Why are there no objective values?

Using the mathematical frameworks of economic preference ranking, subjective probability, and rational learning through empirical evidence, the epistemological implications of teleological ethical intuitionism are pointed out to the extent to which the latter is based on cognitivist and objectivist concepts of value. The notions of objective value and objective norm are critically analysed with reference to epistemological criteria of intersubjectively shared valuative experience. It is concluded that one cannot meaningfully postulate general material theories of morality that could be tested, confirmed or refuted by intersubjective empirical evidence of preferences and values, however loosely the empirical evidence of values may be interpreted. This situation is explained with reference to the ways in which preceived values become systematically influenced by the concomitants of individual valuative experience, but which have nothing to do with contingent subjective interests.     

Why ‘believes’ is not a vague predicate

According to what I call the ‘Vagueness Thesis’ (‘VT’) about belief, ‘believes’ is a vague predicate. On this view, our concept of belief admits of borderline cases: one can ‘half-believe’ something (Price in Belief, George Allen & Unwin, London, 1969) or be ‘in-between believing’ it (Schwitzgebel in Philos Q 51:76–82, 2001, Noûs 36:249–275, 2002, Pac Philos Q 91:531–553, 2010). In this article, I argue that VT is false and present an alternative picture of belief. I begin by considering a case—held up as a central example of vague belief—in which someone sincerely claims something to be true and yet behaves in a variety of other ways as if she believes that it is not. I argue that, even from the third-person perspective prioritised by proponents of VT, the case does not motivate VT. I present an alternative understanding of the case according to which the person in question believes as they say they do yet also has a belief-discordant implicit attitude otherwise. Moreover, I argue that, independently of the interpretation of any particular case, VT fails to accommodate the first-person perspective on belief. Belief is not only an item of one’s psychology that helps explain one’s behaviour; it is what one takes to be true. This fact about belief manifests itself in the nature of deliberation concerning whether to believe something and that of introspection regarding whether one believes something. Attending to these phenomena reveals that VT is not merely unmotivated, but untenable.     

Why is loving a thief not the same as loving all men for the Mohists?

The purpose of this article is to explain the Mohists’ perceived inconsistences of the following three propositions in the Mojing since we attribute to them an unconditional love toward human beings: (A) A thief is a man. Killing a thief is not killing men. (B) A thief is a man. Loving a thief is not loving men. (C) Zang is a man. Loving Zang is loving men. The attribution of unconditional love toward human beings is not unusual to the Mohists when we render the Mohist idea of jian’ai as universal love. My interpretation first suggests that we can consistently interpret the Mohist ethical position as intentional utilitarianism. Second, I claim that Mohist universal love includes some generality, though it does not have to mean universality without exception. This Mohist generality will be explained through the generic use of nouns.     

Why are hispanics at greater risk for PTSD?

Several studies have found that Hispanic Americans have higher rates of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) than non-Hispanic Caucasian and Black Americans. The authors identified predictors of PTSD symptom severity that distinguished Hispanic police officers (n=189) from their non-Hispanic Caucasian (n=317) and Black (n=162) counterparts and modeled them to explain the elevated Hispanic risk for PTSD. The authors found that greater peritraumatic dissociation, greater wishful thinking and self-blame coping, lower social support, and greater perceived racism were important variables in explaining the elevated PTSD symptoms among Hispanics. Results are discussed in the context of Hispanic culture and may be important for prevention of mental illness in the fastest growing ethnic group in the United States.     

“It is not a something,but not a nothing either!”—McDowell on Wittgenstein

This paper corrects a mistake in John McDowell’s influential reading of Wittgenstein’s attack on the idea of private sensations. McDowell rightly identifies a primary target of Wittgenstein’s attack to be the Myth of the Given. But he also suggests that Wittgenstein, in the ferocity of his battles with this myth, sometimes goes into overkill, which manifests itself in seemingly behavioristic denials about sensations. But this criticism of Wittgenstein is a mistake. The mistake is made over two important but notoriously difficult sections in the so-called Private Language Argument, namely §304 and §293 of the Philosophical Investigations. Wittgenstein, maximally charitably read, commits no overkill in these two sections. This correction strengthens McDowell’s overall reading, but it is only a first step toward fully bringing out the deep but obscurely expressed insights in §304 and §293, the full treatment of which must await another occasion.     

Why are familiar-only experiences more frequent for voices than for faces?

Hanley,Smith, and Hadfield (1998) showed that when participants were asked to recognize famous people from hearing their voice , there was a relatively large number of trials in which the celebrity's voice was felt to be familiar but biographical information about the person could not be retrieved. When a face was found familiar, however, the celebrity's occupation was significantly more likely to be recalled. This finding is consistent with the view that it is much more difficult to associate biographical information with voices than with faces. Nevertheless, recognition level was much lower for voices than for faces in Hanleyet al.'s study,and participants made significantly more false alarms in the voice condition. In the present study, recognition performance in the face condition was brought down to the same level as recognition in the voice condition by presenting the faces out of focus. Under these circumstances, it proved just as difficult to recall the occupations of faces found familiar as it was to recall the occupations of voices found familiar. In other words, there was an equally large number of familiar-only responses when faces were presented out of focus as in the voice condition. It is argued that these results provide no support for the view that it is relatively difficult to associate biographical information with a person's voice. It is suggested instead that associative connections between processing units at different levels in the voice-processing system are much weaker than is the case with the corresponding units in the face-processing system. This will reduce the recall of occupations from voices even when the voice has been found familiar. A simulation was performed using the latest version of the IAC model of person recognition (Burton, Bruce, & Hancock, 1999) which demonstrated that the model can readily accommodate the pattern of results obtained in this study.     

Does the familiarity bias hypothesis explain why there is no masked priming for “NO” decisions?

Traditional "activation" views of masked priming explain the identity priming effect in terms of facilitation due to ‘pre-activation’ of stored representations. Norris and Kinoshita's (2008) Bayesian Reader theory of masked priming instead explains priming in terms of the evidence that the prime contributes towards the decision required to the target. In support of the Bayesian Reader account, Norris and Kinoshita showed that the absence of priming for nonwords in the lexical decision task and for targets requiring a Different decision in the same–different match task can be explained based on a single principle. Against this, Bowers (2010) argued that the absence of priming should be explained instead by a combination of sublexical priming and "familiarity bias". As evidence, Bowers cited Bodner and Masson’s (1997) finding that nonword priming did emerge with targets presented in visually unfamiliar cAsE-AlTeRnAtEd format. We present evidence that this finding was due to the use of an ambiguous letter in case-alternated format; when using unambiguous letters, we consistently failed to find priming of case-alternated nonwords. We suggest that the Bayesian Reader, rather than the familiarity bias hypothesis, explains the absence of priming.     

When “no” becomes “yes”: Why girls and women consent to unwanted sex

Recent investigations address a “gray area” on the sexual-violence spectrum—consent to sexual intercourse that is unwanted. This article reviews qualitative and quantitative investigations of adolescent girls' and young women's reasons for consenting to unwanted intercourse and provides a theoretical framework for understanding these experiences. Central to this theoretical perspective is gender-role socialization in the culture by which many girls internalize stereotyped beliefs about male sexual prerogatives and the importance of a heterosexual relationship to feminine identity. Also addressed are applications of this theoretical framework for prevention and education programs.     

“My big sister the town supervisor”: Family leadership training is not just for boys

This study investigates gender similarity in the effects of birth order upon political leadership. Town supervisors were the leaders studied as there are a considerable number of women who attain this level of leadership. Questionnaires about birth order and family size were gained from 66 women who were town supervisors in New York State in 1992, and compared to a randomly selected sample of 57 male town supervisors. It was found that women as well as men town supervisors were more likely to have been first born in their families. However, whereas gender does not apparently influence the relevance of birth order for leadership, it clearly does exert an influence on the level of political leadership attained. Women town supervisors gained their positions in towns that were considerably smaller than the towns led by the male supervisors. Discussion concerned the nature of family experiences that contribute to leadership training, including those that may be different for girls and boys. Further research is needed to clarify barriers to female assertion of political leadership at more senior levels, because as this study shows, female leadership is being trained in families.     

Why was there no place for personalistic thinking in 20th century psychology?

The present article identifies two major impediments to personalistic thinking in 20th century psychology: (1) positivism, and (2) a methodological commitment for which the term ‘statisticism’ has been coined. After explaining both that and why these two traditions have been so fundamentally inhospitable to Stern's ideas, it is suggested in the paper's conclusion that the gradual demise of these heretofore dominant -isms renders more favorable the prospects for personalistic thinking in 21st century psychology.     

Playing for peanuts: Why is risk seeking more common for low-stakes gambles?

Previous research has found that decision makers are more risk seeking for small-stakes gambles than for large-stakes gambles. This “peanuts effect” is not easily explained by Prospect Theory. Two experiments examined the range of circumstances in which peanuts effects occur and tested the hypothesis that anticipated disappointment or anticipated regret explains the peanuts effect. The results suggest that the peanuts effect is related to disappointment, but do not support a connection between the peanuts effect and regret.     

Why are artificial polymorphous concepts so hard for birds to learn?

Stimulus sets defined in terms of artificial polymorphous concepts have frequently been used in experiments to investigate the mechanisms of discrimination of natural concepts, both in humans and in other animals. However, such stimulus sets are frequently difficult for either animals or humans to discriminate. Properties of artificial polymorphous stimulus sets that might explain this difficulty include the complexity of the individual stimuli, the unreliable reinforcement of individual positive features, attentional load, difficulties in discriminating some stimulus dimensions, memory load, and a lack of the correlation between features that characterizes natural concepts. An experiment using chickens as subjects and complex artificial visual stimulus sets investigated these hypotheses by training the birds in discriminations that were not polymorphous but did have some of the properties listed above. Discriminations that involved unreliable reinforcement or high attentional load were found to approach the difficulty of polymorphous concept discriminations, and these two factors together were sufficient to account for the entire difficulty. The usual kind of artificial polymorphous concept may not be a good model for natural concepts as they are perceived and discriminated by birds. A RULEX account of natural concept learning may be preferable.     

Why are artificial polymorphous concepts so hard for birds to learn?

Stimulus sets defined in terms of artificial polymorphous concepts have frequently been used in experiments to investigate the mechanisms of discrimination of natural concepts, both in humans and in other animals. However, such stimulus sets are frequently difficult for either animals or humans to discriminate. Properties of artificial polymorphous stimulus sets that might explain this difficulty include the complexity of the individual stimuli, the unreliable reinforcement of individual positive features, attentional load, difficulties in discriminating some stimulus dimensions, memory load, and a lack of the correlation between features that characterizes natural concepts. An experiment using chickens as subjects and complex artificial visual stimulus sets investigated these hypotheses by training the birds in discriminations that were not polymorphous but did have some of the properties listed above. Discriminations that involved unreliable reinforcement or high attentional load were found to approach the difficulty of polymorphous concept discriminations, and these two factors together were sufficient to account for the entire difficulty. The usual kind of artificial polymorphous concept may not be a good model for natural concepts as they are perceived and discriminated by birds. A RULEX account of natural concept learning may be preferable.     

Why Peirce’s Anti-Intuitionism is not Anti-Cartesian: The Diagnosis of a Pragmatist Dogma

A close reading of Descartes’ works, particularly his Regulae ad Directionem Ingenii, calls into question the common interpretation of Peirce’s ‘Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man’ and ‘Some Consequences of Four Incapacities’ as being anti-Cartesian. In particular, Descartes’ conception of intuition differs from Peirce’s, and on one plausible reading of Descartes his intuitionism actually mirrors Peirce’s inferentialism in key respects. Given these similarities between Descartes and Peirce, the dogmatic status of the anti-Cartesian interpretation of Peirce becomes evident.     

Why are some individuals not racially biased? Susceptibility to affective conditioning predicts nonprejudice toward blacks

Two studies investigated the psychological underpinnings of racial nonbias, defined as extremely low or null bias on measures of implicit and explicit racial attitudes. In Study 1, racially nonbiased Whites showed differential susceptibility to affective conditioning compared with subjects with greater bias. A significant two-way interaction emerged, indicating that nonbiased individuals were significantly less likely than other individuals to acquire negative affective associations to neutral stimuli in a classical conditioning paradigm, but were more likely than other individuals to acquire positive affective associations to neutral stimuli. This pattern of findings was replicated in Study 2, in which the identification of nonbiased Whites was facilitated by their nomination by an African American acquaintance. Implications for bias formation and prejudice reduction are discussed.