Nonhierarchical control of rapid movement sequences: a comment on Rosenbaum, Kenny, and Derr

In a recent article, Rosenbaum, Kenny, and Derr (1983) described a hierarchical storage and execution model for a class of repetitive, discrete response sequences. With a few modifications, this model can match the performance of subjects performing sequences from this class. The authors claimed that this provides an "existence proof" for hierarchical control during movement execution, at least for these sequences. My purpose is to show by counterexample that this claim is too strong. I present a logogen activation model for the rapid execution of stored motor sequences which assumes that (a) logogens corresponding to responses are activated via association and repetition; (b) activation decays; and (c) interresponse time is inversely related to activation of the correct response at each position in the sequence. This model can also fit the results of Rosenbaum et al. A much richer data base, designed to discriminate between competing formulations, will be needed to prove the existence of the hierarchical, tree-traversal control process proposed by Rosenbaum et al.     

Repetition effects in word and pseudoword identification: comment on Salasoo, Shiffrin, and Feustel

Two recent articles by Feustel, Shiffrin, and Salasoo (1983) and Salasoo, Shiffrin, and Feustel (1985) argue that word identification is based on episodic memory as well as semantic (or "permanent, abstract") memory. The earlier article argued for separate processing stages affected by repetition (episodic memory) and lexicality (semantic memory). To account for the new finding that number of repetitions interacts with lexicality, the later article invokes the same two types of memory, operating in parallel rather than serially. We argue that Salasoo et al.'s data are compatible with a wide variety of competing theories, including some that do not involve episodic memory at all. We question the relevance of a complex formal model shown by the authors to account for the main trends in the data, because it makes little use of key properties of episodic memory. Furthermore, we show that two variants of a less complex model inspired by logogen theory fit the data as well or better than the model of Salasoo et al., using fewer free parameters. We argue that what is needed is not an existence proof that one particular complex model can fit a body of data, but experimental manipulations that successfully discriminate between broad classes of competing theories.     

An evaluation of a computational model of lexical access: comment on Dell et al. (1997)

The computational model of lexical access proposed by G. S. Dell, M. F. Schwartz, N. Martin, E. M. Saffran, and D. A. Gagnon (1997) is evaluated. They argued that fits of their model to naming data obtained from normal and brain-damaged patients support assumptions regarding interactivity in the lexicon, global damage in aphasia, and continuity between normal and aphasic naming behavior. Additional analysis reveals that the model fits the empirical data poorly and that the claims Dell et al. made on the basis of the model's performance would not follow even if the model were accurate. Although use of a novel automatic regression procedure improved the model's fit, it cannot account for 5 of Dell et al.'s 21 patients (24%), and its limitations were found to be inherent in its design. It is argued that claims such as those made by Dell et al. can only be addressed by considering evidence from multiple related tasks and by comparing multiple computational models.     

Advance specification and programming interactions: A reply to Rosenbaum,Barnes, and Slotta (1988)

Summary Choice reaction time often depends on the relation between the responses from which subjects have to choose. Rosenbaum, Barnes, and Slotta (1988) criticized the interpretation of a particular set of such effects which can be observed when subjects have to choose between left-hand and right-hand responses that have same or different spatio-temporal patterns. This set of effects had been interpreted in terms of a programming interactions (PI) hypothesis rather than in terms of the more popular advance specification (AS) hypothesis which is the foundation of a major portion of motor-programming research. It is made clear that the controversy is not about whether the one or the other hypothesis is correct in general, but about whether there are exceptions which cannot be interpreted in terms of the AS hypothesis. Further it is argued that the particular set of effects represents such an exception. It is shown that Rosenbaum et al. claim that the data are consistent with the AS hypothesis and inconsistent with the PI hypothesis is untenable.Supported by Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (grant He 1187/3-1)     

Scheduling and programming of rapid finger sequences: tests and elaborations of the hierarchical editor model

Is a response sequence executed only after the sequence has been fully programmed, as discrete processing models predict, or does execution begin before programming has been completed, as continuous processing models predict? To address this issue, we tested a discrete processing model of human motor performance, the hierarchical editor model of Rosenbaum, Inhoff, and Gordon (1984). This model was developed to account for data from experiments in which people perform one of two possible finger sequences, depending on the identity of a choice signal. The model assumes a hierarchically organized motor program that is first "edited" to resolve any uncertainties and is then "executed" to produce the desired responses. Three experiments reported here show that, contrary to the model's predictions and some well-known motor programming results (Sternberg, Monsell, Knoll, & Wright, 1978), the reaction time to begin a response sequence actually decreases with the length of the sequence under some choice conditions. We account for these results with a model that allows execution to begin while editing is still in progress. A key assumption in the model is that subjects schedule execution so that means and variances of interresponse times are minimized.     

Accounting for belief bias in a mental model framework: comment on Klauer, Musch, and Naumer (2000)

K. C. Klauer, J. Musch, and B. Naumer (2000; see record 2000-02818-008) presented a general multinomial model of belief bias effects in syllogistic reasoning. They claimed to map a particular mental model account of belief bias (J. V. Oakhill, P. N. Johnson-Laird, & A. Garnham, 1989; see record 1989-38845-001)) onto this model and to show empirically that it is incorrect. The authors argue that this mental model account does not map onto the multinomial model and that it can account for the data presented by Klauer et al. (Experiments 1-4). The authors further argue that additional data Klauer et al. presented in support of a new model of their own (Experiments 5-8) are explained by this mental model account. The mental model account is, therefore, refuted neither by Klauer et al.'s theoretical analysis nor by any of the results they presented. Furthermore, the account can accommodate more recent findings on belief bias in a more satisfactory way than can alternative models that have been proposed.     

The person response function as a tool in person-fit research

Item responses that do not fit an item response theory (IRT) model may cause the latent trait value to be inaccurately estimated. In the past two decades several statistics have been proposed that can be used to identify nonfitting item score patterns. These statistics all yieldscalar values. Here, the use of the person response function (PRF) for identifying nonfitting item score patterns was investigated. The PRF is afunction and can be used for diagnostic purposes. First, the PRF is defined in a class of IRT models that imply an invariant item ordering. Second, a person-fit method proposed by Trabin & Weiss (1983) is reformulated in a nonparametric IRT context assuming invariant item ordering, and statistical theory proposed by Rosenbaum (1987a) is adapted to test locally whether a PRF is nonincreasing. Third, a simulation study was conducted to compare the use of the PRF with the person-fit statistic ZU3. It is concluded that the PRF can be used as a diagnostic tool in person-fit research.The authors are grateful to Coen A. Bernaards for preparing the figures used in this article, and to Wilco H.M. Emons for checking the calculations.     

Filtering versus parallel processing in RSVP tasks.

An experiment of McLean, D. E. Broadbent, and M. H. P. Broadbent (1983) using rapid serial visual presentation (RSVP) was replicated. A series of letters in one of 5 colors was presented, and the subject was asked to identify the letter that appeared in a designated color. There were several innovations in our procedure, the most important of which was the use of a response menu. After each trial, the subject was presented with 7 candidate letters from which to choose his/her response. In three experimental conditions, the target, the letter following the target, and all letters other than the target were, respectively, eliminated from the menu. In other conditions, the stimulus list was manipulated by repeating items in the series, repeating the color of successive items, or even eliminating the target color. By means of these manipulations, we were able to determine more precisely the information that subjects had obtained from the presentation of the stimulus series. Although we replicated the results of McLean et al. (1983), the more extensive information that our procedure produced was incompatible with the serial filter model that McLean et al. had used to describe their data. Overall, our results were more compatible with a parallel-processing account. Furthermore, intrusion errors are apparently not only a perceptual phenomenon but a memory problem as well.     

Filtering versus parallel processing in RSVP tasks

An experiment of McLean, D. E. Broadbent, and M. H. P. Broadbent (1983) using rapid serial visual presentation (RSVP) was replicated. A series of letters in one of 5 colors was presented, and the subject was asked to identify the letter that appeared in a designated color. There were several innovations in our procedure, the most important of which was the use of a response menu. After each trial, the subject was presented with 7 candidate letters from which to choose his/her response. In three experimental conditions, the target, the letter following the target, and all letters other than the target were, respectively, eliminated from the menu. In other conditions, the stimulus list was manipulated by repeating items in the series, repeating the color of successive items, or even eliminating the target color. By means of these manipulations, we were able to determine more precisely the information that subjects had obtained from the presentation of the stimulus series. Although we replicated the results of McLean et al. (1983), the more extensive information that our procedure produced was incompatible with the serial filter model that McLean et al. had used to describe their data. Overall, our results were more compatible with a parallel-processing account. Furthermore, intrusion errors are apparently not only a pereptual phenomenon but a memory problem as well.     

中外两种推理理论的实验比较研究

通过两个实验对中国学者提出的“推理题与推理者的推理知识双重结构模型”和Evans提出的“双重加工理论”进行了实验比较研究。实验一通过两种评定方法对相应性质命题进行评定后所得实验结果表明Evans等(1983)有关“信念效应”研究中的“结论可信性”变量可以视为与胡竹菁等(1996)实验中的“内容正确性”变量是同一性质的变量; 实验二根据“形式正确性”和“内容正确性”两个自变量设计的推理实验结果与Evans等(1983)的研究结果基本一致; 但增加“内容熟悉性”这一自变量设计的推理实验结果表明“推理题与推理者的推理知识双重结构模型”比Evans提出的“双重加工理论”能更好地解释推理者对性质三段论的推理结果。     

Cortical movement preparation before and after a conscious decision to move

The idea that our conscious decisions determine our actions has been challenged by a report suggesting that the brain starts to prepare for a movement before the person concerned has consciously decided to move (Libet, Gleason, Wright, & Pearl, 1983). Libet et al. claimed that their results show that our actions are not consciously initiated. The current article describes two experiments in which we attempted to replicate Libet et al.'s comparison of participants' movement-related brain activity with the reported times of their decisions to move and also the reported times of their decisions of which hand to move. We also looked at the distribution of participants' reports over time to evaluate an alternative explanation of Libet et al.'s (1983) results. Although the Readiness Potential was usually present before all of the decisions to move, consistent with the findings of Keller and Heckhausen (1990) and Libet et al. (1983), we found that many reported decision times were before the onset of the Lateralized Readiness Potential, which measures hand-specific movement preparation. The latter finding is consistent with the conclusion that the LRP always started after the conscious decision to move. We conclude that even though activity related to movement anticipation may be present before a conscious decision to move, the cortical preparation necessary for the movement to happen immediately may not start until after the conscious decision to move.     

A brief version of the geriatric depression scale for the chinese

Elderly persons (N=310) attending outpatient psychiatric clinics were given an interview on the 30-item Geriatric Depression Scale (T. L. Brink et al., 1982; J. A. Yesavage et al., 1983) and received an independent psychiatric evaluation. A 3-step binary logistic regression showed that 2 items measuring positive affect and 2 others measuring negative affect combined to produce diagnostic performance comparable with the full scale. This result was cross-validated on a different sample (N=134). A hierarchical measurement model in which the 4 items tapped 2 first-order factors (positive and negative affect), which in turn tapped a higher order construct of depression, provided excellent fit to the data.     

When selective adaptation and contrast effects are distinct: a reply to Diehl, Kluender, and Parker

Two alternative conceptualizations of selective adaptation with speech have recently received attention. The adaptation level theory (AL) outlined by Diehl (1981) and a two-stage model outlined by Sawusch and Jusczyk (1981) can both account for much of the adaptation and paired-comparison data. Recently, Diehl, Kluender, and Parker (1985) proposed that all adaptation and contrast data can be accounted for by AL theory. They reported the results of a study that showed evidence of streaming in selective adaptation and claimed that their results provide a counterdemonstration to recent studies that have argued against the AL approach. In the present article, an outline of how the Diehl et al. results can be accounted for by both the two-stage model and AL theory is presented. In addition, a new set of results comparing adaptation and paired-comparison procedures is presented. These results are precisely as predicted by the two-stage model, but they can not be handled by AL theory.     

The basis of the Bourdon illusion

Day (1990) and Day, Mitchell, and Stecher (1990) recently reported new data on the Bourdon illusion, showing that the effect occurs in novel variations of the classic figure--for example, with orthogonal and parallel test edges--and also that it occurs in the haptic modality. Day (1990) criticized theories of the Bourdon effect proposed by Wenderoth, Criss, and van der Zwan (1990), Wenderoth and O'Connor (1987a, 1987b), and Wenderoth, O'Connor, and Johnson (1986), and proposed his own "perceptual compromise" hypothesis. It is argued that Day has inaccurately portrayed the Wenderoth et al. theory, and that his own hypothesis lacks predictive power because it lacks any reference to neural mechanisms. Day's theory is thus unable to account for extant data, including his own. It is demonstrated how Day's novel experiments provide insights into the mechanisms of the Bourdon effect, and also how the Wenderoth et al. theory can account for the new data of Day (1990) and Day et al. (1990).     

Age differences in encoding and retrieving details of a pediatric examination

Baker-Ward, Gordon, Ornstein, Larus, and Clubb (1993) showed that recall improves over ages 3–7 for events experienced during a physical examination. We used a joint multinomial model to ask whether the improvement was due to encoding, to retrieval, or to likelihood to report. The model fit the Baker-Ward et al. data well and showed that (1) retrieval and reporting cannot be distinguished and (2) the observed effects were due primarily to age-related improvement in retrieval reporting rather than in encoding.     

An examination of three sets of MMPI-2 personality disorder scales

Three sets of personality disorder scales (PD scales) can be scored for the MMPI-2 (Butcher, Dahlstrom, Graham, Tellegen, & Kaemmer, 1989). Two sets (Levitt & Gotts, 1995; Morey, Waugh, & Blashfield, 1985) are derived from the MMPI (Hathaway & McKinley, 1983), and a third set (Somwaru & Ben-Porath, 1995) is based on the MMPI-2. There is no validity research for the Levitt and Gotts scale, and limited validity research is available for the Somwaru and Ben-Porath scales. There is a large body of research suggesting that the Morey et al. scales have good to excellent convergent validity when compared to a variety of other measures of personality disorders. Since the Morey et al. scales have established validity, there is a question if additional sets of PD scales are needed. The primary purpose of this research was to determine if the PD scales developed by Levitt and Gotts and those developed by Somwaru and Ben-Porath contribute incrementally to the scales developed by Morey et al. in predicting corresponding scales on the MCMI-II (Millon, 1987). In a sample of 494 individuals evaluated at an Army medical center, a hierarchical regression analysis demonstrated that the Somwaru and Ben-Porath Borderline, Antisocial, and Schizoid PD scales and the Levitt and Gotts Narcissistic and Histrionic scales contributed significantly and meaningfully to the Morey et al. scales in predicting the corresponding MCMI-II (Millon, 1987) scale. However, only the Somwaru and Ben-Porath scales demonstrated acceptable internal consistency and convergent validity.     

Does the asymmetry effect inflate the temporal expansion of odd stimuli?

Tse et al. (Percept Psychophys 66:1171–1189, 2004) reported that participants tend to overestimate the duration of an oddball stimulus. The size of this effect was much larger than the one reported by Ulrich et al. (Psychol Res 70:77–87, 2006). More crucially, the effect in the study of Tse et al. already emerged at short standard durations, arguing against the arousal account proposed by Ulrich et al. This study investigated whether the oddball effect reported by Tse et al. was inflated by an asymmetry effect, that is, by an asymmetrical distribution of physical comparison durations around the duration of the standard. Experiment 1 demonstrated that an asymmetry effect could mimic an oddball effect. Therefore, we conducted Experiment 2 to replicate the results by Tse et al. employing not only their original procedure but also an adaptive procedure that rather avoids an asymmetry effect. Both psychophysical procedures in this experiment revealed an oddball effect, which, however, was of smaller size than the one reported by Tse et al. Furthermore, this effect emerged only at longer standard durations, which is in agreement with the arousal account as the underlying mechanism of this robust temporal illusion.     

Some exact results for random walk models with applications

This article presents a random walk model that can be analyzed without recourse to Wald's (1947) approximation, which neglects the excess over the absorbing barriers. Hence, the model yields exact predictions for the absorption probabilities and all mean conditional absorption times. We derive these predictions in some detail and fit them to the extensive data of an identification experiment published by Green et al. (1983). The fit of the model seems satisfactory. The relationship of the model to existing classes of random walk models (SPRT and SSR; see Luce, 1986) is discussed; for certain combinations of its parameters, the model belongs either to the SPRT or to the SSR class, or to both. We stress the theoretical significance of the knowledge of exact results for the evaluation of Wald's approximation and general properties of the several models proposed derived from this approximation.     

Improving precision of ability estimation: Getting more from response times

By considering information about response time (RT) in addition to response accuracy (RA), joint models for RA and RT such as the hierarchical model (van der Linden, 2007) can improve the precision with which ability is estimated over models that only consider RA. The hierarchical model, however, assumes that only the person's speed is informative of ability. This assumption of conditional independence between RT and ability given speed may be violated in practice, and ignores collateral information about ability that may be present in the residual RTs. We propose a posterior predictive check for evaluating the assumption of conditional independence between RT and ability given speed. Furthermore, we propose an extension of the hierarchical model that contains cross-loadings between ability and RT, which enables one to take additional collateral information about ability into account beyond what is possible in the standard hierarchical model. A Bayesian estimation procedure is proposed for the model. Using simulation studies, the performance of the model is evaluated in terms of parameter recovery, and the possible gain in precision over the standard hierarchical model and an RA-only model is considered. The model is applied to data from a high-stakes educational test.     

Assessing the belief bias effect with ROCs: reply to Dube, Rotello, and Heit (2010)

Dube, Rotello, and Heit (2010) argued (a) that the so-called receiver operating characteristic is nonlinear for data on belief bias in syllogistic reasoning; (b) that their data are inconsistent with Klauer, Musch, and Naumer's (see record 2000-02818-008) model of belief bias; (c) that their data are inconsistent with any of the existing accounts of belief bias and only consistent with a theory provided by signal detection theory; and (d) that in fact, belief bias is a response bias effect. In this reply, we present reanalyses of Dube et al.'s data and of old data suggesting (a) that the receiver operating characteristic is linear for binary "valid" versus "invalid" responses, as employed by the bulk of research in this field; (b) that Klauer et al.'s model describes the old data significantly better than does Dube et al.'s model and that it describes Dube et al.'s data somewhat better than does Dube et al.'s model; (c) that Dube et al.'s data are consistent with the account of belief bias by misinterpreted necessity, whereas Dube et al.'s signal detection model does not fit their data; and (d) that belief bias is more than a response bias effect.