An Actor's Knowledge and Intent Are More Important in Evaluating Moral Transgressions Than Conventional Transgressions

An actor's mental states—whether she acted knowingly and with bad intentions—typically play an important role in evaluating the extent to which an action is wrong and in determining appropriate levels of punishment. In four experiments, we find that this role for knowledge and intent is significantly weaker when evaluating transgressions of conventional rules as opposed to moral rules. We also find that this attenuated role for knowledge and intent is partly due to the fact that conventional rules are judged to be more arbitrary than moral rules; whereas moral transgressions are associated with actions that are intrinsically wrong (e.g., hitting another person), conventional transgressions are associated with actions that are only contingently wrong (e.g., wearing pajamas to school, which is only wrong if it violates a dress code that could have been otherwise). Finally, we find that it is the perpetrator's belief about the arbitrary or non‐arbitrary basis of the rule—not the reality—that drives this differential effect of knowledge and intent across types of transgressions.     

Logical recoding of S-R rules can reverse the effects of spatial S-R correspondence

Two experiments investigated competing explanations for the reversal of spatial stimulus—response (S—R) correspondence effects (i.e., Simon effects) with an incompatible S—R mapping on the relevant, nonspatial dimension. Competing explanations were based on generalized S—R rules (logical-recoding account) or referred to display—control arrangement correspondence or to S—S congruity. In Experiment 1, compatible responses to finger—name stimuli presented at left/right locations produced normal Simon effects, whereas incompatible responses to finger—name stimuli produced an inverted Simon effect. This finding supports the logical-recoding account. In Experiment 2, spatial S—R correspondence and color S—R correspondence were varied independently, and main effects of these variables were observed. The lack of an interaction between these variables, however, disconfirms a prediction of the display—control arrangement correspondence account. Together, the results provide converging evidence for the logical-recoding account. This account claims that participants derive generalized response selection rules (e.g., the identity or reversal rule) from specific S—R rules and inadvertently apply the generalized rules to the irrelevant (spatial) S—R dimension when selecting their response.     

Should I save or should I not kill? How people solve moral dilemmas depends on which rule is most accessible

The literature on how people solve moral dilemmas often focuses on situations in which individuals have to make a decision where different moral rules are in conflict. In some of these situations, such as in footbridge dilemmas, people have to choose between sacrificing a few people in order to save many. The present research focuses on how people decide what to do in dilemmas involving conflicting moral rules. We propose that the rule that is cognitively most accessible during the decision making process (e.g., “Save lives” or “Do not kill”) will influence how people solve these moral dilemmas. Three studies are reported that indeed demonstrate that the most accessible rule influences willingness to intervene within footbridge dilemmas. This effect is found even when the accessibility of the rule is induced subliminally.     

Moral foundations,worldviews, moral absolutism and belief in conspiracy theories

In the present research, we examined whether individual differences in basic moral concerns might be related to a greater endorsement of conspiracy theories. Building on the notion that conspiracy theories often deal with super‐individual relevant events in which a group perspective is central, we proposed that individual differences in moral concerns pertaining to group‐ and community‐concerns (i.e., binding moral foundations) rather than to individual well‐being (i.e., individualising moral foundations) would be positively associated with conspiracy beliefs. We further hypothesised that such relations would be totally mediated by beliefs in a dangerous world and by embracing moral absolutism. We found support for these predictions in two community samples (Ns: 319; 514). Theoretical implications were discussed.     

A social-psychological perspective on tacit coordination: How it works,when it works, (and when it does not)

We present a programmatic line of experimental studies which focus on the how and when of tacit coordination (i.e., the phenomenon that people can successfully coordinate their decisions without communication). We investigated this phenomenon using different types of economic games (i.e., social dilemmas as well as coordination games). Our studies broadly cover three themes: (a) fairness as a coordination rule, (b) uncertainty and common understanding, (c) social information as a cue. By focusing on these themes we have obtained several new insights on the prerequisites and boundary conditions of tacit coordination. We conclude that tacit coordination is often facilitated by mutual adherence to social norms (e.g., fairness rules, rules of deference, etcetera), but that in order to employ such norms people need sufficient environmental and/or social information.     

Rules of Meaning and Practical Reasoning

Can there be rules of language which serve both to determine meaning and to guide speakers in ordinary linguistic usage, i.e., in the production of speech acts? We argue that the answer is no. We take the guiding function of rules to be the function of serving as reasons for actions, and the question of guidance is then considered within the framework of practical reasoning. It turns out that those rules that can serve as reasons for linguistic utterances cannot be considered as normative or meaning determining. Acceptance of such a rule is simply equivalent to a belief about meaning, and does not even presuppose that meaning is determined by rules. Rules that can determine meaning, on the other hand, i.e., rules that can be regarded as constitutive of meaning, are not capable of guiding speakers in the ordinary performance of speech acts.     

Before the rules are written: navigating moral ambiguity in performance enhancement

In 1984, a number of US cyclists used blood transfusions to boost their performance at the Los Angeles Olympic Games. The cyclists broke no rules and dominated the Games, yet were later maligned as cheaters and dopers—they had, it seemed, violated some important norm, albeit one which was neither an official rule nor otherwise easily identifiable. Their case illustrates the moral ambiguity that arises when a performance enhancement is employed in a sport that has not addressed it. This article takes up the crucial question posed by such moral ambiguity: is it ethical to enhance performance through a substance or technology when no rules exist to prohibit it? We first examine ordinary ethical obligations that athletes carry based on their status as moral agents. We conclude that such obligations provide some guidance, but cannot resolve the issue. We then examine arguments that take sport as a unique social practice that presents its own moral obligation not to use performance enhancers. We argue that these ‘spirit of sport’ arguments, developed by McNamee and Loland and Hoppeler cannot resolve the issue either. We conclude that when the rules governing sport are silent on the issue of performance enhancement the constraints on its ethical use are limited at best.     

Sticky rules: integration between abstract rules and specific actions

The authors manipulated repetitions and/or changes of abstract response rules and the specific stimulus- response (S-R) associations used under these rules. Experiments 1 and 2, assessing trial-to-trial priming effects, showed that repetition of complete S-R couplings produced only benefits when the rule also repeated (i.e., rule-S-R conjunctions) but costs when identical S-R couplings repeated while rules changed. In Experiments 3 and 4, the authors manipulated amount of experience with specific rule-S-R conjunctions and demonstrated integration between rules and S-R couplings in terms of cumulative practice effects. However, unlike short-term priming effects, cumulative practice supported generalization of experience with specific S-R couplings across rule boundaries (Experiment 4). Results are discussed in terms of constraints on models of hierarchical control and in terms of qualitatively different ways in which people profit from very recent experiences (i.e., all-or-none access to working memory representations) versus cumulative experience (i.e., similarity-based retrieval from long-term memory).     

Societal rule evaluations: Adolescent offenders' reasoning about moral,conventional, and personal rules

This study investigated adolescent offenders' (81 felons and 83 misdemeanants) evaluations of three types of societal rules (moral, conventional, and personal) on dimensions pertaining to importance, sanctions, authority, and individual choice. In addition, participants selected the acts which should be under personal jurisdiction. Participants provided reasons (i.e., justifications) to support their evaluations. The judgment evidence suggests that the moral rules were considered the most important, the transgressions the most wrong, the violators the most deserving of punishment, and the acts the least acceptable when permitted by an authority. With regard to these same dimensions, conventional rules and violations were ranked second; whereas, the personal rules were ranked third. Offender status differences were obtained for importance ratings and for deservedness of punishment. Justifications for moral events reflected reasoning from both the moral (e.g., other's welfare) and conventional (e.g., social order) domains. Reasoning about conventions involved both conventional and personal concerns; whereas, justifications about personal issues focused on individual prerogatives. The implications of these data are discussed. © 1996 Wiley-Liss, Inc.     

Re-Examining the Overjustification Effect

The purpose of the present investigation was to extend the research related to the possible negative side effects of extrinsic reinforcement on children's compliant behavior, particularly the overjustification effect. Specifically, this study examined the effects of a token reinforcement procedure in a naturalistic environment (third grade classroom) on children's compliance with classroom rules. Three students exhibiting high compliance with classroom rules were selected. Results indicated that the introduction of a token reinforcement program contingent on the occurrence of rule compliance had no detrimental effect on their rule compliant behavior following the withdrawal of the token procedure (i.e., comparison of Baseline I and Baseline II). Thus, the overjustification effect was not supported.     

Quasi-Realism, Negation and the Frege-Geach Problem

Every expressivist theory of moral language requires a solution to the Frege-Geach problem, i.e., the problem of explaining how moral sentences retain their meaning in unasserted (e.g., conditional and disjunctive) contexts. An essential part of Blackburn's ' quasi -realist project', i.e., the project of showing how we can earn the right to treat moral sentences as if they have ordinary truth-conditions, is to provide a sophisticated solution. I show, however, that simple negated contexts provide a fundamental difficulty, since accepting the negation of a sentence is easily confused with merely refusing to accept that sentence. I argue that Blackburn's model-set semantics for his 'Hooray!' and 'Boo!' operators requires logical apparatus to which he is not entitled. I consider various modifications, but show that they do not succeed.
email : n.unwin@bolton.ac.uk     

Consciousness and inference to the best explanation: Compiling empirical evidence supporting the access-phenomenal distinction and the overflow hypothesis

A tacit assumption in the field of consciousness studies is that the more empirical evidence a theory can explain, the better it fares when weighed against competitors. If one wants to take seriously the potential for empirical evidence to move forward debates in consciousness studies, there is a need to gather, organize, validate, and compare evidence. We present an inference to the best explanation (IBE) process on the basis of empirical support that is applicable in debates between competing theories of consciousness. Our proposed IBE process consists in four steps: Assimilate, Compile, Validate, and Compare. Until now, the vast majority of the work in the field has consisted in gathering empirical evidence for theories i.e., the assimilation step. To illustrate the feasibility of our proposed IBE process, and what it may look like when applied in practice, we deliver a complete collection (the compilation step) of empirical support for the distinction between A-Consciousness and P-Consciousness and the overflow hypothesis. Finally, we offer an example of the validation step, by scrutinizing the interpretation of aphantasics’ performance on retro-cue paradigms offered in the literature in support of the overflow hypothesis. The compilation we deliver here is the first effort in the IBE process, the end result of which — hopefully — will be the ability of the research community to carry out side-by-side comparisons of theories and the empirical phenomena they claim to explain, i.e., the comparison step.     

Reasons-responsiveness,control and the negligence puzzle

A longstanding puzzle about moral responsibility for negligence arises from three plausible yet jointly inconsistent theses: (i) an agent can, in certain circumstances, be morally responsible for some outcome O, even if her behavior with respect to O is negligent (i.e., even if she never adverted to the possibility that the behavior might result in O), (ii) an agent can be morally responsible for O only if she has some control over O, (iii) if an agent acts negligently with respect to O, then she has no control over O. This paper is in two parts. First, I argue that reasons-responsiveness models of moral responsibility can be applied naturally to negligence scenarios; indeed, agents are intuitively responsible for the outcomes of their negligent behavior just when they meet the conditions for responsibility given by the best reason-responsiveness theories. Second, if the reasons-responsiveness conditions are applicable to negligence scenarios then one of two things follows: either agents can have direct control over outcomes they never adverted to, or reasons-responsiveness is not a condition of control but of something else connected to moral responsibility. Each possibility would be important in its own right—and each can solve the negligence puzzle.     

计算机化分类测验终止规则的类别、特点及应用

计算机化分类测验(Computerized Classification Testing, CCT)能够高效地对被试进行分类, 已广泛应用于合格性测验及临床心理学中。作为CCT的重要组成部分, 终止规则决定测验何时停止以及将被试最终划分到何种类别, 因此直接影响测验效率及分类准确率。已有的三大类终止规则(似然比规则、贝叶斯决策理论规则及置信区间规则)的核心思想分别为构造假设检验、设计损失函数和比较置信区间相对位置。同时, 在不同测验情境下, CCT的终止规则发展出不同的具体形式。未来研究可以继续开发贝叶斯规则、考虑多维多类别情境以及结合作答时间和机器学习算法。针对测验实际需求, 三类终止规则在合格性测验上均有应用潜力, 而临床问卷则倾向应用贝叶斯规则。     

The elusive matching bias effect in the disjunctive selection task

When reasoning with conditional statements (i.e., if [not] p then [not] q), for example when solving Wason's selection task, subjects tend to display matching bias: Options which match the entities named in the rule tend to be selected irrespective of whether this is logically appropriate. Recently, there have been suggestions that the underlying causes of matching bias reflect a general phenomenon that applies to many types of logical rule, not just conditionals. A study is reported in which performance is investigated for selection tasks with categorical or disjunctive rules. Although matching bias was clearly present for categorical rules, inverted matching bias was identified for disjunctive rules, calling into question the generality of the phenomenon and its explanations. In addition, performance at one task was not correlated with performance at the other, calling into question recent cognitive capacity accounts of selection task performance.     

Rule Consequentialism and Scope

Rule consequentialism (RC) holds that the rightness and wrongness of actions is determined by an ideal moral code, i.e., the set of rules whose internalization would have the best consequences. But just how many moral codes are there supposed to be? Absolute RC holds that there is a single morally ideal code for everyone, while Relative RC holds that there are different codes for different groups or individuals. I argue that Relative RC better meets the test of reflective equilibrium than Absolute RC. In particular, I contend that Relative RC is superior because it accommodates our convictions about costless benefits. Some have charged that Relative RC threatens our convictions about the generality of moral codes and that it leads inevitably to what Brad Hooker calls “runaway relativism.” I argue that Relative RC has principled reasons for stopping this imagined slide down the slippery slope.     

The Institutionality Of Legal Validity

The most influential theory of law in current analytic legal philosophy is legal positivism, which generally understands law to be a kind of institution. The most influential theory of institutions in current analytic social philosophy is that of John Searle. One would hope that the two theories are compatible, and in many ways they certainly are. But one incompatibility that still needs ironing out involves the relation of the social rule that undergirds the validity of any legal system (H.L.A. Hart's rule of recognition) to Searle's notion of codification: the idea that institutions need official declarations of their constitutive rules in order to enjoy the full benefits of institutions. The incompatibility arises from the fact that, in order to do its institutional work, the basic validity rule must be codified in Searle's sense—yet, given the particular role it has in legal positivism, it may be impossible to codify in the Searlean sense. In this paper I develop the incompatibility in detail, consider and reject consigning the basic validity rule to Searle's “Background” capacities that support institutional facts, and conclude that the best route to eliminating it while doing a minimum of damage to the two theories is to make a slight emendation to Searle's theory of institutions.     

Harm concerns predict moral judgments of suicide: Comment on Rottman,Kelemen and Young (2014)

Two prominent theories offer different perspectives on the role of harm in moral cognition. Dyadic morality suggests that harm-related concerns are pervasive, whereas moral pluralism suggests that these concerns apply only to canonically harmful violations (e.g., murder), and not impure violations (e.g., suicide). Rottman et al. (2014) contrast these two theories by examining moral judgments of suicide. They conclude that suicide wrongness is independent of harm, therefore arguing against dyadic morality and for moral pluralism. However, these conclusions may be overstated; across all these studies, a meta-analysis reveals that harm is a significant predictor of suicide judgments. Moreover, the association between harm and suicide wrongness may be suppressed in individual studies by insufficient power, restrictive exclusion criteria, a single bivariate outlier, and reliance upon the conventional significance threshold of p < .05. In revised analyses harm is robustly associated with suicide wrongness, consistent with dyadic morality.     

When Self-Blame Is Rational and Appropriate: The Limited Utility of Socratic Questioning in the Context of Moral Injury: Commentary on Wachen et al. (2016)

In this commentary, we argue that a generally sound therapeutic technique—Socratic questioning—is ill-suited to address a common variant of combat-related emotional and psychological distress. Specifically, moral injury is a term used to describe a syndrome of shame, self-handicapping, anger, and demoralization that occurs when deeply held beliefs and expectations about moral and ethical conduct are transgressed. Importantly, moral injury can and often does result from instances of intentional perpetration. We contend that challenging the accuracy of self-blame in such cases is conceptually problematic and potentially harmful. Such an approach is based on a questionable premise—i.e., that self-blame and resulting guilt are inherently illogical or inaccurate. Though this is often the case, it is not invariably so. We briefly describe an alternate approach—Adaptive Disclosure—that allows for accurate and legitimate self-blame when warranted but also promotes the possibilities of self-forgiveness, compassion, and moral reparation.