本心灵觉:良知境界的美学意义

良知作为本体具有三重意义:作为造化的精灵,天地万物因本心良知而存在,呈现为意义世界;作为是非的准则,道德人生因本心良知而明辨,呈现为道德世界;作为真诚恻怛的灵觉,妍媸美恶因本心良知而照觉,呈现为审美世界.良知本体所蕴涵的个体性、情感性、直觉性、当下呈现性特征,为审美境界的呈现提供了直接的契机和本体的依据.     

“无善无恶心之体”：本体虚无与价值生成

王阳明"无善无恶心之体"一说在中晚明引起了激烈的争论,批评者谓该说否定了善恶的分际,有取消道德工夫的危险。的确,王阳明承认心之本体具有虚无的性质。但是,他所说的"虚无"并非为纯然的否定,而是指本体的超越普遍性。"无善无恶心之体"并未泯灭善恶的分判,相反,此说为经验世界善恶的确立、明觉与转换奠定了本体论基础:意念之发动,或为本心的感通,或为本心的阻滞,此即"有善有恶意之动",表明经验世界存在着善恶的分判;本心的感通或阻滞,良知自能感应明觉,此即"知善知恶是良知",表明良知能提供先天的道德法则;只有破除私欲之阻隔,方能恢复本心的感通,此即"为善去恶是格物",表明道德践履工夫有其必要性。阳明承诺本体虚无而不碍价值生成之观点,实有助于对虚无主义症候的反思及人类社会价值的重建。     

论儒家哲学“以春见仁”的理论进路——以董仲舒、程颢、朱熹为中心

在儒家的本体论建构中，“春”具有重要地位：四时之春与乾之元德、五常之仁德具有深层一致性，生春气象同样贯通着生意仁心，显现出宇宙的仁本体。从古代儒学史中可以窥见一个“以春见仁”的理论进路。董仲舒的“春系于元”,通过“天之端”显现“无穷极之仁”,其对天地分理的论说可视作理学的先声。程颢以“生春气象”显现本体为生生之仁体，由象见体的过程中体现了理学的统分与显隐。朱熹极富条理地解说四象之春对宇宙本体的显现，“春气流行”即是仁体流行、天理流行。径此理论进路来看，由生春气象显现的仁体兼有“时”、“德”、“气”三个维度，可说是时间之始、道德之源、万物之本。与之相关的春意功夫论在于观天地生意与体一己之仁心，由此上达仁本体。     

与天地为一的审美精神——王阳明对中国传统美学的继承和发展

一、良知与《易》象阳明哲学的两个基本原则 ,即知行合一、体用一源 ,决定了本体、功夫和境界三者的同一。这三者的同一 ,也就成为阳明美学的前提。在这个前提下 ,阳明美学认为 ,对天地的审美观照 ,就是对天地万物的本体和生命的“道”的观照 ;“道” ,是统一万物一体之气 ,也就是“与天地万物一体”的自我本心———“仁”。观照天地万物 ,就是通过感发自我本心的良知 ,以创化这个“仁”的境界 (意境 )。因此 ,以良知为个体自我与天地万物相互感发的境界 ,就成为阳明美学的出发点。这个出发点的思想来源 ,可以追溯到《易传》。阳明特别反对…     

“知德”与“敦化”:王船山论成德主体与人文化成的内在张力

儒家的德性观向来是以自我身心的道德修养为核心的为己之学。德作为"实得",强调的是唯有主体才能够承担起道德价值,而完全靠自我的修养则易使本真德性旁落。王船山强调知德之难言,即揭露出这一问题。他通过"德""化"关系从天道向人道的价值转化,阐发个体性和普遍性统一于德的本质内容。在他看来,圣人存神忘迹于天下,不同于道家式的无为,即在于圣人敦仁而逐渐进入仁熟盛德的境界,由此而可以推扩、建构仁之流行感通的人文世界,是内在整体地参与"化"的作用中而自成其"德",是一仁之体显其大用。德落实到人文化成即是德之无私性和笃实性,德的独知、自成则坚守了儒家为己的成德准则。     

论张九成“仁即是觉,觉即是心”的思想及其意义

张九成在二程和谢良佐的基础上提出“仁即是觉,觉即是心,因心生觉,因觉有仁”的思想。以觉为心的本质属性,将心与性(仁)连接起来,一方面解决了仁性从潜在到现实何以可能的问题,另一方面将心(或觉)上升到了本体的高度,心之所以在造化和认识宇宙上具有决定性意义,完全在于心之“觉”,从而开始了心学的创立。因为以心为本,所以他强调“正心”之学,以唤起时人麻木的心灵。张九成“觉即是心”的思想无疑受到了禅宗的启发,但因此断定其学为禅学却是不恰当的。正确认识张九成的“仁即是觉,觉即是心”思想,对于重新认识心学具有重大意义。     

真妄和合与本觉自证——《大乘起信论》“心灵环保”义趣探析

《大乘起信论》树立“体用不二”的心体论,统一染与净、觉与不觉、体与用,提出“真如本觉”和“染净互熏”的新思想.真如能随缘而入生灭流转,染而不染,又能以内在的本觉智性和熏习力实现沿流而返的自我救赎.通过真如熏习的内在机制与本觉自证的修行实践,众生可返染成净,实现心灵的净化,共同建设人间净土.     

王玄览道教重玄美学思想简论

在道教美学思想的范畴里,“道”(有时又称为“玄”“一”)是其本体论的核心判断。“道”是一切美的根源与归宿,是修道之人获得宗教化审美体验的源泉。早期道教著名学者葛洪在其所著《抱朴子》中开宗明义地说:“玄者,自然之始祖,而万殊之大宗也,妙昧乎其深也,故能微焉;绵邈乎其远也,故能妙焉。”妙者,美也;玄即妙即玄即美。在道教哲学里,如何说明作为世界本原的“道”即是内在于万事万物中的本体之“道”,一直是一大难题。这个问题在美学上同样不能避免。作为美的本原的道与作为美的本体之道如何即二即一,即沟通美的本原与美的本体,使作为最…     

佛学研究断想

佛学研究断想胡晓光一当代著名佛学研究专家吕先生认为,中国佛学与印度佛学有本质性区别,而其区别的基本点,就是在于印度佛学主张“性寂”,而中国佛学则主张“性觉”。吕先生所指的中国佛学是天台宗、华严宗和禅宗,这三大宗都有严密的哲学理论体系,是中国化佛学...     

朱子之仁:道德实践的自律主体

当代新儒家之一的牟宗三以朱子道德为他律道德而判定朱子哲学是别子为宗,其核心理据是心是气心,理是但理,性只存有不活动,心具理是当具而不是本具。因此,朱子道德哲学没有道德主体,只能成就他律道德。其实,朱子之仁,作为仁心则是善良意志,是道德实践的自律主体,是道德理性与道德情感的统一,仁作为心之德本身即具有实现道德法则的力量;作为仁理,则是仁心所颁布的道德法则;作为仁情,则是具有先验性的道德情感,乃是道德主体对道德法则的一种表象,即四端;作为仁境则实现了意志之自由,即意志之积极自由与消极自由,其结果是康德自律道德之证成,自由意志之实现。     

BLONDEL, MODERN CATHOLIC THEOLOGY AND THE LEIBNIZIAN EUCHARISTIC BOND

The category of substance is fundamental in Leibniz's philosophy, and conceived in specifically theological terms in his late correspondence with Bartholomaeus des Bosses. The exchange develops as a discussion of the bond of substance ( vinculum substantiale ) in the transubstantiated eucharistic host, but the bond also provides the basis for a general theory of universal substance. This eucharistic vision of the substance of the world is appropriated by Maurice Blondel as the basis of his philosophy of action, in which divine transforming activity is necessarily implied, and which he describes as a form of transubstantiation of both the subject of action and its material object. This Leibnizian-Blondelian theology of the divine transformation of the substance of the world provides eucharistic foundations for modern Catholic social teaching.     

Saint Thomas Aquinas’ ontological epistemology as clarified realism: The relating of subject to object for ontological knowledge

The Kantian revolution limited the possibility of ontological knowledge, severing subject from thing as is evident in its legacy in both continental and analytic philosophy. Consequently, if a thing cannot be known as it is, the philosophical status of empirical science as a study about existing natural things should be called into question. It could be construed, for instance, that a scientific theory is a construction about something to which the subjective constructor can never have ontological access. But, when empirical scientists develop evidence-based proofs for their theories the assumption of realism usually stands: scientific theories constructed by scientists are actually purported to represent natural entities back to these constructing scientists. Given that there is a danger of philosophy becoming isolated from empirical science, we attempt to bridge the gap between philosophical discourse and science-in-praxis through a recapitulation of Aquinas’ ontological epistemology. Aquinas argued for a clarified realism in which the epistemic is construed as an intersection between the thinking subject and the object. Contrary to naïve realism, then, it will be explicated how Aquinas’ realism was a precursor of “critical realism”, as he discerned the complex interaction of thinking subject and the being of the object as both bearing on the production of knowledge.     

Counting subjects

Kolak’s arguments for the thesis ‘there is only one person’ in fact show that the subject-in-itself is not a countable entity. The paper argues for this assertion by comparing Kolak’s concept of the subject with Kant’s notion of the transcendental unity of apperception (TUAP), which is a formal feature of experience and not countable. It also argues the point by contrasting both the subject and the TUAP with the notion of the individual human being or empirical self, which is the main concern standard theories of personal identity such as those of Williams, Parfit and Nozick. Unlike the empirical self, but rather like Kant’s TUAP, the subject-in-itself cannot be counted because it is not an object or substance, despite Kolak’s thesis that there is only one. The paper also maintains that Kolak’s contention that the subject is an entity hinges on a strong and less plausible interpretation of Kant’s transcendental idealism.     

The shaken realist: Bernard Williams,the war,and philosophy as cultural critique

Bernard Williams thought that philosophy should address real human concerns felt beyond academic philosophy. But what wider concerns are addressed by Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, a book he introduces as being “principally about how things are in moral philosophy”? In this article, we argue that Williams responded to the concerns of his day indirectly, refraining from explicitly claiming wider cultural relevance, but hinting at it in the pair of epigraphs that opens the main text. This was Williams's solution to what he perceived as the stylistic problem of how to pursue philosophy as cultural critique. Taking the epigraphs as interpretative keys to the wider resonances of the book, we show how they reveal Williams's philosophical concerns—with the primacy of character over method, the obligation to follow orders, and the possibility of combining truth, truthfulness, and a meaningful life in a disillusioned world—to be recognisably rooted in the cultural concerns of post-war Britain. In the light of its epigraphs, the book emerges as the critique of a philosophical tradition's inadequacies to the special difficulties of its cultural moment.     

Kant on Duties Regarding Nonrational Nature: Allen W. Wood

Kant's moral philosophy is grounded on the dignity of humanity as its sole fundamental value, and involves the claim that human beings are to be regarded as the ultimate end of nature. It might be thought that a theory of this kind would be incapable of grounding any conception of our relation to other living things or to the natural world which would value nonhuman creatures or respect humanity's natural environment. This paper criticizes Kant's argumentative strategy for dealing with our duties in regard to animals, but defends both his theory and most of his conclusions on these topics.     

To have and to be: towards the social representation of quality of life in China

This study explores the social representation of quality of life (QOL) in the Chinese socio‐cultural context. The data were collected by 16 open‐ended individual interviews. The study shows that the social representation of QOL embedded deeply in the collective memory of Chinese society is generated from, and organized around, the central thema of ‘having’/‘being’. ‘Having’ and ‘being’ are both antinomic and dialogically interdependent. ‘Having’ gives priority to how subject instrumentalizes object as resources to be possessed and consumed. It is manifested in the possessions of money, food, housing and car. The possessions are not only simply the material things but also the objects of symbolic significance. ‘Being’ prioritizes the authentic relationship between subject and object. It is manifested in rootedness, connectedness, participation and freedom. These provide a sense of belonging, commitment, direction and purpose and involve the establishment and maintenance of the union between the self and others, and between the individual and the outside world. On the other hand, neither ‘having’ nor ‘being’ exists in its pure form. Rather, they co‐exist dynamically, in rival or complementary ways, and each calls the possibility of the other into play. It is the synthesis of opposites between ‘having’ and ‘being’ that the social representation of QOL is generated and structured. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Human Becoming: Cognitive and Moral Enhancement Inside the Imago Dei Narrative

Abstract

With advancements in human enhancement technologies and sciences, the reality of moral/cognitive enhancements is close upon us. In light of recent advances in the fields of cognitive science of religion (CSR), neurotheology and philosophy of technology this paper follows the contemporary neuroethics debate on the subject of moral bioenhancement and engages it inside an imago Dei narrative. To explore this possibility we first establish some major points in the contemporary imago Dei debate, especially the substantial and relational aspect and some of its important interpretations. We then move to an exploration of the very possibility of moral/cognitive bioenhancement, as well as some concrete pitfalls and opportunities, inside the imago Dei narrative. Lastly, we try to portray a wider theological picture in which we engage humanity as both sacred and technological being living in a dynamic cosmic environment we are called to sanctify through the election offered to us by the Reedemer. To establish this we contemplate on the relationship between our eschatological fulfillment, the process of theosis, and the being and role of technology itself.     

熊十力《新唯识论》的易学渊源与理论创新

研究《周易》生命哲学,单向度地从宇宙论演绎太极阴阳变化,或从心性论凸显易道生命实践的主体能动性,都无法实证宇宙大生命一体贯通的诚明合一之境。在熊十力哲学多元文化渊源和思想元素中,《周易》无疑是其哲学创新的最深邃的理论源泉和精神根基。宇宙本体与生命主体圆融为一,以生生之道涵化主体心灵,用主体心灵担当天地之情,成为熊十力《新唯识论》生命哲学理论突破的关键所在。     

Facing being: the significance of Thomist ontological epistemology to realism in post-Kantian philosophy

The Kantian ‘Copernican Revolution’ contained in his Prologomena and The Critique of Pure Reason deemed metaphysical statements to be ‘transcendental illusions’, so directing metaphysics to its dearth. As a consequence, no longer could objects be known ‘in-themselves’ by the sensorily-reliant human. This perceived impossibility of metaphysical knowledge in the turn to the subject from Kant through Nietzsche's rejection of true knowledge has heavily inclined Continental Philosophy to an anti-metaphysical quandary. Analytic Philosophy is no different following the influence of Carnap, Wittgenstein and Rorty upon its own ‘linguistic turn’. An inevitable consequence of things not being knowable in themselves is the philosophical distance from ‘the world’, which Stephen Hawking has argued, makes the philosophical enterprise ‘dead’. In dialogue with this widespread decline in metaphysics, I will attempt to reclaim realist metaphysics through the employment of a Thomist paradigm. If philosophy is to be relevant to the knowledge economy, it is compelled to be in relation with what is. Thus, in my theoretical framework, being will be considered as central to all knowledge systems seeking to correspond to ‘hard’ science. The Thomist realist natural philosophy of ‘scientia’ – wherein truth is conformed with being – will be at the core of the argument. This paper challenges the ignoring of being because extant reality is composed of all that is, continuously faced and never evadable. Consequently, Thomism is recaptured as significant to post-Kantian philosophy as Aquinas articulated a means through which the thinking subject engages with being through sensation and cognition.     

The Question of Human Animality in Heidegger

Heidegger thinks that humans enjoy openness to being, an openness that distinguishes them from all other entities, animals included. To safeguard openness to being, Heidegger denies that humans are animals. This position attracts the criticism of Derrida, who denies the difference between humans and animals and with it the human openness to being. In this paper, I argue that human difference and human animality are not mutually exclusive. Heidegger has the conceptual resources in his thought and in the history of philosophy to affirm human animality while safeguarding the human difference. A cause transforms the meaning of a condition. The case of the human hand, an animal appendage that serves our openness to being, illustrates splendidly this transformation. The human hand not only grasps things in its environment but also points things out, makes things, acts, and welcomes others in the world. Humans are animals transformed by openness to being.