新生代工作价值观结构、测量及对绩效影响

采用质化和量化相结合的方法, 运用3批共893份问卷, 探析中国情境下新生代工作价值观的结构、内涵和测量工具, 并检验新生代工作价值观对绩效的影响。结果表明, 新生代工作价值观是一个包含功利导向、内在偏好、人际和谐、创新导向、长期发展的二阶五因子结构, 其量表具有良好的信度和效度, 且对角色内绩效和角色外绩效都呈显著的正向影响效应。文章有利于管理者更全面、深刻地理解新生代员工的工作价值观, 并为构建基于工作价值观的新生代管理体系提供必要的理论基础和技术支持。     

Social values influence the adequacy conditions of scientific theories: beyond inductive risk

The ‘death of evidence’ issue in Canada raises the spectre of politicized science, and thus the question of what role social values may have in science and how this meshes with objectivity and evidence. I first criticize philosophical accounts that have to separate different steps of research to restrict the influence of social and other non-epistemic values. A prominent account that social values may play a role even in the context of theory acceptance is the argument from inductive risk. It maintains that the more severe the social consequences of erroneously accepting a theory would be, the more evidence is needed before the theory may be accepted. However, an implication of this position is that increasing evidence makes the impact of social values converge to zero; and I argue for a stronger role for social values. On this position, social values (together with epistemic values and other empirical considerations) may determine a theory’s conditions of adequacy, which among other things can include considerations about what makes a scientific account unbiased and complete. I illustrate this based on recent theories of human evolution and the social behaviour of non-human primates, where some of the social values implicated are feminist values. While many philosophical accounts (both arguments from inductive risk and from underdetermination) conceptualize the relevance of social values in terms of making inferences from evidence, I argue for the need for a broader philosophical framework, which is also motivated by issues pertaining to scientific explanation.     

PLURALISM,LIBERALISM, AND THE ROLE OF OVERRIDING VALUES

While it is often thought that pluralism is best accommodated by a liberal state, John Kekes has recently argued that pluralism and liberalism involve inconsistent commitments. He maintains that liberalism is committed to the idea that one or more of the “liberal values” must override all other values, while pluralism is committed to the idea that there are no overriding values whatsoever. In this paper I challenge Kekes' position by arguing that ethical pluralism does not require an absence of overriding values, and that liberalism does not require that one or more of the liberal values must override all others.     

Whose social values? Evaluating Canada’s ‘death of evidence’ controversy

With twentieth- and twenty-first-century philosophy of science’s unfolding acceptance of the nature of scientific inquiry being value-laden, the persistent worry has been that there are no means for legitimate negotiation of the social or non-epistemic values that enter into science. The rejection of the value-free ideal in science has thereby been coupled with the spectres of indiscriminate relativism and bias in scientific inquiry. I challenge this view in the context of recently expressed concerns regarding Canada's death of evidence controversy. The worry, raised by Stathis Psillos, is that as constructivist accounts of science demoted the previously secure status of evidence for drawing justified conclusions in science, we were left with no rational delineation between the right and wrong values for science. The implication for the death of evidence controversy is that we may have no rational grounds for claiming that the Canadian Government is wrong to interfere with scientific enterprise. But he does offer another avenue for reaching the conclusion that the wrong social values are directing the current stifling of some sectors of Canadian science. Psillos draws from standpoint epistemologies to devise a salient defence of ‘valuing evidence’ as a universalizable social value. That is, government bodies ought to enable scientific research via adequate funding as well as political non-interference. In this paper, I counter that (i) non-epistemic values can be rationally evaluated and that (ii) standpoint epistemology’s universalizable standpoint provides an inadequate framework for negotiating social values in science. Regarding (i), I draw from the evidence-based medicine debate in philosophy of medicine and from feminist empiricist investigations into the science–values relationship in order to make the argument for empirically driven value arbitration. If social values can be rationally chosen in the context of justification, then we can have grounds for charging the Canadian leadership with being ‘at war with science’. (ii) I further argue that my recommended empiricist methodology is preferable to Psillos’s search for universalizable perspectives for negotiating social values in science because the latter method permits little more than the trivial conclusion that evidence is valuable to science.     

Who Cares If They Need Help? The Deservingness Heuristic,Humanitarianism, and Welfare Opinions

Citizens’ welfare opinions are highly susceptible to cues about welfare recipients’ deservingness. Extant research argues that this deservingness heuristic is a universal feature of human help‐giving psychology, implying that all citizens, regardless of their values, are evenly affected by deservingness cues. This article suggests that the deservingness heuristic is much more conditional than previously appreciated. Specifically, its influence on welfare opinions is conditioned by humanitarianism: the belief that others in need should be helped. The more people adhere to this value, the more they need information that signals whether others are genuinely needy. Citizens should thus rely more on the deservingness heuristic the stronger their humanitarian values are. I find support for this argument in three survey experiments (two nationally representative), where citizens are exposed to cues that welfare recipients are either lazy (undeserving) or unlucky (deserving). These findings have important implications for our understanding of citizens’ welfare opinions.     

Dispositions, conditionals and auspicious circumstances

A number of authors have suggested that a conditional analysis of dispositions must take roughly the following form: Thing X is disposed to produce response R to stimulus S just in case, if X were exposed to S and surrounding circumstances were auspicious, then X would produce R. The great challenge is cashing out the relevant notion of ‘auspicious circumstances’. I give a general argument which entails that all existing conditional analyses fail, and that there is no satisfactory way to define ‘auspicious circumstances’ just in terms of S, R, and X. Instead, I argue that the auspicious circumstances C for the manifestation of a disposition constitute a third irreducible element of that disposition, and that to pick out (or to ‘individuate’) that disposition one must specify C along with S and R. This enables a new conditional analysis of dispositions that gives intuitively satisfying answers in cases that pose problems for other approaches.     

Values,abilities and behavior

The values of life, freedom and solidarity are the base on which we can build behaviors and abilities. Schools must be flexible, they must allow the young to explore and to express all their potential abilities. We must create a new balance, just as we must give the young a new sense of responsibility in the pursuit of their studies.     

Science, Values and the Human Dimensions

The presented paper substantiates the principle that values are an immanent component of science and any rational cognitive activity. This principle belongs to the European cultural tradition starting from the book of Genesis of the Old Testament, the values of certainty in the antique Greek philosophy and Francis Bacon's coincidence of knowledge and power. Values in science form complicated structures inconnection with different types of knowledge including “the knowledge that”, empirical evidence, various types of generalizations or rules, methods, directions, algorithms, “the knowledge how”, “the knowledge why” or other types of knowledge. Since the assignments of different types of values are the products of a decision-making, it is useful to distinguish many types of decision-making, especially semantic decision-making, information decision-making and decision-making with distinctly pragmatic dimensions. The values assignable to scientific activities and their results also include their social recognition, respect and prestige granted to knowledge and bearers of knowledge by society and social groups or communities. Knowledge generation and the rational and justified application of the achieved and acceptable impacts are also connected with decision-making procedures, values and criteria of social acceptance. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

The peculiarity of the dialectical ideas of the Second Teacher,a prominent representative of the Muslim Renaissance

This paper investigates the development of dialectical concepts about the universe, being, metaphysics, scientific methods, and the knowledge of philosophers. The methods it uses are mainly theoretical and empirical methods, such as analysis and synthesis. Within the boundaries of the designated topic, it offers a systematic analysis of the historical periodization of Arab Muslim philosophy from the eighth century to the twentieth. The paper examines the activities of the prominent philosopher and mathematician Abu Nasr Muhammad ibn Muhammad al-Farabi, showing the circumstances of his borrowing certain forms, concepts, and structures from ancient Greek philosophers. The paper's main conclusion is that al-Farabi is a Second Teacher in modern philosophy, meaning the continuation in his works of the search for a scientific approach to the study of various forms of being.     

The Gladiator Sparrow: ethical issues in behavioral research on captive populations of wild animals: a case study with commentaries exploring ethical issues and research on wild animal populations

This case involves invasive research on captive wild populations of birds to study aggressive animal behavior. The case and associated commentaries raise and examine fundamental issues, whether and under what conditions, such research is ethically justified when the research has no expected, direct application to the human species; the moral status of animals and how one balances concern for the animal's interests against the value of gains in scientific knowledge. They also emphasize the issue of the importance of a thorough literature search to ensure appropriate research design and experimental design to minimize animal suffering. It raises the issue of circumstances in which such research should be modified or terminated.     

重庆市中学生与其父母价值观的差异研究

从与其父母间具有差异的价值观的角度出发,本研究自编了重庆市中学生价值观量表,并对重庆市的中学生及其家长进行了调查。结果显示:(1)自编的问卷具有良好的信效度;(2)重庆市中学生的价值观具有显著的性别主效应和年级主效应,学校区域和学校类型均不存在主效应;父亲职业、母亲职业在某些维度上存在主效应。(3)中学生与其父母的价值观在多个维度上都存在差异。在六个主因素中,学生最看重自我方面,而家长最看重家庭。次因素中,学生最看重的是家庭气氛、平等、独立和隐私,家长最看重的是家庭气氛、家庭责任、平等、知识价值。     

Kaufmann on the Probabilities of Conditionals

Kaufmann has recently argued that the thesis according to which the probability of an indicative conditional equals the conditional probability of the consequent given the antecedent under certain specifiable circumstances deviates from intuition. He presents a method for calculating the probability of a conditional that does seem to give the intuitively correct result under those circumstances. However, the present paper shows that Kaufmann’s method is inconsistent in that it may lead one to assign different probabilities to a single conditional at the same time.     

Desires, Whims and Values

Neo-Humean instrumentalists hold that anagent's reasons for acting are grounded in theagent's desires. Numerous objections have beenleveled against this view, but the mostcompelling concerns the problem of ``aliendesires' – desires with which the agent doesnot identify. The standard version ofneo-Humeanism holds that these desires, likeany others, generate reasons for acting. Avariant of neo-Humeanism that grounds anagent's reasons on her values, rather than allof her desires, avoids this implication, but atthe cost of denying that we have reasons to acton innocent whims. A version of neo-Humeanismthat holds that an agent has reason to satisfyall of her desires that are not in conflictwith her values appears to allow us to grantthe reason-giving force of innocent whims whiledenying the reason-giving force of alien desires.     

Who’s afraid of the big bad wolf? The interweaving of values and science

The role of values in the scientific process is widely debated. But evidence and values cannot be neatly separated. Instead, values infuse the entire scientific process, starting with the choice of research questions. Research avenues are selected based on prior beliefs about the workings of the world. In fact, informally assigned prior probabilities and normalizing constants play an essential role in distinguishing causes from correlations and ignoring irrelevant associations that would otherwise be suggested by raw data. But since these initial probabilities often have a heterogeneous pedigree – often not all that went into their formation is known or knowable – it becomes difficult to cleanly separate evidence from values. At the same time, this reality does not undermine science’s unique status in generating knowledge. This is because it is not the evidence per se generated by science, but rather the method by which science generates it, that justifies science’s privileged role.     

Against the odds: human values arising in unfavourable circumstances elicit the feeling of being moved

People sometimes say they are “moved” or “touched” by something. Although the experience is familiar to most, systematic research on being moved has just begun. The current research aims to advance our understanding of the prototypical elicitors of being moved. We tested the hypothesis that being moved is elicited by core values (i.e. values that are particularly central to being human) that manifest themselves in circumstances that are unfavourable to their emergence. In three experiments, two with text stimuli and one with pictorial stimuli, we found compelling evidence that the same core value (e.g. love, willpower, beauty) is perceived as more moving when it emerges in unfavourable than in favourable circumstances. The effect was found in both males and females, although stronger in the latter group, and across all investigated core values, although love was generally more moving than other core values. The theoretical and practical significance of these findings is discussed.     

The Gladiator Sparrow: Ethical issues in behavioral research on captive populations of wild animals

This case involves invasive research on captive wild populations of birds to study aggressive animal behavior. The case and associated commentaries raise and examine fundamental issues: whether and under what conditions, such research is ethically justified when the research has no expected, direct application to the human species; the moral status of animals and how one balances concern for the animal’s interests against the value of gains in scientific knowledge. They also emphasize the issue of the importance of a thorough literature search to ensure appropriate research design and experimental design to minimize animal suffering. It raises the issue of circumstances in which such research should be modified or terminated.     

The Gladiator Sparrow: Ethical issues in behavioral research on captive populations of wild animals

This case involves invasive research on captive wild populations of birds to study aggressive animal behavior. The case and associated commentaries raise and examine fundamental issues: whether and under what conditions, such research is ethically justified when the research has no expected, direct application to the human species; the moral status of animals and how one balances concern for the animal’s interests against the value of gains in scientific knowledge. They also emphasize the issue of the importance of a thorough literature search to ensure appropriate research design and experimental design to minimize animal suffering. It raises the issue of circumstances in which such research should be modified or terminated.     

“Intrinsically” or just “Instrumentally” Valuable? On Structural Types of Values of Scientific Knowledge

Debates about scientific (though rarely about otherforms of) knowledge, research policies or academic trainingoften involve a controversy about whether scientificknowledge possesses just “instrumental” value or also “intrinsic” value. Questioning this common simpleopposition, I scrutinize the issues involved in terms of agreater variety of structural types of values attributableto (scientific) knowledge. (Intermittently, I address thepuzzling habit of attributing “intrinsic” value to quitedifferent things, e.g. also to nature, in environmentalethics.) After some remarks on relevant broader philosophicaldebates about scientific knowledge, I pave a path throughthe (terminological) thicket of structural types of values. Our initial simple opposition is shown to conflate thedistinctions intrinsic/extrinsic and instrumental (or justuseful)/final. Next, I consider the value(s) of knowledgeand knowing in general and their possible value components(like the values of truth and justifiedness). After havingdiscussed the types of value of everyday knowledge,especially its functional and constitutive value (notionsintroduced earlier), I argue that these can or should alsobe attributed to scientific knowledge, thus departing fromboth objectivist and sociological views of science. One could say that I offer a certain defense of theintrinsic value of scientific knowing (and the inherentvalue of scientific knowledge) and some importantdifferentiations of its “instrumental values”. I alsocaution (in relation with my puzzle) against drawing hastymoral conclusions. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Conditional Excluded Middle in Systems of Consequential Implication

It is natural to ask under what conditions negating a conditional is equivalent to negating its consequent. Given a bivalent background logic, this is equivalent to asking about the conjunction of Conditional Excluded Middle (CEM, opposite conditionals are not both false) and Weak Boethius' Thesis (WBT, opposite conditionals are not both true). In the system CI.0 of consequential implication, which is intertranslatable with the modal logic KT, WBT is a theorem, so it is natural to ask which instances of CEM are derivable. We also investigate the systems CIw and CI of consequential implication, corresponding to the modal logics K and KD respectively, with occasional remarks about stronger systems. While unrestricted CEM produces modal collapse in all these systems, CEM restricted to contingent formulas yields the Alt2 axiom (semantically, each world can see at most two worlds), which corresponds to the symmetry of consequential implication. It is proved that in all the main systems considered, a given instance of CEM is derivable if and only if the result of replacing consequential implication by the material biconditional in one or other of its disjuncts is provable. Several related results are also proved. The methods of the paper are those of propositional modal logic as applied to a special sort of conditional.     

Evidence: wanted,alive or dead

This paper is meant to link the philosophical debate concerning the underdetermination of theories by evidence with a rather significant socio-political issue that has been taking place in Canada over the past few years: the so-called ‘death of evidence’ controversy. It places this debate within a broader philosophical framework by discussing the connection between evidence and theory; by bringing out the role of epistemic values in the so-called scientific method; and by examining the role of social values in science. While it should be admitted that social values play an important role in science, the key question for anyone who advocates this view is: what and whose values? The way it is answered makes an important epistemic difference to how the relation between evidence and theory is appraised. I first review various arguments for the claim that evidence underdetermines theory and shows their presuppositions and limitations, using conceptual analysis and historical examples. After broaching the relation between evidence and method in science by highlighting the need to incorporate epistemic values into the scientific method, my discussion focuses on recent arguments for the role of social values in science. Finally, I address the implications of the approach outlined for the current ‘death of evidence’ debate in Canada.