Strange-face illusions during inter-subjective gazing

In normal observers, gazing at one’s own face in the mirror for a few minutes, at a low illumination level, triggers the perception of strange faces, a new visual illusion that has been named ‘strange-face in the mirror’. Individuals see huge distortions of their own faces, but they often see monstrous beings, archetypal faces, faces of relatives and deceased, and animals. In the experiment described here, strange-face illusions were perceived when two individuals, in a dimly lit room, gazed at each other in the face. Inter-subjective gazing compared to mirror-gazing produced a higher number of different strange-faces. Inter-subjective strange-face illusions were always dissociative of the subject’s self and supported moderate feeling of their reality, indicating a temporary lost of self-agency. Unconscious synchronization of event-related responses to illusions was found between members in some pairs. Synchrony of illusions may indicate that unconscious response–coordination is caused by the illusion–conjunction of crossed dissociative strange-faces, which are perceived as projections into each other’s visual face of reciprocal embodied representations within the pair. Inter-subjective strange-face illusions may be explained by the subject’s embodied representations (somaesthetic, kinaesthetic and motor facial pattern) and the other’s visual face binding. Unconscious facial mimicry may promote inter-subjective illusion–conjunction, then unconscious joint-action and response–coordination.     

Perceptual illusions in brief visual presentations

We often feel that our perceptual experience is richer than what we can express. For instance, when flashed with a large set of letters, we feel that we can see them all, while we can report only a few. However, the nature of this subjective impression remains highly debated: while many favour a dissociation between two forms of consciousness (access vs. phenomenal consciousness), others contend that the richness of phenomenal experience is a mere illusion. Here we addressed this question with a classical partial-report paradigm now modified to include unexpected items in the unreported parts of the stimuli. We show that even in the presence of unexpected pseudo-letters, participants still felt that there were only letters. Additionally, we show that this feeling reflects an illusion whereby participants reconstruct letters using partial letter-like information. We propose that the feeling of seeing emerges from the interplay between partially accessible information and expectations.     

Yang's iris illusion: External contour causes length‐assimilation illusions1

The Delboeuf illusion and the Ebbinghaus illusion (also known as the Titchener illusion) demonstrate that an external contour can lead to size‐assimilation and size‐contrast perception. This paper explores a novel illusion, revealing that neighboring external contours can also lead to a distortion in length perception. The illusion was originally discovered from a face stimulus (Experiment 1) in which a face was depicted alongside its mirror image so as to make the four irises absolutely equidistant. The distance between the middle two irises was underestimated in Asian faces, but overestimated in Caucasian faces. The illusion was also maintained when the facial stimuli were replaced by line drawings of eyes (Experiment 2). However, the illusion vanished when the irises were presented alone. Further scrutiny of the differences in facial characteristics between Asian and Caucasian faces reveals that the illusion might be elicited by the relative position of the eye shapes. This hypothesis was confirmed in Experiment 3, in which the distances between the eye shapes and the irises were manipulated.     

Holistic face processing can be independent of gaze behaviour: Evidence from the composite face illusion

People tend to perceive identical top halves (i.e. above the nose) of two face stimuli as being different when they are aligned with distinct bottom halves. This composite face illusion is generally considered as the most compelling evidence that facial features are integrated into a holistic representation. Here, we recorded eye‐movements during the composite face illusion in a delayed matching task of top halves of faces. Behavioural results showed a strong composite face effect, participants making more mistakes and taking longer time to match two identical top halves of faces when they were aligned (vs. misaligned) with different bottom halves. Importantly, fixation sites and eye‐movements were virtually identical when the top and bottom parts were aligned (composite illusion) or misaligned (no illusion), indicating that holistic face processing can be independent of gaze behaviour. These findings reinforce the view that holistic representations of individual faces can be extracted early on from information at a relatively coarse scale, independently of overt attention.     

The Illusion of Transparency: Assessment of Sex Differences in Showing and Hiding Disgust

The illusion of transparency occurs when one overestimates the ability of others to discern one's internal states, including emotions. Two experiments demonstrated this illusion using the emotion of disgust. Male and female tasters were given drinks, including one that was very unpleasant tasting. Tasters either displayed spontaneous facial expressions (Experiment 1) or tried to conceal their expressions (Experiment 2). Male and female observers rated tasters' expressions and tried to identify the disgusting drink based on the tasters' facial expressions. Results demonstrated the illusion of transparency (e.g., tasters overestimated the percentage of observers who correctly identified the disgusting drink) and suggested that the illusion was partly attributable to the inability of people to set aside their own knowledge when considering the perception of others who do not share this knowledge. Females were less successful than males at hiding their disgust but there was no sex difference in the susceptibility to the illusion.     

高低自我监控者在不同互动情境中的被洞悉错觉

用Snyder的自我监控量表,从大学生中筛选出典型高低自我监控者。要求他们不动声色地喝下1杯醋和4杯水,而后,让观众根据他们的表现去辨别饮料的味道,并让被试预测可能猜中的人数。在实验1中,被试和观众以录像为媒介间接的互相推测;在实验2中,被试和观众现场直接的互相推测。两个实验都包括高低自我监控者各21名。实验结果表明,自我监控水平对被洞悉错觉有明显的影响,在直接和间接两种互动情境中,低自我监控者的被洞悉错觉都比高自我监控者强烈。互动情境对高自我监控者有明显的影响,在间接的互动中,高自我监控者出现了明显的被洞悉错觉;而在直接的互动情境中,低自我监控者的被洞悉错觉依然非常明显,高自我监控者则趋于消失     

人际互动中的被洞悉错觉

被洞悉错觉是人际互动中的一种认知偏差。文章回顾了被洞悉错觉在不同领域存在的证据;介绍了被洞悉错觉在旁观者冷漠、刑事审讯、社交障碍、自我泄露感和亲密关系中的相关应用;分析了锚定及其调节效应、知识之祸、自我关注和朴素实在论对被洞悉错觉的理论解释;讨论了以往研究在对象、方法及跨文化比较方面的不足。     

Categorical Discrimination of Human Facial Expressions by Pigeons: A Test of the Linear Feature Model

Pigeons were trained to discriminate human facial expressions, happiness and anger, in a go/ no-go discrimination procedure. Five pigeons learned to discriminate photographs of the happy and angry faces of 25 different people and showed high levels of transfer to novel faces expressing the training emotions. The pigeons directed their pecks predominantly to the mouth, eyes, or the area between these features. The pigeons were then tested with familiar stimuli in which the upper and lower parts of the face were manipulated separately by substitution or removal of facial features ('eyes-and-eyebrows' and 'mouth'). It was shown that the salience of particular features differed considerably among the birds, but that a linear feature model adequately accounted for discriminative performance of the birds with these stimuli. Furthermore, the discrimination was maintained when these features were inverted. Thus, the so-called Thatcher illusion did not occur. It is suggested that the discrimination is based not on a feature configuration or perceptual gestalt but on an additive integration of individual features.     

The weight of expectation: Implicit,rather than explicit,prior expectations drive the size–weight illusion

In the size–weight illusion, small objects feel heavier than identically weighted larger objects. This illusion is thought to be a consequence of how one's prior expectations can influence conscious perception—lifters expect the large object to outweigh the small object and subsequently experience it as feeling lighter than they expected it to be. Here, we directly examined how a familiar object's identity can affect how heavy someone expects it to be, and how these expectations will influence subsequent perceptions of heaviness. We describe two novel weight illusions induced with familiar objects. In one condition, participants judged the weight of a set of similar-size objects with very different natural weights (a polystyrene sphere, a tennis ball, and a cricket ball), which had all been adjusted to weigh the same amount as one another. In this condition, participants experienced a small, but reliable, weight illusion, with the lightest looking ball feeling heavier than the heaviest looking ball. In the other condition, participants judged the weights of a different set of balls, which were different sizes, but similar natural weights, to one another (a golf ball, a foam soccer ball, and an inflated beach ball). Again, participants experienced a perceptual illusion, but in the opposite direction. Surprisingly, participant's perceptions matched, rather than contrasted with, their explicit expectations such that, even though they expected the golf ball to outweigh the beach ball they perceived the golf ball as feeling heavier than the beach ball. The effect of object mass appeared to dominate the effect of conscious expectations, suggesting that contrasting expectations of heaviness are not necessary to experience weight illusions and that current models of this robust perceptual effect must be revised.     

The Thatcher illusion in squirrel monkeys (Saimiri sciureus)

Like humans, Old World monkeys are known to use configural face processing to distinguish among individuals. The ability to recognize an individual through the perception of subtle differences in the configuration of facial features plays an important role in social cognition. To test this ability in New World monkeys, this study examined whether squirrel monkeys experience the Thatcher illusion, a measure of face processing ability in which changes in facial features are difficult to detect in an inverted face. In the experiment, the monkeys were required to distinguish between a target face and each of the three kinds of distracter faces whose features were altered to be different from those of the target. For each of the pairs of target and distracter faces, four rotation-based combinations of upright and inverted face presentations were used. The results revealed that when both faces were inverted and the eyes of the distracter face were altered by rotating them at an angle of 180° from those of the target face, the monkeys' discrimination learning was obstructed to a greater extent than it was under the other conditions. Thus, these results suggest that the squirrel monkey does experience the Thatcher illusion. Furthermore, it seems reasonable to assume that squirrel monkeys can utilize information about facial configurations in individual recognition and that this facial configuration information could be useful in their social communications.     

On the aesthetic illusion

The aesthetic illusion--the experience of the content of a work of art as reality--occurs through the mobilization and intensification of typical infantile fantasies in the beholder. This necessarily evokes intrapsychic conflict in the mature adult. Two illusion-producing strategies ameliorate this conflict and effect the aesthetic illusion. The first illusion is that the artist's proffered fantasy is the beholder's own personal and private fantasy. This isolates the beholder from the shame- and guilt-evoking social surround. The second illusion is that the protagonist depicted in the work is an actual person. This defends the beholder from the painful emotions attendant upon his instinctually gratifying identification with the protagonist. The first illusion is necessary for the establishment of the second, but it is the second that establishes the aesthetic illusion. The aesthetic illusion exists in a highly unstable dynamic equilibrium with the beholder's usual reality orientation. If either orientation is too powerful, the dynamic equilibrium is disrupted and the aesthetic experience as such is abolished.     

Illusions of causality at the heart of pseudoscience

Pseudoscience, superstitions, and quackery are serious problems that threaten public health and in which many variables are involved. Psychology, however, has much to say about them, as it is the illusory perceptions of causality of so many people that needs to be understood. The proposal we put forward is that these illusions arise from the normal functioning of the cognitive system when trying to associate causes and effects. Thus, we propose to apply basic research and theories on causal learning to reduce the impact of pseudoscience. We review the literature on the illusion of control and the causal learning traditions, and then present an experiment as an illustration of how this approach can provide fruitful ideas to reduce pseudoscientific thinking. The experiment first illustrates the development of a quackery illusion through the testimony of fictitious patients who report feeling better. Two different predictions arising from the integration of the causal learning and illusion of control domains are then proven effective in reducing this illusion. One is showing the testimony of people who feel better without having followed the treatment. The other is asking participants to think in causal terms rather than in terms of effectiveness.     

How the Thatcher illusion reveals evolutionary differences in the face processing of primates

Face recognition in humans is a complex cognitive skill that requires sensitivity to unique configurations of eyes, mouth, and other facial features. The Thatcher illusion has been used to demonstrate the importance of orientation when processing configural information within faces. Transforming an upright face so that the eyes and mouth are inverted renders the face grotesque; however, when this “Thatcherized” face is inverted, the effect disappears. Due to the use of primate models in social cognition research, it is important to determine the extent to which specialized cognitive functions like face processing occur across species. To date, the Thatcher illusion has been explored in only a few species with mixed results. Here, we used computerized tasks to examine whether nonhuman primates perceive the Thatcher illusion. Chimpanzees and rhesus monkeys were required to discriminate between Thatcherized and unaltered faces presented upright and inverted. Our results confirm that chimpanzees perceived the Thatcher illusion, but rhesus monkeys did not, suggesting species differences in the importance of configural information in face processing. Three further experiments were conducted to understand why our results differed from previously published accounts of the Thatcher illusion in rhesus monkeys.     

Roughness perception during the rubber hand illusion

Watching a rubber hand being stroked by a paintbrush while feeling identical stroking of one’s own occluded hand can create a compelling illusion that the seen hand becomes part of one’s own body. It has been suggested that this so-called rubber hand illusion (RHI) does not simply reflect a bottom–up multisensory integration process but that the illusion is also modulated by top–down, cognitive factors. Here we investigated for the first time whether the conceptual interpretation of the sensory quality of the visuotactile stimulation in terms of roughness can influence the occurrence of the illusion and vice versa, whether the presence of the RHI can modulate the perceived sensory quality of a given tactile stimulus (i.e., in terms of roughness). We used a classical RHI paradigm in which participants watched a rubber hand being stroked by either a piece of soft or rough fabric while they received synchronous or asynchronous tactile stimulation that was either congruent or incongruent with respect to the sensory quality of the material touching the rubber hand. (In)congruencies between the visual and tactile stimulation did neither affect the RHI on an implicit level nor on an explicit level, and the experience of the RHI in turn did not cause any modulations of the felt sensory quality of touch on participant’s own hand. These findings first suggest that the RHI seems to be resistant to top–down knowledge in terms of a conceptual interpretation of tactile sensations. Second, they argue against the hypothesis that participants own hand tends to disappear during the illusion and that the rubber hand actively replaces it.     

The composite face illusion: A whole window into our understanding of holistic face perception

Two identical top halves of a face are perceived as being different when their bottom halves belong to different faces, showing that the parts of a face cannot be perceived independently from the whole face. When this visual illusion is inserted in a matching task, observers make more mistakes and/or are slower at matching identical top face halves aligned with different bottom halves than when the bottom halves are spatially offset: The composite face effect. This composite face paradigm has been used in more than 60 studies that have provided information about the specificity and nature of perceptual integration between facial parts (“holistic face perception”), the impairment of this process in acquired prosopagnosia, its developmental course, temporal dynamics, and neural basis. Following a review of the main contributions made with the paradigm, I explain its rationale and strengths, and discuss its methodological parameters, making a number of proposals for its optimal use and refinement in order to improve our understanding of holistic face perception. Finally, I explain how this standard composite face paradigm is fundamentally different than the application to facial parts of a congruency/interference paradigm that has a long tradition in experimental psychology since Stroop (1935), and which was originally developed to measure attentional and response interference between different representations rather than perceptual integration. Moreover, a version of this congruency/interference paradigm used extensively over the past years with composite faces lacks a baseline measure and has decisional, attentional, and stimulus confounds, making the findings of these studies impossible to interpret in terms of holistic perception. I conclude by encouraging researchers in this field to concentrate fully on the standard composite face paradigm, gaze contingency, and other behavioural measures that can help us take one of the most important challenges of visual perception research: Understanding the neural mechanisms of holistic face perception.     

Willusionism,epiphenomenalism, and the feeling of conscious will

While epiphenomenalism—i.e., the claim that the mental is a causally otiose byproduct of physical processes that does not itself cause anything—is hardly ever mentioned in philosophical discussions of free will, it has recently come to play a crucial role in the scientific attack on free will led by neuroscientists and psychologists. This paper is concerned with the connection between epiphenomenalism and the claim that free will is an illusion, in particular with the connection between epiphenomenalism and willusionism, i.e., with the thesis that there is empirical evidence for a thoroughgoing skepticism with regard to free will that is based on the claim that mental states are epiphenomena. The paper discusses four arguments for willusionism that in some form or other appeal to epiphenomenalism and argues that three of them can be discarded relatively easily. The fourth one, based on Daniel Wegner’s theory of apparent mental causation and his claim that free will is an illusion because the feeling of conscious will is epiphenomenal with regard to the corresponding voluntary actions, is dealt with in more detail. The overall verdict is negative: there is no empirical evidence for any kind of epiphenomenalism that would warrant the claim that free will is an illusion. Whatever it is that makes free will the object of contention between neuroscience and philosophy, epiphenomenalism provides no reason to think that free will is an illusion.     

The effects of location,orientation, and cumulation of boxes in the Baldwin illusion

Three experiments were conducted on variants of the Baldwin illusion. Experiment 1 showed that placing a box on each side of the standard line produced a larger illusion than placing both boxes on the same side of the line. These results failed to support the assimilation theory proposed by Brigell, Uhlarik, and Goldhorn (1977). In Experiment 2, the side of a rectangular box was varied when that side was either parallel or perpendicular to the standard line. The parallel rectangle produced a function that was similar to the one found with the classical Baldwin figure, but the perpendicular boxes produced a monotonically decreasing function with a reversal of illusion evident at the large sizes. The latter function did not support any version of the assimilation theory. The findings of Experiment 3 replicated previous findings that showed that cumulating contours as box size increased had no effect on the illusion. These findings explain two longstanding puzzles about the Müller-Lyer illusion: why a multifinned form is not the sum of its single-finned parts and why the shrinkage form produces a smaller effect than does the expansion form.     

Susceptibility to the rubber hand illusion does not tell the whole body-awareness story

The rubber hand illusion (RHI) is an enigmatic illusion that creates a feeling of owning an artificial limb. Enthusiasts of this paradigm assert that it operationalizes bodily self-awareness, but there are reasons to doubt such a clear link. Because little is known about other functional contributions to the RHI, including effects of context-dependent visual processing and cognitive control or the ability to resolve intermodal conflict, we carried out two complementary experiments. In the first, we examined the relationships between the RHI and (1) body awareness, as assessed by the Body Perception Questionnaire (BPQ); (2) context-dependent visual processing, as assessed by the rod-and-frame test (RFT); and (3) conflict resolution, as assessed by the Stroop test. We found a significant positive correlation between the RHI-associated proprioceptive drift and context-dependent visual processing on the RFT, but not between the RHI and body awareness on the BPQ. In the second experiment, we examined the RHI in advanced yoga practitioners with an embodied lifestyle and a heightened sense of their own body in space. They succumbed to the illusion just as much as did yoga-naïve control participants, despite significantly greater body awareness on the BPQ. These findings suggest that susceptibility to the RHI and awareness of one’s own body are at least partially independent processes.     

Active and passive-touch during interpersonal multisensory stimulation change self–other boundaries

In the “enfacement” illusion seeing an unfamiliar face being touched at the same time as one’s own face evokes changes in self-face recognition. We investigated the contribution of proprioceptive and motor signals derived from self-generated actions in the sensory-driven malleability of self–other boundaries during the “enfacement” illusion. Changes in self-face recognition during active- and passive-touch interpersonal visuo-tactile stimulation were quantified by means of psychophysical and psychometric tasks. Active- and passive-touch evoked comparable changes in the categorical boundaries of self–other distinction, changing the extent to which the other is assimilated into the mental self-representation. Actively touching or simply feeling touch on one’s own face with concurrent observed touch on someone else’s face seems to elicit comparable changes in self-recognition, suggesting that afferent input might be sufficient for updating one’s body-image, although some components of the experience of self-identification seem to be more affected by passive- than by active-touch.     

The phantom illumination illusion

A novel brightness illusion in planar patterns is reported. The illusion occurs, for example, when surfaces with a luminance ramp shaded from black to white are positioned on a black homogeneous background, so that each white end of the surfaces faces a single point of the plane of the pattern. The illusion consists of the enhancement of the brightness of the background in a relatively wide area around the white ends of the surfaces. A parametric study was conducted in which participants were asked to rate the difference in brightness between the parts of the background inside and outside a virtual circle formed by disks with different luminance ramps. The results show that mean ratings of brightness depended on the luminance of the background, the luminance range of ramps, and the kind of ramp. Discussion of these results with reference to other brightness illusions (assimilation, neon color spreading, anomalous surfaces, visual phantoms, grating induction, and the glare effect) shows that t hephantom illumination illusion derives from processes producing the perception of ambient illumination.