共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 15 毫秒
1.
Hans-Johann Glock 《Metaphilosophy》2004,35(4):419-444
Abstract: This article first surveys the established views on Wittgenstein's relation to analytic philosophy. Next it distinguishes among different ways of defining analytic philosophy—topical, doctrinal, methodological, stylistic, historical, and the idea that it is a family‐resemblance concept. It argues that while certain stylistic features are important, the historical and the family‐resemblance conceptions are the most auspicious, especially in combination. The answer to the title question is given in section 3. Contrary to currently popular “irrationalist” interpretations, Wittgenstein was an analytic philosopher in all phases of his career, albeit an exceedingly exotic one whose style transcends the limits of academic philosophy in general. On the historical understanding he qualifies because he was influenced by and in turn influenced mainly analytic philosophers. On the family‐resemblance conception he qualifies both because he developed and employed logico‐linguistic analysis and because he initiated the linguistic turn and the distinction between philosophy and science that characterizes one important strand in analytic philosophy. 相似文献
2.
In his 1987 paper “Truth or Consequences,” Dan Brock describes a deep conflict between the goals and virtues of philosophical scholarship and public policymaking: whereas the former is concerned with the search for truth, the latter must primarily be concerned with promoting good consequences. When philosophers are engaged in policymaking, he argues, they must shift their primary goal from truth to consequences—but this has both moral and methodological costs. Brock’s argument exemplifies a pessimistic, but not uncommon, view of the possible shape and nature of applied philosophy. The present paper paints a richer and more optimistic picture. It argues that the difference between theoretical philosophy and applied philosophy is not best understood as a choice between truth and consequences. On the contrary, applied philosophers engage in forms of truth-seeking that are properly concerned with consequences—including the consequences of philosophical practice itself. 相似文献
3.
《The journal of positive psychology》2013,8(6):695-723
ABSTRACTThe humanities are instrumental to human development and happiness and are an integral part of our lives. However, a lack of empirical research limits our current understanding of the role the humanities play in the well-being of individuals, communities, and societies. Through a systematic search of the literature, we identify and review empirical studies that investigate whether engagement with history, literature, and philosophy influences individual’s well-being (i.e. psychological well-being, subjective well-being, and virtues). The results suggest that studies investigating such influences are limited and mainly conducted in pedagogical settings. At the same time, these studies provide initial evidence for the positive effects of engagement in the humanities on individual well-being. Through this review, we identify gaps in the literature and provide recommendations for future research. 相似文献
4.
Science is our best way of finding out about the natural world, and philosophers who write about that world ought to be sensitive to the claims of our best science. There are obstacles, however, to outsiders using science well. We think philosophers are prone to misuse science: to give undue weight to results that are untested; to highlight favorable and ignore unfavorable data; to give illegitimate weight to the authority of science; to leap from scientific premises to philosophical conclusions without spelling out their relevance; to treat mere resonance between a scientific theory and a philosophical view as empirical evidence for the philosophical view. This article identifies and illustrates some of the ways in which philosophers misuse science, explains why these pitfalls are easy to fall into, and concludes with suggestions for avoiding them. 相似文献
5.
Jana Mohr Lone 《Metaphilosophy》2013,44(1-2):171-186
Although much has been written about the nature of philosophy and how the discipline can be defined, little attention has been paid to the ways we develop the facility to reflect philosophically or why cultivating this ability is valuable. This article develops a conception of “philosophical sensitivity,” a perceptual capacity that facilitates our awareness of the philosophical dimension of experience. Based in part on Aristotle's notion of a moral perceptual capacity, philosophical sensitivity starts with most people's natural inclinations as children to reflect about life's fundamental mysteries; when this capacity is cultivated with training over time, our attentiveness to the philosophical features of ordinary life becomes almost second nature. In much the same way an aesthetically sensitive person notices certain qualities of experience not readily perceptible by others, philosophical sensitivity involves the development of a particular way of seeing the world. 相似文献
6.
Not only do the writings of Nietzsche – early and late – fail to support the pedagogy of self-reformulation, this doctrine
embodies what for him is worst in man and would destroy that which is higher. The pedagogy of self-reformulation is also incoherent.
In contrast, Nietzsche offers a fruitful and comprehensive theory of education that, while non-democratic and contemptuous
of egalitarian aspirations, emerges consistently from his metaphysics and philosophical anthropology. Whatever, then, we might
think of his premises, Nietzsche’s philosophy of education represents an attractive model for those who would develop a meaningful,
distinctive, and persuasive educational theory. It defines a domain of the possible and then straightforwardly states what
is and is not to be done within it – and why. 相似文献
7.
In recent years, there has been growing discussion amongst philosophers about “conceptual engineering”. Put roughly, conceptual engineering concerns the assessment and improvement of concepts, or of other devices we use in thought and talk (e.g., words). This often involves attempts to modify our existing concepts (or other representational devices), and/or our practices of using them. This paper explores the relation between conceptual engineering and conceptual ethics, where conceptual ethics is taken to encompass normative and evaluative questions about concepts, words, and other broadly “representational” and/or “inferential” devices we use in thought and talk. We take some of the central questions in conceptual ethics to concern which concepts we should use and what words should mean, and why. We put forward a view of conceptual engineering in terms of the following three activities: conceptual ethics, conceptual innovation, and conceptual implementation. On our view, conceptual engineering can be defined in terms of these three activities, but not in a straightforward, Boolean way. Conceptual engineering, we argue, is made up of mereologically complex activities whose parts fall into the categories associated with each of these three different activities. 相似文献
8.
Aaron Preston 《Metaphilosophy》2004,35(4):445-465
Abstract: The careful historical and metaphilosophical attention recently bestowed upon analytic philosophy has revealed that traditional ways of defining it are inadequate. In the face of this inadequacy, contemporary authors have proposed new definitions that detach analytic philosophy from its turn of the twentieth century origins. I argue that this contemporary trend in defining analytic philosophy is misguided, and that it diminishes the likelihood of our coming to an accurate historical and metaphilosophical understanding of it. This is especially unsatisfactory since such understanding is essential to finding an adequate remedy for the widely perceived ills of contemporary analytic philosophy. I suggest that a more fruitful approach to developing such understanding might begin with treating the unity of analytic philosophy as illusory. 相似文献
9.
Tzachi Zamir 《Metaphilosophy》2002,33(3):321-336
In this article I attempt to present an explanation that integrates the five features needed for the cognitive (knowledge-yielding) linking of philosophy and literature. These features are, first, explaining how a literary work can support a general claim. Second, explaining what is uniquely gained through concentrating on such support patterns as they appear in aesthetic contexts in particular. Third, explaining how features of aesthetic response are connected with knowledge. Four, maintaining a distinction between manipulation and adequate persuasion. Five, achieving all this without invoking what David Novitz has called \"a shamelessly functional and didactic view of literature.\" 相似文献
10.
Raphael Sassower 《Studies in Philosophy and Education》1990,10(3):251-261
This paper suggests that medical education be revised to assist in diffusing potential ethical dilemmas that arise during health care provision. A revised medical education would emphasize the role of the humanities in the training of physicians, especially in light of recent critiques of the canonical scientific model in general, and more specifically in the use of that model for medical training and practice.I wish to thank Dr. Mary Ann Cutter and Melissa M. Amaro for their critical suggestions. 相似文献
11.
Xiaojun Ding;Peter Harteloh;Tianqun Pan;Feng Yu; 《Metaphilosophy》2024,55(4-5):517-534
Philosophical practice, an art of living rooted in ancient traditions, is enriched by modern techniques such as individual counseling, Socratic group dialogues, and organizational consulting. Philosophical counseling, a key aspect of this practice, employs traditional philosophical frameworks and rational reasoning to address clients' concerns, distinguishing itself from psychotherapy while respecting individual autonomy. The growing Western interest in Asian philosophies also underscores a shared pursuit of wisdom, spirituality, and meaning. This paper examines the development, key features, and leading proponents of philosophical practice, its relationship with academic philosophy, and the tensions between their differing aims and methods. The outlook for philosophical counseling is promising, offering an alternative to medical approaches for existential issues and expanding its scope to personal guidance, conflict resolution, and life-skill development. Its future trajectory hinges on societal trends toward secularization, the de-medicalization of mental health, and the increasing recognition of philosophy's intrinsic practical value. 相似文献
12.
Luciano Floridi 《Metaphilosophy》2013,44(3):191-194
This introduction presents the project of a one‐day meeting on the future of philosophical research, hosted by the Institute of Philosophy, School of Advanced Study, University of London, on 13 January 2012. The meeting brought together several distinguished philosophers and scholars in their roles as journal editors and publishing experts, in order to clarify and discuss the future of philosophical research. This symposium in Metaphilosophy collects a selection of the papers presented at the meeting and some invited articles. 相似文献
13.
Christopher McMahon 《Dialog》2008,47(3):271-277
Abstract : Both pastors and academic theologians have struggled with the place of apocalyptic language and imagery within the modern worldview. Many have dismissed apocalyptic as escapist and have alleged that it is divorced from the political and social concerns at the heart of contemporary theology and practice. Yet, contemporary critical theorists have overcome similar suspicions about science‐fiction and now embrace it as a unique vehicle for thinking about the ills and the promise of contemporary culture. This essay suggests that within contemporary critical theory one finds useful tools for reading and using apocalyptic language and imagery as a means for engaging a world threatened by sin and violence. 相似文献
14.
Experimental philosophy is often presented as a new movement that avoids many of the difficulties that face traditional philosophy. This article distinguishes two views of experimental philosophy: a narrow view in which philosophers conduct empirical investigations of intuitions, and a broad view which says that experimental philosophy is just the colocation in the same body of (i) philosophical naturalism and (ii) the actual practice of cognitive science. These two positions are rarely clearly distinguished in the literature about experimental philosophy, both pro and con. The article argues, first, that the broader view is the only plausible one; discussions of experimental philosophy should recognize that the narrow view is a caricature of experimental philosophy as it is currently done. It then shows both how objections to experimental philosophy are transformed and how positive recommendations can be provided by adopting a broad conception of experimental philosophy. 相似文献
15.
Daniel A. Wilkenfeld 《Thought: A Journal of Philosophy》2020,9(1):25-33
The central claim of this paper is that people who ignore recherche cases might actually understand ethics better than those who focus on them. In order to establish this claim, I employ a relatively new account of understanding, to the effect that one understands to the extent that one has a representation/process pair that allows one to efficiently compress and decode useful information. I argue that people who ignore odd cases have compressed better, understand better, and so can be just as ethical (if not more so) as those who focus on such cases. The general idea is that our intuitive moral judgments only imprecisely track the moral truth—the function that maps possible decisions onto moral valuations—and when we try to specify the function precisely we end up overfitting what is basically a straightforward function to accommodate irrelevant data points. 相似文献
16.
Steffen Koch 《Inquiry (Oslo, Norway)》2013,56(6):700-717
It seems natural to think that Carnapian explication and experimental philosophy can go hand in hand. But what exactly explicators can gain from the data provided by experimental philosophers remains controversial. According to an influential proposal by Shepherd and Justus, explicators should use experimental data in the process of ‘explication preparation’. Against this proposal, Mark Pinder has recently suggested that experimental data can directly assist an explicator’s search for fruitful replacements of the explicandum. In developing his argument, he also proposes a novel aspect of what makes a concept fruitful, namely, that it is taken up by the relevant community. In this paper, I defend explication preparation against Pinder’s objections and argue that his uptake proposal conflates theoretical and practical success conditions of explications. Furthermore, I argue that Pinder’s suggested experimental procedure needs substantial revision. I end by distinguishing two kinds of explication projects, and showing how experimental philosophy can contribute to each of them. 相似文献
17.
Simon Truwant 《International Journal of Philosophical Studies》2013,21(5):696-715
AbstractBoth Kant and Levinas state that traditional ontology is a type of philosophy that illegitimately forces the structure of human reason onto other beings, thus making the subject the center and origin of all meaning. Kant’s critique of the ontology of his scholastic predecessors is well known. For Levinas, however, it does not suffice. He rejects what we could call an ‘existential ontology’: a self-centered way of living as a whole, of which all philosophical ontology is but a branch. Alternatively, he presents an ethical way of living centered on ‘the Other’. Kant also, however, eventually turns to ethics to uncover a more fundamental domain of meaning. Hence, both thinkers ultimately agree about the primacy of ethics over theory. Despite this concurrence, Levinas nevertheless criticizes all aspects of Kant’s turn towards ethics: his reason for making this turn, the kind of critique that he applies to this domain, and the outcome thereof. These three points reflect Levinas’ more general critique that Kant did not succeed in overcoming ontological discourse. This paper shows how Kant can reply to, and overcome, each of Levinas’ three critiques. In this way, I reveal certain commonalities between these two thinkers that commentators still often overlook. 相似文献
18.
James W. Jones 《Zygon》1992,27(2):187-202
Abstract. In a recent Zygon article (June 1991), Roger Sperry argues for the unification of science and religion based on the principle of emergent causation within the central nervous system. After illustrating Sperry's position with some current experiments, I suggest that his conclusions exceed his argument and the findings of contemporary neuroscience and propose instead a pluralistic, rather than unified, approach to the relations between religion and science necessitated by the incompleteness inherent in any strictly neurological account of human nature. 相似文献
19.
Dan Haybron 《Journal of Happiness Studies》2007,8(1):99-138
Life satisfaction is widely considered to be a central aspect of human welfare. Many have identified happiness with it, and
some maintain that well-being consists largely or wholly in being satisfied with one’s life. Empirical research on well-being
relies heavily on life satisfaction studies. The paper contends that life satisfaction attitudes are less important, and matter
for different reasons, than is widely believed.] For such attitudes are appropriately governed by ethical norms and are perspectival
in ways that make the relationship between life satisfaction and welfare far more convoluted than we tend to expect. And the
common identification of life satisfaction with happiness, as well as widespread views about the centrality of life satisfaction
for well-being, are problematical at best. The argument also reveals an unexpected way in which philosophical ethics can inform
scientific psychology: specifically, ethical reflection can help explain empirical results insofar as they depend on people’s
values. 相似文献
20.
Zhengyu Sun 《Frontiers of Philosophy in China》2006,1(1):124-132
To explore the development of contemporary Chinese philosophy, fundamentally, is to explore the development of Marxist philosophy
in contemporary China. The disputes over philosophical views in Chinese academic circles during the first half of the twentieth
century have been focused on understanding Marxist philosophy from such aspects as “what kind of philosophy Chinese society
needs,” “the relation of philosophy to science,” and “philosophy as an idea to reflect on one’s life.” These explorations
have provided us a significant ideological insight into the development of Marxist philosophy and contemporary Chinese philosophy;
that is, in contemporary China, Marxist philosophy, as a doctrine of the liberation and all-round development of human beings,
exists not only as a kind of “doctrine” or “academy” but also as a kind of widely accepted “xueyuan (academic cultivations)” among people.
Translated by Zhao Zhiyi from Jourmal of Jilin University (Social Sciences), 2005:1 相似文献