Truthmaking, metaethics, and creeping minimalism

Creeping minimalism threatens to cloud the distinction between realist and anti-realist metaethical views. When anti-realist views equip themselves with minimalist theories of truth and other semantic notions, they are able to take on more and more of the doctrines of realism (such as the existence of moral truths, facts, and beliefs). But then they start to look suspiciously like realist views. I suggest that creeping minimalism is a problem only if moral realism is understood primarily as a semantic doctrine. I argue that moral realism is better understood instead as a metaphysical doctrine. As a result, we can usefully regiment the metaethical debate into one about moral truthmakers: In virtue of what are moral judgments true? I show how the notion of truthmaking has been simmering just below the surface of the metaethical debate, and how it reveals one metaethical view (quasi-realism) to be a stronger contender than the others.     

Zombies and the Case of the Phenomenal Pickpocket

A prevailing view in contemporary philosophy of mind is that zombies are logically possible. I argue, via a thought experiment, that if this prevailing view is correct, then I could be transformed into a zombie. If I could be transformed into a zombie, then surprisingly, I am not certain that I am conscious. Regrettably, this is not just an idiosyncratic fact about my psychology; I think you are in the same position. This means that we must revise or replace some important positions in the philosophy of mind. We could embrace radical skepticism about our own consciousness, or maintain the complete and total infallibility of our beliefs about our own phenomenal experiences. I argue that we should actually reject the logical possibility of zombies.     

Solving the problem of creeping minimalism

Abstract

In this paper I discuss the so-called problem of creeping minimalism, the problem of distinguishing metaethical expressivism from its rivals once expressivists start accepting minimalist theories about truth, representation, belief, and similar concepts. I argue that Dreier’s ‘explanation’ explanation is almost correct, but by critically examining it we not only get a better solution, but also draw out some interesting results about expressivism and non-representationalist theories of meaning more generally.     

Missed It By That Much: Austin on Norms of Truth

A principal challenge for a deflationary theory is to explain the value of truth: why we aim for true beliefs, abhor dishonesty, and so on. The problem arises because deflationism sees truth as a mere logical property and the truth predicate as serving primarily as a device of generalization. Paul Horwich, attempts to show how deflationism can account for the value of truth. Drawing on the work of J. L. Austin, I argue that his account, which focuses on belief, cannot adequately accommodate the complex role that truth plays in the norms governing assertion and similar speech acts.     

Truth or Meaning? A Question of Priority

There is an incompatibility between the deflationist approach to truth, which makes truth transparent on the basis of an antecedent grasp of meaning, and the traditional endeavour, exemplified by Davidson, to explicate meaning through of truth. I suggest that both parties are in the explanatory red: deflationist lack a non‐truth‐involving theory of meaning and Davidsonians lack a non‐deflationary account of truth. My focus is on the attempts of the latter party to resolve their problem. I look in detail at Davidson's more recent work and suggest that it seeks to articulate a primitive notion of truth that may balance between a notion that collapses into deflationism and one that is wholly subsumed under a general theory of interpretation. I conclude that this tightrope walk is ultimately unsuccessful. Equally, however, some reasons are provided for thinking that deflationism might be equally unsuccessful with its problem. ‘Truth or meaning?’remains an open question.     

Skepticism: Impractical,therefore implausible

The truth of skepticism would be depressing and impractical. Our beliefs would be groundless, we would know nothing (or almost nothing) about the world around us, and epistemic success would likely be impossible. But do these negative consequences have any bearing on the truth of skepticism? According to many scholars, they do not. The impractical consequences of skepticism are typically regarded as orthogonal to its truth. For this reason, pragmatic resolutions to skepticism are regularly dismissed. I will argue, however, that skepticism is implausible because it is impractical. In particular, skepticism is implausible because it goes against the point of epistemic evaluation.     

Knowledge,Presupposition, and Pragmatic Implicature

It is widely accepted that knowledge is factive, but two different understandings of ＂factivity＂ should be distinguished, namely, the implication version and the presupposition version. While the former only takes the truth of P as a necessary requirement for ＂S knows that P,＂ the latter considers it also necessary for ＂S does not know that P.＂ In this paper, I argue against presupposition and defend implication. More specifically, I argue against Wang and Tai＇s defense of the presupposition version as presented in a recent paper and propose a pragmatic response to the ＂persistence problem＂ of implication. In other words, my positive proposal is an account of implication plus pragmatic implicature. To conclude, I use my version to analyze Wang and Tai＇s distinction between inner skepticism and outer skepticism. My conclusion is that, after abandoning presupposition, we can identify two types of intermediate skepticism between Wang and Tai＇s inner and outer skepticism.     

紧缩论,证明与保守性

紧缩论者主张真谓词表达了一种逻辑概念,它的全部意义都体现在所有塔斯基式的T-语句中。Shapiro近来论证说,将紧缩论的公理添加到一阶皮亚诺算术公理系统(PA)中,在该扩张理论中能够证明PA的可靠性,并在此基础上证明PA的一致性,这表明紧缩论不具有保守性,因此真谓词不是紧缩的。本文论证,扩张理论预设了反射原则,这导致它推出了更多的东西,而反射原则是可证性谓词定义的推论,这才是造成扩张理论非保守性的真正根源。针对紧缩论的非保守性论证因此失效了。     

Deflationism, the Problem of Representation, and Horwich's Use Theory of Meaning

This paper contains a critical discussion of Paul Horwich's use theory of meaning. Horwich attempts to dissolve the problem of representation through a combination of his theory of meaning and a deflationism about truth. I argue that the dissolution works only if deflationism makes strong and dubious claims about semantic concepts. Horwich offers a specific version of the use theory of meaning. I argue that this version rests on an unacceptable identification: an identification of principles that are fundamental to an explanation of the acceptance of sentences with principles that are fundamental to meaning.     

Realism,inferential semantics,and the truth norm

Characteristic of neo-pragmatism is a commitment to deflationism about semantic properties, and inferentialism about conceptual content. It is usually thought that deflationism undermines the distinction between realistic discourses and others, and that the neo-pragmatists, unlike the classical pragmatists, cannot recognize that truth is a norm of belief and inquiry. I argue, however, that (1) the distinction between realistic discourses and others can be maintained even in the face of a commitment to deflationism, and (2) that deflationists can recognize that truth is a norm of belief and inquiry. If deflationism is true, realistic discourses, it turns out, are those that are inferentially integrated with a large body of other commitments, whereas those that call for an anti-realist treatment are inferentially isolated. Now, Grimm has persuasively argued that inquiry aims at achieving understanding, and that to understand something is, roughly, to grasp a large body of inferential connections in which it features. So, if he is right, realistic discourses are those in which the aim of inquiry can be achieved. This fact, together with an inferential theory of conceptual content, will, I argue, allow neo-pragmatists to recognize truth as a norm of belief and inquiry, despite their commitment to deflationism.

     

Unifying Moral Methodology

This article argues that the best way to pursue systematic normative ethical theorizing involves metaethical enquiry. My argument builds upon two central claims. First, I argue that plausible metaethical accounts can have implications that can help to resolve the methodological controversies facing normative ethics. Second, I argue that metaethical research is at least roughly as well supported as normative ethical research. I conclude by examining the implications of my thesis. Inter alia, it shows that the common practice of engaging in systematic normative theorizing uninformed by metaethical commitments offers a significant and troubling hostage to metaethical fortune.     

Deflationism And The Truth Conditional Theory of Meaning

Controversy has arisen of late over the claim that deflationism about truth requires that we explain meaning in terms of something other than truth-conditions. This controversy, it is argued, is due to unclarity as to whether the basic deflationary claim that a sentence and a sentence that attributes truth to it are equivalent in meaning is intended to involve the truth-predicate of the object language for which we develop an account of meaning, or is intended to involve the truth-predicate of the metalanguage in which we develop an account of meaning. The former view is compatible with the truth-conditional theory of meaning for the object language, the latter is incompatible with it. However, the former view is also trivially true; hence we should endorse the claim that any form of deflationism worth being interested in is incompatible with understanding meaning truth-conditionally.     

Ethical Phenomenology and Metaethics

In recent times, comments have been made and arguments advanced in support of metaethical positions based on the phenomenology of ethical experience – in other words, the feel that accompanies our ethical experiences. In this paper I cast doubt on whether ethical phenomenology supports metaethical positions to any great extent and try to tease out what is involved in giving a phenomenological argument. I consider three such positions: independent moral realism (IMR), another type of moral realism – sensibility theory – and noncognitivism. Phenomenological arguments have been used in support of the first two positions, but my general claim is that ethical phenomenology supports no metaethical position over any other.I discuss two types of phenomenological argument that might be offered in support of different types of moral realism, although I couch my debate in terms of IMR. The first argument asserts that ethical properties are not experienced in the way that rivals to IMR say we experience them. Against this I claim that it is odd to think that one could experience ethical properties as any metaethical theory characterizes them. The second argument is more complicated: the general thought is that an adequate metaethical theory should not distort our ethical experience unduly. I consider one aspect of our ethical experience – that there is some ethical authority to which our judgements answer – in order to illustrate this idea. I discuss why IMRealists might think that this phenomenon supports their position. Against them I claim that other metaethical positions might be able to accommodate the phenomenon of ethical authority. Even if they cannot, then, secondly, I argue that there are other aspects of our ethical experience that sit more naturally with other metaethical positions. Hence, one cannot argue that ethical phenomenology as a whole supports one theory over any others.     

Axiology,Realism, and the Problem of Evil*

Discussions of the problem of evil presuppose and appeal to axiological and metaethical assumptions, but seldom pay adequate attention to those assumptions. I argue that certain theories of value are consistent with theistic answers to the argument from evil and that several other well‐known theories of value, such as hedonism, are difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile with theism. Although moral realism is the subject of lively debate in contemporary philosophy, almost all standard discussions of the problem of evil presuppose the truth of moral realism. I explain the implications of several nonrealist theories of value for the problem of evil and argue that, if nonrealism is true, then we need to rethink and re‐frame the entire discussion about the problem of evil.     

Theorizing about truth outside of one’s own language

A theory of truth is language-transcendent if it ascribes truth conditions to truth-bearers that are not expressible in (or translatable to) our natural language; a theory is language-immanent if it is not language-transcendent. In this paper, I argue for the following theses. (1) Whether the correct theory of truth is language-transcendent or language-immanent will have significant consequences for general philosophy. Prima facie, a language-transcendent theory is preferable. However, (2) language-transcendent theories tend to require substantive metaphysical commitments concerning truth. Deflationist theories are particularly interesting in this context. I argue that, if deflationism is to remain consistent with its motivations, then it must opt for a language-immanent conception of truth.

     

CORRESPONDENCE ON THE CHEAP

In this paper, I distinguish between correspondence and deflationary conceptions of truth in terms of the modal status they attribute to the relation between a sentence and its truth conditions. And I distinguish between robust and minimalist correspondence conceptions on the basis of whether they provide a reductive analysis of the relation between a sentence and its truth conditions. I argue, contra deflationism, that a correspondence conception of truth is required in explanations of success by appealing to counterfactuals that such explanations must support. But I argue, contra Field, that nothing stronger than a minimalist correspondence conception is required.     

Leave Truth Alone: On Deflationism and Contextualism

Abstract: According to deflationism, grasp of the concept of truth consists in nothing more than a disposition to accept a priori (non‐paradoxical) instances of the schema: (DS) It is true that p if and only if p. According to contextualism, the same expression with the same meaning might, on different occasions of use, express different propositions bearing different truth‐conditions (where this does not result from indexicality and the like). On this view, what is expressed in an utterance depends in a non‐negligible way on the circumstances. Charles Travis claims that contextualism shows that ‘deflationism is a mistake’, that truth is a more substantive notion than deflationism allows. In this paper, I examine Travis's arguments in support of this ‘inflationary’ claim and argue that they are unsuccessful.     

Dream Skepticism and the Conditionality Problem

Recently, Ernest Sosa (2007) has proposed two novel solutions to the problem of dream skepticism. In the present paper, I argue that Sosa’s first solution falls prey to what I will refer to as the conditionality problem, i.e., the problem of only establishing a conditional—in this case, “if x, then I am awake,” x being a placeholder for a condition incompatible with dreaming—in a context where it also needs to be established that we can know that the antecedent holds, and as such can infer the consequent, i.e., “I am awake.” Sosa’s second solution, in terms of so-called reflective knowledge, is shown to land him in the dilemma of either facing yet another conditionality problem, or violating an internalist constraint that he explicitly grants the skeptic with respect to what kind of factors can be legitimately invoked in our account of how we may know the relevant antecedent. For these reasons, I conclude that Sosa has not solved the problem of dream skepticism.