What do computer models of cognition explain: a reply to Gobet

The differences between Gobet’s views and ours call attention to some points concerning the argumentative status of computational models. If we have two fundamentally different models which reasonably accurately simulate a phenomenon, we must ask, what is the argumentative status of the models in psychological terms. Moreover, if it is possible to present different models of same phenomena, what is the general argumentative power of models in psychology? As the kind of differences between our views and the ones of Gobet’s are common in modelling, we briefly call attention to these foundational issues in our paper.     

General slowing alone cannot explain age-related search effects: reply to Cerella (1991)

Cerella (1991) has argued that the performance of older adults in the Fisk and Rogers (1991) study is a linear function of the performance of younger adults that is independent of task-specific cognitive requirements. We demonstrate that this is not the case. First, we show that the scatter plot analyses used by Cerella can hide the very task-specific age-related slowing they were designed to reveal. Second, we demonstrate that the percentage of variance explained by such analyses can be misleading. Third, we show that there are reliable differences across tasks in the parameters relating younger and older adults' performance. Finally, we argue that the general, task-independent proportionate slowing that Cerella suggested explains so much of the variance in age-related performance is actually an average slowing that is a function of a relatively small task-independent and a relatively large task-dependent factor.     

How unexpected observations lead to new beliefs: A Peircean pathway

People acquire new beliefs in various ways. One of the most important of these is that new beliefs are acquired as a response to experiencing events that one did not expect. This involves a form of inference distinct from both deductive and inductive inference: abductive inference. The concept of abduction is due to the American pragmatist philosopher C. S. Peirce. Davies and Coltheart (in press) elucidated what Peirce meant by abduction, and identified two problems in his otherwise promising account requiring solution if that account were to become fully workable. Here we propose solutions to these problems and offer an explicit cognitive model of how people derive new beliefs from observations of unexpected events, based on Peirce’s work and Sokolov’s ideas about prediction error triggering new beliefs. We consider that this model casts light not only upon normal processes of belief formation but also upon the formation of delusional beliefs.     

How scientific models can explain

Scientific models invariably involve some degree of idealization, abstraction, or fictionalization of their target system. Nonetheless, I argue that there are circumstances under which such false models can offer genuine scientific explanations. After reviewing three different proposals in the literature for how models can explain, I shall introduce a more general account of what I call model explanations, which specify the conditions under which models can be counted as explanatory. I shall illustrate this new framework by applying it to the case of Bohr’s model of the atom, and conclude by drawing some distinctions between phenomenological models, explanatory models, and fictional models.     

How to explain receptivity to conjunction-fallacy inhibition training: Evidence from the Iowa Gambling Task

Intuitive predictions and judgments under conditions of uncertainty are often mediated by judgment heuristics that sometimes lead to biases. Using the classical conjunction bias example, the present study examines the relationship between receptivity to metacognitive executive training and emotion-based learning ability indexed by Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) performance. After completing a computerised version of the IGT, participants were trained to avoid conjunction bias on a frequency judgment task derived from the works of Tversky and Kahneman. Pre- and post-test performances were assessed via another probability judgment task. Results clearly showed that participants who produced a biased answer despite the experimental training (individual patterns of the biased → biased type) mainly had less emotion-based learning ability in IGT. Better emotion-based learning ability was observed in participants whose response pattern was biased → logical. These findings argue in favour of the capacity of the human mind/brain to overcome reasoning bias when trained under executive programming conditions and as a function of emotional warning sensitivity.     

How Humeans can make normative beliefs motivating

Philosophical Studies - Normative realism faces a problem concerning the practicality of normative judgment, the presumptive view that normative judgments are motivational states. Normative...     

How Buddhist beliefs relate to blood donation intention: The role of moral attentiveness and self-monitoring

Buddhism is prevalent in Asia and has been growing in Western countries. Its perspectives have subtle influences on people’s ways of thinking and behaving. This study focuses on the association between Buddhist beliefs and blood donation intention. We draw on a social-cognitive perspective to delineate how this link is mediated by moral attentiveness and moderated by self-monitoring. Data were collected via online surveys, and 508 respondents were included in the final sample. We used Hayes’ PROCESS macro and simple slope analysis to assess all relationships in our moderated mediation model. Results indicated that Buddhist beliefs were positively related to blood donation intention, and moral attentiveness mediated this relationship. Moreover, self-monitoring was found to moderate the direct relationship between Buddhist beliefs and moral attentiveness, as well as the indirect relationship between Buddhist beliefs and blood donation intention through moral attentiveness. The associations were strengthened with increased self-monitoring. This research provides a nuanced explanation of the manner in which Buddhist beliefs are associated with blood donation intention. Blood donation recruitment campaigns can incorporate instrumental elements of Buddhist teachings, such as the pursuit of moral perfection, the cultivation of the virtues of unselfishness, benevolence and understanding, and the laws of Karma. Meanwhile, mindfulness as a core practice in Buddhism can be utilized to improve moral attentiveness and self-monitoring, thereby promoting blood donation intention.     

How people explain actions performed by groups and individuals.

The authors explore whether people explain intentional actions performed by groups differently from actions performed by individuals, A theoretical framework is offered that distinguishes between 2 modes of explanation: the agent's reasons (beliefs or desires in light of which the agent decided to act) and causal histories of reasons (CHRs; factors that preceded and brought about the agent's reasons). The authors develop the hypothesis that people use more CHR explanations when explaining group actions than when explaining individual actions. Study 1 demonstrates this asymmetry. Studies 2 and 3 explore 2 necessary conditions for the asymmetry: that the group be perceived as an aggregate of individual actors rather thin as a jointly acting group and that explainers have general information available about the group. Discussion focuses on people's perception of groups as entities and agents.     

The need to explain

How do reasoners deal with inconsistencies? James (1907) believed that the rational solution is to revise your beliefs and to do so in a minimal way. We propose an alternative: You explain the origins of an inconsistency, which has the side effect of a revision to your beliefs. This hypothesis predicts that individuals should spontaneously create explanations of inconsistencies rather than refute one of the assertions and that they should rate explanations as more probable than refutations. A pilot study showed that participants spontaneously explain inconsistencies when they are asked what follows from inconsistent premises. In three subsequent experiments, participants were asked to compare explanations of inconsistencies against minimal refutations of the inconsistent premises. In Experiment 1, participants chose which conclusion was most probable; in Experiment 2 they rank ordered the conclusions based on their probability; and in Experiment 3 they estimated the mean probability of the conclusions' occurrence. In all three studies, participants rated explanations as more probable than refutations. The results imply that individuals create explanations to resolve an inconsistency and that these explanations lead to changes in belief. Changes in belief are therefore of secondary importance to the primary goal of explanation.     

The need to explain

How do reasoners deal with inconsistencies? James (1907) believed that the rational solution is to revise your beliefs and to do so in a minimal way. We propose an alternative: You explain the origins of an inconsistency, which has the side effect of a revision to your beliefs. This hypothesis predicts that individuals should spontaneously create explanations of inconsistencies rather than refute one of the assertions and that they should rate explanations as more probable than refutations. A pilot study showed that participants spontaneously explain inconsistencies when they are asked what follows from inconsistent premises. In three subsequent experiments, participants were asked to compare explanations of inconsistencies against minimal refutations of the inconsistent premises. In Experiment 1, participants chose which conclusion was most probable; in Experiment 2 they rank ordered the conclusions based on their probability; and in Experiment 3 they estimated the mean probability of the conclusions' occurrence. In all three studies, participants rated explanations as more probable than refutations. The results imply that individuals create explanations to resolve an inconsistency and that these explanations lead to changes in belief. Changes in belief are therefore of secondary importance to the primary goal of explanation.     

Accreditation: A reply to mathers

Accreditation in counselling is meant not for the benefit of the counsellor but for the protection of the public. It is concerned more with guaranteeing certain standards of ethics than with the acclamation of status. Whatever method is used, it must avoid the pitfalls of conservatism and academicism which in other professions have been jointly responsible for the attack on accreditation itself as a process. Those involved in counselling and psychotherapy should not wait passively until Parliament acts, but need to be critically involved in bringing into being a system of accreditation which is both flexible and creative.     

How beliefs influence the relative magnitude of pleasure and pain

Loss aversion is an economic assumption about utility—people value giving up a good more than they value getting it. It also has hedonic meaning—the pain of a loss is greater in magnitude than the pleasure of a comparable gain. But value and pleasure are not necessarily identical. We test the hedonic interpretation of loss aversion in experimental markets. With hedonic forecasts, sellers imagine the pain of losing their endowment, and buyers imagine the pleasure of being endowed. With hedonic experiences, sellers rate the pleasure of having the endowment, and buyers rate the pain of being without it. Contrary to loss aversion, predicted pleasure is greater in magnitude than predicted pain, and experienced pleasure surpasses experienced pain. We show that the relative magnitude of pleasure and pain depends on beliefs about the likelihood of outcomes, as well as utilities. Surprise makes gains more pleasurable and losses more painful. With surprising gains and expected losses, pleasure can surpass pain. But when gains and losses are equally likely (or losses are surprising and gains are expected), the opposite pattern can occur. Finally, within‐group and between‐group prices are significantly correlated with hedonic experiences. Sellers who feel better with their endowments assign higher selling prices, and buyers who feel worse about the absence of endowment assign higher buying prices. Despite the fact that hedonic experiences deviate from loss aversion, these emotions predict the endowment effect. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

How does anybody live in this strange place? A reply to Samantha Vice

Abstract

Samantha Vice has argued that ‘white’ South Africans are so tainted by the history of racial oppression in their country that they are incapable of attaining a great degree of moral virtue. She recommends that they should live in humility and political silence. There are a number of flaws in her argument. First, none of the characteristics of ‘white’ South Africans that she says provides the basis for these conclusions can distinguish (almost) all ‘white’ South Africans from (almost) all ‘black’ South Africans. Second, because it is not only ‘white’ South Africans but everybody in the world who either perpetrates serious injustice or is tainted by others’ perpetration of it, her argument, if sound, would imply that nobody is capable of great virtue and that everybody ought to be politically silent. Finally, her recommendation that ‘white’ South Africans should be politically silent is a very dangerous one.     

Trustworthiness in explanation: The obligation to explain well

‘Scientific integrity’ certainly requires that data and references be beyond reproach. However, issues within the theory of scientific explanation suggest that there may be more to it than just this. While it is true that some contemporary, pragmatic analyses of explanation suffer from the ‘problem of relevance’ (an inability to ensure that explanations which are paradigmatic technically are relevant to the question being posed), it does not seem to be true that the addition of formal, metaphysical constraints is necessary to solve this problem. I argue that, when viewed as requests for help with an epistemic problem, explanation-seeking questions reveal the existence of a set of moral criteria centered in trust which, when satisfied, prevent trivial or irrelevant explanations from being offered, thereby broadening the concept of ‘scientific integrity’.