Crisis and authority in early modern Ashkenaz

The social and intellectual foundations of medieval Judaism were shaken by a series of developments that included the invention of printing, advances in scientific knowledge, humanism, and the commercial revolution. In early modern Ashkenaz, the ensuing crisis centered on questions of ritual transmission and leadership. Minhagbücher composed in seventeenth-century Worms and Frankfurt urged the preservation and reinstatement of medieval customs relating to synagogue worship and rituals practiced in the home, while in some cases newer customs were also incorporated. However, the writings of Rabbi Ya’ir ?ayyim Bacharach were more far-reaching in response to the crisis of authority, as is evident in his forthright independence in matters of ritual and law. Customs could be considered authentic, in his view, provided they were textually based, were proven to be historically reliable, and enjoyed popular consent. His decision to consult kabbalistic sources—a departure from the resistance Kabbalah had encountered in early modern Ashkenaz—rested in part on the theological appeal of mysticism. Reflecting contemporary political philosophy and jurisprudence, Bacharach’s unequivocal endorsement of lay communal authority hinged on its elected status and on the legitimacy of law founded on principles of equity and justice.     

Competing Perspectives on Legal Decision Making in Early Modern Ashkenaz

The respective roles of jurists and judges in the decision-making process offers a valuable perspective on judicial practice and the delivery of justice in early modern Ashkenazic communities. This essay is concerned with differences in the approaches of poseqim (jurists) and dayanim (judges); it suggests that these distinctions were reflections of the institutional settings in which they worked, the size of their communities, and regional factors. Data unearthed from communal records and rabbinic responsa offer important evidence of disparities between the offices of early modern dayanim and poseqim, their distinct personae, and their respective views of how judicial rulings are decided. Moreover, these differences were related to the slow transition to fixed rabbinic-communal courts in western and central Europe that was a product of forces peculiar to the resettlement of Jews in the west, the deliberate development of communal traditions, and the role of the enlightened absolutist state. The impact of the growing recourse to non-Jewish courts, especially as it evinced differences between eastern and western/central European history and culture, was also a factor. Clearly, regional forces influenced the distinct legal efforts and perspectives of judges and jurists, as did the discrete functions they were assigned, their particular training, and the institutional standing of rabbinic courts. These differences became more glaring in the two centuries prior to the collapse of the ancien régime, as structural changes in western Ashkenazic communities contributed to a new Jewish legal culture.     

Marriage Before the Bench: Divorce Law and Litigation Strategies in Thirteenth-Century Ashkenaz

Scholars regularly refer to independently operating Jewish courts as prime evidence of Jewish autonomy and self-rule in medieval Christian Europe. Yet few have focused on the largely anonymous individuals who populated these forums, despite the vital role that litigants played in fueling the judicial system. This article joins a growing body of research devoted to a bottom-up examination of the institutions of law and justice in premodern Europe, highlighting the activities of those who made use of the courts rather than the structures that authorized them. Specifically, it considers a divorce suit adjudicated in the mid-thirteenth century by the rabbinic court of Rabbi Hezkiah b. Jacob of Magdeburg as a lens onto the legal knowledge of lay litigants, their expectations of the judicial system, and the litigation strategies they developed. The reactions of R. Hezkiah and his colleagues to these tactics demonstrate that litigation in the Jewish courts not only reflected current legal trends but could also affect them.     

Arthur Prior and medieval logic

Though Arthur Prior is now best known for his founding of modern temporal logic and hybrid logic, much of his early philosophical career was devoted to history of logic and historical logic. This interest laid the foundations for both of his ground-breaking innovations in the 1950s and 1960s. Because of the important r?le played by Prior??s research in ancient and medieval logic in his development of temporal and hybrid logic, any student of Prior, temporal logic, or hybrid logic should be familiar with the medieval logicians and their work. In this article we give an overview of Prior??s work in ancient and medieval logic.     

Transcending tradition

In recent years, the renewed presence of religion in the European societies has inspired a number of intellectuals on a popular as well as academic level to critically engage with religion. The aim of this article is to give a contribution to this debate. In contrast to the rather reductive and objectifying accounts of religion offered in much of the contemporary critique, I argue that a relevant and constructive critique of religion is most effectively achieved when undertaken from within the religious tradition itself. As an example of an internal critical resource in the Christian tradition, I seek to explore the idea of a continuous revelation through the Holy Spirit, pointing to the self-exceeding nature of every living tradition and thus to our need and duty continuously to engage in a constructive critical reinterpretation of the tradition.     

Cultural Meanings of Money in Medieval Ashkenaz: On Gift,Profit, and Value in Medieval Judaism and Christianity

This article explores the cultural history of money in medieval Judaism and Christianity. In doing so, it reassesses a historical narrative describing the emergence of a “new money economy” in the High Middle Ages. In the prevailing narrative, money is positioned as a causal agent: it is said to effect and symbolize the “profit motive,” becoming a locus for anxiety about the new money economy. But a close reading of moral literature suggests that money per se was not a locus of anxiety. Moralists had a sophisticated understanding of economic value and its relation to moral economy. Anxiety among Jewish and Christian moralists focused on the possible disjuncture between moral and economic values, not on economic value per se. Through close readings of medieval exempla, this article demonstrates that moralists regarded the economic act of acquisition as creating a moral value. When “bad” moral value adhered to coins, they sought to devise means for redeeming that value through penitential acts. This ideology, which was shared by Jewish and Christian authors, suggests that cultural assumptions about money were more sophisticated than a straightforward fear of the profit economy and profit motive and that the narrative of European economic development as a shift from gift economy to profit economy ought to be problematized. Binary oppositions between gift and profit and between an altruistic Christianity (linked to a gift economy) and a modernizing Judaism (linked to a profit economy) ought to be broken down.     

The topics in medieval logic

The topics is a theory of argumentation based upon topoi or in Latin loci. The medieval logicians used works by Aristotle and Boethius as their sources for this doctrine, but they developed it in a rather original way. The topics became a higher-level analysis of arguments which are non-valid from a purely formal point of view, but where it is none the less legitimate to infer the conclusion from the premiss(es). In this connection the topics give rise to a number of discussions about the form and the matter of arguments. Further the topic contribute to the elaboration of the important doctrine of the second intentions, i.e. higher-level concepts of the particular things. In some respects the topics may be said to form a link between formal and informal logic. The topics vanished as a part of logic at the end of the Middle Ages, perhaps because the medieval logicians never got rid of Boethius' claim to have compiled a complete list of the loci, which was an unlucky one. The topics does not have an exact parallel in modern formal logic, but some reflections on non-formal argumentation by recent authors contain certain resemblances to it.     

Aristotle'sTopics and medieval obligational disputations

In writing this paper I have gained much from discussions with Simo Knuuttila and Calvin Normore.     

Mobility and marriage in two medieval Jewish societies

A significant characteristic of pre-modern Jewish life in both the Muslim and Christian realms is geographic mobility. There has been little specific scholarly work on Jewish women and geographic mobility but the available primary sources show that women traveled frequently and for a variety of reasons. This essay focuses on women’s mobility and particularly their migrations due to marriage in both Muslim and Christian milieus. It poses questions about how medieval Jewish communities balanced values of family propinquity versus economic interests. Marriage contracts and letters from the Cairo Genizah demonstrate that marriages over significant distances to cement mercantile or intellectual alliances were not uncommon. Genizah writings also reveal that indigent women were frequent travelers, seeking runaway husbands and financial support. Rabbinic responsa literature of the tenth to thirteenth centuries from France and Germany shows that Jewish women’s mobility in Ashkenaz, both for marriage and for business, was generally within a more limited region. In this society, families tended to move as a group and women often preferred migrating with their parents rather than remaining with a husband. The far more frequent long distance marriages among Jewish women in the Muslim world reflect a more developed system of far-flung scholarly contacts and economic alliances. Similarly, the much larger Jewish population in Islamic realms also meant that there were more women from elite families and more indigent abandoned wives, the two groups particularly likely to travel due to marital prospects and marital woes.     

Hume and the nominalist tradition

Many of the central theses of Hume's philosophy – his rejection of real relations, universals, abstract objects and necessary causal relations – had precedents in the later medieval nominalist tradition. Hume and his medieval predecessors developed complex semantic theories to show both how ontologies are apt to become inflated and how, if we understand carefully the processes by which meaning is generated, we can achieve greater ontological parsimony. Tracing a trajectory from those medieval traditions to Hume reveals Hume to be more radical, particularly in his rejection of abstraction and abstract ideas. Hume's denial of general, abstract ideas is consistent with his philosophical principles but fails to appreciate the more sophisticated nominalist approaches to abstraction, the result of which is a theoretically impoverished account of our capacity for generalization.     

Nietzsche and the tradition 1

Nietzsche and Modern Times: A study of Bacon, Descartes and Nietzsche. Laurence Lampert. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993. Pp. xii + 475. £35.00

Nietzsche and Metaphysics. Peter Poellner. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995. Pp. xi + 320.     

Rawls and the metaphysical tradition

Abstract

Political philosophers, like all philosophers, can be divided into roughly two camps. There are those who are principally metaphysical in their conclusions; feeling that there is something in the nature of things to find or locate to settle the disputes commonly considered to be political disputes, and those others who explicitly reject that type of formulation. Placing the work of John Rawls into one of these categories is, I think, rather challenging; crudely, Rawls can be seen as having made noises of both sorts. The attempt to situate Rawls’s A Theory of Justice both within and beyond the grand metaphysical tradition lies at the center of this paper’s ambitions. This paper also aims to reflect, more generally, on the strengths and weaknesses of Rawls’s Theory. While it will be argued that John Rawls’s early conception of justice is, for the most part, admirable, it will be shown that firstly, Rawls does not fully leave behind the metaphysical inclination that he, as a self-declared non-metaphysical philosopher, is adamant on setting aside, and secondly, although this is very much related to the first point, Rawls’s theory of justice is too heavily grounded in and dependent on the truth of liberalism and thus fails to be adequately mindful of historicism. An examination of the metaphysical flavors in the early articulation of Rawls’s Theory is significant for two main reasons (1) such an examination compels us to ask whether or not Rawls’s Theory was successful, given what we assume were Rawls’s non-metaphysical ambitions, and (2) that the legacy of John Rawls should probably be better off, philosophically speaking (ceterus paribus and by our present lights), if metaphysics were absent in his Theory.