共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 4 毫秒
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Reasoning about update logic 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Logical frameworks for analysing the dynamics of information processing abound [4, 5, 8, 10, 12, 14, 20, 22]. Some of these frameworks focus on the dynamics of the interpretation process, some on the dynamics of the process of drawing inferences, and some do both of these. Formalisms galore, so it is felt that some conceptual streamlining would pay off.This paper is part of a larger scale enterprise to pursue the obvious parallel between information processing and imperative programming. We demonstrate that logical tools from theoretical computer science are relevant for the logic of information flow. More specifically, we show that the perspective of Hoare logic [13, 18] can fruitfully be applied to the conceptual simplification of information flow logics. 相似文献
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Gert -Jan C. Lokhorst 《Studia Logica》1996,57(1):221-237
We describe a new way in which theories about the deontic status of actions can be represented in terms of the standard two-sorted first-order extensional predicate calculus. Some of the resulting formal theories are easy to implement in Prolog; one prototype implementation—R. M. Lee's deontic expert shell DX—is briefly described.This research was partially supported by the Esprit III Basic Research Working Group No. 8319 ModelAge. 相似文献
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Reasoning about actions in dynamic linear time temporal logic 总被引:5,自引:0,他引:5
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Samuel Asarnow 《Philosophy and phenomenological research》2017,95(3):614-636
According to the Reasoning View about normative reasons, facts about normative reasons for action can be understood in terms of facts about the norms of practical reasoning. I argue that this view is subject to an overlooked class of counterexamples, familiar from debates about Subjectivist theories of normative reasons. Strikingly, the standard strategy Subjectivists have used to respond to this problem cannot be adapted to the Reasoning View. I think there is a solution to this problem, however. I argue that the norms of practical reasoning, like the norms of theoretical reasoning, are characteristically defeasible, in a sense I make precise. Recognizing this property of those norms makes space for a solution to the problem. The resulting view is in a way analogous to the familiar defeasibility theory of knowledge, but it avoids a standard objection to that theory. 相似文献
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Ralph Piddington 《Australasian journal of philosophy》2013,91(1):42-54
Contra Lewis, it is argued that the correspondence theory is a genuine rival theory of truth: it goes beyond the redundancy theory; it competes with other theories of truth; it is aptly summarized by the slogan 'truth is correspondence to fact'; and it really is a theory of truth. 相似文献
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Larry Wright 《Argumentation》2002,16(1):33-46
When regimented in a certain natural way, the concepts of explanation and justification manifest a pattern of interrelations connected more or less systematically to their object. Besides its intrinsic interest, this pattern may give us some insight into the nature, source, and limits of the concept of argument. 相似文献
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I argue that logical understanding is not propositional knowledgebut is rather a species of practical knowledge. I further arguethat given the best explanation of logical understanding someversion or another of inferential role semantics must be the correct account of the determinants of logical content. 相似文献
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This paper concerns the extent to which uncertain propositional reasoning can track probabilistic reasoning, and addresses kinematic problems that extend the familiar Lottery paradox. An acceptance rule assigns to each Bayesian credal state p a propositional belief revision method ${\sf B}_{p}$ , which specifies an initial belief state ${\sf B}_{p}(\top)$ that is revised to the new propositional belief state ${\sf B}(E)$ upon receipt of information E. An acceptance rule tracks Bayesian conditioning when ${\sf B}_{p}(E) = {\sf B}_{p|_{E}}(\top)$ , for every E such that p(E)?>?0; namely, when acceptance by propositional belief revision equals Bayesian conditioning followed by acceptance. Standard proposals for uncertain acceptance and belief revision do not track Bayesian conditioning. The ??Lockean?? rule that accepts propositions above a probability threshold is subject to the familiar lottery paradox (Kyburg 1961), and we show that it is also subject to new and more stubborn paradoxes when the tracking property is taken into account. Moreover, we show that the familiar AGM approach to belief revision (Harper, Synthese 30(1?C2):221?C262, 1975; Alchourrón et al., J Symb Log 50:510?C530, 1985) cannot be realized in a sensible way by any uncertain acceptance rule that tracks Bayesian conditioning. Finally, we present a plausible, alternative approach that tracks Bayesian conditioning and avoids all of the paradoxes. It combines an odds-based acceptance rule proposed originally by Levi (1996) with a non-AGM belief revision method proposed originally by Shoham (1987). 相似文献
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P. C. Wason D. W. Green 《The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology Section A: Human Experimental Psychology》1984,36(4):597-610
Four experiments exploring the effects of the coherence of a mental representation of material on reasoning performance are presented. Each employs a simple task that allows most subjects at some stage to solve the problem. We postulate that the crucial factor influencing performance is a unified representation of the material. In Experiment 1 we use an authorization of a kind familiar in daily life, and in Experiments 2, 3 and 4 we use sentences describing simple objects in different ways. In each case performance was enhanced when the material could be given a unified representation. 相似文献
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Montgomery Link 《Synthese》2009,166(1):41-54
In his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951) presents the concept of order in terms of a notational iteration that is completely logical
but not part of logic. Logic for him is not the foundation of mathematical concepts but rather a purely formal way of reflecting
the world that at the minimum adds absolutely no content. Order for him is not based on the concepts of logic but is instead
revealed through an ideal notational series. He states that logic is “transcendental”. As such it requires an ideal that his
philosophical method eventually forces him to reject. I argue that Wittgenstein’s philosophy is more dialectical than transcendental. 相似文献
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BART STREUMER 《Philosophy and phenomenological research》2007,74(1):1-29
It is sometimes suggested that there are two kinds of reasoning: inferential reasoning and non-inferential reasoning. However, it is not entirely clear what the difference between these two kinds of reasoning is. In this paper, I try to answer the question what this difference is. I first discuss three answers to this question that I argue are unsatisfactory. I then give a different answer to this question, and I argue that this answer is satisfactory. I end by showing that this answer can help to resolve some disagreements in which the difference between inferential and non-inferential reasoning plays a role. 相似文献
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