From Metaphysical to Substantive Naturalism: A Case Study

This paper addresses two related questions. First, what is involved in giving a distinctively realist and naturalist construal of an area of discourse, that is, in so much as stating a distinctively realist and naturalist position about, for example, content or value? I defend a condition that guarantees the realism and naturalism of any position satisfying it, at least in the case of positions on content, but perhaps in other cases as well. Second, what sorts of considerations render a distinctively realist and naturalist position more plausible than its irrealist and non-naturalist rivals? The answer here focuses again on theories of content and is wholly negative. I argue that the standard array of arguments offered in support of realist and naturalist theories in fact provide equal support for a host of irrealist and non-naturalist ones. Taken together, these considerations reveal an important gap in the recent philosophical literature on content. The challenge to proponents of putatively realist and naturalist theories is to insure that those theories so much as state distinctively realist and naturalist positions and then to identify arguments that support what is distinctively realist and naturalist about them.

... the deepest motivation for intentional irrealism derives ... from a certain ontological intuition: that there is no place for intentional categories in a physicalistic view of the world; that the intentional can't be naturalized.'' Fodor (1987, p. 97).

``Realists about representational states ... must ... have some view about what it is for a state to be representational ....

Well, what would it be like to have a serious theory of representation? Here there is some consensus to work from. The worry about representation is above all that the semantic (and/or intentional) will prove permanently recalcitrant to integration in the natural order ... ''Fodor (1990, p. 32).

     

Metaphysical Systematics: A Lesson from Whitehead

Despite its lack of influence in analytical philosophy, and independently of its content as a process philosophy, Whitehead's system in Process and Reality affords a valuable lesson on how to pursue revisionary systematic metaphysics. This paper argues the case generally for metaphysical revision and system, describes the structure of Whitehead's categorial scheme, endorses his idea of an ultimate which is not an entity, and outlines an alternative, “digital” ultimate or basis composed of several analytical factors. [I]n the absence of a well-defined categoreal scheme of entities, issuing in a satisfactory metaphysical system, every premise in a philosophical argument is under suspicion. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Analytic Voyages: Surprises at Sea Reply to Commentaries

I elaborate, at the level of unconscious fantasy, the oedipal recognition of “threeness” as a traumatic disruption that can have the quality of a sudden shock and that can be experienced as an assault on (dyadic) “reality.” I then take up the question of the individuality of choice, given the impact of the cultural surround. A relationship is identified between female attire and the regulation of sexual excitement. The focus on maternal sexual subjectivity is extended to include consideration of women as subjects of beauty. I contend that female beauty, including the erotic, is a communication not solely to men but between women, within any given woman, and, at core, between mother and infant.     

The Metaphysical Club: A Story of Ideas in America

The Psychological Record -     

Skepticism and elegance: problems for the abductivist reply to Cartesian skepticism

Some philosophers argue that we are justified in rejecting skepticism because it is explanatorily inferior to more commonsense hypotheses about the world. Focusing on the work of Jonathan Vogel, I show that this “abductivist” or “inference to the best explanation” response rests on an impoverished explanatory framework which ignores the explanatory gap between an object's having certain properties and its appearing to have those properties. Once this gap is appreciated, I argue, the abductivist strategy is defeated.     

Generations Lost: A Cancer Genetics Case Report

The process of cancer genetic counseling can unearth issues that, sometimes unbeknownst to the counselor, are emotionally and psychologically significant to the patient. The following case report illustrates how the precounseling process of obtaining a medical chart on a deceased parent affected two sister counselees. This medical chart helped these sisters to reconnect with the mother they lost as children and to better understand her struggle with breast cancer. This case also chronicles the counselor's professional growth and discovery during this process.     

汉语"是"的形而上之谜——"是"为什么发展为判断词?

汉语判断词“是”的问题 ,历来是我国语言学界关注的焦点 ,但大半个世纪过去了 ,有关的诸多问题仍然是一大谜团 ;近年来 ,“是”又成为哲学界关注的热点。哲学界的讨论 ,与我们讨论了整整大半个世纪的汉语判断词“是”的问题有密切关系。当我们超越传统语言学 ,站在语言哲学的高度而又以严格的语言科学方法来探讨“是”的问题时 ,我们发现 ,“是”之所以发展为判断词的全部秘密就在于 :它自产生之日起就与西语 (本文在未加特别说明时以英语为例 )ｔｏｂｅ相当 ,即集形而上学之本在、存在、存在者三个核心观念于一身。一　ｔｏｂｅ与形而上学…     

非同一的统一:重新审视物质构成

在大卫像与大理石以及心与身之间的关系问题上,传统观点不是陷入同一论,就是沦落为某种形式的二元论。物质构成范畴作为一种"非同一的统一"关系,有望走出一条非还原的物理主义路线。一方面,根据模态论证,被构成的事物不是必然地同一于构成它的事物,在被构成的事物的本质上,构成观坚持了外在主义。另一方面,具有构成关系的两个事物,通过"双向"借入或派生,能够彼此共享模态属性以外的绝大部分属性,故不是二元分离而是相互统一的。物质构成作为一种新的哲学范畴有重要的形而上学和心灵哲学意义。