realist thesis that mathematical statements have determinate truth‐values. The status of second‐order logic is a controversial issue, however. Worries about ontological commitment have been influential in the debate. Recently, Vann McGee has argued that one can get some of the technical advantages of second‐order axiomatizations—categoricity, in particular—while walking free of worries about ontological commitment. In so arguing he appeals to the notion of an open‐ended schema—a schema that holds no matter how the language of the relevant theory is extended. Contra McGee, we argue that second‐order quantification and open‐ended schemas are on a par when it comes to ontological commitment.     

Speaking about the Unspeakable: genocide and philosophy

ABSTRACT  Genocide is a political catastrophe. Yet it has not received much academic attention. A few social scientists have studied it. Philosophers have largely ignored it. There is a large literature on the Holocaust, but there is little agreement as to how this should be related to other genocides. Some have argued that the Holocaust represented a crisis of Western culture, but that Western culture has not responded adequately for the lack of the appropriate self-understanding. This crisis has been attributed to the predominance of scientistic models of rationality in our culture. Social-scientific approaches to genocide have been criticised because of their commitment to logical empiricism, which is held to be epistemologically and ethically inadequate. Ethical approaches based on liberal humanism have been criticised by post-Nietzschean philosophers for their attachment to allegedly outworn metaphysical assumptions. However, the deconstruction of social science and liberal ethics leads in the direction of relativism and nihilism, which are either useless or dangerous in the face of evils such as genocide. The arguments against conventional social science and ethics are examined, and a counter-critique made of post-modern philosophy in order to clear the ground for constructive thinking about genocide.     

Evaluating Creativity Through the Degrees of Solidity of Its Assessment: A Relational Approach

In this paper, we introduce a new approach to creativity assessment. Arguably, one of the main obstacles to creativity assessment is that creativity criteria are likely to change depending on what is assessed and who is making the assessment. We argue that we might be able to solve this problem by adopting a relational ontology, i.e., an ontology according to which beings of the world acquire their properties by relating to other beings. First, we present the main consequences of this ontological approach for creativity assessment: (a) Accounting for the creativity of a given object involves retracing the beings (including criteria) that relate it to its alleged creativity; (b) One can assess the creativity of this object by looking at the number of beings that substantiate this relation, i.e., by looking at what we call the “degree of solidity” of the relation; (c) One can thus account for the specificity of various forms of creativity and, at the same time, compare them in terms of solidity. Building on these ontological assumptions, we then present a new assessment technique, the Objection Counting Technique, before putting it to the test using an excerpt taken from a naturally occurring brainstorming session.     

自由的现实性与定言命令的可能性———对康德《道德形而上学奠基》的新理解

自由是康德实践哲学的精神和核心:自由观不仅构成了康德实践哲学的最抽象的层面,而且是其整个伦理学的根基;定言命令是康德道德哲学中的基本要求。然而,康德关于自由的现实性的思想,却是他被诟病最多的地方之一:根据对自由的本体化的传统解释,在实践哲学中,康德试图论证本体所具有的先验自由(独立于经验性因素而引起因果序列的能力),并对实在性、因果性这些知性范畴     

ONTOLOGICAL NATURALISM*

Abstract: Ontological naturalism is the view that our best construal of what there is, is what science says there is. This paper argues that while such a doctrine is very appealing, unfortunately, determining what there is, is neither as simple, nor as straightforward, as ontological naturalism would have it seem. Determining what there is, it is claimed, involves three steps. First, one must decide which part of scientific discourse should be taken as true. One must then regiment that part of scientific discourse, and finally, one has to apply a criterion for ontological commitment to that regimented discourse. This paper will concentrate on the first and third of these tasks. It is argued that resolving the tasks these steps put before us requires the employment of philosophical maneuvers, that is, maneuvers that neither originate within, nor are ratified by, the practice of science. But these are maneuvers that the ontological naturalist is not entitled to. Thus, ontological naturalism is not a feasible doctrine.     

In homage to Descartes and Spinoza: A cosmo‐ontological case for God

Integrating cosmological and ontological lines of reasoning, I argue that there is a self‐necessary being that (a) serves as the sufficient condition for everything, that (b) has the most perfect collection of whatever attributes of perfection there might be, and that (c) is an independent, eternal, unique, simple, indivisible, immutable, all‐actual, all‐free, all‐present, all‐powerful, all‐knowing, all‐good, and personal creator of every expression of itself that everything is. My cosmo‐ontological case for such a being, an everything‐maker with the core features ascribed to the God of classical theism, addresses the standard worries plaguing these lines of reasoning: (1) the richness required of such a being dissolves it into many beings; (2) the metaphysical possibility of such a being is assumed on insufficient grounds; (3) the features we ascribe to such a being are mere human‐all‐too‐human projections.     

Can Truthmaker Theorists Claim Ontological Free Lunches?

Truthmaker theorists hold that propositions about higher‐level entities (e.g. the proposition that there is a heap of sand) are often made true by lower‐level entities (e.g. by facts about the configuration of fundamental particles). This generates a problem: what should we say about these higher‐level entities? On the one hand, they must exist (since there are true propositions about them), on the other hand, it seems that they are completely superfluous and should be banished for reasons of ontological parsimony. Some truthmaker theorists—most prominently David Armstrong—have tried to solve this puzzle by arguing that these entities are ‘an ontological free lunch’, i.e. real existents that are still ‘no addition of being’. This answer is prima facie attractive, but I argue in this paper that the standard approaches to truthmaking—modal theories and grounding theories—are unable to vindicate the doctrine of the ontological free lunch, and thus fail to solve the problem of higher‐level entities. Fortunately, there is a non‐standard account of truthmaking available, the reductive explanation account, which succeeds where the standard approaches fail.     

Reid, Kant and the Philosophy of Mind

I suggest a possible rehabilitation of Reid's philosophy of mind by a constructive use of Kant's criticisms of the common sense tradition. Kant offers two criticisms, explicitly claiming that common sense philosophy is ill directed methodologically, and implicitly rejecting Reid's view that there is direct epistemological access by introspection to the ontology of mind. Putting the two views together reveals a tension between epistemology and ontology, but the problem which Kant finds in Reid also infects his own system, as his weaker ontological claims are undermined to such an extent by the necessary reintroduction of self-consciousness that the justification he seeks for reason fails to be reached epistemologically. Plausible solutions to these parallel tensions imply that both Reid and Kant have a pre-systematic concept of mind, and may lead to the conclusion that Reid's method is more economical in the elaboration of an ontology for the philosophy of mind.