Can an aspect of consciousness be imprinted into an electronic device?

Although quantum mechanics allows consciousness to have some effect on the collapse of wave functions, most conventional scientists expect the effect to be quite small. Their experience with expert systems, computer-aided design, etc., would cause them to deny the possibility that a specific human intention could be imprinted into a simple electronic device via a meditative process and that this device could then influence a target experiment in accordance with the specific intention. Here, via two very different target experiments, that prevailing supposition has been experimentally tested and found to be fallacious! For each target experiment, one starts with two identical physical devices, isolates them from each other and “charges” one with the specific intention for the particular experiment. This charging process involved the services of four highly qualified meditators to imprint the device with the specific intention. The devices were then wrapped in aluminum foil and separately shipped, via Federal Express ∼2,000 miles to a laboratory where the actual target experiments were conducted by others. For the two experiments, the intentions were (1) to decrease (increase) the pH of water by one pH unit and (2) to increase the ATP/ADP ratio in fruit fly larvae so as to significantly decrease their development time. For (1), changes of 0.5 to 1.0 pH units were achieved while, for (2), reductions of ∼15 percent in larval development time for the imprinted vs. unimprinted device were observed (p<0.005). From a theoretical perspective, (1) a thermodynamic basis is provided for the effect of intention on both the electrochemical potential and flux of molecular species, (2) a conceptual model for linking subtle domains with the physical domain devices is given, and (3) a conceptual model is also given of how such devices may broadcast specific prime directive information via intention—augmented electromagnetism which can “tilt” chemical reactions in appropriate ways within the target experiment.     

Can the Dead be Brought into Disrepute?

Queen Christina of Sweden was unconventional in her time, leading to hypotheses on her gender and possible hermaphroditic nature. If genetic analysis can substantiate the latter claim, could this bring the queen into disrepute 300 years after her death? Joan C. Callahan has argued that if a reputation changes, this constitutes a change only in the group of people changing their views and not in the person whose reputation it is. Is this so? This paper analyses what constitutes change and draws out the implications to the reputation of the dead. It is argued that a reputation is a relational property which can go through changes. The change is “real” for the group changing their views on Queen Christina and of a Cambridge kind for the long dead queen herself. Cambridge changes result in new properties being acquired, some of which can be of significance. Although the dead cannot go through any non-relational changes, it is possible for the dead to change properties through Cambridge changes. In this sense changes in reputation do affect the dead, and thus Queen Christina can acquire a new property, in this case possibly a worse reputation.     

Can philosophy be an academic discipline?

Richard Rorty notoriously maintained that philosophy is not an academic discipline. He thought that the only viable candidate for philosophy to be an academic discipline—where philosophy consists in a collection of permanent, pure topics—depends on a Cartesian conceptual framework. Once we overcome this framework, he maintained, there will be nothing left to be the distinct subject matter of philosophy. This article argues that there is a conception of philosophy that can be an academic discipline, even if we take Rorty's challenge seriously. It remains even if we overcome the Cartesian conceptual framework. In the end the article goes beyond Rorty's challenge and considers two further criteria for philosophy to be an academic discipline: that it have a distinct method, and that it be able to be done for the public good. The article argues that philosophy can fulfill these two criteria, and therefore that it can be an academic discipline.     

Can an anger face also be scared? Malleability of facial expressions

Do people always interpret a facial expression as communicating a single emotion (e.g., the anger face as only angry) or is that interpretation malleable? The current study investigated preschoolers' (N = 60; 3-4 years) and adults' (N = 20) categorization of facial expressions. On each of five trials, participants selected from an array of 10 facial expressions (an open-mouthed, high arousal expression and a closed-mouthed, low arousal expression each for happiness, sadness, anger, fear, and disgust) all those that displayed the target emotion. Children's interpretation of facial expressions was malleable: 48% of children who selected the fear, anger, sadness, and disgust faces for the "correct" category also selected these same faces for another emotion category; 47% of adults did so for the sadness and disgust faces. The emotion children and adults attribute to facial expressions is influenced by the emotion category for which they are looking. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved).     

Is self-reflectiveness an unhealthy aspect of private self-consciousness?

A number of researchers (M. Conway & C. Giannopoulos, 1993; P. J. Watson & M. D. Biderman, 1993) have suggested that self-reflectiveness is an unhealthy aspect of private self-consciousness related to psychopathology. However, these studies did not control for the significant correlation that exists between self-reflectiveness and subscale factors of public self-consciousness: style consciousness and appearance consciousness. The purpose of this research was to address these interrelationships by comparing correlational results with those obtained from multiple regression analyses. Participants (N = 111) completed the Self-Consciousness Scale (A. Fenigstein, M. F. Scheier, & A. H. Buss, 1975) and the NEO-Five Factor Inventory (P. T. Costa & R. R. McCrae, 1992). The results suggested that when the effects of style consciousness and appearance consciousness are controlled, the relationship between self-reflectiveness and neuroticism is nonsignificant. Furthermore, multiple regression analyses suggested a significant relationship between self-reflectiveness and low levels of agreeableness. Aspects of self-consciousness may be better understood in the context of overlapping domains that consider both common and unique variance.     

Towards an ecology of consciousness∗

Forms characteristic of the earth itself are inherent in the design of man. Man's being emerged out of a cosmic matrix whose morphic aspects man himself expresses. These forms and their functional interrelationships are the very conditions of consciousness. This paper proposes that the relationship between human consciousness and its complete environment should be the subject matter of an emerging discipline, the ecology of consciousness. Constructs useful in the ecology of plants and animals should be coordinated to psychological constructs. These coordinating constructs should be based upon study of the most pervasive morphic regularities at the biophysical level. An analysis of the design of man suggests many possibilities, especially when one considers the known neurophysiological and biochemical conditioners of consciousness. Educational (experiential) strategies for the transformation of consciousness should also be explored. These might include the manipulation of variables such as volume, duration, and intensity of sensory stimulation, including various combinations of modalities. A systematic effort should be made to state the fundamental problems to which a scientific ecology of consciousness might address itself. New methods must be devised. A preliminary program for an ecology of consciousness is proposed.     

Can self-relevant stimuli help assessing patients with disorders of consciousness?

Emotional and self-relevant stimuli are able to automatically attract attention and their use in patients suffering from disorders of consciousness (DOC) might help detecting otherwise hidden signs of cognition.We here recorded EEG in three Locked-in syndrome (LIS) and four Vegetative State/Unresponsive Wakefulness Syndrome (VS/UWS) patients while they listened to the voice of a family member or an unfamiliar voice during a passive. Data indicate that, in a passive listening condition, the familiar voice induces stronger alpha desynchronization than the unfamiliar one. In an active condition, the target evoked stronger alpha desynchronization in controls, two LIS patients and one VS/UWS patient. Results suggest that self-relevant familiar voice stimuli can engage additional attentional resources and might allow the detection of otherwise hidden signs of instruction-following and thus residual awareness. Further studies are necessary to find sensitive paradigms that are suited to find subtle signs of cognition and awareness in DOC patients.     

Can Persistence be a Matter of Convention?

This paper asks whether persistence can be a matter of convention. It argues that in a rather unexciting de dicto sense persistence is indeed a matter of convention, but it rejects the notion that persistence can be a matter of convention in a more substantial de re sense. However, scenarios can be imagined that appear to involve conventional persistence of the latter kind. Since there are strong reasons for thinking that such conventionality is impossible, it is desirable that our metaphysical-cum-semantic theories of persistence be able to account for such scenarios in terms of conventions of the first kind. Later parts of the article therefore investigate whether three of the currently most influential metaphysical-cum-semantic theories of persistence—the endurance theory, the stage theory, and the perdurance theory—can do this. Fortunately, for them, it turns out that all can, though some philosophers have disputed this. However, when we ask how they account for a typical case of “conventional persistence” some problematic features of the theories—having to do with reference, persistence conditions, how they relate, and the epistemology of persistence—are revealed.     

Can Deflationists be Dialetheists?

Philosophical work on truth covers two streams of inquiry, one concerning the nature (if any) of truth, the other concerning truth-related paradox, especially the Liar. For the most part these streams have proceeded fairly independently of each other. In his Deflationary Truth and the Liar (JPL 28:455–488, 1999) Keith Simmons argues that the two streams bear on one another in an important way; specifically, the Liar poses a greater problem for deflationary conceptions of truth than it does for inflationist conceptions. We agree with Simmons on this point; however, we disagree with his main conclusion. In a nutshell, Simmons' main conclusion is that deflationists can solve the Liar only by compromising deflationism. If Simmons is right, then deflationists cannot solve the Liar paradox. In this paper we argue that, pace Simmons, there is an approach to the Liar that is available to deflationists, namely dialetheism.     

Can Bioethics be Lutheran?

Abstract :  A Lutheran bioethics must rest on a reconstructed version of Martin Luther's ethics. In the article it is shown that this ethics is Christian in that it has faith in Jesus Christ as its source. But the ethics of neighbor love is practiced in the secular world where it to some extent corresponds with natural law ethics. A Christian believer acts ethically both as an individual and as a citizen. Against the background of this understanding of Lutheran ethics, the position of Ted Peters and Gilbert Meilaender on genetics and stem cells is presented and criticized. One conclusion is that there is no Lutheran doctrine on the status of the human embryo.     

Can semantics be syntactic?

The author defends John R. Searle's Chinese Room argument against a particular objection made by William J. Rapaport called the Korean Room. Foundational issues such as the relationship of strong AI to human mentality and the adequacy of the Turing Test are discussed. Through undertaking a Gedankenexperiment similar to Searle's but which meets new specifications given by Rapaport for an AI system, the author argues that Rapaport's objection to Searle does not stand and that Rapaport's arguments seem convincing only because they assume the foundations of strong AI at the outset.The author wishes to thank Brad Bergeron, David J. Cole, James H. Fetzer, Charles E. Jahren, Michael Losonsky, William J. Rapaport, and Robyn Roslak for reading earlier drafts of this paper and/or their general discussions on cognitive science and AI. An earlier version of this paper was given at the Student Conference of the Minnesota Philosophical Society, Bethel College, 1988.     

Can there be a science of the symbolic?

Science means not just 'knowing', but knowing verified by replicability. Science is particularly hard to bring to depth psychology because the individual uniquenesses that can't be repeated are what make people most deeply themselves. Everyone, including the analytic investigator, however, has a science, in the sense of a world-view that is replicated by experience. Jung offered hermeneutics as an alternative mode to science for getting to know the psychological subject. But as Heidegger emphasized, hermeneutics always begins with the projection of a world-view, i.e., the science of the would-be interpreter. In the analytic situation, dialogue is available to test the world-view and enlarge its horizon, in accord with Gadamer's expansion of hermeneutics, 'the classical discipline concerned with the art of understanding texts', into a method of inquiry open to the possibilities of otherness. An example is given from an analytic training seminar, in which the author began by projecting his version of the theory of psychological types onto the dream material a candidate offered in response to the seminar. A dialogue with the candidate ensued which enabled the teacher to correct his original, somewhat rigid, application of his scientific viewpoint. In such a dialogue, psyche emerges as the final interpreter of what is, generating hypotheses that can fruitfully be applied to the understanding of other cases.