How Emotional Are Populists Really? Factors Explaining Emotional Appeals in the Communication of Political Parties

Are populists really more emotional than mainstream parties? The alleged link between populism and emotional communication has barely been subject to systematic empirical scrutiny. I use literature on populist communication and appraisal theory to generate expectations about which political parties use which emotional appeals. I test these claims by applying a novel emotional dictionary to a large set of text data including more than 700,000 press releases and tweets from three European countries. As expected, I find that populist parties use significantly more negative emotional appeals (anger, fear, disgust, sadness) and less positive emotional appeals (joy, enthusiasm, pride, hope) than mainstream parties. Furthermore, I find that political actors adapt the usage of emotional appeals to different purposes depending on the communication medium and the politicians' status level. This study entails important implications for the research on emotional appeals in politics and populist communication.     

Why Does Fear Override Hope in Societies Engulfed by Intractable Conflict,as It Does in the Israeli Society?

The question of why fear overrides hope in societies embarked on the road of peacemaking after years of intractable conflict is answered on the basis of accumulated knowledge in the psychology and sociology of emotions. This knowledge suggests that fear is an automatic emotion, grounded in the perceived present and often based on the memorized past (also processed unconsciously), that leads to freezing of beliefs, conservatism, and sometimes preemptive aggression. Hope, in contrast, involves mostly cognitive activity, which requires the search for new ideas and thus is based on creativity and flexibility. Because hope is based on thinking, it can be seriously impeded by the spontaneous and unconscious interference of fear. Both fear and hope can become collective emotional orientations that organize society's views and direct its forms of action. It is assumed that societies involved in intractable conflict are dominated by a collective emotional orientation of fear, which is functional in their coping with the stressful and demanding situation. But such an orientation serves as a psychological obstacle to a peace process once it starts. The Israeli Jewish case of collective fear orientation is offered as an example. The presentation includes the roots of this orientation, the ways in which it is reflected and disseminated, and its expressions among the Israeli Jewish public; it ends optimistically with the suggestion that societies can determine to overcome their fear and establish a collective orientation of hope for peace.     

Populism and democracy: The challenge for deliberative democracy

Theorists of democracy have long grappled with the question of how to uphold the promise of popular government while restraining populist excesses. The deliberative conception of democracy proposes to do so by subjecting power to collective decision making through procedures of free and equal public deliberation. Critics of this idea often target its realizability. Though valid in theory, they claim, deliberative democracy is hopelessly utopian. The paper argues that, given a proper understanding of the deliberative approach and its underlying ideal of collective self‐government, this line of criticism is not very potent. However, another line of criticism, less pronounced in the contemporary debate, is more effective, questioning the very cogency of public discussion, even by a competent public, as a means of collective self‐government. Open public discussion is prone to various forms of manipulation and deception, which subvert rather than facilitate self‐government. Deliberative democracy's egalitarianism and populism therefore run counter to its deliberative aspiration, which underpins its ideal of democratic legitimacy.     

The dominance of fear over hope in the life of individuals and collectives

We address the question why fear dominates hope in the life of individuals and collectives on the basis of the accumulated knowledge in the psychology, neurology and sociology of emotions. This knowledge suggests that fear, as primary emotion, is grounded in the experienced present and based on the memorized past, processed both consciously and unconsciously, causes freezing and conservatism, and sometimes leads to pre‐emptive aggression. Hope, in contrast, as a secondary emotion, involves cognitive activity, which requires anticipation and the search for new ideas and thus is based on complex processes of creativity and flexibility. Therefore, hope is often preceded and inhibited by spontaneous, automatically activated and faster fear. Fear and hope can each become a collective emotional orientation, and as such organize society's views and direct its actions. Societies involved in intractable conflict are dominated by a collective fear orientation. This orientation is functional for society's coping with the stressful and demanding situation—but it may serve as a psychological obstacle to any peace process, once it starts. The case of the collective fear orientation in the Jewish Israeli society is presented as an example. The article ends with a presentation of a particular approach, suggesting that individuals and collectives can overcome their fear with much determination, and establish an orientation of hope which allows change in situations dominated by fear. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

How exposure to real conspiracy theories motivates collective action and political engagement? Τhe moderating role of primed victimhood and underlying emotional mechanisms in the case of 2018 bushfire in Attica

Conspiracy theories concern milestone events, mobilizing various explanations. However, there is still emerging research on how conspiracy beliefs mobilize normative and nonnormative collective action, as well as political engagement and what the emotional underpinnings of such effects are. We conducted two experimental studies (Study 1, N = 301 and Study 2, N = 328) on exploring the relationship between exposure to conspiracy theories and normative, nonnormative collective action and political engagement, moderated by primed victimhood and mediated by fear/anxiety and anger emotional indices. Results in Study 1 showed that exposure to conspiracy theories decreases normative collective action, but increases nonnormative collective action, negative emotions of anger and fear/anxiety and political engagement. In Study 2 we confirmed findings of Study 1, but these effects were moderated by primed victimhood. Study 2 also showed that anger index, but not fear/anxiety index, significantly mediated the moderating interaction effect between exposure to conspiracy theories and primed victimhood on the (non)normative collective action and political engagement. Results are discussed in light of the broader impact of circulation of conspiracy theories and their effective tackle amidst societal traumas.     

Optimism as a predictor of the effects of laboratory‐induced stress on fears and hope

The objective of the current study is to explore optimism as a predictor of personal and collective fear, as well as hope, following laboratory‐induced stress. Students (N = 107; 74 female, 33 male) were assigned randomly to either the experimental (stress—political violence video clip) or the control group (no‐stress—nature video clip). Questionnaires of fear and hope were administered immediately after the experiment (Time 1) and 3 weeks later (Time 2). Structural equation modeling indicated the following: (a) Optimism significantly predicted both fear and hope in the stress group at Time 1, but not in the no‐stress group. (b) Optimism predicted hope but not fear at Time 2 in the stress group. (c) Hope at Time 1 significantly predicted hope at Time 2, in both the stress and the no‐stress groups. (d) Gender did not predict significantly fear at Time 1 in the stress group, despite a significant difference between genders. This study supports previous studies indicating that optimism plays an important role in people's coping with stress. However, based on our research the data raise the question of whether optimism, by itself, or environmental stress, by itself, may accurately predict stress response.     

Unravelling the relationship between populism and belief in conspiracy theories: The role of cynicism,powerlessness and zero-sum thinking

In recent years, it has been argued that conspiracy beliefs and populist attitudes go hand in hand. Despite their theoretical and empirical similarities, it remains unclear why these constructs are so closely associated. Across three studies, we examined the processes underlying the relationship between belief in conspiracy theories and populist attitudes. Study 1 (Greece, N = 275) and Study 2 (United Kingdom, N = 300) revealed that the relationship between populist attitudes and conspiracy beliefs is mediated by political cynicism and zero-sum thinking. In Study 3 (USA, N = 300, pre-registered), we use a vignette of a fictitious country to experimentally show that having a newly elected populist party in power (as compared to a well-established party) reduced participants' tendency to believe conspiracy theories. Moreover, this was due to increased empowerment, decreased political cynicism and decreased zero-sum thinking. These findings reveal various complementary mediators of the link between populist attitudes and conspiracy thinking and suggest that electing a populist party in power may reduce conspiracy beliefs among the public.     

The role of threat,emotions, and prejudice in promoting collective action against immigrant groups

In two studies we assessed the role of distinctiveness threat, group‐based emotions (angst, fear, and anger), and prejudice on people's willingness to engage in collective action against immigrant groups. In Study 1 (N = 222) White British participants were either informed that in the next 40 years the proportion of immigrants in the UK is unlikely to change (control condition) or that there will be more immigrants than White British people living in Britain (threat condition). We obtained support for a sequential multiple mediator model in which threat predicted British people's willingness to engage in collective action via the emotions first and then prejudice. This finding was replicated in Study 2 with an Italian sample (N = 283). These results enhance understanding of when and why advantaged groups undertake collective action against disadvantaged groups by demonstrating that distinctiveness threats and emotions promote such actions.     

Trust,Reliance, and Democracy

Abstract

From the perspective of philosophy and political science it is often pointed out that trust is of central value for democracy. The paper critically examines this claim and argues that we should not overestimate the role of trust in democracy. In order to do that, I argue for a specific understanding of the notion of trust that appropriately accounts for the distinction between trust and mere reliance. In a second step, I argue that we have no reason to put this kind of trust in our elected officials and representatives, but should instead focus on legislative and institutional ways to make sure that they are reliable in particular respects. After contrasting my suggestion with the position of Hardin, I point to two advantages of my account: (1) The avoidance of political analysis through the lens of trust allows us to react more flexibly to unforeseen circumstances and resist populist attempts to emotionalize public debates; (2) at the same time, diffusing the tension between trust and civic vigilance solves a systematic problem in political philosophy. In a concluding section, I briefly discuss the question whether there is an alternative role for trust to play in the field of politics.     

Above and below the streets: A musical geography of anti-nuclear protest in Tokyo

Affects such as anger, fear and love have compelled Tokyoites to take to the streets in protest in the wake of the Fukushima nuclear disaster of March 2011. One of the characteristic forms these protests have taken has been the anti-nuclear “sound demonstrations” in which bands, DJs and rappers perform from the backs of trucks that lead demonstrators through the streets. Projecting their emotive music through urban space with the aid of powerful sound systems, these demonstrations disrupt the everyday noises of the neoliberal city and create a public space for the vocalisation of dissent. After the demonstrations, these same artists and demonstrators move to the underground live houses and social centres that constitute a subterranean backbone to the visible demonstrations in the street. Expressing emotions through musical protest is a powerful motor for what Stevphen Shukatitis has called affective composition, the process via which collective political subjectivities are formed through the expression of shared emotions. This paper outlines the emotional geography of anti-nuclear music in post-Fukushima Tokyo. It examines the dynamic interplay between aboveground political protest and the city's subterranean network of musical performance spaces.     

Make America gracious again: Collective nostalgia can increase and decrease support for right-wing populist rhetoric

Democracies across the globe are shaken by a new class of populist right-wing politicians. A defining element of right-wing populism is a preference for antagonistic rhetoric to describe opponents. Three studies connect support for right-wing populist rhetoric to collective nostalgia for the past. Importantly, the results show that collective nostalgia can both increase and decrease support for right-wing populist antagonistic rhetoric, depending on how the past is conceptualized. Nostalgia for a past characterized by political incorrectness is associated with increased support, whereas nostalgia for the past's greater decorum is associated with decreased support for right-wing populism. Studies 1 and 2 show this with vignettes. Study 3 measures support for Trump and the GOP in the 2018 midterm elections. Although right-wing populism is often seen as the result of a wave of nostalgia, our results show that this link can be disconnected and even reversed.     

“I was mad about it all,about the ban”: Emotional spaces of solidarity in the Poznan March of Equality

In this paper, I focus on the spatial and emotional constitution of protest in the context of gay and lesbian public activism in Poland, on the basis of a case study of the Poznan March of Equality. The event took place on 19 November 2005, despite an earlier ban issued by the mayor of the city, following the recent rise of right-wing parties in power. The brutal break-up of the peaceful demonstration by the police sparked a discussion on broader issues of freedom of assembly and the state of Polish democracy. Through the narratives of March organizers, I look at the ways in which the activists engaged in the practices of collective memory work and emotion work, focusing specifically on anger, fear and euphoria. I call for discussion of emotions of public protest in the context of sexual citizenship as well as argue that it is necessary to examine the space-time scale of these emotions. In particular, I look at the ways in which the spatial and emotional context of collective memory work enabled the activists to inscribe the event into the narrative of Polish 1980s Solidarity activism and sustain activism despite an unfavourable political context.     

Disappointment expression evokes collective guilt and collective action in intergroup conflict: the moderating role of legitimacy perceptions

Research on intergroup emotions has largely focused on the experience of emotions and surprisingly little attention has been given to the expression of emotions. Drawing on the social-functional approach to emotions, we argue that in the context of intergroup conflicts, outgroup members’ expression of disappointment with one’s ingroup induces the complementary emotion of collective guilt and correspondingly a collective action protesting ingroup actions against the outgroup. In Study 1 conducted immediately after the 2014 Gaza war, Jewish-Israeli participants received information about outgroup’s (Palestinians) expression of emotions (disappointment, fear, or none). As predicted, outgroup’s expression of disappointment increased collective guilt and willingness to participate in collective action, but only among those who saw the intergroup situation as illegitimate. Moreover, collective guilt mediated the relationship between disappointment expression and collective action, moderated, again, by legitimacy perception. In Study 2, we replicated these results in the context of racial tension between Black and White Americans in the US. We discuss the theoretical and applied implications of the findings.     

Populism and religion: On the politics of fear

Our societies of fear go along with an increase of populist movements in politics. This article explains the basics of populism and shows how easily it joins highly likely political friend‐enemy patterns. Anthropologically, we have to deal with parochial altruism undergirded by a static type of religion. A further step deals with the relationship between politics and fear by referring to terror management theory and its insight into the relationship between mortality and fear. The concluding part addresses ways out of fear and in what way a dynamic type of religion helps to avoid scapegoating and political enmity.     

Methodological Challenges in the Study of Emotions in Politics and How to Deal With Them

This introductory article to the special issue zooms in on the literature on political emotions with a specific focus on methodological questions of “how to study” political emotions. To the extent that methodological matters are addressed in the extant literature, the associated challenges are often portrayed as a clash between social science and natural science disciplines, a clash frequently illustrated by the meeting between political science and neuroscience. Rather than being a clash between academic disciplines, this article argues that many of the methodological challenges facing emotional research have their origin in scholars' diverse views on the relationship between themselves as researchers and political emotions as a research object. In the light of this acknowledgment, the article encircles and discusses the methodological challenges associated with three key conceptual distinctions between: (1) individual and collective emotions, (2) emotions and reason, and between (3) involuntary political emotions and the strategic usage of political emotions. Using the contributions to this special issue as illustrations, the article argues in favor of moving beyond mutually exclusive dichotomies regarding these conceptual distinctions and offers pathways for dealing with current methodological challenges to emotional research. It points to methodological pluralism, transparency, and context‐sensitive research strategies.     

The Central Role of Group-Based Hatred as an Emotional Antecedent of Political Intolerance: Evidence from Israel

In recent years, political scientists have shifted the focus of explaining political phenomena from the purely cognitive perspective to an integrated emotion-cognition one. Yet most studies which examine antecedents of political intolerance ignore the potential role played by "gut feelings" or group-based negative emotions in endorsing those attitudes. Moreover, even the few studies that deal with emotions and intolerance concentrate exclusively on the role of groups of emotions (positive vs. negative, dispositional vs. surveillance) or on basic emotions (anger or fear) and ignore the potential influence of more complex discrete emotions like hatred on political intolerance. Hence, the main goal of this study was to create a deeper understanding regarding the role of discrete negative emotions in increasing political intolerance among different groups of individuals in different contexts. In order to do so, the relations between political intolerance and three group-based negative emotions (hatred, anger, and fear) were tested by means of four large-scale nationwide surveys. Within the surveys, various intolerance measurement methods were used in various contexts (wartime vs. no-war/routine periods) and among individuals with different levels of political sophistication. Results, obtained via multiple regression analysis and structural equation modeling, show that: (1) Group-based hatred is the most important antecedent of political intolerance even when controlling for important intolerance inducers such as perceived threat. (2) Other group-based negative emotions like anger or fear influence political intolerance wholly through the mediation of hatred or perceived threat. (3) The role of group-based hatred in inducing political intolerance is more substantial in the face of heightened existential threat and among unsophisticated individuals than among sophisticated ones.     

Feeling at home in the occupied territories: Emotion work of the religious settler movement

Religious settlers exhibit a strong desire to settle the entire Land of Israel despite resistance among the local Palestinian population and among opposition within Israel. The return to the Promised Land and the establishment of settlements elicit strong emotions that are connected to the socio-spatial identities of the settlers. Introducing the concept of emotion work the article focuses on the collective construction of emotions inside the movement and on active practices directed at the Israeli audience at large. Emotions are elicited and regulated in the political process in order to make and defend territorial claims. After discussing the concepts of emotional geographies, emotion regulation, and emotion work, the article analyzes the multi-layered passions of the settlers and strategies of creating an emotional attachment to the conquered territories in the Israeli public. Finally, the Second Intifada revealed tensions between the desire for the land and a contracting geography of fear. The article discusses how the settlers dealt with violence, threats, and experiences of conjoint emotions.     

The CARE System in Its Importance in Dealing with Today's Crises1

The CARE system is a gift from Mother Nature, we have it in our biological heritage; it enables us humans—as a basic gift—to help each other in a large, life-serving context, and thus also to counterbalance destruction. It is about a basic human ability, linked to typical behaviour, but also about a basic human need for connectedness. In this paper, I would like to show how the CARE system can be activated as a collective attitude. The CARE system is strengthened by positive emotions. We are currently being affected by many crises and this triggers fear. How can we deal with this better? Fear is countered with hope and the associated positive emotions such as joy, awe, kama muta and others. These emotions and feelings can be consciously encouraged and placed alongside the feelings of fear. But also, when we share the feelings of grief with each other, it triggers an attitude of CARE. We can grieve together for the various experiences of loss that we go through—but we can also imagine together how we envisage a future that is worth living for everyone. An attitude in the sense of CARING has been practised in friendship for thousands of years. It would therefore be possible to move away from an attitude of competing and outdoing, to an attitude not only of recognition, care, and solidarity in human interaction, but also in our connection with nature.     

Exclusive and inclusive protest in Europe: Investigating values,support for democracy,and life conditions

Dissatisfaction with the economic situation and perceived governmental inefficacy in regard to the financial crisis has spawned a widespread feeling of political distrust across Europe. This distrust has been translated into protests against institutional authority that aims at either expanding democratic procedures or supporting xenophobic and populist measures. This research uses European Social Survey data to compare exclusive and inclusive protesters with regard to a number of personal and social values, attitudes toward democratic principles, and different life conditions and socio‐economic resources. It also considers contextual factors to investigate how different protesters' profiles are interwoven with socio‐economic conditions. The results of a multilevel latent profile analysis show that exclusive and inclusive protesters, despite sharing similar levels of political distrust, differ with regard to key values and political attitudes, and these differences are related to individual and collective living conditions. We argue that unfavourable living conditions play a non‐negligible role in increasing the probability of easy (i.e., populist) scapegoat political attitudes. Further support for this hypothesis is provided by the cross‐country analysis, which shows that higher levels of exclusive protest are present in countries that were characterized by worse living conditions before the economic crisis.