条件推理的条件概率模型述评

该文从理论模型和实验范式两个方面对Oaksford等人提出的条件推理概率模型作了综合评述,并充分肯定该模型将演绎推理与归纳推理结合起来进行研究对推理心理学的发展所作出的重要贡献。     

Conditional theories

This paper introduces conditional logic, that is, a variant of free logic where the existence condition of a function is defined by a formula of the formal language. Syntax and semantics are developed. A completeness theorem is given.     

Subjunctive Conditional Probability

There seem to be two ways of supposing a proposition: supposing “indicatively” that Shakespeare didn’t write Hamlet, it is likely that someone else did; supposing “subjunctively” that Shakespeare hadn’t written Hamlet, it is likely that nobody would have written the play. Let P(B//A) be the probability of B on the subjunctive supposition that A. Is P(B//A) equal to the probability of the corresponding counterfactual, A □→B? I review recent triviality arguments against this hypothesis and argue that they do not succeed. On the other hand, I argue that even if we can equate P(B//A) with P(A □→B), we still need an account of how subjunctive conditional probabilities are related to unconditional probabilities. The triviality arguments reveal that the connection is not as straightforward as one might have hoped.     

Conditional Ranking Revision

In the context of a general framework for belief dynamics which interprets revision as doxastic constraint satisfaction, we discuss a proposal for revising quasi-probabilistic belief measures with finite sets of graded conditionals. The belief states are ranking measures with divisible values (generalizing Spohn’s epistemology), and the conditionals are interpreted as ranking constraints. The approach is inspired by the minimal information paradigm and based on the principle-guided canonical construction of a ranking model of the input conditionals. This is achieved by extending techniques known from conditional default reasoning. We give an overview of how it handles different principles for conditional and parallel revision and compare it with similar accounts.     

Conditional Excluded Middle

In this essay I renew the case for Conditional Excluded Middle (CXM) in light of recent developments in the semantics of the subjunctive conditional. I argue that Michael Tooley’s recent backward causation counterexample to the Stalnaker-Lewis comparative world similarity semantics undermines the strongest argument against CXM, and I offer a new, principled argument for the validity of CXM that is in no way undermined by Tooley’s counterexample. Finally, I formulate a simple semantics for the subjunctive conditional that is consistent with both CXM and Tooley’s counterexample.

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Intuitionistic Conditional Logics

Journal of Philosophical Logic - Building on recent work by Yale Weiss, we study conditional logics in the intuitionistic setting. We consider a number of semantic conditions which give rise, among...     

Heresies of the Heart and the Problem of the Other: A Psychoanalytic and Theological Perspective

In this article, I unmoor the concept of heresy from its religious, technical roots, using the metaphor heresies of the heart to depict the psychological and theological dynamics of the human proclivity to rely on the idea of Truth to alienate, depersonalize, and coerce other human beings. Using the concepts of the personal mode of existence and emotional intelligence, I define heresies of the heart as comprising (a) those emotional attitudes that involve the transformation of insecurity and anxiety into hostility and hatred toward the Other, (b) recognition and treatment of the Other as less than a person, and (c) unquestionable beliefs regarding one’s truth and the certainty of one’s innocence. Theologically, heresies of the heart signify the presence of idolatry, which is a type of bad faith that involves the use of a contingent object to contain anxiety by transforming it into hostility toward the Other.     

Bisimulation for Conditional Modalities

We give a definition of bisimulation for conditional modalities interpreted on selection functions and prove the correspondence between bisimilarity and modal equivalence, generalizing the Hennessy–Milner Theorem to a wide class of conditional operators. We further investigate the operators and semantics to which these results apply. First, we show how to derive a solid notion of bisimulation for conditional belief, behaving as desired both on plausibility models and on evidence models. These novel definitions of bisimulations are exploited in a series of undefinability results. Second, we treat relativized common knowledge, underlining how the same results still hold for a different modality in a different semantics. Third, we show the flexibility of the approach by generalizing it to multi-agent systems, encompassing the case of multi-agent plausibility models.     

Conditional reasoning and causation

An experiment was conducted to investigate the relative contributions of syntactic form and content to conditional reasoning. The content domain chosen was that of causation. Conditional statements that described causal relationships (if mean value of cause, then mean value of effect) were embedded in simple arguments whose entailments are governed by the rules of truth-functional logic (i.e., modus ponens, modus tollens, denying the antecedent, and affirming the consequent). The causal statements differed in terms of the number of alternative causes and disabling conditions that characterized the causal relationship. (A disabling condition is an event that prevents an effect from occurring even though a relevant cause is present). Subjects were required to judge whether or not each argument's conclusion could be accepted. Judgements were found to vary systematically with the number of alternative causes and disabling conditions. Conclusions of arguments based on conditionals with few alternative causes or disabling conditions were found to be more acceptable than conclusions based on those with many.     

Defending Conditional Excluded Middle

Lewis (1973) gave a short argument against conditional excluded middle, based on his treatment of ‘might’ counterfactuals. Bennett (2003) , with much of the recent literature, gives an alternative take on ‘might’ counterfactuals. But Bennett claims the might‐argument against CEM still goes through. This turns on a specific claim I call Bennett’s Hypothesis. I argue that independently of issues to do with the proper analysis of might‐counterfactuals, Bennett’s Hypothesis is inconsistent with CEM. But Bennett’s Hypothesis is independently objectionable, so we should resolve this tension by dropping the Hypothesis, not by dropping CEM.     

Basic Intuitionistic Conditional Logic

Journal of Philosophical Logic - Conditional logics have traditionally been intended to formalize various intuitively correct modes of reasoning involving (counterfactual) conditional expressions...