Distributing Responsibility in the Debate on Sustainable Biofuels

In the perception of technology innovation two world views compete for domination: technological and social determinism. Technological determinism holds that societal change is caused by technological developments, social determinism holds the opposite. Although both were quite central to discussion in the philosophy, history and sociology of technology in the 1970s and 1980s, neither is seen as mainstream now. They do still play an important role as background philosophies in societal debates and offer two very different perspectives on where the responsibilities for an ethically sound development of novel technologies lie. In this paper we will elaborate on these to two opposing views on technology development taking the recent debate on the implementation of biofuels as a case example.     

Distributing working memory resources during problem solving

This study examines how problem solvers distribute working memory demands over internal and external resources. Participants recorded notes while performing an arithmetic task. They recorded a majority of intermediate results and labeled many of those results (e.g., "C = 10"). When more effort was required to take notes, participants recorded fewer results. Participants with a consistent goal structure recorded fewer results and with practice labeled fewer recorded results than those with varied goal structures. When notes were displayed in a consistent spatial arrangement participants labeled fewer recorded results than when notes appeared in varied locations. These findings indicate that individuals use explicit and implicit strategies for indexing intermediate results. The data support the view that individuals flexibly distribute working memory over internal and external resources in response to situational cost-benefit considerations.     

Wanton Responsibility

Mainstream accounts of responsible agency either overlook or discount wanton agents as plausible candidates for responsible agency. This is largely due to the compatibilist project of such accounts, and to their deemphasis of historical and modal considerations. I argue that wantons – those who are indifferent to the desires that move them to act – can and ought to be counted as responsible agents. Indeed, they deserve special blame for the acts of wrong doing that issue from their wanton behavior.     

Semantic Responsibility

Abstract

In this paper I attempt to develop a notion of responsibility (semantic responsibility) that is to the notion of belief what epistemic responsibility is to the notion of justification. ‘Being semantically responsible’ is shown to involve the fulfilment of cognitive duties which allow the agent to engage in the kind of reason-laden discourses which render her beliefs appropriately sensitive to correction. The concept of semantic responsibility suggests that the notion of belief found in contemporary philosophical debates about content implicitly encompasses radically different classes of beliefs. In what follows I make those different types explicit, and sketch some implications for naturalisation projects in semantics and for accounts of the (putative) non-conceptual content of perceptual experiences.     

Global Responsibility

ABSTRACT Concern with global responsibility for survival as such invites the creation of a specific international organization. The new body should adjudicate as to which disputes are open (such as, for example, concerning the advisability of building nuclear plants) and which are not (for example, white supremacy); most significantly, the new body should carefully guard its credibility by sticking to veracity, by avoiding deceit even in extreme situations. In particular it behoves us all to confess that we have no solution to our most urgent problems.     

Collective Responsibility

The basic bearer of responsibility is individuals, because that isall there are – nothing else can literally be the bearer of fullresponsibility. Claims about group responsibility therefore needanalysis. This would be impossible if all actions must be understoodas ones that could be performed whether or not anyone else exists.Individuals often act by virtue of membership in certain groups;often such membership bears a causal role in our behavior, andsometimes people act deliberately in order to promote the prospectsof members of a given group. Nevertheless, it is rational to awardproportionally to individual contributions to those actions andindividual shares in the production of the consequences of thoseactions.     

Role Responsibility

This article is about ‘role responsibility’ as understood by H. L. A. Hart in his taxonomy of responsibility concepts in his book, Punishment and Responsibility. More particularly, it focuses on what I call ‘public, institutional role responsibility’. The main arguments are that (1) such role responsibility is based on authority and power rather than physical and mental capacity; and (2) the foundation of role responsibility in authority has significant implications for what Hart referred to as ‘liability–responsibility’, which I unpack in terms of ‘attribution’, ‘accountability’ and ‘liability’. The article addresses possible objections to the authority-based analysis of role responsibility based on the concept of ‘moral’ responsibility, and on understandings of what types of question are ‘philosophical.’     

Distributing versus focusing attention in visual short-term memory

Visual short-term memory (VSTM) is traditionally considered a robust form of visual memory resistant to interference from subsequent visual input. This study shows that the robustness of VSTM depends on the way attention is allocated in VSTM. When attention is distributed across multiple memory items, VSTM for these items is vulnerable to interference from subsequent input, including passively viewed images and the postchange testing displays. Yet attention can readjust its focus in VSTM on the basis of an attentional orienting cue presented long after encoding. When attention is oriented to a particular memorized item, the memory is resistant to subsequent interference. This effect, however, is eliminated when the subset of items demanding focal attention exceeds one, suggesting that orienting attention in VSTM is less flexible than orienting attention in perception. We propose that the robustness of VSTM is influenced by whether attention is focused or distributed in VSTM.