条件推理的条件概率模型述评

该文从理论模型和实验范式两个方面对Oaksford等人提出的条件推理概率模型作了综合评述,并充分肯定该模型将演绎推理与归纳推理结合起来进行研究对推理心理学的发展所作出的重要贡献。     

Conditional theories

This paper introduces conditional logic, that is, a variant of free logic where the existence condition of a function is defined by a formula of the formal language. Syntax and semantics are developed. A completeness theorem is given.     

Heresies of the Heart and the Problem of the Other: A Psychoanalytic and Theological Perspective

In this article, I unmoor the concept of heresy from its religious, technical roots, using the metaphor heresies of the heart to depict the psychological and theological dynamics of the human proclivity to rely on the idea of Truth to alienate, depersonalize, and coerce other human beings. Using the concepts of the personal mode of existence and emotional intelligence, I define heresies of the heart as comprising (a) those emotional attitudes that involve the transformation of insecurity and anxiety into hostility and hatred toward the Other, (b) recognition and treatment of the Other as less than a person, and (c) unquestionable beliefs regarding one’s truth and the certainty of one’s innocence. Theologically, heresies of the heart signify the presence of idolatry, which is a type of bad faith that involves the use of a contingent object to contain anxiety by transforming it into hostility toward the Other.     

Subjunctive Conditional Probability

There seem to be two ways of supposing a proposition: supposing “indicatively” that Shakespeare didn’t write Hamlet, it is likely that someone else did; supposing “subjunctively” that Shakespeare hadn’t written Hamlet, it is likely that nobody would have written the play. Let P(B//A) be the probability of B on the subjunctive supposition that A. Is P(B//A) equal to the probability of the corresponding counterfactual, A □→B? I review recent triviality arguments against this hypothesis and argue that they do not succeed. On the other hand, I argue that even if we can equate P(B//A) with P(A □→B), we still need an account of how subjunctive conditional probabilities are related to unconditional probabilities. The triviality arguments reveal that the connection is not as straightforward as one might have hoped.     

Conditional Ranking Revision

In the context of a general framework for belief dynamics which interprets revision as doxastic constraint satisfaction, we discuss a proposal for revising quasi-probabilistic belief measures with finite sets of graded conditionals. The belief states are ranking measures with divisible values (generalizing Spohn’s epistemology), and the conditionals are interpreted as ranking constraints. The approach is inspired by the minimal information paradigm and based on the principle-guided canonical construction of a ranking model of the input conditionals. This is achieved by extending techniques known from conditional default reasoning. We give an overview of how it handles different principles for conditional and parallel revision and compare it with similar accounts.     

Intuitionistic Conditional Logics

Journal of Philosophical Logic - Building on recent work by Yale Weiss, we study conditional logics in the intuitionistic setting. We consider a number of semantic conditions which give rise, among...     

Conditional Excluded Middle

In this essay I renew the case for Conditional Excluded Middle (CXM) in light of recent developments in the semantics of the subjunctive conditional. I argue that Michael Tooley’s recent backward causation counterexample to the Stalnaker-Lewis comparative world similarity semantics undermines the strongest argument against CXM, and I offer a new, principled argument for the validity of CXM that is in no way undermined by Tooley’s counterexample. Finally, I formulate a simple semantics for the subjunctive conditional that is consistent with both CXM and Tooley’s counterexample.

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A Paraconsistent Conditional Logic

Journal of Philosophical Logic - We develop a paraconsistent logic by introducing new models for conditionals with acceptive and rejective selection functions which are variants of Chellas’...     

Basic Intuitionistic Conditional Logic

Journal of Philosophical Logic - Conditional logics have traditionally been intended to formalize various intuitively correct modes of reasoning involving (counterfactual) conditional expressions...     

Avoiding the Conditional Fallacy

Over-simple internalist accounts of practical reasons imply that we cannot have reasons to become more rational, because they claim that we have a reason to φ only if we would have some desire to φ if we were fully rational. But if we were fully rational, we would have no desire to become more rational. Robert Johnson has recently argued that in their attempts to avoid this problem, existing versions of internalism yield reasons which do not have an appropriate connection with potential explanations of action. I suggest that the problem is partly a result of failure to see that action-tokens are usually tokens of a wide variety of action-types, and that the internalist conditional need only be true of one of these types in order to justify a reason claim about the token.     

Conditional reasoning and conditionalization

In solving conditional reasoning problems, reasoners are assumed to compute the probability of the conclusion, conditionalizing first on the categorical premise, giving the knowledge-based component, and conditionalizing then on the conditional-statement premise, from which the assumption-based component is derived. Because reasoners find it difficult to compute the second-step conditionalization except when the conditional-statement premise is found to be related to the result of the first-step conditionalization as for modus ponens or, possibly, for modus tollens, the knowledge-based component generally dominates reasoning performance. After representing all the possible cases in which conditional-argument forms may appear, this approach was found to be consistent with the results from the 3 experiments reported in this study, whereas 2 alternative hypotheses account for only some of the results.