共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 15 毫秒
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JONATHAN E. ADLER 《Pacific Philosophical Quarterly》2005,86(4):445-458
Abstract: Fair lotteries offer familiar ways to pose a number of epistemological problems, prominently those of closure and of scepticism. Although these problems apply to many epistemological positions, in this paper I develop a variant of a lottery case to raise a difficulty with the reliabilist's fundamental claim that justification or knowledge is to be analyzed as a high truth-ratio (of the relevant belief-forming processes). In developing the difficulty broader issues are joined including fallibility and the relation of reliability to understanding. 相似文献
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Philosophical Studies - 相似文献
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Joachim Horvath 《Ratio》2009,22(2):191-205
Kant famously argued that, from experience, we can only learn how something actually is, but not that it must be so. In this paper, I defend an improved version of Kant's argument for the existence of a priori knowledge, the Modal Argument , against recent objections by Casullo and Kitcher. For the sake of the argument, I concede Casullo's claim that we may know certain counterfactuals in an empirical way and thereby gain epistemic access to some nearby, nomologically possible worlds. But I maintain that our beliefs about metaphysical necessities still cannot be justified empirically. Furthermore, I reject Casullo's deflationary thesis about the significance of such justification. Kitcher's most troublesome objection is that we can gain any modal justification whatsoever through testimony , i.e. in an experiential way. This can be countered by distinguishing between productive sources of justification, like perception, and merely reproductive sources, like testimony. Thus, some productive a priori source will always be needed somewhere. 1 相似文献
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Harry Brighouse 《Pacific Philosophical Quarterly》1996,77(3):193-215
Neutralist defenses of liberalism fail because they cannot account for essential features of an acceptable liberal theory: a firm guarantee for a sphere of individual liberty, an account of our interest in being able to revise our moral commitments, a wide range of applicability, and the possibility of legitimate government in the face of rejection by unreasonable citizens. A liberalism based on the value of autonomy can address the problems which motivate neutralists, while succeeding in providing for the essential features just mentioned. 相似文献
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I examine Paul Boghossian's recent attempt to argue for scepticism about logical rules. I argue that certain rule-and proof-theoretic considerations can avert such scepticism. Boghossian's 'Tonk Argument' seeks to justify the rule of tonk-introduction by using the rule itself. The argument is subjected here to more detailed proof-theoretic scrutiny than Boghossian undertook. Its sole axiom, the so-called Meaning Postulate for tonk, is shown to be false or devoid of content. It is also shown that the rules of Disquotation and of Semantic Ascent cannot be derived for sentences with tonk dominant. These considerations deprive Boghossian's scepticism of its support. 相似文献
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ANTHONY BRUECKNER 《Pacific Philosophical Quarterly》2007,88(3):285-287
Abstract: Michael Williams and Crispin Wright have claimed that we are epistemically justified in believing hinge propositions , such as there is an external world . In a recent paper Allan Hazlett puts forward an argument that purports to elucidate the source of such justification. This paper reconstructs Hazlett's argument and offers a criticism of it. 相似文献
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MATTHEW WEINER 《Pacific Philosophical Quarterly》2005,86(3):422-444
Abstract: It has been claimed that justification, conceived traditionally in an internalist fashion, is not an epistemologically important property. I argue for the importance of a conception of justification that is completely dependent on the subject's experience, using an analogy to advice. The epistemological importance of a property depends on two desiderata: the extent to which it guarantees the epistemic goal of attaining truth and avoiding falsehood, and the extent to which it depends only on the information available to the believer. The traditional intermalist notion of justification completely satisfies the second desideratum and largely satisfies the first. 相似文献