An Inferential Account of Model Explanation

Philosophia - This essay develops an inferential account of model explanation, based on Mauricio Suárez’s inferential conception of scientific representation and Alisa Bokulich’s...     

An Inferential Model of Scientific Understanding

In this article I argue that two current accounts of scientific understanding are incorrect and I propose an alternative theory. My new account draws on recent research in cognitive psychology which reveals the importance of making causal and logical inferences on the basis of incoming information. To understand a phenomenon we need to make particular kinds of inferences concerning the explanations we are given. Specifically, we come to understand a phenomenon scientifically by developing mental models that incorporate the correct causal and logical properties responsible for the causes or logical properties of the phenomenon being explained.     

Idealisation,naturalism, and rationality: Some lessons from Minimal Rationality

In his bookMinimal Rationality (1986), Christopher Cherniak draws deep and widespread conclusions from our finitude, and not only for philosophy but also for a wide range of science as well. Cherniak's basic idea is that traditional philosophical theories of rationality represent idealisations that are inaccessible to finite rational agents. It is the purpose of this paper to apply a theory of idealisation in science to Cherniak's arguments. The heart of the theory is a distinction between idealisations that represent reversible, solely quantitative simplifications and those that represent irreversible, degenerate idealisations which collapse out essential theoretical structure. I argue that Cherniak's position is best understood as assigning the latter status to traditional rationality theories and that, so understood, his arguments may be illuminated, expanded, and certain common criticisms of them rebutted. The result, however, is a departure from traditional, formalist theories of rationality of a more radical kind than Cherniak contemplates, with widespread ramifications for philosophical theory, especially philosophy of science itself.I would like to thank Professor R. E. Butts and the Department of Philosophy at the University of Western Ontario, Canada, for generous support and stimulating discussion during the research leave at which time this paper was prepared, and the University of Newcastle and its vice-chancellor, Professor K. Morgan, for support. I am greatly indebted to extended discussion with Professor H. I. Brown, to thoughtful comments from two anonymousSynthese referees, and to discussion with Professor W. Harper; between them they have sharpened and corrected the presentation at several places, especially Sections 3 (referees), 4passim (Brown), 4.1 (referee), 4.3 (Harper). More specific acknowledgement is given as appropriate.     

Model Building With Prospect Theory: A Cognitive Approach to International Relations

Despite the growing call for new models of politics grounded in the capacities of real–world decision–makers, much international relations theory still incorporates rationalist assumptions. Scholars defend such assumptions as the best way to produce parsimonious theoretical structures. Recent attempts to deploy prospect theory in the study of international politics are consistent with the call for empirically grounded models of political behavior. However, past attempts have often emphasized individualized comparisons of prospect theory with rational choice at the expense of building deductive theory. The analysis here demonstrates that prospect theory can produce deductive models for empirical comparison with those already manufactured under rational choice. The result is a new set of propositions concerning international politics securely anchored to the actual capacities of human actors.     

基于知觉论和特质论的信用研究

从知觉论和特质论出发,本文回顾了信用涵义、结构、测量和效能方面的国外研究成果,认为未来的信用研究需要关注过程论的研究思路。     

Inferential Contextualism, Epistemological Realism and Scepticism: Comments on Williams

In this paper I will discuss Michael Williamss inferential contextualism – a position that must be carefully distinguished from the currently more fashionable attributer contextualism. I will argue that Williamss contextualism is not stable, though it avoids some of the shortcomings of simple inferential contextualism. In particular, his criticism of epistemological realism cannot be supported on the basis of his own account. I will also argue that we need not give up epistemological realism in order to provide a successful diagnosis of scepticism.     

Virginia Satir: An Integrated, Humanistic Approach

This article traces professional and personal influences that helped Virginia Satir to shape her worldview. She was an integrative humanist who included body, mind, emotional, and spiritual processes to transform systems ranging from the molecular to the cosmic. Her theories and techniques offered a wellspring of hope and possibility to individuals as well as large assemblies. The presentation of a case with young, abused children demonstrates her use of self (through physical touch) by sensitively reframing the cycle of violence as an opportunity for safe, cooperative contact.     

意义的推理论及其在价值表达式上的运用

本文尝试提出一种新的意义理论--意义的推理说(Inferential Theory),并着重讨论其在价值表达式上的运用.一个满意的意义理论应当对事实表达式与价值表达式都能给出一个融贯的解释,而一些广为人知的意义理论均未能满足这个标准.因而笔者给出意义的推理论的解决方案,并将其运用于事实表达式.     

Nonverbal Behaviors,Persuasion, and Credibility

This study examined the relationships among nonverbal behaviors, dimensions of source credibility, and speaker persuasiveness in a public speaking context. Relevant nonverbal literature was organized according to a Brunswikian lens model. Nonverbal behavioral composites, grouped according to their likely proximal percepts, were hypothesized to significantly affect both credibility and persuasiveness. A sample of 60 speakers gave videotaped speeches that were judged on credibility and persuasiveness by classmates. Pairs of trained raters coded 22 vocalic, kinesic, and proxemic nonverbal behaviors evidenced in the tapes. Results confirmed numerous associations between nonverbal behaviors and attributions of credibility and persuasiveness. Greater perceived competence and composure were associated with greater vocal and facial pleasantness, with greater facial expressiveness contributing to competence perceptions. Greater sociability was associated with more kinesic/proxemic immediacy, dominance, and relaxation and with vocal pleasantness. Most of these same cues also enhanced character judgments. No cues were related to dynamism judgments. Greater perceived persuasiveness correlated with greater vocal pleasantness (especially fluency and pitch variety), kinesic/proxemic immediacy, facial expressiveness, and kinesic relaxation (especially high random movement but little tension). All five dimensions of credibility related to persuasiveness. Advantages of analyzing nonverbal cues according to proximal percepts are discussed.     

Approach, avoidance, and self-regulatory conflict: An individual differences perspective

Four studies involving 230 undergraduates examined the interactive effects of dispositional approach and avoidance, as manifest in the traits of extraversion and neuroticism. Participants who were high in both traits or low in both traits exhibited less assertive knocking behavior (Study 1), had difficulties refraining from blinking (Study 2), and displayed more anxious behavior during a mental health interview (Study 3). Study 4 tested the idea that such extraversion by neuroticism interactions might be associated with difficulties in recognizing and responding to goal-relevant stimuli. Results involving a go/no go task confirmed this hypothesis. In total, the results highlight the manner in which the co-activation of dispositional motives related to approach and avoidance can compromise effective self-regulation.     

Credibility judgments of narratives: language, plausibility, and absorption

Two experiments were conducted in order to find out whether textual features of narratives differentially affect credibility judgments made by judges having different levels of absorption (a disposition associated with rich visual imagination). Participants in both experiments were exposed to a textual narrative and requested to judge whether the narrator actually experienced the event he described in his story. In Experiment 1, the narrative varied in terms of language (literal, figurative) and plausibility (ordinary, anomalous). In Experiment 2, the narrative varied in terms of language only. The participants' perceptions of the plausibility of the story described and the extent to which they were absorbed in reading were measured. The data from both experiments together suggest that the groups applied entirely different criteria in credibility judgments. For high-absorption individuals, their credibility judgment depends on the degree to which the text can be assimilated into their own vivid imagination, whereas for low-absorption individuals it depends mainly on plausibility. That is, high-absorption individuals applied an experiential mental set while judging the credibility of the narrator, whereas low-absorption individuals applied an instrumental mental set. Possible cognitive mechanisms and implications for credibility judgments are discussed.     

Conservatives and Racists: Inferential Role Semantics and Pejoratives

According to inferential role semantics (IRS), for any given expression to possess a particular meaning one must be disposed to make or, alternatively, acknowledge as correct certain inferential transitions involving it. As Williamson points out, pejoratives such as ‘Boche’ seem to provide a counter-example to IRS. Many speakers are neither disposed to use such expressions nor consider it proper to do so. But it does not follow, as IRS appears to entail, that such speakers do not understand pejoratives or that they lack meaning. In this paper, I examine recent responses to this problem by Boghossian and Brandom and argue that their proposed construal of the kind of inferential rules governing a pejorative such as ‘Boche’ is to be ruled out on the grounds that it is non-conservative. I defend the appeal to conservatism in this instance against criticism and, in doing so, propose an alternative approach to pejoratives on behalf of IRS that resolves the problem Williamson poses.

Inferential reasoning by exclusion in pigeons, dogs, and humans

The ability to reason by exclusion (which is defined as the selection of the correct alternative by logically excluding other potential alternatives; Call in Anim Cogn 9:393–403 2006) is well established in humans. Several studies have found it to be present in some nonhuman species as well, whereas it seems to be somewhat limited or even absent in others. As inconsistent methodology might have contributed to the revealed inter-species differences, we examined reasoning by exclusion in pigeons (n = 6), dogs (n = 6), students (n = 6), and children (n = 8) under almost equal experimental conditions. After being trained in a computer-controlled two-choice procedure to discriminate between four positive (S+) and four negative (S−) photographs, the subjects were tested with displays consisting of one S− and one of four novel stimuli (S′). One pigeon, half of the dogs and almost all humans preferred S′ over S−, thereby choosing either by novelty, or by avoiding S− without acquiring any knowledge about S′, or by inferring positive class membership of S′ by excluding S−. To decide among these strategies the subjects that showed a preference for S′ were then tested with displays consisting of one of the S′ and one of four novel stimuli (S′′). Although the pigeon preferentially chose the S′′ and by novelty, dogs and humans maintained their preference for S′, thereby showing evidence of reasoning by exclusion. Taken together, the results of the present study suggest that none of the pigeons, but half of the dogs and almost all humans inferred positive class membership of S′ by logically excluding S−. Electronic supplementary material  The online version of this article (doi:) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

Replications and Limitations of a Two-Factor Model of Child Witness Credibility

Two experiments are reported that test the idea that jurors perceive child witnesses in terms of a 2-factor model of credibility with the factors defined as cognitive ability and honesty (Leippe & Romanczyk, 1987; Ross, Millers, & Moran, 1989). In the first experiment, 300 mock jurors watched a realistic videotaped recreation of a sexual abuse trial and rated the credibility of the child witness. Mock jurors perceived the child witness in terms of 2 factors: cognitive ability and honesty. Only honesty predicted verdict. These findings were replicated in Experiment 2 ( N = 300) when only the child's testimony was presented and the perceptions of the child witness were not contaminated by the testimony of the other witnesses in the trial.