Ideological Asymmetries and the Essence of Political Psychology

Individuals are not merely passive vessels of whatever beliefs and opinions they have been exposed to; rather, they are attracted to belief systems that resonate with their own psychological needs and interests, including epistemic, existential, and relational needs to attain certainty, security, and social belongingness. Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, and Sulloway ( 2003 ) demonstrated that needs to manage uncertainty and threat were associated with core values of political conservatism, namely respect for tradition and acceptance of inequality. Since 2003 there have been far more studies on the psychology of left‐right ideology than in the preceding half century, and their empirical yield helps to address lingering questions and criticisms. We have identified 181 studies of epistemic motivation (involving 130,000 individual participants) and nearly 100 studies of existential motivation (involving 360,000 participants). These databases, which are much larger and more heterogeneous than those used in previous meta‐analyses, confirm that significant ideological asymmetries exist with respect to dogmatism, cognitive/perceptual rigidity, personal needs for order/structure/closure, integrative complexity, tolerance of ambiguity/uncertainty, need for cognition, cognitive reflection, self‐deception, and subjective perceptions of threat. Exposure to objectively threatening circumstances—such as terrorist attacks, governmental warnings, and shifts in racial demography—contribute to modest “conservative shifts” in public opinion. There are also ideological asymmetries in relational motivation, including the desire to share reality, perceptions of within‐group consensus, collective self‐efficacy, homogeneity of social networks, and the tendency to trust the government more when one's own political party is in power. Although some object to the very notion that there are meaningful psychological differences between leftists and rightists, the identification of “elective affinities” between cognitive‐motivational processes and contents of specific belief systems is essential to the study of political psychology. Political psychologists may contribute to the development of a good society not by downplaying ideological differences or advocating “Swiss‐style neutrality” when it comes to human values, but by investigating such phenomena critically, even—or perhaps especially—when there is pressure in society to view them uncritically.     

Distress and Avoidance in Generalized Anxiety Disorder: Exploring the Relationships with Intolerance of Uncertainty and Worry

Theory and research suggest that treatments targeting experiential avoidance may enhance outcomes for patients with generalized anxiety disorder (GAD). The present study examined the role of experiential avoidance and distress about emotions in a treatment-seeking sample with a principal diagnosis of GAD compared with demographically matched nonanxious controls and sought to explore their shared relationship with two putative psychopathological processes in GAD: intolerance of uncertainty and worry. Patients with GAD reported significantly higher levels of experiential avoidance and distress about emotions compared with nonclinical controls while controlling for depressive symptoms, and measures of these constructs significantly predicted GAD status. Additionally, experiential avoidance and distress about anxious, positive, and angry emotions shared unique variance with intolerance of uncertainty when negative affect was partialed out, whereas only experiential avoidance and distress about anxious emotions shared unique variance with worry. Discussion focuses on implications for treatment as well as future directions for research.     

Core Job Characteristic and Uncertainty Avoidance: Into the Black Box of Transformational Leadership Effect on Creativity

Drawing upon the job characteristic model and the “management of meaning” perspective, this study examines the process and conditions through which transformational leadership fosters employee creativity. Our results reveal that the effect of transformational leadership on creativity is mediated by employees’ perceptions of core job characteristics (variety, identity, significance, autonomy, feedback). This mediation effect is further moderated by employees’ uncertainty avoidance orientation. Specifically, transformational leaders foster creativity through followers’ perceptions of core job characteristics only among employees low on uncertainty avoidance. The association between enhanced job characteristics and creativity is more positive for employees with low uncertainty avoidance orientation than those with high uncertainty avoidance orientation. Implications and future research directions are discussed.     

The Relationship Between Need for Closure and Conservative Beliefs in Western and Eastern Europe

This work explored the hypothesis that need for closure is associated with the adoption of conservative ideology. Two different studies on eastern and western European samples (Polish and Flemish) supported the hypothesis that need for closure—as measured by Webster and Kruglanski's (1994 ) Need for Closure Scale—is related to conservative beliefs. However, in the second study, a negative relationship between need for closure and economic conservatism in the Polish sample was noted, whereas a positive relationship occurred in the Flemish sample. These results may be accounted for by the Need for Simple Structure factor of Neuberg, Judice, and West (1997 ) and by specific rather than non-specific epistemic processes.     

The Two Dimensions of Narcissistic Personality and Support for the Radical Right: The Role of Right-wing Authoritarianism,Social Dominance Orientation and Anti-immigrant Sentiment

This paper offers an explanation of the link between grandiose narcissism and support for radical right parties. Drawing on representative data of the GESIS Panel (N = 2827), focusing on support for the German radical right populist party Alternative for Germany in 2016 and treating grandiose narcissism as a two-dimensional concept, it is shown that the effects of grandiose narcissism are indirect rather than direct. The paper also reveals that it is mainly narcissistic rivalry that accounts for radical right party support, whereas narcissistic admiration has a protecting relationship. Finally, our results indicate that the indirect effects of narcissistic rivalry on radical right party support via right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation, respectively, are mediated by anti-immigrant sentiment. All in all, our results suggest that in studies on ideological orientations and voting behaviour, both dimensions of grandiose narcissism should be considered due to their contradictory relationship. Moreover, our findings indicate that the success of radical right parties might be the expression of personality dispositions of some parts of the electorate. © 2020 The Authors. European Journal of Personality published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of European Association of Personality Psychology     

Anti‐Immigrant Propaganda by Radical Right Parties and the Intellectual Performance of Adolescents

In recent years radical right political parties have become a substantial electoral force in many countries around the world. Based on the vision of a mono‐ethnic state, anti‐immigration is these parties' core message. Connecting research on discrimination, social exclusion, and social identity threat, it was assumed that this anti‐immigrant propaganda undermines the intellectual performance of immigrant adolescents. In an experiment conducted at Austrian schools, the intelligence test performance of adolescents with an immigration background decreased after they were exposed to radical right election posters whereas ethnic majority adolescents remained unaffected. The results further suggest that individuals with a strong ethnic minority identity are less vulnerable to the detrimental impact of the radical right propaganda.     

Between Avoidance and Problem Solving: Resilience,Self‐Efficacy,and Social Support Seeking

The authors explored resilience, self‐efficacy, and social support seeking as (a) mediators between stress and problem solving and (b) moderators buffering the effect of stress on avoidance. Participants were 220 college students. Structural equation modeling showed that resilience and self‐efficacy positively influenced problem solving but could not buffer stress's effect on avoidance. Social support seeking played a more important role than resilience and self‐efficacy in reducing avoidance when individuals intentionally used social support seeking as a source for problem solving instead of avoidance.     

The Formation of Left‐Right Identification: Pathways and Correlates of Parental Influence

Given the significance of the left‐right dimension as one of the most frequently employed capping term of ideological thought in most western democracies, the question arises as to how people come to identify themselves along this continuum. Drawing on a set of parent‐child pairs located in Catalonia, we seek to determine whether the processes found elsewhere with respect to the intergenerational transmission of partisanship and issue stances also apply to left‐right ideology, in a novel context characterized by the presence of a distinctive, partially cross‐cutting dimension based on center‐periphery loyalties. Results provide strong support for the principles of the direct transmission model as derived from social learning theory, while also showing the significant role of parents' place identities in conditioning the passing on of left‐right orientations.     

依恋焦虑对大学生囤积行为的影响:无法忍受不确定性与经验性回避的序列中介作用

为探讨依恋焦虑、无法忍受不确定性、经验性回避与大学生囤积行为的关系，本研究构建了一个序列中介模型。采用问卷法对黑龙江等地高校的610名大学生进行调查研究。结果发现：（1）无法忍受不确定性和经验性回避在依恋焦虑与大学生囤积行为之间均起部分中介作用；（2）无法忍受不确定性和经验性回避在依恋焦虑和大学生囤积行为之间构成序列中介，即依恋焦虑个体通过增强无法忍受不确定性，从而提高经验性回避倾向，进而增加大学生的囤积行为。研究进一步从认知和应对手段角度来考察依恋焦虑对大学生囤积行为的作用机制，对囤积行为的预防和干预具有启示意义。     

From Stigmatized Immigrants to Radical Right Voting: A Multilevel Study on the Role of Threat and Contact

This study examines the interplay between presence of stigmatized immigrants, threat, and intergroup contact that underlies radical right voting (voting propensity and actual district‐level vote results). On the one hand, low‐status immigrants are often stigmatized and depicted as threats. Thus, presence of stigmatized immigrants should heighten threat perceptions, thereby increasing radical right voting. On the other hand, as positive contact with stigmatized immigrants is known to reduce anti‐immigrant prejudice, it should also attenuate radical right voting. As predicted, multilevel path analyses with the Swiss Election Studies 2011 data (N = 1,736 respondents in 136 districts) revealed that the proportion of stigmatized immigrants (from former Yugoslavia and Albania) in districts heightened perceived threat. Threat perceptions, in turn, increased propensity to vote for the Swiss People's Party, the major radical right party. In contrast, experiencing positive, everyday contact with former Yugoslav and Albanian immigrants reduced voting propensity through attenuated threat perceptions. Contact and threat perceptions were also related to the actual vote through voting propensity.     

The Irony of Social Trust: Individual‐level and Contextual‐level Links with Protest Intention and Radical Right Support in Switzerland

This research examines how social trust translates into dynamics of mobilisation for inclusion or exclusion in Swiss cantons by studying how social trust is linked to equality‐directed protest intention versus radical right support, comparing individual‐level and contextual‐level relationships. The study is based on data from the Swiss Household Panel collected between 2002 and 2008. The impact of individual‐level and contextual‐level social trust is analysed in three‐level regression models of repeated observations, nested in individuals who are nested in cantons. The results indicate complex patterns that depend on the level at which social trust is assessed and confirm the need for a contextualised view of social trust and social capital. For individuals, higher social trust is associated with higher protest intention and lower radical right support. However, in cantons characterised by higher rates of social trust, individuals are less likely to engage in protest actions and more likely to support the radical right. Further analyses show that canton‐level social trust is intertwined with other contextual factors, suggesting that in certain configurations, that is, combined with low levels of cultural and social diversity, climates of social trust may be linked to more restricted forms of solidarity and the persistence of inequality. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

People Wait Longer when the Alternative is Risky: The Relation Between Preferences in Risky and Inter‐temporal Choice

In two experiments, we demonstrate that despite indicating indifference when probed about risk or delay in isolation, when forced to explicitly trade‐off between the two, participants prefer delayed over risky rewards. This pattern of findings sets a boundary condition for any common utility‐based comparison process involving both risk and delay. Furthermore, this change from indifference‐in‐isolation to delay‐preference‐in‐a‐trade‐off strengthens as reward amount increases. Exploratory modeling results suggest that the shift in preference can be explained by allowing for different discount rates for delay‐only choices compared with when delay is in competition with risk. This explanation is better than one in which probability weighting is different between risk‐only choices and risks considered in the presence of a delay. Together, the empirical and modeling work lays a path for future investigations of why and when people's evaluation of the properties of risky and delayed choices vary as a function of the alternatives on offer. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The French New Right: multiculturalism of the right and the recognition/exclusionism syndrome

This article studies a seeming paradox – the adoption of multi-culturalist strategies and arguments by the neo-fascist European New Right. Why would neo-fascists adopt such a theoretical framework, and why has multiculturalism failed in Europe? In this article, I argue that the European New Right employs a multiculturalism framework, which I define as a recognition/exclusionist one, in order to create a new discourse of ‘legitimate exclusionism’ of non-authentic European immigrants. In short, multiculturalism, by celebrating differences between ethnic and cultural groups, inherently admits that there exist such differences between individuals. This allows neo-fascists to distinguish between themselves and ‘others’, immigrants not sharing their cultural heritage, and to claim the need for protecting such a cultural heritage through exclusion of others. As this article attempts to claim, immigrants will not benefit from multiculturalism, but the right of the radical integralist in its different versions.     

On the Relation Between Religiosity and the Endorsement of Conspiracy Theories: The Role of Political Orientation

Religious and conspiracy beliefs share the feature of assuming powerful forces that determine the fate of the world. Correspondingly, they have been theorized to address similar psychological needs and to be based on similar cognitions, but there exist little authoritative answers about their relationship. We delineate two theory-driven possibilities. If conspiracy theories and religions serve as surrogates for each other by fulfilling similar needs, the two beliefs should be negatively correlated. If conspiracy and religious beliefs stem from the same values and cognitions, this would speak for a positive correlation that might be diminished—for example—by controlling for shared political ideologies. We approached the question with a meta-analysis (N = 10,242), partial correlations from large Christian-dominated datasets from Germany, Poland, and the United States (N = 12,612), and a preregistered U.S. study (N = 500). The results indicate that the correlations between religiosity and conspiracy theory endorsement were positive, and political orientation shared large parts of this covariance. Correlations of religiosity with the more need-related conspiracy mentality differed between countries. We conclude that similarities in the explanatory style and ideologies seem to be central for the relation between intrinsic religiosity and endorsing conspiracy theories, but psychological needs only play a minor role.     

The Automaticity of Affect for Political Leaders, Groups, and Issues: An Experimental Test of the Hot Cognition Hypothesis

We report the results of three experimental tests of the "hot cognition" hypothesis, which posits that all sociopolitical concepts that have been evaluated in the past are affectively charged and that this affective charge is automatically activated within milliseconds on mere exposure to the concept, appreciably faster than conscious appraisal of the object.
We find support for the automaticity of affect toward political leaders, groups, and issues; specifically:

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  Most Ss show significantly faster reaction times to affectively congruent political concepts and significantly slower response times to affectively incongruent concepts;

       
  
  

论健康权的国际合作与援助义务

目前,在全球健康领域存在诸多不平等,各国均有义务对外开展合作与援助。这种健康权的国际合作与援助义务主要以国际法规则和有关政治承诺为基础,由此也明确了该义务的依据和范围。我国作为发展中的大国,要辩证地看待这项国际义务：既应积极履行该项国际义务,同时也要努力寻求国际合作,并完善本国健康权保护体系。     

Uncertainty and risk during the COVID-19 pandemic: A latent profile analysis

In the present study, we examine how subgroups of people are characterized by different profiles of uncertainty surrounding COVID-19, susceptibility, and recovery. Participants (N = 199) were U.S. residents recruited online for a longitudinal study during the summer of 2020. We first, identified groups using latent profile analysis (LPA) and then examined whether these profiles predicted differences in COVID-related risky and preventative behaviors. LPA identified five distinct profiles of people representing a combination of low and high uncertainty and low, moderate, and high risk perceptions. Results revealed that latent-profile group membership predicted intention to interact with others outside of the household, intention to engage in non-essential shopping, intention to attend an in-person religious gathering, intention to wear a mask in public, and self-reported physical distancing in the past week. Profile membership did not predict intentions to: dine out, go to the nail/hair salon, go to the gym, nor physically distance from others in the future, nor did it predict handwashing in the past week.     

Within the Limits of Civic Training: Education Moderates the Relationship Between Openness and Political Attitudes

Research demonstrates that the Big‐Five's Openness to Experience is inversely associated with political conservatism. This literature, however, implicitly assumes that the strength of this relationship is invariant across the electorate. We challenge this assumption by arguing that education—an institution designed to increase civic competence—affects the degree to which personality predicts various political attitudes. Specifically, we posit that education facilitates people's ability to identify issue positions that (theoretically) resonate with their personality. Using a national probability sample of New Zealand voters (n = 6,518), we show that education consistently moderates the relationship between personality and a host of political attitudes. Whereas Openness to Experience is inversely associated with politically conservative issue positions among the highly educated, it is often uncorrelated with the same attitudes among those with low levels of educational attainment. These results identify an important—though often neglected—moderator of the relationship between personality and political attitudes.     

Moral Identity Predicts Adherence to COVID-19 Mitigation Procedures Depending on Political Ideology: A Comparison Between the USA and New Zealand

Reducing the spread of infectious viruses (e.g., COVID-19) can depend on societal compliance with effective mitigations. Identifying factors that influence adherence can inform public policy. In many cases, public health messaging has become highly moralized, focusing on the need to act for the greater good. In such contexts, a person's moral identity may influence behavior and serve to increase compliance through different mechanisms: if a person sees compliance as the right thing to do (internalization) and/or if a person perceives compliance as something others will notice as the right thing to do (symbolization). We argue that in societies that are more politically polarized, people's political ideology may interact with their moral identity to predict compliance. We hypothesized that where polarization is high (e.g., USA), moral identity should positively predict compliance for liberals to a greater extent than for conservatives. However, this effect would not occur where polarization is low (e.g., New Zealand). Moral identity, political ideology, and support for three different COVID-19 mitigation measures were assessed in both nations (N = 1,980). Results show that while moral identity can influence compliance, the political context of the nation must also be taken into account.     

Beyond “Heartless Conservative” and “Bleeding Heart Liberal” Caricatures: How Religiosity Shapes the Relationship Between Political Orientation and Empathy

Is political orientation associated with self‐reported empathy? Popular caricatures frame political orientation in terms of the “heartless conservative” and the “bleeding heart liberal.” Yet, previous research has produced findings that present mixed evidence to support these caricatures. Using data from the 2004 General Social Survey, analyses show that the caricatures of the caring liberal and the cold‐hearted conservative are supported by results for empathy—in which conservatives have lower levels of empathy than liberals—but this pattern holds only when individuals also have low levels of religiosity. In the context of high religiosity, self‐identified conservatives do not have lower empathy than self‐identified liberals, net of a host of sociodemographic characteristics. Our observations demonstrate that patterns in empathy across political orientation are evident only when levels of different forms of religiosity are considered.