Does expanded retrieval produce benefits over equal-interval spacing? Explorations of spacing effects in healthy aging and early stage Alzheimer's disease

Three experiments explored different schedules of retrieval practice in young adults, older adults, and individuals with dementia of the Alzheimer type. In each experiment, an initial acquisition phase was presented in which participants studied or attempted to retrieve response words to cues, followed by a later cued-recall test. Experiment 1 produced a benefit of expanded retrieval over equal-interval retrieval during acquisition, but this benefit was lost in final cued recall. In Experiments 2 and 3, participants received corrective feedback during acquisition and modified spacing schedules. There was again no evidence of a difference between expanded and equal-interval conditions in final cued recall. Discussion focuses on the potential benefits and costs of expanded retrieval on a theoretical and applied level.     

Retrieval from memory: vulnerable or inviolable?

We show that retrieval from semantic memory is vulnerable even to the mere presence of speech. Irrelevant speech impairs semantic fluency--namely, lexical retrieval cued by a semantic category name--but only if it is meaningful (forward speech compared to reversed speech or words compared to nonwords). Moreover, speech related semantically to the retrieval category is more disruptive than unrelated speech. That phonemic fluency--in which participants are cued with the first letter of words they are to report--was not disrupted by the mere presence of meaningful speech, only by speech in a related phonemic category, suggests that distraction is not mediated by executive processing load. The pattern of sensitivity to different properties of sound as a function of the type of retrieval cue is in line with an interference-by-process approach to auditory distraction.     

Positive and negative reinforcement: Should the distinction be preserved?

Michael (1975) reviewed efforts to classify reinforcing events in terms of whether stimuli are added (positive reinforcement) or removed (negative reinforcement). He concluded that distinctions in these terms are confusing and ambiguous. Of necessity, adding a stimulus requires its previous absence and removing a stimulus its previous presence. Moreover, there is no good basis, either behavioral or physiological, that indicates the involvement of distinctly different processes, and on these grounds he proposed that the distinction be abandoned. Despite the cogency of Michael's analysis, the distinction between positive and negative reinforcement is still being taught. In this paper, we reconsider the issue from the perspective of 30 years. However, we could not find new evidence in contemporary research and theory that allows reliable classification of an event as a positive rather than a negative reinforcer. We conclude by reiterating Michael's admonitions about the conceptual confusion created by such a distinction.     

Should Happiness-Maximization be the Goal of Government?

Recent social surveys of happiness (subjective well-being) have given a new stimulus to utilitarian political theory by providing a statistically reliable measure of the ‘happiness’ of individuals that can then be correlated with other variables. One general finding is that greater happiness does not correlate strongly with increased wealth, beyond modest levels, and this has led to calls for governments to shift priorities away from economic growth and towards other social values. This paper notes how the conclusions of this research help to address some of the traditional objections to utilitarianism. The question of how happiness research findings can be used to set happiness-maximization goals for public policy needs careful examination, as the translation from research to policy is not always straightforward. Some empirical and ethical objections to this ‘new utilitarianism’ are raised. The complicating factors of public expectations of, and trust in, governments pose obstacles to any proposal that happiness research may lead to changes in public policy and hence to ‘happier’ populations.     

Should the "slow code" be resuscitated?

Most bioethicists and professional medical societies condemn the practice of "slow codes." The American College of Physicians ethics manual states, "Because it is deceptive, physicians or nurses should not perform half-hearted resuscitation efforts ('slow codes')." A leading textbook calls slow codes "dishonest, crass dissimulation, and unethical." A medical sociologist describes them as "deplorable, dishonest and inconsistent with established ethical principles." Nevertheless, we believe that slow codes may be appropriate and ethically defensible in situations in which cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) is likely to be ineffective, the family decision makers understand and accept that death is inevitable, and those family members cannot bring themselves to consent or even assent to a do-not-resuscitate (DNR) order. In such cases, we argue, physicians may best serve both the patient and the family by having a carefully ambiguous discussion about end-of-life options and then providing resuscitation efforts that are less vigorous or prolonged than usual.     

Should Student-Athletes be Paid?

Abstract:

The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) currently prohibits student-athletes from receiving compensation from many non-school-affiliated sources, including sports agents, advertising agencies, and merchandizers. Moreover, student-athletes are prohibited from receiving compensation for media appearances, endorsing products, and autographs. Athletes and schools that violate these rules are subject to various punishments, such as fines, suspensions, and forfeiture of games. This paper challenges this NCAA policy. Accordingly, although colleges and universities often compensate student-athletes with free tuition, room, board, and other expenses, I argue that some prohibitions against athletes receiving compensation from non-school-affiliated sources are: (1) arbitrary and unfair to student-athletes; (2) such policies moreover are non-beneficial to student-athletes since we lack good reason to think the reception or pursuit of outside compensations will harm the student-athlete; (3) no foreseeable detrimental effects to higher education arise if student-athletes are allowed to pursue or receive various compensations; and (4) the integrity of college sports will not be compromised if certain forms of compensation are permitted. I take (1)–(4) as good reasons for doing away with the NCAA’s current policies. Ultimately, while I do not think colleges or universities should compensate student-athletes beyond what they already provide (e.g. free tuition, room, and board), I think student-athletes should be allowed to pursue an assortment of economic-related activities currently prohibited by the NCAA.     

Weathering the storm: Children's long‐term recall of Hurricane Andrew

Children who experienced a highly stressful natural disaster, Hurricane Andrew, were interviewed within a few months of the event, when they were 3–4 years old, and again 6 years later, when they were 9–10 years old. Children were grouped into low, moderate, or high stress groups depending on the severity of the experienced storm. All children were able to recall this event in vivid detail 6 years later. In fact, children reported over twice as many propositions at the second interview as at the first. At the initial interview, children in the high stress group reported less information than children in the moderate stress group, but 6 years later, children in all three stress groups reported similar amounts of information. However children in the high stress group needed more questions and prompts than children in the other stress groups. Yet children in the high stress group also reported more consistent information between the two interviews, especially about the storm, than children in the other stress groups. Implications for children's developing memory of stressful events are discussed.     

Mueller-Lyer decrement: practice or prolonged inspection?

Noting the similarity between the illusion decrement and selective adaptation paradigms, Long has challenged the view that illusion decrement effects reflect a strategic--as opposed to a structural--underlying mechanism, and has called for further research on this issue. To investigate the confound between prolonged free inspection and repeated trials in the standard decrement procedure, the effects of three inspection conditions (continuous, intermittent, and immediate) on the magnitude of the overestimation Mueller-Lyer illusion have been assessed under two levels of trials (a total of two or six judgments). Significant illusion decline was found only under conditions of repeated trials, with either continuous or intermittent inspection. These findings do not support the predictions of purely structural theories (including neural adaptation and efferent readiness theories), according to which degree of decrement should be determined solely by viewing time. Instead, the data demonstrate that illusion decrement is a product of practice, providing converging evidence for the view of decrement as involving a cognitive 'recalibration' or learning process.     

Should Career Education be Founded in the Protestant Ethic?

Much of career education philosophy presupposes the Protestant (Work) Ethic, ignoring the fact that this traditional ethic is being challenged by other viewpoints. This article includes a review of the origin and nature of the Protestant (Work) Ethic and a brief outline of some alternative ethics. Ethical and practical problems arise when career education presumes to advocate a single traditional work ethic; this article suggests a solution to these problems.     

Should inter-collegiate football be eliminated? Assessing the arguments philosophically

Recently, there have been discussions about whether or not inter-collegiate football should be eliminated in the US. This article philosophically assesses the arguments for its elimination as well as the arguments proffered against its elimination. While a variety of arguments are discussed, a new one is brought into the foray of philosophical investigation, one that combines the unfairness and economic arguments: the health care and medical costs to others argument. It is believed that this argument is sufficient to justify the elimination of inter-collegiate football.     

Should self-defeating personality disorder be revisited in the DSM?

Self-defeating personality disorder (SDPD) was proposed for consideration in the DSM-III-R, but was eventually removed from the manual because of the lack of evidence to support its validity. Yet, after DSM-IV was published, some studies suggested that SDPD may be a viable diagnosis. The purpose of this study was to evaluate SDPD's viability as a diagnostic category. Consequently, SDPD's internal consistency, comorbidity with other Axis I and II disorders, association with psychosocial impairment, and its ability to predict overall impairment in past, current, and global levels of functioning beyond other personality disorder symptomatology was assessed in 1,200 psychiatric evaluated with the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Personality (Pfohl, Blum, & Zimmerman, 1997). Cronbach's alpha for SDPD criteria was 0.61, and item-total correlations ranged between 0.22-0.38. There was substantial comorbidity of SDPD with depressive, avoidant, and borderline personality disorders, as well as major depression and anxiety disorders. The SDPD group did not significantly differ from psychiatric controls on multiple measures of psychosocial impairment, global functioning, and suicidality. SDPD did not meaningfully add to the prediction of impairment above and beyond other measures of Axis II pathology. It is concluded that the data do not support the reliability, validity, and utility of the SDPD diagnosis.     

Should technological imperatives be obeyed?

This paper argues that both technological determinism (the development of technology is uniquely determined by internal laws) and technological voluntarism (technological change can be externally directed and regulated by the wants and free choice of human beings) are one‐sided and partly mistaken. The determinists are right in the sense that technology has a power to influence our values and behaviour, and thereby appear to direct ‘technological imperatives’ to us. However, such commands are always conditional on some value premises; the voluntarists are thus right in pointing out that we need not obey such imperatives. The principle ‘Can implies Ought’ (all technological possibilities should be realized) is therefore invalid.