正义的可能及其陷阱——一种对罗尔斯正义观的审视

罗尔斯认为正义可以通过两个层面的努力得以实现:一是从宏观上建构正义社会,二是从微观上促使个体获得充分的正义感。对于前者,罗尔斯认为可通过正义原则运用的四个阶段(探求正义原则、立宪、立法和行政司法)来实现。对于后者,他认为可以通过善的内在化或交叠共识方式来完成。可惜的是,由于罗尔斯的正义观本质上是相互性正义观,它以互助互利、相互期待、对等对待作为基础,这使得正义无法脱离铢锱必较的个体利己主义倾向,在正义严重缺乏的社会无法获得实现。     

Estlund on Epistocracy: A Critique

An influential anti-democratic argument says: ??(1) Answers to political questions are truth-apt. (2) A small elite only??the epistocrats??knows these truths. (3) If answers to political questions are truth-apt, then those with this knowledge about these matters should rule. (4) Thus, epistocrats should rule.?? Many democrats have responded by denying (1), arguing that, say, answers to political questions are a matter of sheer personal preference. Others have rejected (2), contending that knowledge of the true answers to political questions is evenly distributed. David Estlund finds neither of these replies conclusive. Instead, he attacks (3) arguing that there can be no agreement between qualified people as to who the epistocrats are and that people are not subject to being ruled by experts, whose status as such they can reasonably dispute. Critically, I argue that this argument does not block all forms of epistocratic argument and that Estlund fails to consider the full range of plausible epistocratic views. More constructively, I offer a modest argument for why greater expertise does not necessarily warrant greater political authority. Presumably, the set of feasible options might differ, depending on what procedure is used, and a sub-optimal choice by nonepistocrats from a better set might be superior to the optimal choice by epistocrats from a worse set. In such cases, the mere fact of greater expertise does not warrant political authority, i.e., (3) is false.     

Meritocracy: A Critique

Herpes Simplex, by T. Natasha Posner, The Experience of Illness Series, London: Routledge, 1998, 143 pages, paperback £13.99     

Kantian Schemata: A Critique Consistent with the Critique

Kant posits the schema as a hybrid bridging the generality of pure concepts and the particularity of sensible intuitions. However, I argue that countenancing such schemata leads to a third‐man regress. Siding with those who think that the mid‐way posit of the Critique of Pure Reason's schematism section is untenable, my diagnosis is that Kant's transcendental inquiry goes awry because it attempts to analyse a form/matter union that is primitive. I therefore sketch a nonrepresentational stance aimed at respecting this primitivity.     

The Soul of Reciprocity Part One: Reciprocity Refused

In this first of a two-part essay, Milbank contends that "Intersubjectivity poses itself both as a problem and as a solution only within the regime of representation that has prevailed since Descartes – although it was foreshadowed by post-Scottish scholasticism." The first part, then, is given over to a deconstruction of modern notions of the self in anticipation of the second part, which is a constructive proposal for a recovery of the soul. In the present essay, then, Milbank's intention is to show that "we should abandon the attempt to modify the regime of subjectivity with postmodern trans-humanism or else phenomenological intersubjectivity, or else again the neo-Kantian ethics of finitude, and instead attempt to recover the regime of the soul."     

The Soul of Reciprocity Part Two: Reciprocity Granted

In "The Soul of Reciprocity Part One: Reciprocity Refused", the case for reciprocity was established in a negative manner. It was shown that its refusal is a crucial aspect of modernity: the result of the interacting influences of modern capitalist economics and an ontotheological outlook that is explicitly modern, not ancient. A disdain for reciprocity thus lies at modernity's very heart. The soul, which, I argued, it allied to reciprocity, was rejected in modernity and the subject was rhetorically advocated in its place. This is true for three crucial instances: Deleuzian transhumanism, Levinasian intersubjectivity and neo-Kantian neo-humanism. All three only re-work the Cartesian and Kantian turn to the subject, which was also a turn away from the soul. "The Soul of Reciprocity Part Two: Reciprocity Restored", establishes a positive case for a postmodern retrieval of the premodern soul of reciprocity.     

Ritualized Exchange: A Consideration of Confucian Reciprocity

In this essay I discuss reciprocity as it unfolds within the context of a Confucian relational ethic. I discuss the relationship between reciprocity and the virtue of shu or ‘sympathetic understanding’ and then go on to argue that the goods that grow out of reciprocal relationships are necessary for Confucian ethics. These include social equilibrium, a rich sense of self-esteem, and reliable expectations concerning the actions of others. Finally, I discuss the difficulties of acting reciprocally in socially disproportional relationships and in those that involve the manifestation of ill will. It is suggested that Confucian ethics provides a viable account of reciprocity that remains relevant for those living in modern contexts.

The rules of ritual propriety value reciprocity,

If I give a gift and nothing is returned,

that is contrary to propriety;

If the thing comes to me, and I give nothing in return,

that is also contrary to propriety.

(Legge, 1885 Legge, J (Trans.). 1885. “Li Ki (Book of rites)”. In Vols. 27–28 of The sacred books of the East, Edited by: Max, Meuller. Oxford: Clarendon Press.  [Google Scholar], p. 65)     

Postmodernism: A Feminist Critique

In this article the author suggests that progress in philosophy can be conceived through contemporary French theories that propose a new, polysemantic way of thinking. Postmodern philosophy has tried to renew the meaning of the subject, of the subject's identity, and of language and communication. The author believes that the postmodern, feminist approach to those concepts represents significant progress in philosophy. It is, in fact, exactly in the context of feminism—conceived of not just as a women's sociopolitical or scientific activity but as a broad theoretical approach to many areas—that Western philosophy has acquired its most explicit and adequate meaning. A crucial example here is the new historicophilosophical analysis of the concept of gender. The author appeals to Lipovetsky, Lacan, Derrida, Kristeva, and other thinkers to show how postmodern feminism helps to overcome the binary vision of the contemporary world and the dichotomic composition of earlier philosophical thought.     

Epistemic Instrumentalism and Reasons for Belief: A Reply to Tom Kelly's "Epistemic Rationality as Instrumental Rationality: A Critique"

Tom Kelly argues that instrumentalist accounts of epistemic rationality fail because what a person has reason to believe does not depend upon the content of his or her goals. However, his argument fails to distinguish questions about what the evidence supports from questions about what a person ought to believe . Once these are distinguished, the instrumentalist can avoid Kelly's objections. The paper concludes by sketching what I take to be the most defensible version of the instrumentalist view.     

A Return to Reciprocity

Feminist affiliation has long been suspect among Native American women whose memories survive the dishonor of colonialism. The idea of common struggles is simultaneously repugnant and alluring. Sadly, this has led to much confusion and rejection between Aboriginal women. I suggest “a return to reciprocity” to understand and come to terms with feminist rejection or affiliation. If we cannot come together, the fracturing that began with European ideology will continue to fragment and destroy the fabric of Native cultures.     

Intrinsic Natures: A Critique of Langton on Kant

This paper argues that there is an important respect in which Rae Langton's recent interpretation of Kant is correct: Kant's claim that we cannot know things in themselves should be understood as the claim that we cannot know the intrinsic nature of things. However, I dispute Langton's account of intrinsic properties, and therefore her version of what this claim amounts to. Langton's distinction between intrinsic, causally inert properties and causal powers is problematic, both as an interpretation of Kant, and as an independent metaphysical position. I propose a different reading of the claim that we cannot know things intrinsically. I distinguish between two ways of knowing things: in terms of their effects on other things, and as they are apart from these. 1 argue that knowing things' powers is knowing things in terms of effects on other things, and therefore is not knowing them as they are in themselves, and that there are textual grounds for attributing this position to Kant.     

Ethics and Selfhood: A Critique

Connectionism: Debates on Psychological Explanation, Volume Two Edited by Cynthia Macdonald and Graham Macdonald Blackwell, 1995. Pp. xvii + 424. ISBN 0–631–19744–3. £50.00 (hbk). ISBN 0–631–19745–1 £16.99 (pbk).

New books on the philosophy of religion

Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason By J.L. Schellenberg, Cornell University Press, 1993. Pp. 217. ISBN 0–8014–2792–4. $36.50 (hbk).

Reason and the Heart By William J. Wainwright, Cornell University Press, 1995. Pp. 160. ISBN 0–8014–3139–5. $28.50 (hbk).

The Rationality of Belief and the Plurality of Faith Edited by Thomas D. Senor, Cornell University Press, 1995. Pp. 291. ISBN 0–8014–3127–1. $39.95 (hbk).     

Experimental Philosophy: A Methodological Critique

This article offers a critique of research practices typical of experimental philosophy. To that end, it presents a review of methodological issues that have proved crucial to the quality of research in the biobehavioral sciences. It discusses various shortcomings in the experimental philosophy literature related to (1) the credibility of self‐report questionnaires, (2) the validity and reliability of measurement, (3) the adherence to appropriate procedures for sampling, random assignment, and handling of participants, and (4) the meticulousness of study reporting. It argues that the future standing of experimental philosophy will hinge upon improvements in research methods.