Implicit Bias and Policing

In a time when racial prejudice is generally taboo and decision makers, including law enforcement officials, strenuously disavow the use of group‐based stereotypes to make judgments that affect others, one might expect discriminatory outcomes to be unusual. However, research repeatedly indicates that discrimination is pervasive across many domains, and specifically in policing. A major cause of biased policing is likely the implicit biases that operate outside of conscious awareness and control but nevertheless influence our behaviors. Implicit biases (e.g., stereotypes linking Blacks with crime or with related traits like violence or hostility) influence judgments through processes of misattribution and disambiguation. Although psychological science gives us good insight into the causes of racially biased policing, there are as yet no known, straightforward, effective intervention programs. Nevertheless, there are several strands of research that represent promising avenues for further exploration, including intergroup contact, exposure to counter‐stereotypic exemplars, and stereotype negation. Meanwhile, many police departments are adjusting their policies, trainings, and procedures to try to address biased policing and community complaints. Several common themes among those changes include banning racial profiling, collecting data, training officers, reducing discretion, and adopting new technologies. These adjustments are more likely to be successful if they incorporate the understanding that biased policing occurs in the absence of explicitly “racist” thoughts because of well‐documented, pernicious stereotypes that operate largely outside of conscious awareness and control.     

乐观偏差的内隐效应

乐观偏差是一个普遍存在的现象。采用Greenwald的内隐联想测验测验（IAT）方法和Inquisit专业软件,以60名大学生为被试对乐观偏差进行了考察。结果发现：乐观偏差存在内隐效应;乐观偏差的内隐效应在性别上没有差异。     

Accessibilism and the Challenge from Implicit Bias

Recent research in social psychology suggests that many beliefs are formed as a result of implicit biases in favour of members of certain groups and against members of other groups. This article argues that beliefs of this sort present a counterexample to accessibilism in epistemology because the position cannot account for how the epistemic status of a belief that is the result of an implicit bias can differ from that of a counterpart belief that is the result of an unbiased response to the available evidence.     

The Bias of Crowds: How Implicit Bias Bridges Personal and Systemic Prejudice

As public awareness of implicit bias has grown in recent years, studies have raised important new questions about the nature of implicit bias effects. First, implicit biases are widespread and robust on average, yet are unstable across a few weeks. Second, young children display implicit biases indistinguishable from those of adults, which suggests to many that implicit biases are learned early. Yet, if implicit biases are unstable over weeks, how can they be stable for decades? Third, meta-analyses suggest that individual differences in implicit bias are associated weakly, although significantly, with individual differences in behavioral outcomes. Yet, studies of aggregate levels of implicit bias (i.e., countries, states, counties) are strongly associated with aggregate levels of disparities and discrimination. These puzzles are difficult to reconcile with traditional views, which treat implicit bias as an early-learned attitude that drives discrimination among individuals who are high in bias. We propose an alternative view of implicit bias, rooted in concept accessibility. Concept accessibility can, in principle, vary both chronically and situationally. The empirical evidence, however, suggests that most of the systematic variance in implicit bias is situational. Akin to the “wisdom of crowds” effect, implicit bias may emerge as the aggregate effect of individual fluctuations in concept accessibility that are ephemeral and context-dependent. This bias of crowds theory treats implicit bias tests as measures of situations more than persons. We show how the theory can resolve the puzzles posed and generate new insights into how and why implicit bias propagates inequalities.     

Equality: Putting the Theory into Action

We outline our central reasons for pursuing the project of equality studies and some of the thinking we have done within an equality studies framework. We try to show that a multi-dimensional conceptual framework, applied to a set of key social contexts and articulating the concerns of subordinate social groups, can be a fruitful way of putting the idea of equality into practice. Finally, we address some central questions about how to bring about egalitarian social change. Editors’ note. John Baker et al’s article below condenses the key themes and arguments of their book, Equality: From Theory to Action. In the next issue of Res Publica, four writers will respond to these arguments, and there will be a reply from the book’s authors. We are grateful to Jurgen De Wispelaere for organising the original workshop on which the article and replies are based, and for his work in putting together this symposium.     

Attitude,Inference, Association: On the Propositional Structure of Implicit Bias

The overwhelming majority of those who theorize about implicit biases posit that these biases are caused by some sort of association. However, what exactly this claim amounts to is rarely specified. In this paper, I distinguish between different understandings of association, and I argue that the crucial senses of association for elucidating implicit bias are the cognitive structure and mental process senses. A hypothesis is subsequently derived: if associations really underpin implicit biases, then implicit biases should be modulated by counterconditioning or extinction but should not be modulated by rational argumentation or logical interventions. This hypothesis is false; implicit biases are not predicated on any associative structures or associative processes but instead arise because of unconscious propositionally structured beliefs. I conclude by discussing how the case study of implicit bias illuminates problems with popular dual‐process models of cognitive architecture.     

Implicit Bias,Moods, and Moral Responsibility

Are individuals morally responsible for their implicit biases? One reason to think not is that implicit biases are often advertised as unconscious, ‘introspectively inaccessible’ attitudes. However, recent empirical evidence consistently suggests that individuals are aware of their implicit biases, although often in partial and inarticulate ways. Here I explore the implications of this evidence of partial awareness for individuals' moral responsibility. First, I argue that responsibility comes in degrees. Second, I argue that individuals' partial awareness of their implicit biases makes them (partially) morally responsible for them. I argue by analogy to a close relative of implicit bias: moods.     

White and Black American Children's Implicit Intergroup Bias

Despite a decline in explicit prejudice, adults and children from majority groups (e.g., White Americans) often express bias implicitly, as assessed by the Implicit Association Test. In contrast, minority-group (e.g., Black American) adults on average show no bias on the IAT. In the present research, representing the first empirical investigation of whether Black children's IAT responses parallel those of Black adults, we examined implicit bias in 7-11-year-old White and Black American children. Replicating previous findings with adults, whereas White children showed a robust ingroup bias, Black children showed no bias. Additionally, we investigated the role of valuing status in the development of implicit bias. For Black children, explicit preference for high status predicted implicit outgroup bias: Black children who explicitly expressed high preference for rich (vs. poor) people showed an implicit preference for Whites comparable in magnitude to White children's ingroup bias. Implications for research on intergroup bias are discussed.     

基于职业的内隐年龄偏见

本研究针对119名大学生,采用内隐联想测验(Implicit Associa-tion Test,IAT)和相应的外显报告法,考察大学生针对不同职业的内隐与外显年龄偏见。结果表明,在大学生中普遍存在基于职业的内隐年龄偏见;职业年龄偏见是双向的,即有的职业偏好年轻人,有些职业偏好年长者;而且有些被试的内隐和外显态度存在不一致性。     

Bias in Jurors vs Bias in Juries: New Evidence from the SDS Perspective

Prior research by Kaplan and Miller (1978) suggested that juries are generally influenced less by extralegal, biasing information than individual jurors are. A social decision scheme (SDS) analysis of this question by Kerr, MacCoun, and Kramer (1997) suggested (a) that Kaplan and Miller's conclusion should hold only for relatively extreme legal cases (i.e., cases where the probability of conviction, without biasing information, was either very high or very low) and (b) that the opposite pattern should hold for moderate cases (with moderate conviction rates)—i.e., juries should show even greater sensitivity to biasing information than should individual jurors. An experiment is reported that compared juror vs jury sensitivity to biasing information (viz., prejudicial pretrial publicity) for versions of a legal case with a moderate and an extreme conviction rate. Consistent with the SDS analysis, juries were more biased than jurors for the moderate-case version, but the reverse was true for the extreme-case version. The implications of these findings and the more general utility of the SDS model for studying group processes are discussed.     

内隐自我正面偏见的机制及可变性

自我正面偏见是指对大多数个体来说, 其自我相关信息与正性情绪效价联系紧密, 个体倾向于把正面结果或特质归因于自我内部稳定的人格特征, 而认为负面结果或特质与自己的人格特征不相关。本项目从自我正面偏见的文化相对论与文化普遍论之争出发, 采用行为和认知神经科学技术, 试图证实集体主义文化下自我正面偏见的存在, 并对照外显自我正面偏见, 考察内隐层面上的自我正面偏见及其可变性, 探索抑郁个体的内隐自我相关信息加工的改善, 了解其大脑神经基础, 揭示内隐自我正面偏见的性质与特征, 验证和完善自我相关信息与情绪信息的功能加工层次模型。研究结果不仅有助于从内隐层面上了解自我与情绪的复杂关系, 而且还将对其神经基础做出重要探索, 更深入地解读中国人的自我的本质。     

Diversity training: Putting theory into practice

Diversity training initiatives are an increasingly large part of many organizations' diversity management portfolio. Little is known, however, about the effectiveness of such initiatives. In this article, we demonstrate how increased adherence to the principles of established social psychological theory can guide and make more coherent the development of diversity initiatives. Likewise, outcomes of diversity training can inform and make more practical social psychological theory and research. In short, both diversity trainers and academics would benefit from greater dialogue, as well as grappling with the tensions that naturally arise when theory and practice collide.     

Putting concepts into context

At first glance, conceptual representations (e.g., our internal notion of the object “lemon”) seem static; we have the impression that there is something that the concept lemon “means” (a sour, yellow, football-shaped citrus fruit) and that this meaning does not vary. Research in semantic memory has traditionally taken this “static” perspective. Consequently, only effects demonstrated across a variety of contexts have typically been considered informative regarding the architecture of the semantic system. In this review, we take the opposite approach: We review instances of context-dependent conceptual activation at many different timescales—from long-term experience, to recent experience, to the current task goals, to the unfolding process of conceptual activation itself—and suggest that the pervasive effects of context across all of these timescales indicate that rather than being static, conceptual representations are constantly changing and are inextricably linked to their contexts.