共查询到19条相似文献,搜索用时 171 毫秒
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选取了122名3~12岁聋童,并分别用65名3~5岁的正常儿童作对照,开展了2个实验系列,探讨了儿童的正确信念、一级错误信念及二级错误信念认知的发展特点.结果如下: (1)聋童及正常儿童信念认知的发展过程中,无论是关于正确信念,还是关于一级错误信念,都是先发展自我信念认知,再发展他人信念认知;(2)关于正确信念、一级错误信念和二级错误信念认知的发展,聋童都比正常儿童滞后,但两者的发展趋势一致; (3)手语聋童在信念认知上略好于口语聋童; (4)父母为聋人或父母会手语的聋童,以及兄弟姐妹会手语的聋童,其信念认知水平要比其他聋童好. 相似文献
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幼儿对基于信念的惊奇情绪的认知发展 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
采用简化的错误信念任务,考察了90名3~5岁幼儿对自己或他人信念证伪引发的惊奇情绪认知及其错误信念理解。结果显示,3~5岁幼儿对自身或是故事主人公信念证伪之后的惊奇情绪理解表现出显著的发展趋势,其归因均以情境定向为主,只有极少数幼儿提到了相应的信念状态。3、4、5幼儿对他人、以及自身错误信念的认知基本是一致的,通过率分别为一半左右、76.7%、93.3%。幼儿对惊奇情绪产生原因的逆向推理能力在3~5岁之间获得了显著的发展,这一能力显著差于其错误信念认知,且略低于其顺向预测能力。这些结果揭示出幼儿很早就发展的心理理论以及心理表征技能在惊奇情绪理解中的作用 相似文献
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学前儿童对事实、信念、愿望和情绪间关系的认知 总被引:4,自引:0,他引:4
76名3至5岁儿童接受了区分事实和信念、根据信念推测他人愿望、根据愿望推测他人情绪等实验任务,通过考查学前儿童对事实、信念、愿望和情绪间关系的认知,探察学前儿童心理理论发展的特点。结果显示3岁儿童在区分信念和事实时,出现错报事实或错报信念两种错误,而不单纯是现实主义偏向错误;在推测他人愿望时,部分3岁和4岁儿童虽然能够正确报告他人的信念却不能正确推测他人愿望,愿望认知发展有其复杂性的一面。学前儿童主要依据愿望推测他人情绪,儿童对信念和愿望的认知水平制约儿童对他人情绪的理解。 相似文献
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儿童对假装的认知发展的研究进展 总被引:6,自引:0,他引:6
1 引言 近二十年来 ,儿童心理理论 (theoryofmind)的发展一直是一个非常重要的研究领域 ,在认知发展研究领域里占有主导地位。心理理论发展的研究主要探查了儿童最基本的心理状态方面的知识 ,这方面的一个关键问题是学前儿童何时能理解心理是对客观世界的表征 ,这种表征有时可能与客观现实不同。儿童对心理表征的理解的研究主要集中于儿童对错误信念的认知 ,儿童是否认识到人的信念并不总是与客观现实一致 ,人的信念可能错误地反映了客观现实。关于错误信念的研究已取得丰硕的成果 ,实验证明儿童在 4岁以后已能理解错误信念。据此研究者… 相似文献
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The study investigates the hypothesis that children's ability to attribute second-order beliefs facilitates their understanding of evidence, as seen in the ability to distinguish between causes and reasons. Seventy-four children 5–7 yr old were given belief and evidence tests. The belief tests assessed their ability to represent and reason from second-order false-beliefs, and the evidence tests assessed their ability to distinguish between the cause of a situation and a person's reason for believing it. The relation between performance on the two tests was determined, taking into account general language and non-verbal reasoning abilities. Results show that performance on the belief test and on the evidence part of the evidence test improved significantly over the age range, and that a significant proportion of variance in the evidence test scores is accounted for by second-order false-belief understanding, over and above that accounted for by general language and non-verbal abilities. The argument is made that second-order false-belief understanding is fundamental to children's epistemological development, underlying not just their understanding of evidence, but also their understanding of inference and truth. 相似文献
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Summary Children's ability to infer a person's ignorance and false belief was tested in two stories which differed as to the relative ease for making these inferences. In the Unexpected Change story ignorance could be directly inferred from the emphasized fact that the target character had not witnessed the change, while false belief required the additional inference that the character would assume that things would stay as they had been initially. In the Misinformation Story false belief was made directly accessible by the content of a false message, while ignorance was not directly indicated by absence of information. It needed to be inferred from the fact that the available information was misleading. Results from 3- and 4-year-old Austrian and English children showed that manipulation of inferential difficulty did not affect their ability to make epistemic state attribution. In both stories children found it easier to attribute ignorance than false belief. To integrate this finding in the larger developmental context we suggest that children younger than 4 years find it difficult to distinguish between knowledge and ignorance because they do not understand the role of informational access in the formation of knowledge and they fail in false-belief attribution because they do not understand that incompatible truth values can be assigned to propositions. 相似文献
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采用“看见-知道”任务考察了儿童对他人知识状态推断的特点和可能存在的偏差效应。被试为90名3-5岁儿童。结果表明,3-5岁儿童已经理解他人看见即知道的关系;5岁儿童已经能准确地推断他人的知识状态,不存在偏差;但3、4岁儿童对他人知识状态的推断受到自身知识的影响且表现出自我中心的倾向:既存在知识偏差即因为自己知道而高估他人的知识,也存在无知偏差即因为自己的无知而低估他人的知识。4岁儿童的知识偏差程度与3岁儿童无异,但无知偏差低于3岁儿童,且4岁儿童的知识偏差程度大于其无知偏差,儿童克服无知偏差的时间可能早于克服知识偏差的时间。 相似文献
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We can understand and act upon the beliefs of other people, even when these conflict with our own beliefs. Children’s development of this ability, known as Theory of Mind, typically happens around age 4. Research using a looking-time paradigm, however, established that toddlers at the age of 15 months old pass a non-verbal false-belief task (Onishi and Baillargeon in Science 308:255–258, 2005). This is well before the age at which children pass any of the verbal false-belief tasks. In this study we present a more complex case of false-belief reasoning with older children. We tested second-order reasoning, probing children’s ability to handle the belief of one person about the belief of another person. We find just the opposite: 7-year-olds pass a verbal false-belief reasoning task, but fail on an equally complex low-verbal task. This finding suggests that language supports explicit reasoning about beliefs, perhaps by facilitating the cognitive system to keep track of beliefs attributed by people to other people. 相似文献
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In highly competitive contexts, deceptive intentions might be transparent, so conveying only false information to the opponent can become a predictable strategy. In such situations, alternating between truths and lies (second-order lying behavior) represents a less foreseeable option. The current study investigated the development of 8- to 10-year-old children’s elementary second-order deception in relation to their attribution of ignorance (first- and second-order ignorance) and executive functions (inhibitory control, shifting ability, and verbal working memory). An adapted version of the hide-and-seek paradigm was used to assess children’s second-order lie-telling, in which children were asked to hide a coin in either of their hands. Unlike the standard paradigm, the opponent did not consistently look for the coin in the location indicated by the children, so children needed to switch between telling simple lies and truths (elementary second-order lies about the coin location) to successfully deceive the recipient. The results showed that older children were less likely to tell elementary second-order lies. However, across the sample, when children decided to lie, this ability was positively related to their second-order ignorance attribution and their verbal working memory. Moreover, we obtained preliminary evidence for the presence of a habituation effect in second-order lying, with children being more accurate and having less variability in their truthful-to-deceive responses (this being the more frequently elicited response) than when telling lies to deceive. Our findings could have implications for understanding the mechanisms underlying children’s ability to alternate between truths and lies to deceive. 相似文献
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《European Journal of Developmental Psychology》2013,10(2):144-158
Studies in the happy victimizer paradigm have shown that preschool children attribute positive emotions to a norm violator whereas older elementary-school children tend to attribute negative emotions. The current research explored the possibility that children's counterfactual reasoning ability (i.e., their capacity to imagine alternatives to reality) can explain this age difference in moral emotion attribution. In Study 1, 100 4- and 8-year-old children attributed significantly more negative emotions to victimizers in a counterfactual-prime condition, in which an alternative course of action was presented before the emotion attribution, than in a no-prime condition, where no counterfactual prompt was given. Counterfactual reasoning ability significantly predicted negative emotion attribution in the no-prime condition. In Study 2, the counterfactual reasoning of 143 4- and 8-year-old children significantly predicted negative emotion attribution to the victimizer. When controlling for counterfactual reasoning, focusing on the victim of a violation did not affect emotion attribution to the violator. 相似文献
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Aggressive and prosocial children's emotion attributions and moral reasoning were investigated. Participants were 235 kindergarten children (M=6.2 years) and 136 elementary-school children (M=7.6 years) who were selected as aggressive or prosocial based on (kindergarten) teacher ratings. The children were asked to evaluate hypothetical rule violations, attribute emotions they would feel in the role of the victimizer, and justify their responses. Compared with younger prosocial children, younger aggressive children attributed fewer negative emotions and were more likely to provide sanction-oriented justifications when evaluating rule violations negatively. Furthermore, age-, gender- and context-effects in moral development occurred. The context-effects included both effects of transgression type (i.e., prosocial morality vs. fairness) on emotion attributions and moral reasoning and the effects of the context of moral evaluation and emotion attribution on moral reasoning. Findings are discussed in terms of the role of emotion attributions and moral reasoning as antecedents of children's aggressive and prosocial behavior. 相似文献
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儿童的信念─愿望推理是心理理论研究的主要内容。多年来,研究者对儿童信念─愿望推理的发展特征及其心理机制进行了大量研究,取得了一系列富有意义的结论。但迄今为止仍有许多问题存在争议,如:儿童究竟何时开始具有信念─愿望推理的能力?儿童在错误信念任务上从不正确到正确反应的转换机制是什么?儿童如何进行信念─愿望推理的加工?该文回顾与探讨了上述存在争鸣的问题,并在此基础上对该领域未来研究方向做了展望。 相似文献
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The authors explored mental-state reasoning ability among 72 preschoolers (ages 3-5 years) as a possible developmental mechanism for the well-known social loafing effect: diminished individual effort in a collaborative task. The authors expected that older children would outperform young children on standard mental-state reasoning tests and that they would display greater social loafing than younger children. In addition, we hypothesized that the ability to infer the mental states of others would be predictive of social loafing, but that the ability to reason about one's own knowledge would not. The authors gave children three standard false-belief tasks and participated in a within-subjects balloon inflation task that they performed both individually and as part of a group. Results indicated that 3-year-olds performed significantly below older preschoolers on mental-state reasoning tasks. Only 4- and 5-year-olds displayed diminished individual effort. Multiple regression analysis indicated that only the ability to reason about others' false beliefs accounted for a significant amount of variance in social loafing; age (in months) and own false-belief reasoning did not. The authors discussed theoretical and pedagogical implications. 相似文献