Unpacking attitude certainty: attitude clarity and attitude correctness

Attitude certainty has been the subject of considerable attention in the attitudes and persuasion literature. The present research identifies 2 aspects of attitude certainty and provides evidence for the distinctness of the constructs. Specifically, it is proposed that attitude certainty can be conceptualized, and empirically separated, in terms of attitude clarity (the subjective sense that one knows what one's attitude is) and attitude correctness (the subjective sense that one's attitude is correct or valid). Experiment 1 uses factor analysis and correlational data to provide evidence for viewing attitude clarity and attitude correctness as separate constructs. Experiments 2 and 3 demonstrate that attitude clarity and attitude correctness can have distinct antecedents (repeated expression and consensus feedback, respectively). Experiment 4 reveals that these constructs each play an independent role in persuasion and resistance situations. As clarity and correctness increase, attitudes become more resistant to counterattitudinal persuasive messages. These findings are discussed in relation to the existing attitude strength literature.     

There is a 60% probability,but I am 70% certain: communicative consequences of external and internal expressions of uncertainty

Current theories of probability recognise a distinction between external (un)certainty (frequentistic probabilities) and internal (un)certainty (degrees of belief). The present studies investigated this distinction in lay people's judgements of probability statements formulated to suggest either an internal (“I am X% certain”) or an external (“It is X% certain” or “There is an X% probability”) interpretation. These subtle differences in wording influenced participants' perceptions and endorsements of such statements, and their impressions of the speaker. External expressions were seen to signal more reliable task duration estimates, and a lower degree of external than internal certainty was deemed necessary to advise a course of action. In conversations about football, internal expressions were perceived as signalling more personal interest, and were expected to be on the average 10% higher than corresponding external probabilities. Finally, people who reported their outcome expectations for two major sports events let their degree of interest in these events influence their internal but not their external certainty. These results have implications for the communication of uncertainty and probability.     

Metascientific foundations for pluralism in psychology

In this paper, I explore the metascientific basis for pluralism in psychology. In the first half, I outline the two levels of the metaparadigm: the epistemological and the methodological. The epistemological level includes the dichotomy between an internal, first-person point of view and an external, third-person one. The methodological level includes the dichotomy between explanation and understanding. The continuing debate regarding methodology, explanation versus understanding, has distinguished the human sciences from the natural sciences. Similarly, the continuing debate regarding the epistemological point of view has distinguished psychology from other sciences. I illustrate these points by placing various trends in psychology into the two-dimensional space formed by the two coordinate axes depicting the methodological and the epistemological dimensions. Each quadrant represents one definition of the object of psychology: quadrant 1 (internal, first-person - explanation) represents “consciousness;” quadrant 2 (internal, first-person - understanding) represents “experiences;” quadrant 3 (external, third-person - understanding) represents “meaningful acts and expressions;” and quadrant 4 (external, third-person - explanation) represents “behaviors and higher processes of the brain.” All of the trends within the history of psychology can be placed within this two-dimensional space. In the second half of the paper, I introduce the third level of the metaparadigm: the metapsychological level. This level includes the three different, and incompatible conceptions of humans: the first-person, the second-person, and the third-person conceptions. A third-person conception of humans is most compatible with trends placed in quadrant 4. A second-person conceptualization is most congruent with quadrant 3, and so on. Thus, the unification of psychologies emerges as not only difficult but actually unreasonable, because the plurality of psychological paradigms originates from the epistemological, methodological, and metapsychological levels of the metaparadigm.     

A phenomenological study of spontaneous spiritual and paranormal experiences in a 21st-century sample of normal people

Summary.-This paper presents a phenomenological study using the methodology of Woodard's phenomenological and perceptual research. This method examines individuals' internal meanings during spontaneous spiritual and paranormal experiences, as described from their point of view. A group of 40 adults was phenomenologically interviewed after they responded to a newspaper announcement in New Hampshire asking for volunteers who had had spiritual and paranormal experiences. Using the method, Six Individual Situated Structures and a General Structure were identified and examined. Nine major themes were explicated during the participants' spontaneous experiencing: unexpectedness, contrariness to belief, certainty, contradictory experiencing, language as a barrier to expression, external influences, internal dialogue, evil as separateness, and some social psychological influences. Several themes observed in hypnotic experiencing, such as the characteristics of the Adequate Personality in Perceptual Psychology, are interpreted and discussed. This research illustrates how subjective experience can be adequately researched in a qualitative manner outside the confines of the laboratory setting. Limitations of the study and suggestions for further research are given.     

False reports from patients with frontotemporal dementia: delusions or confabulations?

Patients with behavioral variant frontotemporal dementia (bvFTD) can make false statements consistent with delusions or confabulations. It is unclear whether bvFTD is primarily associated with either delusions or with confabulations and whether they can be explained by the pathophysiology of this disease. In order to clarify this, we retrospectively surveyed the records of 48 patients with bvFTD for the presence of any false reports and identified four patients. Their false reports included continued interaction with a favorite but dead relation, fictitious marriages with movie stars, and two who claimed that their partner was having an affair. When confronted with the falsity of their statements, the patients conveyed a lack of certainty regarding their external or internal source but persisted in the constancy of their reports. On functional neuroimaging, the patients had predominant frontal involvement. This report found that patients with bvFTD can have both fantastic, wish fulfilling confabulations and typical content-specific delusions. We propose that both phenomena result from known disturbances of ventromedial prefrontal cortex in bvFTD, including deficits in source monitoring and in activating an automatic "doubt tag" for false reports.     

Attitude Certainty: A Review of Past Findings and Emerging Perspectives

Attitude certainty, or the sense of conviction with which one holds one's attitude, has been the subject of considerable research attention. This article provides an overview of past, present, and future research on this topic. First, we review past work on attitude certainty, focusing on what has been learned about the antecedents and consequences of feeling certain or uncertain of one's attitude. Following this review, we examine emerging perspectives on attitude certainty. In particular, we describe recent work exploring the metacognitive appraisals that shape attitude certainty, the different meanings attitude certainty can have, and the dynamic effects of attitude certainty on attitude strength. Along the way, we also highlight important questions that have yet be answered about the certainty construct.     

Seeing failure in your life: Imagery perspective determines whether self-esteem shapes reactions to recalled and imagined failure

The present research reveals that when it comes to recalling and imagining failure in one's life, changing how one looks at the event can change its impact on well-being; however, the nature of the effect depends on an aspect of one's self-concept, namely, self-esteem. Five studies measured or manipulated the visual perspective (internal first-person vs. external third-person) individuals used to mentally image recalled or imagined personal failures. It has been proposed that imagery perspective determines whether people's reactions to an event are shaped bottom-up by concrete features of the event (first-person) or top-down by their self-concept (third-person; L. K. Libby & R. P. Eibach, 2011b). Evidence suggests that differences in the self-concepts of individuals with low and high self-esteem (LSEs and HSEs) are responsible for self-esteem differences in reaction to failure, leading LSEs to have more negative thoughts and feelings about themselves (e.g., M. H. Kernis, J. Brockner, & B. S. Frankel, 1989). Thus, the authors predicted, and found, that low self-esteem was associated with greater overgeneralization--operationalized as negativity in accessible self-knowledge and feelings of shame--only when participants had pictured failure from the third-person perspective and not from the first-person. Further, picturing failure from the third-person, rather than first-person, perspective, increased shame and the negativity of accessible knowledge among LSEs, whereas it decreased shame among HSEs. Results help to distinguish between different theoretical accounts of how imagery perspective functions and have implications for the study of top-down and bottom-up influences on self-judgment and emotion, as well as for the role of perspective and abstraction in coping.     

First-person approaches in neuroscience of consciousness: Brain dynamics correlate with the intention to act

The belief in free will has been frequently challenged since Benjamin Libet published his famous experiment in 1983. Although Libet’s experiment is highly dependent upon subjective reports, no study has been conducted that focused on a first-person or introspective perspective of the task. We took a neurophenomenological approach in an N = 1 study providing reliable and valid measures of the first-person perspective in conjunction with brain dynamics. We found that a larger readiness potential (RP) is attributable to more frequent occurrences of self-initiated movements during negative deflections of the slow cortical potentials (SCP). These negative deflections occur in parallel with an inner impulse reported by an expert meditator which may in turn lead to a voluntary act. We demonstrate in this proof-of-principle approach that the first-person perspective obtained by an expert meditator in conjunction with neural signal analysis can contribute to our understanding of the neural underpinnings of voluntary acts.     

Cognitions related to anxiety: a pilot study of treatment

In general, where anxiety appears to have a specific external focus, such as the situations which are avoided by phobic patients, treatment involving systematic exposure to those situations seems to be effective. This is less appropriate, or even impossible, where anxiety is not dependent on any external circumstance, but is described by the patient as occurring at any time or place, either chronically over long periods, or acutely in the form of ‘panic attacks’. These patients with ‘generalised’ anxiety often describe internal cues for anxiety either in the form of thoughts (e.g. worry over a current problem) or somatic (e.g. chest sensations interpreted as possible heart disease). Beck et al. (1974) has suggested that on interview, all patients diagnosed as suffering from diffuse or generalised anxiety can report specific ideas or other cognitive cues which are associated with anxiety. These usually concern possible traumatic events, such as illness and death, or social rejection. Clearly Beck has in mind the possibility that these cognitions have the effect of inducing anxiety, although even if the validity of the subjective reports were to be accepted, the problem remains of whether the relationship between mood state and cognitions is causal and if so, in which direction it operates. Obviously a causal relationship may also operate in both directions simultaneously, to form a ‘vicious circle’ in which each exacerbates the other. To establish whether there is a sense in which particular cognitions contribute causally to anxious mood, it would be necessary to find a method of manipulating the type or frequency of cognitions thought to be operating in this way.

One obvious possibility is that of ‘thought-stopping’: that is, patients could be taught to identify thoughts which are associated with anxiety and stop them in the usual way (Wolpe, 1973, p. 211) e.g. by' shouting stop, and substituting an alternative thought. The present study was planned as a pilot experiment to determine (i) if appropriate anxiety related cognitions could be elicited from a series of patients with generalised anxiety, (ii) if the reported frequency of such thoughts could be modified by a thought-stopping technique, and (iii) if any changes in thought frequency were associated with improvements in mood.

Clearly there are many ‘non-specific’ features involved in thought-stopping which could also have therapeutic effects on mood. For this reason it was necessary to include an alternative procedure, not directed at reducing thought frequency, but having the same degree of plausibility to patients, and preferably to therapists. The control procedure chosen for this purpose was modelled on desensitisation, in which patients were encouraged to allow the supposedly anxiety-provoking thoughts into their mind and tolerate them, rather than attempt to stop them. In summary, the study employed a relaxation training phase as a base-line, followed by a cross-over design in which the two treatment phases of thought-stopping and ‘cognitive desensitisation’ were given to each patient, in balanced order.     

Thinking about the body as subject

The notion of immunity to error through misidentification (IEM) has played a central role in discussions of first-person thought. It seems like a way of making precise the idea of thinking about oneself ‘as subject’. Asking whether bodily first-person judgments (e.g. ‘My legs are crossed’) can be IEM is a way of asking whether one can think about oneself simultaneously as a subject and as a bodily thing. The majority view is that one cannot. I rebut that view, arguing that on all the notions of IEM that have so far been successfully defined, bodily first-person judgments can be IEM.     

Why so negative? Evidence aggregation and armchair philosophy

This paper aims to clarify a debate on philosophical method, and to give a probabilistic argument vindicating armchair philosophy under a wide range of plausible assumptions. The use of intuitions by so-called armchair philosophers has been criticized on empirical grounds. The debate between armchair philosophers and their empirical critics would benefit from greater clarity and precision in our understanding of what it takes for intuition-based approaches to philosophy to make sense. This paper discusses a set of rigorous, probability-based tools for determining what we can and cannot learn from intuitions in various conditions. These tools can tell us whether beliefs can be justified by armchair practices, and what empirical findings would have to show to undermine the use of intuitions in philosophy. Using these tools, the paper shows that armchair philosophy makes sense in a broad range of situations, and that it is quite plausible that we are in those situations at the moment.     

Applying Deutsch’s concept of good explanations to artificial intelligence and neuroscience – An initial exploration

Artificial intelligence has made great strides since the deep learning revolution, but AI systems remain incapable of learning principles and rules which allow them to extrapolate outside of their training data to new situations. For inspiration we look to the domain of science, where scientists have been able to develop theories which show remarkable ability to extrapolate and sometimes even predict the existence of phenomena which have never been observed before. According to David Deutsch, this type of extrapolation, which he calls “reach”, is due to scientific theories being hard to vary. In this work we investigate Deutsch’s hard-to-vary principle and how it relates to more formalized principles in deep learning such as the bias-variance trade-off and Occam’s razor. We distinguish internal variability, how much a model/theory can be varied internally while still yielding the same predictions, with external variability, which is how much a model must be varied to predict new, out-of-distribution data. We discuss how to measure internal variability using the notion of the Rashomon set and how to measure external variability using Kolmogorov complexity. We explore what role hard-to-vary explanations play in intelligence by looking at the human brain, the only example of highly general purpose intelligence known. We distinguish two learning systems in the brain – the first operates similar to deep learning and likely underlies most of perception while the second is a more creative system capable of generating hard-to-vary models and explanations of the world. We make contact with Popperian epistemology which suggests that the generation of scientific theories is a not an inductive process but rather an evolutionary process which proceeds through conjecture and refutation. We argue that figuring out how replicate this second system, which is capable of generating hard-to-vary explanations, is a key challenge which needs to be solved in order to realize artificial general intelligence.     

Me or not me – An optimal integration of agency cues?

Recent work has demonstrated that the sense of agency is not only determined by efference-copy-based internal predictions and internal comparator mechanisms, but by a large variety of different internal and external cues. The study by Moore and colleagues [Moore, J. W., Wegner, D. M., & Haggard, P. (2009). Modulating the sense of agency with external cues. Conscious and Cognition] aimed to provide further evidence for this view by demonstrating that external agency cues might outweigh or even substitute efferent signals to install a basic registration of self-agency. Although the study contains some critical points that, so we argue, are central to a proper interpretation of the data, it hints at a new perspective on agency: optimal cue integration seems to be the key to a robust sense of agency. We here argue that this framework could allow integrating the findings of Moore and colleagues and other recent agency studies into a comprehensive picture of the sense of agency and its pathological disruptions.     

Unity and diversity of views on intelligence and consciousness: Where the East meets the West

Intelligence is a cognitive function. Cognitive processing is a common base for cognitive theories of intelligence in both the East (India) and in the West (Europe and America). I first review the Eastern view of intelligence and its relation to consciousness. I argue that the study of consciousness has been accepted in Western psychology as a legitimate topic since William James, then present further discussion on the topic from Hindu and Buddhist philosophies. In essence, it is about awareness and the means of achieving a pure state of awareness through self-directed attention to internal thoughts, rather than external objects. The validity of a first-person observation of consciousness then becomes an important issue as well as the question of a non-physical mind. The paper concludes that using introspective reflection as a tool to explore consciousness is supported by both views.     

Selfhood triumvirate: From phenomenology to brain activity and back again

Recently, a three-dimensional construct model for complex experiential Selfhood has been proposed (Fingelkurts, Fingelkurts, & Kallio-Tamminen, 2016b,c). According to this model, three specific subnets (or modules) of the brain self-referential network (SRN) are responsible for the manifestation of three aspects/features of the subjective sense of Selfhood. Follow up multiple studies established a tight relation between alterations in the functional integrity of the triad of SRN modules and related to them three aspects/features of the sense of self; however, the causality of this relation is yet to be shown. In this article we approached the question of causality by exploring functional integrity within the three SRN modules that are thought to underlie the three phenomenal components of Selfhood while these components were manipulated mentally by experienced meditators in a controlled and independent manner. Participants were requested, in a block-randomised manner, to mentally induce states representing either increased (up-regulation) or decreased (down-regulation) sense of (a) witnessing agency (“Self”), or (b) body representational-emotional agency (“Me”), or (c) reflective/narrative agency (“I”), while their brain activity was recorded by an electroencephalogram (EEG). This EEG-data was complemented by first-person phenomenological reports and standardised questionnaires which focused on subjective contents of three aspects of Selfhood. The results of the study strengthen the case for a direct causative relationship between three phenomenological aspects of Selfhood and related to them three modules of the brain SRN. Furthermore, the putative integrative model of the dynamic interrelations among three modules of the SRN has been proposed.     

Not all synaesthetes are created equal: Projector versus associator synaesthetes

In synaesthesia, ordinary stimuli elicit extraordinary experiences. When grapheme-color synaesthetes view black text, each grapheme elicits a photism-a highly specific experience of color. Importantly, some synaesthetes (projectors) report experiencing their photisms in external space, whereas other synaesthetes (associators) report experiencing their photisms "in the mind's eye." We showed that projectors and associators can be differentiated not only by their subjective reports, but also by their performance on Stroop tasks. Digits were presented in colors that were either congruent or incongruent with the synaesthetes' photisms. The synaesthetes named either the video colors of the digits or the colors of the photisms elicited by the digits. The results revealed systematic differences in the patterns of Stroop interference between projectors and associators. Converging evidence from first-person reports and third-person objective measures of Stroop interference establish the projector/ associator distinction as an important individual difference in grapheme-color synaesthesia.     

The cognitive act and the first-person perspective: an epistemology for constructive type theory

The notion of cognitive act is of importance for an epistemology that is apt for constructive type theory, and for epistemology in general. Instead of taking knowledge attributions as the primary use of the verb ‘to know’ that needs to be given an account of, and understanding a first-person knowledge claim as a special case of knowledge attribution, the account of knowledge that is given here understands first-person knowledge claims as the primary use of the verb ‘to know’. This means that a cognitive act is an act that counts as cognitive from a first-person point of view. The method of linguistic phenomenology is used to explain or elucidate our epistemic notions. One of the advantages of the theory is that an answer can be given to some of the problems in modern epistemology, such as the Gettier problem.     

Transfer of Warrant, Begging the Question and Semantic Externalism

Martin Davies argues that 'limitation principles' block the transfer of warrant from the premises of a certain kind of argument to its conclusion. The class of arguments in question includes Moore's argument for the existence of the external world, and a popular style of argument which starts from two premises that are warranted by first-person authority and semantic externalism respectively, ending with a conclusion that does not, allegedly, admit of a priori justification. I argue that the relevant class of arguments can be shown to be unconvincing without appealing to any limitation principles, by showing that they beg the question against sceptical opponents. Principles limiting the transfer of warrant are not required in order to rebut the claim that first-person authority and semantic externalism are incompatible.