Nonindexical contextualism

Philosophers on all sides of the contextualism debates have had an overly narrow conception of what semantic context sensitivity could be. They have conflated context sensitivity (dependence of truth or extension on features of context) with indexicality (dependence of content on features of context). As a result of this conflation, proponents of contextualism have taken arguments that establish only context sensitivity to establish indexicality, while opponents of contextualism have taken arguments against indexicality to be arguments against context sensitivity. Once these concepts are carefully pulled apart, it becomes clear that there is conceptual space in semantic theory for nonindexical forms of contextualism that have many advantages over the usual indexical forms.     

Selective stereotype activation: The joint impact of interpersonal goals and task context

In complex social interactions, such as co‐operation or competition with another person on an ability test, people tend to activate stereotypes strategically in order to achieve their self‐enhancement goals. If multiple ways of categorizing the target person are available, the selected stereotypical traits that serve their motives might also depend on the specific task context in which the interaction is situated. We assumed that people selectively process trait information in order to increase their perceived chances to win in a currently performed task. We tested this hypothesis in a study in which participants were told to perform an analytical or emotional skills task having as a co‐operator or rival, a multiple categorizable target person (female computer science student). In the analytical task context, we found stronger inhibition of stereotypically female traits in the co‐operation than in the competition condition. In the emotional skills task context, we found stronger inhibition of computer scientist traits in the co‐operation than competition condition. The interactive nature of goals and context influences on stereotype activation is discussed and some theoretical implications about the dynamics of stereotype activation processes are drawn. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Ebbinghaus illusion deceives adults but not young children

The sensitivity of size perception to context has been used to distinguish between ‘vision for action’ and ‘vision for perception’, and to study cultural, psychopathological, and developmental differences in perception. The status of that evidence is much debated, however. Here we use a rigorous double dissociation paradigm based on the Ebbinghaus illusion, and find that for children below 7 years of age size discrimination is much less affected by surround size. Young children are less accurate than adults when context is helpful, but more accurate when context is misleading. Even by the age of 10 years context‐sensitivity is still not at adult levels. Therefore, size contrast as shown by the Ebbinghaus illusion is not a built‐in property of the ventral pathway subserving vision for perception but a late development of it, and low sensitivity to the Ebbinghaus illusion in autism is not primary to the pathology. Our findings also show that, although adults in Western cultures have low context‐sensitivity relative to East Asians, they have high context‐sensitivity relative to children. Overall, these findings reveal a gradual developmental trend toward ever broader contextual syntheses. Such developments are advantageous, but the price paid for them is that, when context is misleading, adults literally see the world less accurately than they did as children.     

Epistemic Contextualism and the Semantics-Pragmatics Distinction

Contextualism, in its standard form, is the view that the truth conditions of sentences of the form ‘S knows that P’ vary according to the context in which they are uttered. One possible objection to contextualism appeals to what Keith DeRose calls a warranted assertability maneuver (or WAM), according to which it is not our knowledge sentences themselves that have context-sensitive truth conditions, but what is pragmatically conveyed by the use of such sentences. Thus, proponents of WAMs argue, the context sensitivity of knowledge attributions is not a semantic phenomenon but a pragmatic one. I examine a number of WAMs and show that each (i) is seriously flawed, or (ii) undercuts standard contextualism if we hold a minimalist conception of semantic content. I propose an alternative form of contextualism that accommodates minimalism and is immune to the second type of WAM, and show that this new form of contextualism shares the virtues of standard contextualism.     

An eye-tracking investigation into readers' sensitivity to actual versus expected utility in the comprehension of conditionals

The successful comprehension of a utility conditional (i.e., an “if p, then q” statement where p and/or q is valued by one or more agents) requires the construction of a mental representation of the situation described by that conditional and integration of this representation with prior context. In an eye-tracking experiment, we examined the time course of integrating conditional utility information into the broader discourse model. Specifically, the experiment determined whether readers were sensitive, during rapid heuristic processing, to the congruency between the utility of the consequent clause of a conditional (positive or negative) and a reader's subjective expectations based on prior context. On a number of eye-tracking measures we found that readers were sensitive to conditional utility—conditionals for which the consequent utility mismatched the utility that would be anticipated on the basis of prior context resulted in processing disruption. Crucially, this sensitivity emerged on measures that are accepted to indicate early processing within the language comprehension system and suggests that the evaluation of a conditional's utility informs the early stages of conditional processing.     

East–West cultural differences in context‐sensitivity are evident in early childhood

Accumulating evidence suggests that North Americans tend to focus on central objects whereas East Asians tend to pay more attention to contextual information in a visual scene. Although it is generally believed that such culturally divergent attention tendencies develop through socialization, existing evidence largely depends on adult samples. Moreover, no past research has investigated the relation between context‐sensitivity and other domains of cognitive development. The present study examined children in the United States and Japan (N = 175, age 4–9 years) to investigate the developmental pattern in context‐sensitivity and its relation to executive function. The study found that context‐sensitivity increased with age across cultures. Nevertheless, Japanese children showed significantly greater context‐sensitivity than American children. Also, context‐sensitivity fully mediated the cultural difference in a set‐shifting executive function task, which might help explain past findings that East Asian children outperformed their American counterparts on executive function.     

Highly sensitive adolescents: The relationship between weekly life events and weekly socioemotional well-being

Recent research into Person × Environment interaction has supported the view that sensitivity to environmental influences is a susceptibility factor rather than a vulnerability factor. Given this perspective, this study examined the role of the adolescent’s sensory-processing sensitivity in the context of weekly life events and weekly socioemotional well-being. In the study, 114 adolescents repeatedly self-reported their sensitivity, recent life events, and recent socioemotional well-being in four surveys at one-week intervals. The results suggested the shape of Sensitivity × Life Events interaction significantly varied from week to week, which is consistent with the vantage sensitivity and diathesis–stress framework. In specific weeks, adolescents with high sensitivity are more likely to benefit from positive events than those with low sensitivity. These sensitive adolescents can be described as developmentally susceptibility rather than vulnerability.     

The Meaning of Life Sub Specie Aeternitatis

Several philosophers have argued that if we examine our lives in context of the cosmos at large, sub specie aeternitatis, we cannot escape life's meaninglessness. To see our lives as meaningful, we have to shun the point of view of the cosmos and consider our lives only in the narrower context of the here and now. I argue that this view is incorrect: life can be seen as meaningful also sub specie aeternitatis. While criticizing arguments by, among others, Simon Blackburn, Nicholas Rescher, and Thomas Nagel, I show that what determines assessments of the meaning of a life are the standards of meaningfulness one endorses rather than the size of the context in which that life is assessed. Employing non-demanding standards of meaningfulness to assess a life is compatible with examining it in the context of the cosmos at large. That is also the case if we accept Nagel's claim that to examine a life sub specie aeternitatis is to examine it externally, impersonally and objectively: life can be evaluated as meaningful also when under these perspectives if the standards of meaningfulness we adopt are not overly challenging. Nor does the contingency of our existence, realized sub specie aeternitatis, render our life meaningless. Contrary to a commonly accepted view, then, examining our lives sub specie aeternitatis does not necessitate that we see them as meaningless.     

Mission Impossible and Wittgenstein's Standard Metre

In this paper, I argue that context sensitivity is crucial for a proper exegesis of Wittgenstein's remark that one can say of the standard metre rod neither that it is one metre long nor that it is not one metre long. I discuss cases in which we can meaningfully assert that the rod in question is one metre long and explain why these cases do not conflict with Wittgenstein's insight. I analyse Pollock's recent defence of Wittgenstein's remark, as well as Kripke's objections to it, and show that, while their commentaries are helpful, blindness to context renders them unsatisfactory.     

Overconfidence at the Keyboard: Confidence and Accuracy in Interpreting Affect in E‐Mail Exchanges

Gesture, voice, expression, and context add richness to communications that increase chances of accurate interpretation. E‐mails lack much of this richness, leading readers to impose their own richness. Three experiments tested the effect of communicator relationship and availability of context on e‐mail writer and reader confidence levels and accuracy. Effects of nonverbal and verbal behavior were also investigated. Results showed that confidence levels for both writers and readers were high, yet somewhat unwarranted based on accuracy rates. Further, writers had more confidence that friends would correctly interpret e‐mails than strangers, although friends showed no more accuracy. Findings suggest that reliance upon friendship and context, as well as verbal and nonverbal cues, to interpret emotion in e‐mail is ineffective, sometimes detrimental.     

Context is Everything (in Emotion Research)

As in many areas of psychological inquiry, context matters for how emotion is experienced, expressed, perceived, and regulated. While this may sound like a truism, emotion research does not always directly theorize, manipulate, or measure emotion with context in mind. To facilitate this process, we present a framework of contextual features that shape emotion‐related processes, and highlight several key factors that have been shown to matter in emotion research. We make four recommendations which we believe will help to better integrate context in emotion science. We argue that a deeper collective understanding, interrogation, and integration of context will propel the field forward theoretically and methodologically, and enhance researchers' ability to probe the mechanisms of human psychological experience. While our focus is on emotion research, we believe that the context framework and associated recommendations will also be useful to other fields of social psychological and personality science.     

How General Do Theories of Explanation Need To Be? *

Theories of explanation seek to tell us what distinctively explanatory information is. The most ambitious ones, such as the DN‐account, seek to tell us what an explanation is, tout court. Less ambitious ones, such as causal theories, restrict themselves to a particular domain of inquiry. The least ambitious theories constitute outright skepticism, holding that there is no reasonably unified phenomenon to give an account of. On these views, it is impossible to give any theories of explanation at all. I argue that both the less ambitious and outright skeptical varieties are committed to a certain context‐sensitivity of our explanatory discourse. And though this discourse is almost certainly context‐sensitive in some respects, it does not exhibit the context‐sensitivity less than fully ambitious theories are committed to. Therefore, all accounts that seek to restrict themselves in scope, including causal accounts of explanation, fail.     

Temporality and metaplasticity. Facing extension and incorporation through material engagement theory

In our everyday life, we have the genuine feeling that when something we use works very well, we forget that we are doing something that is mediated by something else. It happens when we read through our glasses, or when we drive home, or when we play guitar. In all those cases, it can be said that the device becomes an extension of our body, or that we have incorporated it. In this paper I want to discuss the extension/incorporation dichotomy as presented in contemporary cognitive sciences. I will present the state of the art in the debate in order to promote a methodological shift, namely to adopt two concept borrowed from Material Engagement Theory (MET) developed by Lambros Malafouris (2013). By advocating the concepts of temporality and metaplasticity, I will argue for two different but related things: 1) extension and incorporation don’t have to be conceived only spatially, but temporally. This shift leads to two distinctive implications: first, the sooner two entities establish a prosthetic contact, the higher the chances to reach incorporation; second, extension temporally precedes incorporation; the former being an early-staged phenomenon of – a condition of possibility for – the latter. 2) Such a temporal perspective is at the base of metaplasticity, which describes, in the context of MET, the constant, co-constitutive loop between humans and things: metaplasticity deflates the privileged role traditionally attributed to the subject in the making of phenomenal experience. Finally, I will discuss extension and incorporation in media theory, relying on the concept of radical mediation.

     

Effects of context on the rate of conjunctive responses in the probabilistic truth table task

The probabilistic truth table task involves assessing the probability of "If A then C" conditional sentences. Previous studies have shown that a majority of participants assess this probability as the conditional probability P(C│A) while a substantial minority responds with the probability of the conjunction A and C. In an experiment involving 96 participants, we investigated the impact on the rate of conjunctive responses of the context in which the task is framed. We show that a context intended to lead participants to consider all the possible cases (i.e. the throw of a die known to allow six possibilities) elicited more conjunctive responses than a context assumed not to have this effect (an unfamiliar deck of cards). These results suggest that the step of inferring the probability can distort our assessment of participants' interpretation of conditional sentences. This might compromise the validity of the probabilistic task in studying conditional reasoning.     

Negation in context: Evidence from the visual world paradigm

Literature assumes that negation is more difficult to understand than affirmation, but this might depend on the pragmatic context. The goal of this paper is to show that pragmatic knowledge modulates the unfolding processing of negation due to the previous activation of the negated situation. To test this, we used the visual world paradigm. In this task, we presented affirmative (e.g., her dad was rich) and negative sentences (e.g., her dad was not poor) while viewing two images of the affirmed and denied entities. The critical sentence in each item was preceded by one of three types of contexts: an inconsistent context (e.g., She supposed that her dad had little savings) that activates the negated situation (a poor man), a consistent context (e.g., She supposed that her dad had enough savings) that activates the actual situation (a rich man), or a neutral context (e.g., her dad lived on the other side of town) that activates neither of the two models previously suggested. The results corroborated our hypothesis. Pragmatics is implicated in the unfolding processing of negation. We found an increase in fixations on the target compared to the baseline for negative sentences at 800?ms in the neutral context, 600?ms in the inconsistent context, and 1450?ms in the consistent context. Thus, when the negated situation has been previously introduced via an inconsistent context, negation is facilitated.     

Lack of positive experiences and positive expectancies mediate the relationship between BAS responsiveness and depression

The anhedonic symptoms of depression have been linked to a lack of incentive responsiveness, which is a function of the Behavioral Activation System (BAS). Using structural equation modeling within the context of a cross-sectional design, we found that a lack of positive experiences and positive expectancies mediated the BAS-depression link among an undergraduate sample (N = 171). We tested the specificity of this model across four alternative models substituting negative experiences, negative expectancies, threat sensitivity, and symptoms of anxiety for their theoretical counterparts in the original model. In each case, the alternative model did not fit the data as well as our original model. This pattern of results is consistent with the position that a lack of positive experiences and positive expectancies uniquely mediate the relationship between the BAS and anhedonic symptoms of depression.     

Aesthetic Adjectives: Experimental Semantics and Context‐Sensitivity

One aim of this essay is to contribute to understanding aesthetic communication—the process by which agents aim to convey thoughts and transmit knowledge about aesthetic matters to others. Our focus will be on the use of aesthetic adjectives in aesthetic communication. Although theorists working on the semantics of adjectives have developed sophisticated theories about gradable adjectives, they have tended to avoid studying aesthetic adjectives—the class of adjectives that play a central role in expressing aesthetic evaluations (e.g., ‘beautiful’, ‘ugly’, ‘elegant’). And despite the wealth of attention paid to aesthetic adjectives by philosophical aestheticians, they have paid little attention to contemporary linguistic theories of adjectives. We take our work to be a first step in remedying these lacunae. In this paper, we present four experiments that examine one aspect of how aesthetic adjectives ordinarily function: the context‐sensitivity of their application standards. Our results present a prima facie empirical challenge to a common distinction between relative and absolute gradable adjectives because aesthetic adjectives are found to behave differently from both. Our results thus also constitute a prima facie vindication of some philosophical aestheticians’ contention that aesthetic adjectives constitute a particularly interesting segment of natural language, even if the boundaries of this segment might turn out to be different from what they had in mind.     

Place your bets: psychophysiological correlates of decision-making under risk

Emotions and their psychophysiological correlates are thought to play an important role in decision-making under risk. We used a novel gambling task to measure psychophysiological responses during selection of explicitly presented risky options and feedback processing. Active-choice trials, in which the participant had to select the size of bet, were compared to fixed-bet, no-choice trials. We further tested how the chances of winning and bet size affected choice behavior and psychophysiological arousal. Individual differences in impulsive and risk-taking traits were assessed. The behavioral results showed sensitivity to the choice requirement and to the chances of winning: Participants were faster to make a response on no-choice trials and when the chances of winning were high. In active-choice trials, electrodermal activity (EDA) increased with bet size during both selection and processing of losses. Cardiac responses were sensitive to choice uncertainty: Stronger selection-related heart rate (HR) decelerations were observed in trials with lower chances of winning, particularly on active-choice trials. Finally, betting behavior and psychophysiological responsiveness were moderately correlated with self-reported impulsivity-related traits. In conclusion, we demonstrate that psychophysiological arousal covaries with risk-sensitive decision-making outside of a learning context. Our results further highlight the differential sensitivities of EDA and HR to psychological features of the decision scenario.     

General and contextualized emotion goals and its link with well-being across late,middle, and young adulthood

Prior research with young adults has shown how emotion goals (i.e., cognitive representations of preferred emotional states) can be instrumental (positive or negative) depending on the context and how this context sensitivity is linked to higher well-being. However, this research has overlooked older adults. We argue it is important looking at this age group as there is mixed evidence given that on one hand they have been described as exhibiting a positivity bias (hedonic orientation; preference for positive emotion goals), and on the other hand, being capable of suppressing this when it is adaptive to do so. Importantly, this bias towards positive emotion goals has been linked to better emotion regulation and higher well-being in older adults. In order to understand whether older adults can also exhibit instrumental emotion goals and whether this is linked to well-being, we conducted an exploratory study with older (N = 43, M_age = 68.33), middle (N = 47, M_age = 43.83), and young adults (N = 47; M_age = 21.98) who reported about their general and contextual emotion goals (in collaboration and confrontation), their well-being, and their current positive and negative affect. Although older adults reported lower negative affect than young adults, there were no age differences for general and contextualized emotion goals. Across the three age groups, a higher preference for happiness in general and in collaboration was linked to higher well-being. The obtained results highlight the need to study emotion goals longitudinally to better understand their possible changes throughout the lifespan and their influence on well-being.     

Shattering the illusion of control: Multi-shot versus single-shot gambles

The illusion of control refers to a phenomenon whereby people believe their chances of success at a task are greater than would be warranted by objective analysis. This article raises two questions. First, how robust is the illusion of control? Second, how might the illusion be ‘shattered?’ Previous experimental demonstrations involved situations that can be likened to unique or single-shot gambles. If, however, the phenomenon is robust, it should occur in repeated or multi-shot gambles in which the outcome depends on a series of gambles involving the same underlying random process. It should also appear in single-shot gambles that are framed so as to superficially resemble multi-shot gambles. We label this the strong illusion of control hypothesis. On the other hand, because people have a better appreciation of probabilistic concepts in tasks they are able to represent as relative frequencies, the introduction of a multi-shot or ‘pseudo-multi-shot’ context might cue people to the random nature of the task, thereby shattering the illusion. The weak illusion of control hypothesis holds that the illusion of control will occur in single-shot but not in multi-shot or pseudo-multi-shot gambles. Two studies are reported that support the weak hypothesis. Alternative explanations are considered and implications are discussed.