推理判断中偏差反应的加工机制：冲突探查失败，还是抑制失败？

通过控制自变量一致性（冲突、非冲突）与问题类型（基础比率问题、合取问题）,对推理判断中偏差反应的加工机制：冲突探查失败,还是抑制失败,进行验证。反应时、反应自信度的结果支持抑制失败说,被试对冲突的探查是成功的,偏差反应的产生是没能抑制占主导的直觉。而冲突探查大小（Conflict detection size）的结果表明冲突探查存在个体差异,有些被试对两种加工间的冲突探查过程完美无暇(Flawless detection),有些被试的冲突探查过程松散马虎(Lax detection),而且受到问题类型的影响。     

Matching bias in syllogistic reasoning: Evidence for a dual-process account from response times and confidence ratings

We examined matching bias in syllogistic reasoning by analysing response times, confidence ratings, and individual differences. Roberts’ (2005) “negations paradigm” was used to generate conflict between the surface features of problems and the logical status of conclusions. The experiment replicated matching bias effects in conclusion evaluation (Stupple & Waterhouse, 2009), revealing increased processing times for matching/logic “conflict problems”. Results paralleled chronometric evidence from the belief bias paradigm indicating that logic/belief conflict problems take longer to process than non-conflict problems (Stupple, Ball, Evans, & Kamal-Smith, 2011). Individuals’ response times for conflict problems also showed patterns of association with the degree of overall normative responding. Acceptance rates, response times, metacognitive confidence judgements, and individual differences all converged in supporting dual-process theory. This is noteworthy because dual-process predictions about heuristic/analytic conflict in syllogistic reasoning generalised from the belief bias paradigm to a situation where matching features of conclusions, rather than beliefs, were set in opposition to logic.     

Framing effects: An analytic-holistic perspective

Under what conditions, why, and for whom are framing effects most likely? In this paper, we build on the existing literature (e.g., Chaiken, 1987; Epstein, Lipson, Holstein, & Huh, 1992; Evans & Over, 1996; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1988; Simon, 1956; Sloman, 1996; Stanovich & West, 2000), in providing answers to these questions. We hypothesized that individuals who engage a decision task with an analytic/systematic versus holistic/heuristic processing style are especially insensitive to the influence of framing effects. Therefore, we predicted that the way in which a decision is framed should have a relatively weak influence on those who were either induced (Experiment 1) or predisposed (Experiment 2) to adopt a predominantly analytic/systematic versus holistic/heuristic processing style. The results of both experiments supported this position.     

Smarter than we think: when our brains detect that we are biased

Human reasoning is often biased by stereotypical intuitions. The nature of such bias is not clear. Some authors claim that people are mere heuristic thinkers and are not aware that cued stereotypes might be inappropriate. Other authors claim that people always detect the conflict between their stereotypical thinking and normative reasoning, but simply fail to inhibit stereotypical thinking. Hence, it is unclear whether heuristic bias should be attributed to a lack of conflict detection or a failure of inhibition. We introduce a neuroscientific approach that bears on this issue. Participants answered a classic decision-making problem (the "lawyer-engineer" problem) while the activation of brain regions believed to be involved in conflict detection (anterior cingulate) and response inhibition (lateral prefrontal cortex) was monitored. Results showed that although the inhibition area was specifically activated when stereotypical responses were avoided, the conflict-detection area was activated even when people reasoned stereotypically. The findings suggest that people detect their bias when they give intuitive responses.     

Power of the desired self: Influence of induced perceptions of the self on reasoning

This research shows that the motivation to posses a desired characteristic (or to avoid an undesired one) results in self-perceptions that guide people’s use of base rate in the Lawyer–Engineer problem (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973). In four studies, participants induced to believe (or recall, Exp. 2) that a rational cognitive style is success-conducive (or an intuitive cognitive style failure-conducive) subsequently viewed themselves as more rational and relied more on base rate in their probability estimates than those induced to believe that a rational cognitive style is failure-conducive (or an intuitive cognitive style success-conducive). These findings show that the desired self had an influence on reasoning in the self-unrelated lawyer–engineer task, since the use of base rates was mediated by changes in participants’ perceptions of their own rationality. These findings therefore show that the desired self, through the working self-concept that it entails, constitutes another factor influencing people’s use of distinct modes of reasoning.     

The dual-process turn: How recent defenses of dual-process theories of reasoning fail

In response to the claim that the properties typically used to distinguish System 1 from System 2 crosscut one another, Carruthers, Evans, and Stanovich have abandoned the System 1/System 2 distinction. Evans and Stanovich both opt for a dual-process theory, according to which Type-1 processes are autonomous and Type-2 processes use working memory and involve cognitive decoupling. Carruthers maintains a two-system account, according to which there is an intuitive system and a reflective system. I argue that these defenses of dual-process theory face two problems. First, as pointed out by Sloman, these new dual-process theories cast the net of “reasoning” too wide. Second, and more importantly, this singular distinction cannot accomplish the explanatory work needed to support dual-process theory. These theorists must fall back on using various properties from the Standard Menu in explanations, thereby committing these accounts to a “Standard View” that they had hoped to avoid. Thus, these theorists face a dilemma: either the distinction between intuitive and reflective (or autonomous and working memory involving) falls back on using the properties of the Standard Menu, or it lacks the explanatory promise that made dual-process theory attractive.     

An evaluation of dual-process theories of reasoning

Current theories propose that reasoning comprises two underlying systems (Evans & Over, 1996; Sloman, 1996; Stanovich & West, 2000). The systems are identified as having functionally distinct roles, differ according to the type of information encoded, vary according to the level of expressible knowledge, and result in different responses. This article evaluates the arguments and the evidence from a select number of key tasks that have been supportive of dual-reasoning theorists' proposals. The review contrasts the dualist approach with a single-system framework that conjectures that different types of reasoning arise through the graded properties of the representations that are utilized while reasoning, and the different functional roles that consciousness has in cognition. The article concludes by arguing in favor of the alternative framework, which attempts to unify thedifferent forms of reasoning identified by dual-process theorists under a single system.     

Development of intuitive rules: Evaluating the application of the dual-system framework to understanding children’s intuitive reasoning

Theories of adult reasoning propose that reasoning consists of two functionally distinct systems that operate under entirely different mechanisms. This theoretical framework has been used to account for a wide range of phenomena, which now encompasses developmental research on reasoning and problem solving. We begin this review by contrasting three main dual-system theories of adult reasoning (Evans & Over, 1996; Sloman, 1996; Stanovich & West, 2000) with a well-established developmental account that also incorporates a dual-system framework (Brainerd & Reyna, 2001). We use developmental studies of the formation and application of intuitive rules in science and mathematics to evaluate the claims that these theories make. Overall, the evidence reviewed suggests that what is crucial to understanding how children reason is the saliency of the features that are presented within a task. By highlighting the importance of saliency as a way of understanding reasoning, we aim to provide clarity concerning the benefits and limitations of adopting a dual-system framework to account for evidence from developmental studies of intuitive reasoning.     

Temporal delays can facilitate causal attribution: Towards a general timeframe bias in causal induction

Does reasoning occur on the Wason selection task, or are card selections determined purely on the basis of heuristic processes? To answer this question two relevance-based theories of reasoning are compared: (1) the theory of Evans (1984, 1989; Evans &; Over, 1996), which takes the heuristic viewpoint, and (2) the theory of Sperber, Cara, and Girotto (1995), which takes the reasoning viewpoint. In three experiments, the effect of removing matching cards from the selection task array is examined. It is argued that the Sperber et al. theory makes clearer predictions about the results of these manipulations, which are confirmed, and that the Evans theory can only accommodate them if it allows the operation of reasoning processes. The results are also discussed in relation to Roth's (1979) account of the selection task, mental models theory, and information gain theory.     

Differential access to information and anticipated group interaction: impact on individual reasoning

Two studies examined the impact of relative differences in access to information and anticipated group interaction on individual reasoning. On 2 different reasoning tasks (P. C. Wason's [1966] selection task and D. Kahneman & A. Tversky's [1973] lawyer-engineer problem), participants sensing that they knew more in anticipation of group interaction or knew less when not anticipating interaction were less susceptible to typical cognitive biases demonstrated by these tasks. Study 2 also showed that the effect of these social contexts was contingent on the task presentation format. Thus, knowing more in anticipation of group interaction and knowing less when not anticipating group interaction seemingly compensated for task features that enhance suboptimal reasoning strategies. These results illustrate the importance of the social context in which reasoning is situated and are discussed in terms of cognitive tuning, social comparison, and social motivations.     

Heuristic Reasoning and the Observer's View: The Influence of Example-Availability on ad-hoc Frequency Judgments in Sport

Drawing upon evidence from broader social psychology, and an illustrative study of frequency-estimation during a simple, sport-specific observe-and-recall task, this paper makes the case for the more thorough investigation of the availability heuristic (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973 Tversky, A. and Kahneman, D. 1973. Availability: A heuristic for judging frequency and probability. Cognitive Psychology, 5: 207–232. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) on practical state-of-play reasoning in largely observational sporting activities. It is argued that this evidence particularly substantiates a need for a more robust body of research in two primary domains: (a) the gatekeeping tasks pertinent (and usually preliminary) to an individual's sporting performance such as talent scouting, team selection, and substitution decisions, and (b) the business of officiating in high-tempo environments.     

Reasoning versus text processing in the Wason selection task: A nondeontic perspective on perspective effects

We argue that perspective effects in the Wason four-card selection task are a product of the linguistic interpretation of the rule in the context of the problem text and not of the reasoning process underlying card selection. In three experiments, participants recalled the rule they used in either a selection or a plausibility rating task. The results showed that (1) participants tended to recall rules compatible with their card selection and not with the rule as stated in the problem and (2) recall was not affected by whether or not participants performed card selection. We conclude that perspective effects in the Wason selection task do not concern how card selection is reasoned about but instead reflect the inferential text processing involved in the comprehension of the problem text. Together with earlier research that showed selection performance in nondeontic contexts to be indistinguishable from selection performance in deontic contexts (Almor & Sloman, 1996; Sperber, Cara, & Girotto, 1995), the present results undermine the claim that reasoning in a deontic context elicits specialized cognitive processes.     

归纳推理中相似性和类别标签的作用

该文采用“篇章阅读”实验范式探索了归纳推理中前提类别和结论类别间相似性、结论类别标签属性对归纳推理的作用。90名大学生被试参加了3个实验。实验1结果表明,归纳推理受前提类别和结论类别之间相似性的影响,相似性越高归纳推理力度越强;实验2结果表明,归纳推理还受结论类别上位类别知识的影响,当类别属性和相似性冲突情况下,被试更倾向按照类别属性进行推理;实验3结果表明,归纳推理通达上位类别知识是一个主动建构的过程,即使是在类别标签不确定的情况下,被试仍然依赖类别标签进行推理。并初步提出了“归纳推理力度=两事物相似性×归类概率”模型设想。     

The probability heuristics model of syllogistic reasoning

A probability heuristic model (PHM) for syllogistic reasoning is proposed. An informational ordering over quantified statements suggests simple probability based heuristics for syllogistic reasoning. The most important is the "min-heuristic": choose the type of the least informative premise as the type of the conclusion. The rationality of this heuristic is confirmed by an analysis of the probabilistic validity of syllogistic reasoning which treats logical inference as a limiting case of probabilistic inference. A meta-analysis of past experiments reveals close fits with PHM. PHM also compares favorably with alternative accounts, including mental logics, mental models, and deduction as verbal reasoning. Crucially, PHM extends naturally to generalized quantifiers, such as Most and Few, which have not been characterized logically and are, consequently, beyond the scope of current mental logic and mental model theories. Two experiments confirm the novel predictions of PHM when generalized quantifiers are used in syllogistic arguments. PHM suggests that syllogistic reasoning performance may be determined by simple but rational informational strategies justified by probability theory rather than by logic.     

逻辑－信念冲突与推理难度对逻辑和信念判断的影响

双加工理论框架下的平行竞争模型和默认干涉模型对推理过程中启发式和分析式加工的启动次序和相互作用的性质提出了不同假设。本研究通过考察被试在信念判断和逻辑判断两种指导语下解决不同难度和不同类型推理问题的正确率和反应时,对两个模型的预测进行了检验。实验结果表明,解决简单问题时,问题类型对信念判断有显著影响,对逻辑判断无显著影响;解决复杂问题时,问题类型对逻辑判断的影响显著大于对信念判断的影响。实验结果支持平行竞争模型的假设,即两类加工在推理过程中同时启动,共同竞争最终的推理反应。     

Story understanding and counterfactual reasoning

D. Kahneman and A. Tversky (1982), in a seminal study on counterfactual reasoning, claimed empirical support for a simulation heuristic wherein ease of converting unusual conditions determines their selection as causes over normal conditions. Discourse analysis of their stories revealed a confounding of explanation and normality. A connectionist simulation of online comprehension and memory access of alternative conditions without conversion accounted for their data. Normality and explanation were varied independently in 2 experiments. Explanation but not normality affected the rank ordering of counterfactual conditions after reading. Access of alternative conditions in simulation was again the best predictor of empirical findings. Comprehension and memory operate where stories communicate information for decision making such as counterfactual reasoning and hindsight bias.     

Models of dependence and independence: A two-dimensional architecture of dual processing

This theoretical note proposes a two-dimensional cognitive architecture for dual-process theories of reasoning and decision making. Evans (2007b Evans, J. St. B. T. 2007b. On the resolution of conflict in dual process theories of reasoning. Thinking and Reasoning, 13: 321–339. [Taylor & Francis Online], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar], 2008a Evans, J. St. B. T. 2008a. Dual-processing accounts of reasoning, judgment, and social cognition. Annual Review of Psychology, 59: 255–278. [Taylor & Francis Online], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar], 2009 Evans, J. St. B. T. and Frankish, K. 2009. In two minds: Dual processes and beyond, Oxford, , UK: Oxford University Press. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar]) distinguishes between two types of dual-processing models: parallel-competitive, in which both types of processes operate in parallel, and default-interventionist, in which heuristic processes precede the analytic processes. I suggest that this temporal dimension should be enhanced with a functional distinction between interactionist architecture, in which either type of process influences the content and valence of the other, and independent architecture, in which they do not. Override architecture is a special case of the latter, which postulates statistical interaction, but no interaction of valence and content. I show that this added dimensional distinction casts doubt on two assumptions of statistical modelling that Evans makes: independence and linearity. However, Evans' (2007b Evans, J. St. B. T. 2007b. On the resolution of conflict in dual process theories of reasoning. Thinking and Reasoning, 13: 321–339. [Taylor & Francis Online], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) point, that statistical modelling is underspecified vis-à-vis the verbal theory, is given further support. The functional dimension is crucial to interpreting the statistical model, as well as to theoretical understanding of the cognitive architecture and its educational applications.     

Natural sampling and base-rate neglect

Using an analogue of the lawyer-and-engineer item (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973), we compared conditions in which base rates were either presented as percentages (A), or frequencies (B), to conditions in which the natural sampling process was described additionally (C) or was directly experienced (D). We expected the likelihood of base-rate utilization to increase as the presentation approaches the process of natural sampling. Accordingly, results showed that the contingency of judgments on base rates systematically increased across conditions A to D. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Mental models and the suppositional account of conditionals

The mental model theory of conditional reasoning presented by P. N. Johnson-Laird and R. M. J. Byrne (2002) has recently been the subject of criticisms (e.g., J. St. B. T. Evans, D. E. Over, & S. J. Handley, 2005). The authors argue that the theoretical conflict can be resolved by differentiating 2 kinds of reasoning, reasoning about possibilities given the truth of assertions and reasoning about the truth of assertions given possibilities. The standard mental model theory accounts for the former kind of reasoning but does not adequately account for the latter, contrary to the suppositional approach favored by J. St. B. T. Evans et al. (2005). The authors thus propose a modified mental model theory of conditionals that reconciles the 2 theoretical approaches. It is demonstrated that this theory is able to explain the key findings that have been opposed to the standard theory by J. St. B. T. Evans et al. and makes new predictions that are empirically verified.