3~6岁儿童二级错误信念认知的发展

采用“新故事”对来自两所幼儿园的133名3~6岁儿童的二级错误信念进行了测查,探查了这一阶段儿童二级错误信念认知的发展。研究主要得出以下结论：4岁左右的儿童能够掌握二级未知知识,但是儿童对于二级错误信念的理解要晚1~2年,6岁左右是儿童二级错误信念发展的关键期。儿童对于信念问题的错误回答主要是基于一级推理,相当一部分的6岁儿童能够基于二级推理对信念问题做出合理解释。儿童对于二级错误信念认知的发展不是一个全或无的过程,而是一个逐步发展的过程。     

Young Children's Knowledge of the Representational Function of Pictorial Symbols: Development Across the Preschool Years in Three Cultures

Three- to 5-year-old children's knowledge that pictures have a representational function for others was investigated using a pictorial false-belief task. In Study 1, children passed the task at around 4 years old, and performance was correlated with standard false-belief and pictorial symbol tasks. In Study 2, the performance of children from two cultural settings who had very little exposure to pictures during the first 3 years (Peru, India) was contrasted with that of children from Canada. Performance was better in the Canadian than Peruvian and Indian samples on the picture false-belief task and drawing tasks but not on the standard false-belief measure. In all settings, children passed drawing and standard false-belief tasks either concurrently with, or prior to, passing the picture false-belief task. The findings suggest that children's explicit knowledge of the representational function of pictorial symbols matures in the late preschool years and develops more rapidly in cultures that strongly promote the symbolic use of pictures early in life.     

Executive and theory-of-mind contributions to event-based prospective memory in children: exploring the self-projection hypothesis

In two studies, 4- to 6-year-olds were asked to name pictures of animals for the benefit of a watching hand puppet (the ongoing task) but to refrain from naming and to remove from view any pictures of dogs (the prospective memory [PM] task). Children also completed assessments of verbal ability, cognitive inhibition, working memory, and false-belief understanding (both studies), empathy (Study 1 only), and performance on false-sign tests that matched the false-belief tests in narrative content and structure (Study 2 only). Both studies found that inhibition and false-belief performance made unique contributions to the variance in PM, although in Study 1 the influence of inhibition was evident only when children needed to withhold naming. Study 2 further demonstrated that false-belief performance was the only reliable predictor of whether children remembered to return to the researcher an object that had been loaned to them prior to the picture-naming game. Both experiments uncovered moderate relations between PM and chronological age, but such relations were rarely significant after taking account of cognitive ability. We consider the implications of the findings for (a) current views regarding frontal/executive contributions to PM development and (b) the suggestion that the same brain network underlies various forms of mental self-projection, including envisioning the future and understanding the minds of other people.     

The Essential Child. Susan Gelman. New York: Oxford University Press. 2003. 392 pages, $49.95 (US), cloth or paper.

To evaluate the claim that correct performance on unexpected transfer false-belief tasks specifically involves mental-state understanding, two experiments were carried out with children with autism, intellectual disabilities, and typical development. In both experiments, children were given a standard unexpected transfer false-belief task and a mental-state-free, mechanical analogue task in which participants had to predict the destination of a train based on true or false signal information. In both experiments, performance on the mechanical task was found to correlate with that on the false-belief task for all groups of children. Logistic regression showed that performance on the mechanical analogue significantly predicted performance on the false-belief task even after accounting for the effects of verbal mental age. The findings are discussed in relation to possible common mechanisms underlying correct performance on the two tasks.     

Children's understanding of promising, lying, and false belief

Understanding promising and lying requires an understanding of intention and the ability to interpret mental states. The author examined (a) the extent to which 4- to 6-year-olds focus on the sincerity of the speaker's intention when the 4-to 6-year-olds make judgments about promises and lies and (b) whether false-belief reasoning skills are related to understanding promising and lying. Participants watched videotaped stories and made promise and lie judgments from their own perspective and from the listener-character's perspective. Children also completed false-belief reasoning tasks. Older children made more correct promise judgments from both perspectives. All children made correct lie judgments from the listener's perspective. The author found that Ist-order false-belief reasoning was related to making judgments from the participant's perspective; 2nd-order false-belief reasoning was related to making judgments from the listener-character's perspective. Results suggest that children's understanding of promising and lying moves from a focus on outcome toward a focus on the belief that each utterance is designed to create.     

Under what conditions do young children have difficulty inhibiting manual actions?

Understanding how responses become prepotent is essential for understanding when inhibitory control is needed in everyday behavior. The authors investigated the conditions under which manual actions became prepotent in a go/no-go task. Children had to open boxes that contained stickers on go trials and leave shut boxes that were empty on no-go trials. In Experiment 1 (n = 40, mean age = 3.6 years), the authors obtained evidence consistent with this task requiring inhibitory control. Results of Experiment 2 (n = 40, mean age = 3.7 years) suggested that box opening was prepotent because (a) opening is the habitual action associated with boxes and (b) children planned to open boxes on go trials of the task. Experiment 3 (n = 96, mean age = 3.5 years) showed that even empty boxes elicited the same errors and that delaying responding reduced errors even though the delay occurred before the cue that indicated the correct response (contrary to a rule reflection account). Because the delay occurred after box presentation, performance was consistent with a transient activation account. Delay training might benefit children with weak inhibition.     

Confidence judgments in event recall: developmental progression in the impact of question format

Two studies were conducted to examine developmental progression in children's and adults' ability to adequately monitor their own attempts to recall event details as well as the dependence of such metamemorial competencies on question formats. Eight and 10-year-old children as well as adults (Study 1, N=116; Study 2, N=60) rated their confidence when responding to specific questions about an observed event. Confirming most recent results, children and adults gave higher confidence ratings after correct than after incorrect answers. This ability, however, was limited to an unbiased question format. When being asked misleading questions, children's ability to differentiate was undermined, as reflected in equally high confidence judgments after correct and incorrect answers, even when the interview contained a mix of misleading and unbiased questions. When the interviewer "bombarded" the children with an uninterrupted series of misleading questions, children's difficulties appeared to be even more pronounced. These findings highlight the importance of the way in which questions are asked, and point to age-related progression in the relative impact of questioning style.     

幼儿心理理论水平及其与抑制控制发展的关系

本研究通过经典的错误信念任务首先考察了3与4岁幼儿心理理论的发展水平;然后通过抑制控制任务探讨了幼儿心理理论发展水平与抑制控制能力发展的关系。结果表明,3、4岁在完成错误信念任务时有显著的年龄差异;通过错误信念任务的幼儿在抑制冲突的得分显著地高于没有通过错误信念的幼儿;而且除了他人的错误信念,幼儿在其他错误信念上的水平与抑制冲突成绩有显著的相关。     

The influence of positive mood on different aspects of cognitive control

Some evidence suggests that positive mood influences cognitive control. The current research investigated whether positive mood has differential effects on two aspects of cognitive control, working memory and prepotent response inhibition. In Study 1, following either a positive or neutral mood induction, participants completed the Running Memory Span (RMS), a measure primarily of working memory storage capacity, and the Stroop task, a measure of prepotent response inhibition. Results were that the positive mood group performed worse on the RMS task but not on the Stroop task. In Study 2, participants completed the RMS and another measure of prepotent response inhibition, the Flanker task. Results were that when in a positive mood state participants performed worse on the RMS but not on the Flanker task. Overall, this research suggests that positive mood has differential effects on cognitive control, impairing working memory but having no effect on prepotent response inhibition.     

False-belief understanding in 2.5-year-olds: evidence from two novel verbal spontaneous-response tasks

Recent research indicates that toddlers and infants succeed at various non-verbal spontaneous-response false-belief tasks; here we asked whether toddlers would also succeed at verbal spontaneous-response false-belief tasks that imposed significant linguistic demands. We tested 2.5-year-olds using two novel tasks: a preferential-looking task in which children listened to a false-belief story while looking at a picture book (with matching and non-matching pictures), and a violation-of-expectation task in which children watched an adult 'Subject' answer (correctly or incorrectly) a standard false-belief question. Positive results were obtained with both tasks, despite their linguistic demands. These results (1) support the distinction between spontaneous- and elicited-response tasks by showing that toddlers succeed at verbal false-belief tasks that do not require them to answer direct questions about agents' false beliefs, (2) reinforce claims of robust continuity in early false-belief understanding as assessed by spontaneous-response tasks, and (3) provide researchers with new experimental tasks for exploring early false-belief understanding in neurotypical and autistic populations.     

Social interaction skills and theory of mind in young children

Two studies explored relations between peer social skills and theory of mind in young children. In Study 1, a global teacher rating of social skills with peers, performance on a traditional false-belief task, a standardized assessment of auditory language comprehension, and a time sampling of amount of speech with peers were obtained. Positive, but moderate, zero-order correlations were observed between the false-belief measure and social skills, and false belief accounted for a significant amount of additional variance in social skills after covarying age and the 2 measures of language. Study 2 replicated the findings of Study 1 by using a larger sample and a standardized teacher questionnaire. The results are discussed with regard to the critical role of a mentalistic theory of behavior for human social interactions.     

3～5岁幼儿错误信念理解能力的发展趋势

基于以往支持心理理论执行功能表达论的研究结果,对标准错误信念任务修正后采用阶段性错误信念任务,运用实验法对101名3~5岁儿童进行研究。结果发现:(1)新任务保留了标准错误信念任务的优势,能勾勒出幼儿错误信念理解能力的发展趋势;(2)3~5岁儿童表现出不同层次和水平的错误信念理解能力;(3)具体分析儿童错误信念的理解能力发展的心理模式,发现每一年龄组具有的错误信念理解能力,都是其更高水平能力发展的基础,支持表达论。     

Children’s first and second-order false-belief reasoning in a verbal and a low-verbal task

We can understand and act upon the beliefs of other people, even when these conflict with our own beliefs. Children’s development of this ability, known as Theory of Mind, typically happens around age 4. Research using a looking-time paradigm, however, established that toddlers at the age of 15 months old pass a non-verbal false-belief task (Onishi and Baillargeon in Science 308:255–258, 2005). This is well before the age at which children pass any of the verbal false-belief tasks. In this study we present a more complex case of false-belief reasoning with older children. We tested second-order reasoning, probing children’s ability to handle the belief of one person about the belief of another person. We find just the opposite: 7-year-olds pass a verbal false-belief reasoning task, but fail on an equally complex low-verbal task. This finding suggests that language supports explicit reasoning about beliefs, perhaps by facilitating the cognitive system to keep track of beliefs attributed by people to other people.     

Relationships between working memory and intelligence from a developmental perspective: Convergent evidence from a neo-Piagetian and a psychometric approach

The objective of this paper, in line with the other papers of this special issue, is to show the potentialities of combining intelligence research and cognitive psychology. The development of intelligence is here addressed from two usually separate perspectives, a psychometric one, and a neo-Piagetian one. Two studies are presented. In Experiment 1, children aged 6, 7, 9, and 11 years (N = 100) were administered two working memory tasks and three Piagetian tasks. In Experiment 2, children aged 8–12 years (N = 207), young adults aged 20–35 (N = 160), and older adults aged 60–88 years (N = 135) were administered working memory and processing speed tasks, as well as the Raven Standard Matrices task. Regression and commonality analyses were run to analyse the age-related variance in the Piagetian tasks (Study 1), and in the Raven task (Study 2). In both experiments, working memory accounted for a large part of the age differences observed, but more so in Study 1 (Piagetian tasks) than in Study 2 (Raven task). It is concluded that working memory mediates the effect of age on fluid intelligence during childhood and during adulthood.     

What makes responses prepotent for young children? Insights from the grass–snow task

Understanding how responses become prepotent is essential for understanding when inhibitory control is needed in everyday behaviour. We investigated prepotency in the grass–snow task—in which a child points to a green card when the experimenter says ‘snow’ and a white card when the experimenter says ‘grass’. Experiment 1 (n=48, mean age=3.5 years) investigated the response method effect—whether pointing is prepotent because it is habitual. Experiment 2 (n=60, mean age=3.5 years) investigated the response set effect—whether responses are prepotent because the child plans to make them in the task. Experiment 2 also provided evidence that children could remember the rules in the task. Experiment 3 (n=30, mean age=3.4 years) produced further evidence that children could remember these rules. We found no evidence for the response method and response set effects, suggesting that prepotency in the grass–snow task is more ‘stimulus‐driven’ than in tasks previously studied. The implications of our findings are discussed in relation to other developmental inhibitory tasks and to children's reliance on inhibitory control to regulate their everyday behaviour. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Children's use of mental state information in selecting persuasive arguments

Whether and when children use information about others' mental states to invent or select persuasive strategies were examined. In Study 1, preschoolers, 3rd-graders, and 6th-graders (ns = 11, 12, and 16, respectively; 17 girls) were told about story characters' persuading parents to buy pets or toys. Children were either given or not given information about story parents' beliefs and asked to invent or select appropriate arguments. Older children, but not preschoolers, used belief information to select arguments. Results were replicated in Study 2 (16 kindergartners, 16 3rd-graders; 19 girls). In Study 3, kindergartners and 1st-graders (N = 16; 6 girls) reasoned well on false-belief tasks but not on persuasion tasks, suggesting that failure to consider mental states in persuasion was not due to lack of a belief concept. Findings suggest that mental state understanding may continue to develop after the preschool years; methodological qualifications are also considered.     

Collaboration promotes proportional reasoning about resource distribution in young children

The authors investigated how children and adults evaluate the "niceness" of individuals who engage in resource distribution, with a focus on their sensitivity to the proportion of resources given. Across 3 experiments, subjects evaluated the niceness of a child who gave a quantity of pennies to another child. In Study 1 (N = 30), adults showed sensitivity to the proportion given, whereas 5- and 7-year-old children did not. In Study 2 (N = 74), both younger (3- to 5-year-old) and older (6- to 8-year-old) children were sensitive to proportion only when resources were earned by a giver in collaboration with the recipient rather than by the giver alone. Adults, however, were sensitive to proportion in both cases. In Study 3 (N = 44), the authors tested 5- and 6-year-olds and their parents to be sure that socioeconomic and ethnic differences between samples did not drive results and replicated key findings from Studies 1 and 2. Together, these findings indicate that children favor proportional resource distribution in situations that invoke intuitions about equity. The authors suggest that these intuitions may form the basis for adult notions of fairness and generosity.     

The Weird World of Cross-Cultural False-Belief Research: A True- and False-Belief Study Among Samoan Children Based on Commands

Previous cross-cultural research using false-belief tasks has explored whether children's theory of mind develops synchronously across cultures. Success on false-belief tasks is usually interpreted as an important indicator of children's mental state understanding, but inconsistent findings have led to questions regarding the interpretation of children's success and failure. Based on the assumptions of perceptual access reasoning (Hedger & Fabricius, 2011 Hedger, J. A., & Fabricius, W. V. (2011). True belief belies false belief: Recent findings of competence in infants and limitations in 5-year-olds, and implications for theory of mind development. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 2, 429–447.[Crossref] , [Google Scholar]) and reflecting on inconsistencies in cross-cultural false-belief research, we argue for the advantages of the additional use of true-belief tasks, which can help to differentiate between different levels of children's reasoning. Consequently, a false-belief task and a true-belief task were derived from typical Samoan adult–child interactions. The performance of 40 Samoan children aged 5 to 7 years old was compared to the performance of 40 age-matched German children. While German children passed both tasks, Samoan children failed the false-belief task and did not reply above chance level in the true-belief task. According to our knowledge, this is the first study using both a false-belief task and true-belief task in a cross-cultural setting. Our results reveal additional patterns of reasoning that are neither in line with perceptual access reasoning nor with a representational understanding of false beliefs. The study is discussed in terms of a more general problem of experimental research in non-Western settings.     

Refining the understanding of inhibitory processes: how response prepotency is created and overcome

Understanding (a) how responses become prepotent provides insights into when inhibition is needed in everyday life. Understanding (b) how response prepotency is overcome provides insights for helping children develop strategies for overcoming such tendencies. Concerning (a), on tasks such as the day‐night Stroop‐like task, is the difficulty with inhibiting saying the name of the stimulus due to the name being semantically related to the correct response or to its being a valid response on the task (i.e. a member of the response set) though incorrect for this stimulus? Experiment 1 (with 40 4‐year‐olds) suggests that prepotency is caused by membership in the response set and not semantic relation. Concerning (b), Diamond, Kirkham and Amso (2002) found that 4‐year‐olds could succeed on the day‐night task if the experimenter sang a ditty after showing the stimulus card, before the child was to respond. They concluded that it was because delaying children’s responses gave them time to compute the correct answer. However, Experiment 2 (with 90 3‐year‐olds) suggests that such a delay helps because it gives the incorrect, prepotent response time to passively dissipate, not because of active computation during the delay.     

The curious incident of the photo that was accused of being false: issues of domain specificity in development, autism, and brain imaging

We resume an exchange of ideas with Uta Frith that started before the turn of the century. The curious incident responsible for this exchange was the finding that children with autism fail tests of false belief, while they pass Zaitchik's (1990) photograph task (Leekam & Perner, 1991). This finding led to the conclusion that children with autism have a domain-specific impairment in Theory of Mind (mental representations), because the photograph task and the false-belief task are structurally equivalent except for the nonmental character of photographs. In this paper we argue that the false-belief task and the false-photograph task are not structurally equivalent and are not empirically associated. Instead a truly structurally equivalent task is the false-sign task. Performance on this task is strongly associated with the false-belief task. A version of this task, the misleading-signal task, also poses severe problems for children with autism (Bowler, Briskman, Gurvidi, & Fornells-Ambrojo, 2005). These new findings therefore challenge the earlier interpretation of a domain-specific difficulty in inferring mental states and suggest that children with autism also have difficulty understanding misleading nonmental objects. Brain imaging data using false-belief, "false"-photo, and false-sign scenarios provide further supporting evidence for our conclusions.