THE JUSTICE IN MERCY

It is natural to wonder how mercy is related to justice. I focus in this essay on a more limited question: how should we relate mercy and retributive justice? My suggestion is that attending to our situation as moral agents can help us solve this conundrum. I offer a pessimistic reading of our situation. Because of original sin and related forms of bad moral luck, we have limited control over our attitudes and actions. This has a surprisingly hopeful upshot, since our unfortunate condition makes it appropriate to respond to one another mercifully. I suggest that this response can take two forms. Without collapsing justice into mercy, it is right to make our approach to justice and punishment more merciful and to recognize the fittingness of “erring” on the side of mercy when we are uncertain how to apportion blame.     

JUSTICE IN CHOICE BEHAVIOR

Une série d'études inter-culturelles a été consacrée à L'effet de L'équité sur le comportement de choix, dans un jeu de type Dilemme du Prisonnier. Les résultats antérieurement collectés montrent que les sujets américains choisissent de maximiser leur gain en fonction de leur niveau d'estime de soi: une distribution des récompenses en fonction du mérite semble correspondre à un besoin d'équité; mais les sujets italiens qui ont une faible estime d'eux-mêmes tendent à maximiser plus fréquemment leur gain: ils ont tendance à être “ ego-défensifs”. Dans les études qui sont présentées ici, une récompense initiale est donnée à L'un des deux partenaires, sur la base d'un “test” d'aptitude à la prédiction (Distribution Juste), ou bien la récompense est donnée arbitrairement, sans tenir compre du test (Distribution Injuste). Les sujets doivent ensuite faire une serie de cinquante choix. Les choix des sujets américains renètent un besoin d'équité dans la condition Distribution Injuste, le sujet qui a reçu une récompense choisit moins souvent de maximiser ses gains que le sujet qui n'a pas reçu de récompense; dans la condition Distribution Juste, les sujets maintiennent L'inégalité créée par la récompense initiale. Sur L'ensemble des trois échantillons italiens qui ont été étudiés séparément, on observe une tendance à minimiser L'injustice dans la condition Distribution Injuste; mais dans la condition Distribution Juste, on observe un effet de défense du moi. Différentes interprétations théoriques des résultats sont discutées.     

JUSTICE IN TEAMS: ANTECEDENTS AND CONSEQUENCES OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE CLIMATE

This study examined antecedents and consequences of procedural justice climate (Mossholder, Bennett, & Martin, 1998; Naumann & Bennett, 2000) in a sample of manufacturing teams. The results showed that climate level (i.e., the average procedural justice perception within the team) was significantly related to both team performance and team absenteeism. Moreover, the effects of climate level were moderated by climate strength, such that the relationships were more beneficial in stronger climates. In addition, team size and team collectivism were significant antecedents of climate level, and team size and team demographic diversity predicted climate strength.     

POLITICAL EQUALITY IN JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS

Philosophical Studies -     

PROCEDURAL AND DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE IN THE EDITORIAL REVIEW PROCESS

Based on organizational justice theories, a model of procedural and distributive justice is proposed to explain authors' reactions to editorial decisions and the editorial review process. Authors ( n = 106) provided justice perceptions and future journal submission intentions upon receiving an editorial decision letter. The editor provided information on editorial decisions and review processes. Explanation and interpersonal sensitivity were important procedural justice dimensions in predicting distributive justice reactions and intentions to submit future work to the journal. Explanations appear particularly important when the decision is negative. Journal submission intentions were positively related to distributive justice reactions for inexperienced, but not experienced, authors. In addition, journal submission intentions were positively related to the perceived explanation received for experienced, but not inexperienced, authors. Discussion focuses on implications for organizational justice theories and for journal publishing and HR practices.     

POWER IN SOCIAL ORGANIZATION AS THE SUBJECT OF JUSTICE

Abstract: The paper suggests that the state is subject to assessment according to principles of social justice because state institutions or practices exercise forms of power over which no particular person has control. This rationale for assessment of social justice equally applies to legally optional or informal social practices. But it does not apply to individual conduct. Indeed, it follows that principles of social justice cannot provide a basis for the assessment and guidance of individual choice. The paper develops this practice‐based conception of the subject of justice by rejoining G. A. Cohen's influential critique of Rawls’ focus on the “basic structure” of society.     

PUNITIVE JUSTICE AND RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AS SOCIAL RECONCILIATION

The notion of justice is broad and complex. When we pursue justice too harshly after a conflict, we create new injustice and more victims; when we do not, the offenders usually keep hurting others and the violence is prolonged. As a matter of fact, only a few perpetrators can be punished. On the other hand, does punishment of the offender alone heal the victim or restore peace and harmony in society? Moreover, when the victim forgives, should the society still punish the offender? What role do truth recovery, state tribute (paid to the victims) and monetary compensation play in finding the balance between punitive justice and restorative justice? This paper takes up these issues of justice and, while discussing certain aspects of the relationship between punitive justice and restorative justice in some processes of social (national) reconciliation, tries to present some answers.     

SOCIAL JUSTICE

Social justice (which includes retributive and distributive justice) is most clearly satisfied by a system of Divine rewards and punishments: an omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly just Being could determine in each case how much effort was made and effect the appropriate distribution of rewards and punishments. A correct understanding of social justice naturally leads us to suppose that there is an afterlife, a God, a free choice — though it is logically possible at least that social justice could be satisfied in some future (very advanced) human society. There will still be those who have their doubts about the correctness of any view according to which justice cannot be attained by fallible creatures who have an incomplete knowledge of one another's behaviour. But, surely, these doubts are not sufficient to discredit my view. There is no a priori reason for rejecting such a view. There is nothing about our use of the term ‘justice’ and its cognates which implies that such a view is mistaken. (Otherwise the statement “There is no justice in this world’ would be meaningless.) To the contrary, there are widely held religious views, Christian as well as non-Christian, which take this view quite seriously. If there is no a priori reason for rejecting this view, then there must be some independent reason for rejecting it. In other words, we need some independent reasons for believing that social justice can be attained by fallible creatures with limited knowledge. The mere fact that we might feel uncomfortable with my theory is not reason enough to reject it. Finally, those who do experience this discomfort might ask themselves whether such discomfort stems from their moral experience or whether they are simply intent on finding justice in imperfect human institutions.