Reflexivity,Subjectivity, and the Constructed Self: A Buddhist Model

The aim of this article is to take up three closely connected questions. First, does consciousness essentially involve subjectivity? Second, what is the connection, if any, between pre-reflective self-consciousness and subjectivity? And, third, does consciousness necessarily involve an ego or self? I will draw on the Yogācāra–Madhyamaka synthesis of ?āntarak?ita (eighth century common era) to develop an account of the relation between consciousness, subjectivity, and the self. I will argue, first, that phenomenal consciousness is reflexive or self-illuminating (svaprakā?ya). Second, I will argue that consciousness necessarily involves minimal subjectivity. Third, I will argue that neither the reflexivity nor the subjectivity of consciousness implies that there is any entity such as the self or ego over and above reflexive consciousness. Fourth, I will argue that what we normally think of as ‘the self’ is best understood as a complex, multi-layered process (aha?kāra, ‘I-making’) that emerges within the pre-egoic flow of subjective consciousness.     

Reflexivity in quantitative research: A rationale and beginner's guide

Reflexivity is the act of examining one's own assumption, belief, and judgement systems, and thinking carefully and critically about how these influence the research process. The practice of reflexivity confronts and questions who we are as researchers and how this guides our work. It is central in debates on objectivity, subjectivity, and the very foundations of social science research and generated knowledge. Incorporating reflexivity in the research process is traditionally recognized as one of the most notable differences between qualitative and quantitative methodologies. Qualitative research centres and celebrates the participants' personal and unique lived experience. Therefore, qualitative researchers are readily encouraged to consider how their own unique positionalities inform the research process and this forms an important part of training within this paradigm. Quantitative methodologies in social and personality psychology, and more generally, on the other hand, have remained seemingly detached from this level of reflexivity and general reflective practice. In this commentary, we, three quantitative researchers who have grappled with the compatibility of reflexivity within our own research, argue that reflexivity has much to offer quantitative methodologists. The act of reflexivity prompts researchers to acknowledge and centre their own positionalities, encourages a more thoughtful engagement with every step of the research process, and thus, as we argue, contributes to the ongoing reappraisal of openness and transparency in psychology. In this paper, we make the case for integrating reflexivity across all research approaches, before providing a ‘beginner's guide’ for quantitative researchers wishing to engage reflexively with their own work, providing concrete recommendations, worked examples, and reflexive prompts.     

Three Facets Of Consciousness

Over the past century phenomenology has ably analyzed the basic structuresof consciousness as we experience it. Yet recent philosophy of mind, lookingto brain activity and computational function, has found it difficult to makeroom for the structures of subjectivity and intentionality that phenomenologyhas appraised. In order to understand consciousness as something that is bothsubjective and grounded in neural activity, we need to delve into phenomenologyand ontology. I draw a fundamental distinction in ontology among the form,appearance, and substrate of any entity. Applying this three-facet ontology toconsciousness, we distinguish: the intentionality of consciousness (its form),the way we experience consciousness (its appearance, including so-called qualia),and the physical, biological, and cultural basis of consciousness (its substrate).We can thus show how these very different aspects of consciousness fit togetherin a fundamental ontology. And we can thereby define the proper domains ofphenomenology and other disciplinesthat contribute to our understanding of consciousness.     

Cognitive avoidance of intrusive memories and autobiographical memory: specificity, autonoetic consciousness, and self-perspective

Autobiographical memory (AM) specificity is impaired in depression and post-traumatic stress disorder. Previous studies emphasised the role of cognitive avoidance of intrusive memories in this impairment. This study aimed to examine the association of cognitive avoidance of intrusive memories with specificity, autonoetic consciousness, and self-perspective. A total of 38 healthy participants were given the revised Impact of Event Scale (IES-R) and an AM task designed to assess positive and negative memories regarding specificity, autonoetic consciousness (remember/know procedure), and self-perspective (field/observer procedure). Taking into account age, verbal IQ, mood, harm avoidance, and executive resources, the IES-R avoidance subscale was negatively correlated with specificity and remember responses for positive memories, and with remember and field responses for negative memories. These findings suggest that cognitive avoidance of intrusive memories is associated with a decrease of the episodic components of AM retrieval.     

Episodic autobiographical memory in depression: Specificity, autonoetic consciousness, and self-perspective

Autobiographical memory (AM) and the self are closely linked. AM retrieval in depression is characterized by a lack of specificity, suggesting an impairment of episodic AM. Autonoetic consciousness and self-perspective, which are critical to episodic AM, have never been addressed in depression. Twenty-one depressed inpatients and 21 matched controls were given an episodic AM task designed to assess positive and negative memories regarding specificity, autonoetic consciousness (remember/know procedure), and self-perspective (field/observer procedure). For specificity, "remember", and "field" responses, ANOVAs revealed a main group effect and a group x valence interaction. Between groups, patients showed lower scores than controls for positive memories. Within groups, patients showed greater scores for negative memories, and controls showed greater scores for positive memories. There is a global episodic AM impairment of positive memories in depression regarding specificity, autonoetic consciousness, and self-perspective. Our results suggest new cognitive interventions to improve the self-relevance of positive memories in depression.     

Development of autonoetic autobiographical memory in school-age children: Genuine age effect or development of basic cognitive abilities?

This study investigated the mechanisms behind episodic autobiographical memory (EAM) development in school-age children. Thirty children (6–11 years) performed a novel EAM test. We computed one index of episodicity via autonoetic consciousness and two indices of retrieval spontaneity (overall and EAM-specific) for a recent period (previous school year) and a more remote one (preschool years). Executive functions, and episodic and personal semantic memory were assessed. Results showed that recent autobiographical memories (AMs) were mainly episodic, unlike remote ones. An age-related increase in the indices of episodicity and specific spontaneity for recent AMs was mainly mediated by an age-related increase in the efficiency of the three cognitive abilities. Remote AMs varied only slightly with age (overall spontaneity), reflecting improvements in semantic abilities. Thus, EAM development in school-age children is essentially bound up with the increasing efficiency of cognitive abilities. Results are discussed in the light of models of childhood amnesia.     

Assessment of behavioural markers of autonoetic consciousness during episodic autobiographical memory retrieval: a preliminary analysis

There is ongoing theoretical debate regarding episodic memory and how it can be accurately measured, in particular if the focus should be content-based recall of episodic details or something more experiential involving the subjective capacity to mentally travel back in time and "re-live" aspects of the original event. The autonoetic subscale of the Episodic Autobiographical Memory Interview (EAMI) is presented here as a new test instrument that attempts to redress theoretical and methodological shortcomings in autobiographical memory assessment. The EAMI merges a phenomenological detail-based approach with an assessment of autonoetic consciousness, departing considerably from traditional Remember/Know paradigms used within this field. We present findings from an initial pilot study investigating the potential markers of autonoetic consciousness that may accompany episodic retrieval. Key behavioural indices of autonoetic consciousness, notably those of viewer perspective, visual imagery, and emotional re-experiencing, emerged as being inextricably bound with the level of phenomenological detail recalled and the overall re-living judgment. The autonoetic subscale of the EAMI permits conceptually refined assessment of episodic personal memories and the accompanying subjective experience of mental re-living, characteristic of episodic memory.     

Impaired strategic regulation of contents of conscious awareness in schizophrenia

Conscious awareness comprises two distinct states, autonoetic and noetic awareness. Schizophrenia impairs autonoetic, but not noetic, awareness. We investigated the strategic regulation of relevant and irrelevant contents of conscious awareness in schizophrenia using a directed forgetting paradigm. Twenty-one patients with schizophrenia and 21 normal controls were presented with words and told to learn some of them and forget others. In a subsequent test, they were asked to recognize all the words they had seen previously and give remember, know or guess responses according to whether they recognized words on the basis of autonoetic awareness, noetic awareness, or guessing. Overall, patients showed the same degree of a directed forgetting effect as normal subjects. However, whereas the effect was observed both for remember and know responses in normal subjects, it was observed for know, but not for remember, responses in patients. These results indicate that patients with schizophrenia exhibit an impaired strategic regulation of contents of autonetic awareness for relevant and irrelevant information.     

Reflexive research and the grounding of analysis: Social psychology and the psy-complex

This paper is concerned with reflexivity in research, and the way research is grounded in the operations of the psy-complex in social psychology. A central argument is that qualitative research in general, and a focus on reflexivity in particular, requires theoretical grounding. Distinctions are drawn between ‘uncomplicated subjectivity’, ‘blank subjectivity’ and ‘complex subjectivity’; and the analytic device of the ‘discursive complex’ is described. It is argued that such theoretical grounding can usefully draw on developments in discourse analytic, deconstructionist, and psychoanalytic social research. The opposition between objectivity and subjectivity is deconstructed, and psychoanalytic conceptual reference points for an understanding of the discursive construction of complex subjectivity in the context of institutions are explored with particular reference to the location of the researcher in the psy-complex. The paper discusses the reflexive engagement of the researcher with data, and the construction of the identity of the researcher with reference to professional bodies. An analysis of a document produced by the British Psychological Society is presented to illustrate conceptual issues addressed in the first sections. This illustrative analysis is designed to show how the material is structured by a series of six discursive complexes, and that the institutional structure facilitates, and inhibits, certain forms of action and reflection.     

Alexithymia and the reflexive self: Implications of congruence theory for treatment of the emotionally impaired

Abstract

This paper attempts to articulate a so far neglected dimension of congruence theory, the reflexive self to self transaction. My claim is that self reflexivity is a tacit but fundamental assumption behind Carl Rogers’ formulations of the relationship—what he refers to as “congruence” or “incongruence"—between experience and its symbolization in awareness. Gendlin's elaboration of the congruence theory in terms of “experiencing” and “inward sensing” has made clear and explicit the important role self reflexivity plays in the relationship between symbols and “unformed emotional experience.” A case vignette of Focusing is used to demonstrate the relevance of self reflexivity to our understanding of verbal expression of emotions, and by extension, to our understanding and treatment of alexithymia and related conditions of emotional impairments.     

Autonoetic consciousness in autobiographical memories after medial temporal lobe resection

This study aims to investigate autonoetic consciousness associated with episodic autobiographical memory in patients who had undergone unilateral medial temporal lobe resection for intractable epilepsy. Autonoetic consciousness, defined as the conscious feeling of mentally travelling back in time to relive a specific event, was assessed using the Remember/Know (R/K) paradigm across different time periods as proposed in the autobiographical memory task developed by Piolino et al. (TEMPau task). Results revealed that the two patient groups (left and right temporal resection) gave reduced sense of reliving (R) responses and more familiarity (K) responses than healthy controls. This poor autonoetic consciousness was highlighted when patients were asked to justify their Remember responses by recalling sensory-perceptive, affective or spatiotemporal specific details across all life periods. These results support the bilateral MTL contribution to episodic autobiographical memory covering the entire lifespan, which is consistent with the multiple trace theory of MTL function. This study also demonstrates the bilateral involvement of MTL structures in recalling specific details of personal events characterized by autonoetic consciousness.     

Effectiveness of an improvement writing program according to students' reflexivity levels

After designing a writing program to enhance students' reflexivity and thus improve their compositions (García & de Caso, 2002a, 2002b), the aim of the research project was to show how reflexivity levels could influence the effectiveness of this program. This writing instruction through reflexivity was carried out with 5th and 6th grade students with learning disabilities (LD) and/or low achievement (LA) during 25 sessions. One hundred participants were assigned to either the experimental group (n=49), which received specific intervention in writing and reflexivity, or the control group (n=51), which simply received the ordinary curriculum. Both groups were assessed on the productivity and quality of their writing composition as well as their attitudes, self-efficacy, and reflexivity towards writing. The results show that coherence and reflexivity improved depending on the level of reflexivity, whereas the relationship with attitudes and self-efficacy is not so clear. Thus, it seems possible to improve LD and/or LA students' compositions by taking their reflexive style into account. Depending on the students' learning style, teachers should use either one or another technique.     

Corporate consciousness: Defining the paradigm

The concept of corporate consciousness is defined and discussed. In response to Campion and Palmer (1996), it is asserted that corporate consciousness is not a construct related to conscientiousness or moral responsibility, but an entirely new paradigm, related to awareness and information processing; the concept is cognitive, not metaphysical. Corporate consciousness serves as a framework for understanding the current trend within organizations toward greater awareness of societal realities, and of the organization's impact within larger systems. This framework borrows heavily from the cognitive, social, and organizational psychological literature and can be understood from both micro and macro levels of analysis. Also discussed are the issues of why and how to study corporate consciousness, as well as implications for the organizational practitioner.     

Factors affecting conscious awareness in the recollective experience of adults with Asperger's syndrome

have shown a small but significant impairment of autonoetic awareness or remembering involved in the episodic memory experiences of adults with Asperger's syndrome. This was compensated by an increase in experiences of noetic awareness or knowing. The question remains as to whether the residual autonoetic awareness in Asperger individuals is qualitatively the same as that of typical comparison participants. Three experiments are presented in which manipulations that have shown differential effects on different kinds of conscious awareness in memory in typical populations are employed with a sample of adults with Asperger's syndrome. The results suggest that the experiences of remembering reported by such individuals, although reduced in quantity, are qualitatively similar to those seen in the typical population. The results are discussed in the context of current theories of awareness in episodic memory.     

意识的四个要素理论

基于实验事实 ,提出了意识内部结构的观念。按照本文提出的意识的四个要素理论 ,意识由意识的四个要素及它们之间的相互作用组成。意识的四个要素是意识觉醒、意识内容、意识指向和意识感情。讨论了意识四个要素的脑机制     

Using relational reflexivity as a resource in teaching family therapy

In this paper we talk about creating coherence and transparency in the relationships between teacher, model of adult learning and subject taught. We describe how we have made connections between adult learning theory and family therapy to generate resources for action in teaching on the qualifying level course at Northumbria University. Using a recent teaching session and the voices of trainees, we illustrate these connections with an example of teaching about relational reflexivity, using methods which enabled us to generate reflexive ‘flow’ in the learning context.     

Individual differences in time perspective predict autonoetic experience

Tulving (1985) posited that the capacity to remember is one facet of a more general capacity—autonoetic (self-knowing) consciousness. Autonoetic consciousness was proposed to underlie the ability for “mental time travel” both into the past (remembering) and into the future to envision potential future episodes (episodic future thinking). The current study examines whether individual differences can predict autonoetic experience. Specifically, the Zimbardo Time Perspective Inventory (ZTPI, Zimbardo & Boyd, 1999) was administered to 133 undergraduate students, who also rated phenomenological experiences accompanying autobiographical remembering and episodic future thinking. Scores on two of the five subscales of the ZTPI (Future and Present-Hedonistic) predicted the degree to which people reported feelings of mentally traveling backward (or forward) in time and the degree to which they reported re- or pre-experiencing the event, but not ten other rated properties less related to autonoetic consciousness.     

Future-oriented mental time travel in individuals with disordered gambling

This study investigated the ability of individuals with disordered gambling to imagine future events. Problem gamblers (n = 35) and control participants (n = 35) were asked to imagine positive and negative future events for three temporal distances (one week, one year, 5–10 years). Then, a variety of phenomenological aspects of their future thoughts (e.g., sensory and contextual details, autonoetic consciousness) were rated. Compared to control subjects, problem gamblers generated fewer positive and negative events across all temporal distances, an impairment that was correlated to verbal fluency scores. Furthermore, problem gamblers rated imagined events as containing fewer sensory and contextual details, and lacking autonoetic consciousness. These findings demonstrate that problem gambling is associated with a reduced future-oriented mental time travel ability and, in particular, with diminished autonoetic consciousness when imagining future events.     

Self-awareness and self-deception: a Sartrean perspective

In spite of the fact that many find Jean-Paul Sartre’s account of la mauvaise foi puzzling, unclear and troublesome, he remains a recurring figure in the debate about self-deception. Indeed, Sartre’s exposition of self-deception is as puzzling as it is original. The primary task of my paper will be to expose why this is the case and to thereby correct a recurrent misunderstanding of Sartre’s theory of consciousness. In the end, will we see that Sartre offers the following theory: self-deception is to be accounted for by assuming that there are intrinsically self-deceptive epistemic states. The latter are self-deceptive in so far as they claim certainty while nevertheless being accompanied by an inbuilt and incorruptible awareness of being unwarranted. For Sartre, developing this rather peculiar account of self-deception, is, as we will see, not primarily intended as an end in itself. Rather, Sartre thereby hopes to illuminate the nature of self-awareness as (i.) epistemically super-secure, (ii.) pre-reflexive, (iii.) non-positional and “embryonic” knowledge that (iv.) does not necessitate but can still ground epistemically super-secure reflexive knowledge, and (v.) that can replace Freud’s notion of unconscious knowledge. As an account of self-deception, Sartre’s suggestion, however, comes at a high price. Apart from the presuppositions Sartre makes in the theory of consciousness and intentionality, his account is deflationist with regard to local cases of self-deception.     

Recognition memory with little or no remembering: Implications for a detection model

Remembering and knowing are two states of awareness that reflect autonoetic and noetic consciousness. Recent extensions of signal detection theory have attempted to fitremember andknow responses, which measure these states of awareness, to a continuum of trace strength or familiarity. The model assumes there are two response criteria, a remembering criterion, which is more strict, and a recognition criterion, which is more lenient and leads to any positive recognition response. The most important prediction of this model is that bias-free estimates of memory should be the same whether derived from overall hit and false alarm rates or fromremember hit and false alarm rates. We describe evidence that disconfirms this prediction and discuss other findings that the model cannot accommodate.